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Foreword
In physics, power is the rate of work per unit time. In geopolitics, it is the ability of
one nation to influence the behaviour of other nations. It’s not surprising that the
same word, with its root in the Latin posse (to be able), refers to both concepts.
A nation’s command of physical power, notably through its control over primary
energy resources such as oil, not only shapes its economic development but also its
national security and military strength. As such, the international relations of
nations are profoundly influenced by the distributions of energy resources and the
technologies for their utilization.
Every great transition in energy technology entails a shift in geopolitics as well.
Our generation’s energy transition to zero-carbon energy, or decarbonization, will
reshape geopolitics of the twenty-first century. This superb volume offers a deeply
informed tour d’horizon of the geopolitics of global energy decarbonization, and
the ways that geopolitics may stymie or support the transition to climate safety.
Energy transitions have defined several key epochs of human history. Early
man’s harnessing of fire changed the genetic and cultural trajectory of humanity
itself. The harnessing of wind power for sailing ships enabled sea-based trade and
migrations over vast distances. The harnessing of horse power gave rise to empires.
And without doubt, it was James Watt’s coal-fired steam engine (building on
precursors of Savery and Newcomen) that gave rise to industrialization, and with it,
to Britain’s remarkable global hegemony in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.
Watt’s invention, commercialized around 1776, ushered in the Fossil-Fuel Age,
a period of more than two centuries in which global economic growth has been
powered by solar energy of tens of millions of years ago stored in fossilized remains
of plant and animal life. By gaining the ability to harness the fossil fuels—coal, oil
and natural gas—humanity tapped into a seemingly limitless reserve of power.
Watt’s coal-fired steam engine was followed by Daimler and Benz’s internal
combustion engine for automobiles, and Parsons’ and Curtis’s gas turbines for
transport and mechanical power.
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The global distribution of fossil fuel is highly unequal, with some countries
blessed with massive reserves and others bereft of fossil fuels that are exploitable on
an economical basis. Ownership of plentiful fossil fuels, not surprisingly, has
tended to give a huge boost to economic development, military might and
geopolitical influence. Britain’s highly accessible coal reserves were essential to
turn Watt’s new steam engine from a mere curiosity to the source of Britain’s
imperial might. Other countries with accessible coal reserves generally found an
earlier path to industrialization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
By the early twentieth century, oil joined coal as a new key currency of
geopolitics, especially after Winston Churchill ordered Britain’s navy to convert
from coal-burning steam engines to oil-burning steam engines, to be followed later
by the navy’s conversion from steam power to diesel engines. The control of oil
became key to military and geopolitical power. Like coal, oil was very unequally
distributed around the world. Oil-rich regions like the US and Russia gained vast
geopolitical and economic advantages, or alternatively fell victim to military con-
quests by Britain, the US, Russia and other major powers that acted militarily to
secure their oil supplies.
But for the climate crisis, the fossil-fuel era would surely be continuing today and
into the future with the exploitation of new fossil-fuel reserves through fracking,
deep-sea drilling and other advances in exploration, development and utilization.
Despite claims to the contrary, theworld has enough coal, oil and natural gas to last for
centuries. The fossil-fuel era is ending not by running out of fossil fuels but for a
wholly different reason, indeed a quirk of quantum physics. As great nineteenth-
century scientists including Fourier, Tyndall and Arrhenius came to realize that fossil
fuels have a pesky side effect. When they are combusted, they release carbon dioxide
(CO2) into the atmosphere, and CO2 has the quantum physical property of absorbing
electromagnetic radiation at infrared wavelengths. The implication? Atmospheric
CO2 warms Earth by trapping infrared radiation that would otherwise radiate from
Earth to outer space. CO2 is, in modern parlance, a greenhouse gas. To an extent, this
is life-saving good news. Without atmospheric CO2 and other greenhouse gases,
Earth would be as cold and lifeless as the moon. Yet with too much atmospheric CO2,
the Earth’s temperature will rise to dangerous levels.
Such is our current predicament and the backstory of this important volume.
Humanity has already raised the atmospheric concentration of CO2 from 280 parts
per million (ppm) to around 415 ppm in May 2019, mostly through fossil-fuel use
but also through deforestation and other economic activities. The result is that the
planet is now around 1.2 °C warmer than when Watt unveiled his world-changing
steam engine. 1.2 °C might not seem like much, but it is enough to make Earth
warmer than at any time since the start of civilization itself some 10,000 years ago.
It is enough to be disrupting societies, economies and ecosystems around the world.
We are already in an era of intense storms, rising sea levels, droughts, floods,
emerging infectious diseases, massive forest fires and other climate-related disas-
ters. We are already suffering worldwide losses amounting to hundreds of billions
of dollars per year, and mass displacements of populations, including losses of life.
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And the prospects of further warming are even more dangerous. The Earth is
already at, or soon will be at, temperatures high enough to result in a multi-metre
rise of ocean levels, with the consequence of disrupting lives for hundreds of
millions or billions or people around the world. Moreover, the Earth’s climate
system is characterized by multiple ‘positive feedbacks’ that amplify the
human-induced warming, such as the loss of sea ice (which reduces the Earth’s
albedo and accelerates warming), the melting of the permafrost (which releases
methane and carbon dioxide) and the drying of rainforests (turning them from
carbon sinks to carbon sources).
For all of these reasons, every UN member state adopted the Paris Climate
Agreement in December 2015, to hold warming to ‘well below 2 °C’ and to aim to
limit warming to 1.5 °C or less. Each country is to put forward a ‘nationally
determined contribution’ of energy transformation and other economic changes
(e.g. in land use and diets) so that the sum of the national efforts will be sufficient to
achieve the global goal. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
has, in turn, underscored the importance of adhering to the lower bound of 1.5 °C
rather than 2 °C in order to improve the prospects of climate safety. Moreover, to
have a likely (>66%) outcome of 1.5 °C or less, the world as a whole must achieve
net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. In shorthand, the world must decar-
bonize by 2050 and shift from net deforestation to net reforestation and afforesta-
tion. So far, the world is grievously off-track, hurtling towards warming by 2100 of
3 °C or higher.
The engineers have made clear that decarbonization by 2050 is feasible, by
shifting power generation from coal, oil and gas to zero-carbon energy sources
(wind, solar, geothermal, hydro, ocean, biomass, nuclear or fossil fuel with carbon
capture and storage), and by using that zero-carbon power to provide the energy for
downstream uses, notably transport, buildings and industry. To the extent possible,
downstream uses should be directly electrified, as with light-duty battery-electric
vehicles and electric heat pumps for home heating. And when direct electrification
is not feasible, the zero-carbon power should be used to create synthetic (or ‘green’)
fuels such as hydrogen, green methane, green ammonia and other fuel carriers that
can be combusted without releasing CO2 into the atmosphere. The amazing finding
by economists and engineers is that most or all of the decarbonization is within
reach at very low cost, perhaps 1% or less of annual world output until 2050.
Yet here geopolitics enters the scene. Indeed, geopolitics may prove to be the
single biggest factor in the success or failure of the world’s quest for decar-
bonization and energy safety. The limiting factor in decarbonization, it seems, is not
low-cost alternatives, nor the shortage of zero-carbon primary energy sources (solar
radiation and wind alone could power the planet). The limiting factor, it seems, is
global political cooperation to get the job done through a variety of policy
instruments such as carbon pricing, public investments, public–private R&D and
government regulation. And what is the real source of this political resistance? One
answer is the usual problem of free-riding, as each nation tries to get the others do
the hard work and bear the incremental costs. But something else is at play:
geopolitics.
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For two centuries, national control over fossil fuels has been the key to the
global realm. National security, military strength and political power have been
deeply intertwined with the nation’s control over fossil fuels, especially in the case
of countries that are rich in fossil-fuel reserves. And when global superpowers have
lacked sufficient domestic supplies of key energy resources (such as the British
Empire and oil during 1900–1950, and the US and oil after 1945 at least until
recently), they have deployed their military might to secure effective control over
overseas oil, often through wars or coups to install pliant regimes, especially in the
hydrocarbon-rich Middle East.
The energy transition to zero-carbon energy is, for these reasons, being heavily
shaped—and more specifically, slowed—by today’s fossil-fuel-rich countries,
especially the US, Russia and Saudi Arabia, but also Canada, Australia, Venezuela,
Brazil, Mexico, Iran, Iraq and others. If the world succeeds in decarbonizing, these
fossil-fuel-rich countries stand to lose, at least relatively, in three ways. First, they
will suffer major capital losses as their fossil-fuel reserves are stranded (that is, left
under the ground by the requirements of climate safety). Second, they will suffer
ancillary economic losses as their treasuries can no longer finance the public sector
through fossil-fuel rents. Third, and perhaps as consequential as the first two, they
will lose geopolitical relative advantages as their concentrated holdings of fossil
fuels are supplanted by globally diffuse access to wind, solar, hydro and other
zero-carbon energy sources.
The two populous giants of the planet, China and India, are perhaps the most
complex players in the unfolding geopolitics of the energy transition. On the one
hand, both of these giants are densely populated and highly vulnerable to climate
change, India especially. China is water scarce, especially in the north, and further
global warming could play havoc with China’s ecosystems. India is heavily trop-
ical, water scarce and already under intense ecological stress and degradation. Parts
of India are now reaching 50 °C summer days in the context of global warming.
Large swaths of India could be rendered essentially uninhabitable through the
combination of poverty, water stress, global warming, air and water pollution, soil
degradation and other forms of environmental degradation. Nor are these two
countries fossil-fuel-rich. They each have enough coal to do dire and lasting
damage to the global environment, but they are also both heavily dependent on
imported hydrocarbons.
The EU is another key region in this geopolitical puzzle. As one of the three
hubs of the global economy, together with North America and Northeast Asia,
Europe’s energy transition is a vital part of the global story. Europe is mostly
fossil-fuel-poor (especially after two centuries of fossil-fuel extraction and use). As
such, the European politics are strongly directed towards decarbonization, except in
the few remaining pockets of local coal production (Germany, Eastern Europe and
Spain).
The energy transition geopolitics to date, therefore, shapes up as follows. The
major fossil-fuel powers are generally resistant to decarbonization, now led by the
Trump Administration, which has become an outright foe determined to topple the
Paris Climate Agreement. While Russia, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Brazil and others
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still offer rhetorical support for decarbonization, in practice they tend to line up
behind Trump in closed-door negotiations. The European Union is on the other end
of the geopolitical spectrum, with much to lose from global warming (as is basically
true everywhere) and with little at stake in terms of European fossil-fuel reserves.
China and India are the world’s swing actors, giants that can shape the planet’s
climate prospects this century, and with mixed motives. On the one hand, they face
potential disasters with runaway climate change and are in any event heavily
dependent on hydrocarbon imports. On the other hand, they still have significant
domestic deposits of coal, which provide vast employment and which constitute a
powerful industrial lobby for the status quo.
Of course, as this volume spells out in considerable and illuminating detail, the
geopolitical issues extend beyond fossil-fuel haves and have-nots. The zero-carbon
energy technologies will also give rise to new global value chains, for example, for
the key minerals used in solar panels, wind turbines and batteries. Copper, lead,
molybdenum, nickel, zinc, cobalt, lithium and rare earth minerals are all key inputs
into the new zero-carbon technologies. These mineral resources are also unequally
distributed around the world. Many are located in unstable and impoverished
societies (such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and cobalt reserves).
Already the world’s major regions are anticipating an intense rivalry and geopo-
litical competition over global supply lines for the key minerals. As with the past
century’s many wars over oil, this century could see wars over the mineral inputs to
the new energy economy.
The geopolitics of the energy transition will, therefore, involve an intense and
highly disruptive era of international relations, one that could end up sinking the
world’s hopes for climate safety under a multi-metre sea-level rise—if global delay
and disruption prevail over global cooperation. To succeed globally, we will need
to chart an era of unprecedented cooperation. Here too, this volume is of ines-
timable value and insight. Global success will require new forms of industrial
policy, global diplomacy, transnational infrastructure, global-scale public–private
partnerships for research and development and shared policies to adjust to ongoing
climate change as well as to decarbonize the energy system.
In sum, we are in for a tumultuous era in geopolitics that will require our greatest
reservoirs of wisdom, tolerance, diplomacy and global-scale cooperation. To reach
such an unprecedented degree of cooperation, we will need an unprecedented
degree of global understanding. This unique volume offers a vital and timely






The world is undergoing an historical energy transition, driven by increasingly
strong decarbonization policies and quick low-carbon technology developments.
The Paris Agreement marked a major step forward in global efforts to address
global warming. For the first time, developed and developing countries committed
to act in order to limit global average temperature increase to well below 2 °C, and
to pursue efforts to further limit this to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. This
reinforces decarbonization measures already being undertaken in different parts
of the world. With its Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stepped up pressure on
decarbonization, outlying that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C would require
rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society.
Meanwhile, technological advancements have significantly increased the
cost-competitiveness of low-carbon technologies such as solar and wind power
generation, power storage technologies and electric vehicles. This has already
started to reshape the global energy system, notably by giving a greater role to solar
and wind in the power generation mix.
By transforming the global energy architecture, international decarbonization
policies and low-carbon technology advancements will also have profound
geopolitical implications. The large-scale shift to low-carbon energy is disrupting
the global energy system, impacting economies and changing the political
dynamics within and between countries.
This book seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of the geopolitical aspects
of the global energy transition, from both regional and thematic perspectives. An
introductory chapter will set the scene by presenting the big picture of the chal-
lenges and opportunities related to the global energy transition, from a techno-
logical, economic and geopolitical perspective. The first part of the book will
provide a set of regional insights, aimed at analysing the geopolitical implications
of the global energy transition in the world’s main energy-producing and
energy-consuming regions. The second part of the book will provide in-depth
focuses on selected issues, spanning from the geopolitics of renewable energy to the
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mineral foundations of the global energy transformation, up to the governance
issues related to the changing global energy order.
Presenting a comprehensive overview of the issue, this book aims to be acces-
sible to a wide readership of both academics and professionals working in the
energy industry, as well as to general readers interested in the ongoing debate about
energy and climate change.
This book has been written just before COVID-19 hit our societies and
economies. The impacts of the pandemic have not spared the world of energy.
Lockdown measures put in place all over the world to contain the contagion indeed
represented an unparalleled shock to the economies and to energy markets with
dramatic impacts to oil and gas markets. The effects of this situation on the global
energy transition remain, at the time of writing, difficult to assess. On the one hand,
the economic crises and the historical disruption experienced by the petroleum
industry might negatively impact the global energy transition, as public and private
investments needed for the energy transition may now be channelled into economic
recovery and as low-cost oil and natural gas could temporarily slow-down the
deployment of clean energy technologies. On the other hand, the aggressive eco-
nomic recovery policies being adopted by governments across the world could
represent a formidable driver for the global energy transition, if focused on green
investments as seems to be the case in several countries/regions. Whatever the
impacts of COVID-19 on the geopolitics of the global energy transition will ulti-
mately be, they will inevitably build on the challenges and opportunities described
in the different chapters of this book. The present work can thus also be considered
as a tool to understand the geopolitical fundamentals of the global energy transition
that COVID-19 might contribute to reshape.
Support from the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) in realizing this book
and financing its open access is gratefully acknowledged. Founded in 1989, FEEM
is a non-profit, policy-oriented, international research centre and a think tank pro-
ducing high-quality, innovative, interdisciplinary and scientifically sound research
on sustainable development. It contributes to the quality of decision-making in
public and private spheres through analytical studies, policy advice, scientific
dissemination and high-level education. Thanks to its international network, FEEM
integrates its research and dissemination activities with those of the best academic
institutions and think tanks around the world.
Within FEEM, the Future Energy research Program (FEP), where this book has
been conceived and elaborated, aims to carry out interdisciplinary, scientifically
sound, prospective and policy-oriented applied research, targeted at political and
business decision-makers. This aim is achieved through an integrated quantitative
and qualitative analysis of energy scenarios and policies. This interdisciplinary
approach puts together the major factors driving the change in global energy
dynamics (i.e. technological, economic, financial, geopolitical, institutional and
sociological aspects). FEP applies this methodology to a wide range of issues such
as energy demand and supply, infrastructures, market analyses and socio-economic
impacts of energy policies.
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Executive Director and Financial Director of FEEM, for their strong support in the
realization of this book. They also thank Barbara Racah and Pier Paolo Raimondi
for their help throughout the editorial process. Finally, a special acknowledgement
to Prof. Jeffrey Sachs for his inspiring foreword and for the precious cooperation
established between FEEM and SDSN to lay down a scientific pathway towards
total decarbonization by 2050.
Milan, Italy Manfred Hafner
June 2020 Simone Tagliapietra
Preface xiii
Introduction
Energy has long shaped global geopolitics, determining great powers, alliances and
outcomes of wars. Every international order in modern history has been based on an
energy resource: coal was the backdrop for the British Empire in the nineteenth
century, oil has been at the core of the subsequent ‘American Century’, and today
many expect China to become the twenty-first century’s world renewable energy
superpower.
Since World War I, oil has undoubtfully represented the cornerstone of global
energy geopolitics. The decision of then-First Lord of the Admiralty Winston
Churchill to shift the power source of the Royal Navy’s ships from coal to oil in
order to make the fleet faster than its German counterpart truly signed the opening
of a new era. The switch from the reliable coal supplies from Wales to the insecure
oil supplies from what was then Persia, not only made the oil-rich Middle East a
key epicentre of global geopolitics, but also turned oil into a key national security
issue.
Since the early twentieth century, control of oil resources played a central role in
several wars. This was, for instance, the case of the 1967–1970 Biafran War, the
1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War, the 1990–1991 Gulf War, the 2003–2011 Iraq War and
of the conflict in the Niger Delta ongoing since 2004.
The second half of the twentieth century also saw increasing tensions between
oil-producing and oil-consuming countries, which in two cases erupted in major oil
crises. In September 1960, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) was established in Baghdad, with the participation of five member coun-
tries: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and Venezuela. The original aim of OPEC
was to prevent its members from lowering the price of oil, by coordinating their
production and export policies. During the 1970s, some of OPEC members also had
the aim of nationalizing their petroleum resources to preserve sovereignty.
The geopolitical role of OPECs became clear as the Arab–Israeli War—also
known as Yom Kippur War—erupted in October 1973. Arab members of OPEC
imposed an embargo against the United States, the Netherlands, Portugal and South
Africa in retaliation of their support to Israel. A ban of oil exports to the targeted
countries as well as oil production cuts was introduced by OPEC. This resulted in a
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sharp rise in oil prices, and in severe oil shortages and spiralling inflation across the
West. As OPEC kept raising prices in the following years, its geopolitical and
economic power grew.
In the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis, and upon proposal of then-US Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger, the IEA was established in November 1974 as a platform for
oil-importing countries in the West to coordinate a shared response to major dis-
ruptions in the supply of oil. This was also allowed by the introduction of a
requirement for all IEA member countries to maintain strategic petroleum reserves
equal to at least 90 days of their previous year’s net oil imports.
A second oil crisis erupted in 1979, as a result of the Iranian revolution and the
following 1980–88 war with Iraq, which brought the region into turmoil. By 1981
the price of oil stabilized at USD 32 per barrel, a level ten times higher than before
the 1973 oil crisis.
In the following decades, other oil price shocks occurred, notably in relation to
major geopolitical developments in the Middle East. For instance, in 1990, an oil
price shock took place in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, with a
doubling of oil price in a matter of few months that contributed to the early 1990s
recession in the United States.
But energy geopolitics is not limited to oil. Natural gas, nuclear energy and even
renewable energy sources such as wind and solar do have—more or less critical—
geopolitical aspects.
In certain areas of the world, natural gas is even considered to be more
geopolitical than oil. This certainly is the case of Europe, where natural gas markets
have been developed since the 1960s on the basis of large pipeline infrastructures
connecting key suppliers such as Russia and Norway to European consumers. This
situation has led to an over-reliance of Europe on few major suppliers. Natural gas
imports from Russia indeed continue to provide a third Europe’s total natural gas
supply mix.
For decades, this situation has not raised energy security concerns in Europe.
During the 1970s and the 1980s, in the midst of the Cold War, Europe decisively
pursued the construction of the long pipelines connecting the large Siberian natural
gas fields and Europe, which still today represent the main avenues of Russian
natural gas export. Europe pursued these projects notwithstanding the strong
opposition of the Reagan Administration, which even sanctioned German and
French companies engaged in the construction of the ‘Brotherhood’ pipeline, which
still today represents the major natural gas supply route to Europe.
The (over-)reliance on Russian natural gas supplies started to be considered as a
major geopolitical threat in Europe when, first in January 2006 and then in January
2009, natural gas pricing dispute between Russia and Ukraine led to the halt of
Russian natural gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine—its primary transit route. This
generated economic damages for Europe, notably in South-Eastern European
countries heavily dependent on Russian natural gas for both electricity generation
and residential heating. Europe responded to these natural gas crises by adopting an
energy security strategy mainly focused on reducing its dependency on Russian
natural gas supply. In the midst of the 2014 Ukraine crisis, concerns about a
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potential politically motivated disruption of all European natural gas supplies from
Russia lifted again this issue to the top of the European agenda, leading to renewed
efforts to lower the European dependency on Russian natural gas supply under the
umbrella of the European Union (EU)’s ‘Energy Union’ initiative.
On its side, nuclear energy presents both security and geopolitical concerns.
Issues like safety of nuclear facilities and nuclear waste management represent
serious security concerns. The concerns for nuclear safety have particularly
amplified after the Chernobyl accident in 1986 and the Fukushima disaster of 2011.
These events sparkled, particularly in Europe and in Japan, broad public debates on
nuclear energy. In certain cases, these debates led to radical energy policy shifts.
For instance, after the Chernobyl accident Italy holds a referendum on nuclear
power, which resulted in the decision to close-down all operating nuclear power
plants in the country. More recently, after the Fukushima disaster a surge of
anti-nuclear protests in Germany pushed Chancellor Angela Merkel to announce
the closure of around half of the operating reactors in the country and the complete
phase out of nuclear by 2022. These concerns have been most recently accompa-
nied by the emergence of new risks concerning potential terrorist attacks at nuclear
power plants.
From a geopolitical perspective, proliferation is the main risk associated to
nuclear energy. Elements of the nuclear fuel cycle can, in fact, be used to develop
nuclear weapons, either through uranium enrichment or through reprocessing (i.e.
the separation of plutonium from the highly radioactive spent fuel). It was precisely
the close link between the civil and military use of nuclear energy that led to the
establishment in 1957 of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a United
Nations organization tasked of promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In
1968 (i.e. in the midst of the Cold War), the General Assembly of the United
Nations also approved the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, aimed at the disar-
mament of countries with nuclear weapons, as well as at the prevention of nuclear
weapons adoption by countries still without them.
But if for more than half a century oil, natural gas and nuclear energy have been
at the heart of the geopolitics of energy, it is sensible to investigate if and how this
will change as a result of the global energy transition, a process driven by decar-
bonization policies and by quick developments in renewable energy technologies
and electric cars.
The Paris Agreement marked an important step forward in global efforts to
respond to the challenge of global warming. For the first time, developed and
developing countries have committed themselves to act to limit the increase in the
average global temperature to well below 2 °C compared to pre-industrial levels.
This reinforces the decarbonization measures already in place in several parts of the
world, primarily in Europe. Meanwhile, technological advances have increased the
competitiveness of solar and wind energy technologies, batteries and electric cars.
The convergence of these two elements has already begun to reshape the global
energy system. By transforming the global energy architecture, international
decarbonization policies and low-carbon technology advancements will also have
profound geopolitical implications. The large-scale shift to low-carbon energy is
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disrupting the global energy system, impacting economies and changing the
political dynamics within and between countries. But what will be the conse-
quences of these developments on the geopolitics of energy?
As far as energy-importing countries are concerned, the consequences will
certainly be positive. In these cases, as imports of oil and natural gas will decrease,
both their ‘national energy bill’ and the associated geopolitical risks will decrease.
Countries that are able to innovate more in renewables, batteries and electric cars
will also be able to reap the industrial and economic benefits of this transition,
generating jobs and economic growth.
But, of course, the energy transition will also see the emergence of new
geopolitical challenges.
Firstly, the global energy transition represents a challenge for oil- and
gas-producing countries, and, in particular, for those with a less diversified econ-
omy more dependent on oil revenues. This is the case for many countries in the
Middle East and North Africa which, despite the adoption of elaborate strategies for
economic diversification, have not really made much progress in this direction. If
the global energy transition were to take place more quickly than expected, and if
these countries were to remain unprepared, the consequences could be serious from
both the socio-economic and geopolitical points of view.
Secondly, the spread of renewable energies will increase electrification and
stimulate cross-border trade in electricity. Energy sources such as solar and wind
require flexible energy systems that can cope with the variability of weather con-
ditions. Smart electricity grids will, therefore, play an increasingly important role in
mitigating this variability and ensuring system stability. The digitization of elec-
tricity grids clearly presents security risks, as terrorist groups or hostile countries
could seek to either enter the systems to extrapolate information, or to disrupt them
to cause economic and social damages.
Thirdly, it is important to stress that the rapid development of wind and solar
energy, together with that of electric cars, raises concerns about the security of
supply of the minerals needed to manufacture them. These concerns have also
developed following events such as those of 2008, when China imposed a limit on
the supply of rare earths—of which it holds a large part of the global production—
to foreign buyers, leading to panic in the markets and a very rapid increase in prices.
Another case was the ‘cobalt crisis’ of 1978, following the outbreak of a conflict in
the province of Katanga—the heart of world mineral extraction—in what was then
called Zaire. The crisis caused a global shortage of cobalt, driving the international
price of the mineral to the sky. It is clear that if something like this were to happen
in the future, the consequences for the production of electric cars would be
important. Cobalt is, in fact, a key component of their batteries. These are just
examples of how the minerals at the heart of the energy transition will carry their
own geopolitical risks, just as oil and natural gas have had theirs.
The global energy transition will not, therefore, lead to the end of the geopolitics
of energy, but rather to its transformation. On the one hand, it might strengthen the
energy security of most of the countries currently importing oil and natural gas,
promoting job creation and economic growth in those who will be able to seize the
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industrial opportunities of this development. On the other hand, it might create
elements of instability in oil- and gas-exporting countries, which might have to
reinvent themselves to keep developing in the new energy era, and new security
risks linked to electricity grids and minerals.
This book seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of the geopolitical aspects
of the global energy transition, from both regional and thematic perspectives.
The first part of the book provides a set of regional insights, aimed at analysing
the geopolitical implications of the global energy transition in the world’s main
energy-producing and energy-consuming regions.
The second part of the book provides in-depth focuses on selected issues,
spanning from the geopolitics of renewable energy to the mineral foundations of the
global energy transformation, up to the governance issues related to the changing
global energy order.
In chapter “The Global Energy Transition: A Review of the Existing Literature”,
Hafner and Tagliapietra present an overview of the existing literature in the field,
which surprisingly remains fragmented. This should represent for the reader a
useful summary to the state of the art of knowledge in the field, and therefore a
useful starting point for the book.
In chapter “The European Union and the Energy Transition”, El-Mazzega and
Mathieu discuss the European Union and the energy transition by looking at the key
strategic energy and climate policy issues facing the next 5 years, also elaborating
on how the EU energy and climate policies may be shaped, and what are their
global implications.
In chapter “US Clean Energy Transition and Implications for Geopolitics”,
Elkind tackles the U.S. clean energy transition and its geopolitical implications. It
argues that in a time of complicated geopolitics, the country’s global standing will
be materially affected by the way it will manage energy and climate issues, as will
its ability to work with international partners on other global challenges.
In chapter “China: The Climate Leader, and Villain”, Meidan analyses how
China’s emergence as a global economic power and energy consumer has shaped
global energy production and trade flows. It argues that while China was a tech-
nology follower in the fossil-fuel world, in the energy transition it is likely to play a
vastly different role, at the forefront of global innovation and projected towards a
global clean technology leadership.
In chapter “Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia”, Henderson
and Mitrova discuss the implications of the global energy transition on Russia,
arguing that this poses an existential threat for all the key Russian stakeholders,
challenging the very sustainability of the economic (and political) system in the
country and therefore requiring a new strategy for the energy sector development.
In chapter “A Fine Balance: The Geopolitics of the Global Energy Transition in
MENA”, Mills analyses the impacts of the global energy transition on the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) region, the cornerstone of global oil and gas
production. It argues that while regional countries are—to different degrees—im-
plementing policies to diversify their economies, regional unrest and conflict, cli-
mate change and geopolitical competition between the U.S., Russia, China and
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other local and international powers complicate the diplomacy and energy security
challenges of the MENA energy transition.
In chapter “Addressing Africa’s Energy Dilemma”, Pistelli discusses how the
ongoing low-carbon energy transformation could reshape geopolitics within Africa
and between the continent and the rest of the world. It analyses the drivers and
modalities of Africa’s alleged shift to finally explore geopolitical dynamics, ques-
tioning whether Africa is still the locus for the global supply of natural resources,
introducing patterns of engagement between Africa and international/regional
actors, and finally presenting the socio-economic implications of the shift.
In chapter “Technologies for the Global Energy Transition”, Hafner and
Noussan highlight the main strengths and weaknesses of the current technologies
for the global energy transition, to help the reader in understanding which are the
main opportunities and challenges related to the development and deployment of
each of them. The chapter also provides strategies and policy recommendations
from a technology point of view on how to decarbonize the global energy systems
by mid-century and of the necessity to take a systems approach.
In chapter “Policy and Regulation of Energy Transition”, Daszkiewicz discusses
the role of policies and regulations in fostering the energy transition. It looks at the
different types of policies that have been effective in delivering these goals and
provides examples for the way forward.
In chapter “The Global Energy Transition: A Review of the Existing Literature”,
Dell’Aquila, Atzori and Raluca Stroe provide a comparative analysis of how China
and the U.K. have implemented policies transitioning away from fossil fuels to
renewable energy, discussing the commonalities and differences of the two
approaches.
In chapter “Financing the Sustainable Energy Transition”, Van de Putte,
Campbell-Holt and Littlejohn discuss the financing aspects of the global energy
transition. They argue that there is also a role for governments in developing
countries to develop their capital markets and gradually internalize the direct and
indirect subsidies from which the fossil-fuel industry derives an unfair advantage;
only when these various change factors come together will it be possible to scale the
sustainable energy transition.
In chapter “Minerals and the Metals for the Energy Transition: Exploring the
Conflict Implications for Mineral-Rich, Fragile States”, Church and Crawford look
at the minerals and metals underpinning the energy transition, in view of exploring
the extent to which increased demand for the minerals critical to green energy
technologies could affect fragility, conflict and violence in producing states, and
explore what would be required by the international community to mitigate these
local and national threats.
In chapter “The Impacts of the Energy Transition on Growth and Income
Distribution”, Luciani discusses the impacts of the energy transition on growth and
income distribution, claiming that if we want to make progress with the energy
transition, it is necessary to acknowledge its cost and seek agreements on the
division of the burden. Agreements are needed at the international level, between
rich and poor countries, but also at the national level between rich and poor citizens.
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In chapter “The Global Energy Transition and the Global South”, Goldthau,
Eicke and Weko provide a ‘Global South’ perspective on the energy transition, by
shedding light on the specific circumstances pertaining to countries of this part
of the world.
In chapter “Governing the Global Energy Transition”, Pastukhova and Westphal
conceptualize the governance of energy transition and argue that the Paris
Agreement should be accompanied by governance mechanisms in the energy realm,
being the energy sector the key contributor to global emissions.
In chapter “Setting up a Global System for Sustainable Energy Governance”,
Zuev discusses the potential ways to set up a global system for sustainable energy
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The Global Energy Transition: A Review
of the Existing Literature
Manfred Hafner and Simone Tagliapietra
This chapter presents an overview of the existing literature on the geopolitics of the
global energy transition. Notwithstanding its potentially re-defining role for interna-
tional relations, this issue has, so far, not been analysed in a comprehensive manner
but in a rather fragmented way. This chapter represents a useful summary to the
state-of-the-art of knowledge in the field, and therefore a useful starting point for the
book.
The first attempt to provide a holistic assessment of the geopolitics of the global
energy transition has been made by IRENA (2019). This study maps the geopolitical
transformations generated by the rise of renewables and the decline of fossil fuels.
The study argues that the rise of renewables will reshape relations between states
(i.e., oil and gas exporters versus oil and gas importers) and will lead to fundamental
structural changes in economies and society. The report affirms that the world of
the renewable energy transition will be very different from the one based on fossil
fuels. The report claims that to some extent, the global energy transformation may
generate a peace dividend, since the world is driving away from fossil fuels, which
are often an aggravating factor in armed conflicts within states. However, the growth
of digitalization in the energy sector due to the energy transition, can raise security
and privacy risks in the absence of an international rules-based framework. IRENA
affirms that global power structures and arrangements will change in many ways
and the dynamics of relationships within states will also be transformed. Power
will become more decentralized and diffused. Those countries that have invested
in renewable technologies will increase their influence in the global context; while,
by contrast, those states that rely heavily on revenues from fossil fuels will face
substantial challenges to their economic and social models.
Following the IRENA report, Goldthau et al. (2019) published a first academic
analysis outlining some geopolitical scenarios for the transition by 2030. The authors
present four different scenarios for the energy transition and its effects on global
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geopolitics. The first scenario (‘Big green deal’) assumes full cooperation due to
a global consensus for action on climate change leads to a concerted international
policy. In this scenario, a wave of green globalization allows all countries to share in
the benefits of decarbonization; petrostates are compensated to transition smoothly to
a sustainable economy. The result is a win-win for climate and security, geopolitical
friction is low. The second scenario (‘Technology breakthrough’) assumes that a
major technological advance steers the world along a different path. The US and
China take the lead in scaling up the technology, but competition between nations
also spikes. Indeed, the world fractures into two camps in a cleantech cold war, where
technology leaders hold the power and others gravitate towards one of the leaders,
reinforcing regional blocs and increasing rivalry. Fossil-fuel producers have to adapt
rapidly to falling demand, with tensions rise in some areas. The third scenario (‘Dirty
nationalism’) assumes that nation-first policies put a premium on self-sufficiency,
favouring domestic energy sources over imported ones, which drive the development
of fossil fuels as well as renewables. In this context, zero-sum logic returns and power
rivalries marginalize the UN and undermine multilateral institutions. The fourth
scenario (‘Muddling on’) is a business as usual one, resulting in amix of energy clubs,
with little cooperation. Fossil fuels remain dominant, despite renewables claim an
increasing share of the energy mix by 2030, as unit costs keep declining. The speed
of the energy transition is too slow to mitigate climate change, but too fast for the
fossil-fuel industry to adapt. Oil-producing countries in the Middle East, Russia
and Africa see political turmoil as government coffers empty. Motivated by energy
security as much as climate change, countries pursue diverse energy strategies. As
some regions have inadequate regulation or fail to benefit from these partnerships,
existing economic and geopolitical imbalances are reinforced and energy inequality
rises. The authors outline three steps that will help to put geopolitics at the heart
of debates about the energy transition: (i) researchers and decision-makers need to
shift the attention from targets to pathways; (ii) policymakers need to draw lessons
from past and parallel experiences and (iii) abating carbon will create losers, thus
now the policy focus needs to switch to the potential conflicts resulting from falling
fossil-fuel demand, and the related economic and security risks.
Hafner and Wochner (2020) also provide an outlook of how the global energy
transition will play out among the different major global geoeconomic/geopolitical
blocks and how it may affect and be affected by global governance. They argue that
four main unfolding drivers will lead to major tectonic shifts in the global energy
system: i—global energy demand, spurred largely by Asia; ii—“top-down” climate
policies that contribute to decarbonization of the global economy; iii—bottom-up
technology and market-driven digitalization that favour new energy approaches and
also a more decentralized energy system; iv—technological innovation that drives
the energy industry both in the fields of renewable energy and low-carbon vehi-
cles, but also in unconventional oil and gas production. The authors then present the
strategies presently being developed by the different major global countries/block
and they argue for instance that Europe being a major energy importer has a much
higher incentive to push for decarbonization policies which bring the co-benefit of
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improved energy security compared to the United States, which is presently experi-
encing an economic boom thanks to its unconventional oil&gas revolution allowing
it to not only to have access to cheap energy but to even become a major gas exporter
and possibly a net oil exporter. At the same time, the US thanks to its formidable
entrepreneurial spirit, China with its state-driven policies, but also Europe and Japan
are investing heavily in developing new low-carbon technologies which should pro-
vide them with a technological and economic advantage in a decarbonizing world.
Russia and hydrocarbon exporting Middle East countries, on the other hand, face
challenges in the energy transformation of their economies due to multiple system
inertia. The authors then test the strategies of the different major global blocks under
three possible future scenarios: i—Weak Climate Governance; ii—Global Efforts
for Climate Acton; iii—Muddling Through. They argue that with globally Weak
Climate policies, energy-exporting countries (the Gulf States, Russia and the US)
would remain in a strong position while Europe may end up paying a high price
in the short term as its investments in low-carbon technologies may not pay off as
quickly as planned, though the medium-long term will provide it with an increased
independence from increasingly volatile global energy prices. In a Global Efforts
for Climate Action scenario, those countries who are at the forefront of the energy
transition will be the clear winners, these include Europe but also China and the US,
while traditional fossil fuel producers and exporters (Gulf countries and Russia) will
need to quickly diversify their economies if they want to continue to have a role
on the international scene (they could for instance convert from fossil fuel exports
to hydrogen exports). The authors conclude that the present weak global network
spanning the energy field does not provide effective governance mechanisms. The
most effective way to govern a global energy transition is to create increased own-
ership of climate policies both among countries (developed, emerging, developing)
and inside societies (rich, middle-class and poor) thanks to a more inclusive and just
redistribution of burdens (everybody needs to see a win-win solution for itself), and
at the same time to strengthen the review mechanisms of the Paris Accord to oblige
States to bring their national energy and climate strategies in line with the goal of
preserving the planet Earth.
A comprehensive review of the existing literature on individual aspects of the
geopolitics of the global energy transition is now presented, to provide the reader
with a clear picture of the current status of knowledge in the field. To facilitate the
reader, this literature review follows the structure of the book.
Froma regional point of view, there is a heterogeneous spectrumabout the quantity
and quality of the existing literature: profusion on Europe and MENA, scant/meagre
on Russia and the US, while there is almost no study on geopolitical analysis of the
energy transition in Africa and China.
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1 Europe
Bressand (2012) affirmed that the world energy system is undergoing a far-reaching
transition in which three agendas collide: an economic agenda of supply and demand
and of national competitiveness; a security agenda reflecting strategic dependence
on trade in oil and gas and a sustainability agenda now centred on the search for a
low-carbon energymix. The paper seeks to identify the key players and their strategic
postures in this new era of energy geopolitics, with a view to drawing implications
for the European Union and the US. The paper identifies the energy seven countries
with the highest influence on energy and climate relations across energy sources.
The author evaluates Saudi Arabia, Iraq, China and Japan as ‘status quo’ countries
in terms of their core policy stance regarding the global energy system and markets.
Then, he shows how the Russian Federation and the EU are the two players intent,
for very different, reasons, on changing the game. However, the author affirms that
the thrust of the conclusions regarding Europe is far less optimistic than is the case in
prevailing views that tend to define success. Gains tend to be assessed with reference
to the world as Europeans would like it to be rather than as it is. A geopolitical
perspective and the less complacent cost-benefit analysis suggests lead to a sharper
and more realistic assessment of energy and climate policy options.
Lombardi and Gruenig (2016) consider low-carbon energy security and energy
geopolitics in Europe focusing on four thematic clusters: challenging the energy
security paradigm; climate change and energy security objectives (the components
of a secure and low-carbon energy system); energy security in a geopolitical per-
spective, as it relates to economics, resource competition, and availability; and the
influence of large-scale renewable energy projects on energy security and shifting
geopolitical alliances. The book is developed around three themes: energy security
in a geopolitical perspective; reshaping equilibria: renewable energy mega-projects
and distributed generation; developing policy strategies towards a low-carbon and
secure energy system.
Eyl-Mazzega and Mathieu (2019) highlight that the geopolitical and geoeco-
nomic issues related to energy and climate policies are becoming more complex.
They affirmed that to the old and existing energy rivalries, there is the emergence
of new rivalries related to the energy transition, especially regarding the control of
the value chains of low-carbon technologies, which are crucial for competitiveness,
economic development, energy sovereignty and security. In this race, China and the
US have taken a certain lead. The authors pointed out that the EU has scientific and
industrial strengths, but public policies have favoured the breaking up of industrial
entities to foster competition and open markets in order to lower prices for con-
sumers, sometimes at the cost of technological leadership objectives. The authors
also outlined the necessary steps that the EU, France and Germany should take in
order to benefit from the energy and technological transition.
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2 United States
Pascual (2015) provides a framework to understand the relationships between energy
geopolitics and energy markets, with an underlying premise that neither energy mar-
kets nor foreign policy is static. The paper explained that America’s new oil and
natural gas abundance will not ultimately lead to a more isolated position in global
energymarkets, because it will not serve its national security interests within a global
energy market. The author affirms that the US, like other major energy producers
in the past, has used its newly tapped energy resources to support its international
objectives. However, interfering with markets can come with unintended conse-
quences that can ultimately undermine the interests of the US and its international
partners. Pascual states that if stopping climate change remains a key foreign policy
and national security concern, then the financial and technical factors driving these
investment trends must become a priority at the intersection of energy markets and
geopolitical interests.
3 Russia
Makarov et al. (2017) begin from the fact that Russian budget relies heavily on
exports of fossil fuels and they assess the impacts of the §Paris Agreement on the
Russian economy and find that climate-related actions outside of Russia lower Rus-
sia’s GDP growth rate by about a half of a percentage point. Through a number of
scenarios, the article shows how the future landscape post-Paris Agreement might
affect the Russian economy, which is highly dependent on production and exports
of fossil fuels. For Russia, it is critically important to get ready to mitigate the risks
associated with the Paris Agreement by adjusting itself to the new energy landscape.
They argue that the objective of Russian strategy should be broader than just planning
low-carbon development. In addition to the plans to support low-carbon technologies
that are most relevant to the Russian market and to introduce new regulations and
legislative incentives promoting low-carbon development (including emissions dis-
closure requirements and a carbon pricing scheme), the strategy should find ways to
address three types of risks: of reducing energy exports, of additional market barriers
to Russian exporters of energy-intensive goods, and of relying on outdated energy
technologies. In conclusion, the authors affirm that the post-Paris energy landscape
poses a challenge for Russia and its energy and economic model. The current way of
fossil export-based development will be difficult to sustain in the coming decades,
regardless of Russia’s own climate policy choices.
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4 Mena
Despite theMENA region is commonly linked with fossil fuels, only in the last years
some studies have beenmade on the effects of the global energy transformation for the
region. One of the most recent study is the one proposed by Goldthau and Westphal
(2019), inwhich the authors challenge the assumption of the end of the petrostates due
to the global energy transition. They affirm the global energy transition might even
throw somepetrostates an additional lifeline, for examples, those petrostates that have
already started to move up the energy value chain by building up refining capacity
and developing a viable petrochemical industry, namely, Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates or Kuwait. The authors affirm that the global energy transformation
does not mean the end of the petrostate. The low-carbon transition may in fact well
facilitate new oligopolies, and a higher market concentration among fewer crude
suppliers. They state that fast decarbonizers commitment to making the bright clean
energy future work will therefore need to prepare for a twofold challenge: managing
a rapidly changing energy system in order to secure the transformation dividends it
will bring for human security and economic welfare and balancing the (geo) political
order after pains of the incumbent fuels leaving the system.
Weatherby et al. (2018) published a report onUAEenergydiplomacy and its role in
exporting renewable energy to the global south. This analysis identifies three arenas,
where the UAE can strategically expand its clean energy diplomacy in order to help
mitigate carbon emissions in developing countries: capacity building, strategically
targeted foreign aid and increased commercial ties in the renewable energy sector
in developing countries. One of the main messages of the analysis is that there is
an opportunity for the UAE to build its soft power and reap commercial benefits by
helping countries throughout theGlobal South implement renewable energy projects.
The authors affirm that the UAE can play a leading role in Southeast Asia’s energy
transition, which should be a priority target for UAE clean energy diplomacy.
Luomi (2018) frames the overall challenge for the UAE and other Gulf Arb ab
energy exporters which, due to structural similarities, will be facingmany of the same
external challenges. The paper identifies three interests the UAE has vis-à-vis the
transition: remaining a global energy supplier; ensuring that domestic energy targets
can be met and ensuring economic prosperity through a diversified economy. She
identifies the main economic challenges to the UAE in the context of the transition
that is related to: maintaining or increasing oil exports at competitive prices long
enough, while increasing the share of higher value oil-based exports to enable a
stable transition in terms of government revenue and the broader economy; and
meeting domestic energy demand growth without compromising on environmental
sustainability. Finally, the author argues for the need for governments in the region
to develop outward-oriented and comprehensive ‘energy diplomacy strategies’ that
build on domestic energy agendas, address these opportunities and challenges and
proactively engage with a world that is moving away from hydrocarbons.
Griffiths (2017) provides an assessment and outlook for energy policy in the
MENA region within the context of the myriad factors impacting policy design and
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implementation. The author affirms that although the MENA region will continue to
be a major oil and gas producer, consumer and exporter for years to come, a global
transition to new sources of energy supply is underway and this will continue to
impact all MENA countries. The assessment of the current MENA region context
suggests that driving forces for the evolution of energy policy are energy security
and energy cost minimization. Griffiths underlines that although renewable energy is
a central topic of energy system diversification globally, there is significant interest
regionally in nuclear energy and coal to complement greater use of natural gas in the
power sector. Regional energy cooperation is essential but must be approached in a
thoughtful and realistic manner, according to the author. In conclusion, he states that
evolution and transition of the MENA energy system will be challenging but will
progress out of necessity. Advances for now will mainly be based on transactional
exploitation of easier opportunities.
Luomi (2015) examines how the resource-rich GCC countries are positioning
themselves in the international relations of the green economy, focusing in particular
on how the United Arab Emirates is seeking to acquire the means of implementation
for a national green energy economy transition. She affirms that while not unique
in a global perspective, the case of the UAE is unique in the GCC context: unlike
its neighbours, the UAE has actively embraced the ‘win-win’ aspects of the green
economy agenda, initiating numerous partnerships and programmes. The case study
of theUAEprovides important lessons for the otherGCC states and to other resource-
rich developing countries as well. She affirms that the case of the UAE shows how
a benefits-oriented approach to the global governance of environmental problems
has so far brought its benefits, through its participation in multiple international
partnerships that provide invaluable political and technical support and foster new
economic partnerships ‘free to charge’. Another lesson is that successes of the UAE’s
sustainable energy drive have resulted from support at the highest levels of decision-
making.
Tagliapietra (2019) illustrates the persistent over-reliance of MENA hydrocar-
bon producers on the hydrocarbon rent. His article presents the ambitious economic
reform programmes adopted by MENA hydrocarbon producers since the drop-in oil
prices began in 2014, suggesting a positive view on their implementation prospects.
The author highlights that two additional arguments have emerged for economic
diversification, besides the risk of oil market volatility: the uncertainty regarding the
speed of the global energy transition, and the pressing need to create job opportuni-
ties for a large and youthful population. In conclusion, the global energy transition
might then turn out to be a positive input forMENA hydrocarbons, a stimulus to con-
sider economic diversification as an unavoidable pathway, to be pursued in order to
guarantee future economic prosperity in any future scenario—even in a low-carbon
world scenario.
We now provide a review of the existing literature related to the in-depth focuses
developed in the secondpart of the book (i.e. the impacts of the transition on economic
growth and income distribution, the role of the global South, the relevance ofminerals
and metals for low-carbon technologies as well as governance and financing of the
global energy transition).
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5 The Impacts of the Energy Transition on Economic
Growth and Income Distribution
IRENA (2016) published a report on the economic benefits generated by the renew-
able energy, providing the quantification of the macroeconomic impact of doubling
the global share of renewables in the energy mix by 2030. The study demonstrates
that the benefits of scaling up renewable energy surpass cost competitiveness. It
claims that doubling the share of renewables in the global energy mix by 2030 would
increase global GDP between 0.6 and 1.1% or between around US$700 billion and
US$1.3 trillion. Additionally, according to IRENA’s report doubling the share of
renewables increases direct and indirect employment in the sector to 24.4 million by
2030. The report explains also the impacts on fuel importers and exporters generated
by the increase of the renewable energy share in the global energy system.
Santos Pereira et al. (2019) propose a research, aiming to empirically assess and
discuss: (i) whether different types of household have suffered dissimilar effects
from the promotion of renewables; (ii) the consequences of promoting renewables
on household income; and (iii) if the promotion of renewables has reduced the risk
of poverty and social exclusion. The research found that the income of different
households has differing effects on RES promotion, benefiting hydropower and solar
PV. Secondly, the authors found that the installed capacities of both wind power
and hydropower, and the overall share of RES have dissimilar impacts on different
households, but they have increased the income of some. However, the unexpected
findingwas the negative effect of solar PVdeployment on household income. Thirdly,
the capacity of wind and hydropower have reduced the risk of poverty for some
households, but have increased the risk for others.
Concerning the impacts of climate policies on households of different income lev-
els, a relevant study was conducted by Zachmann et al. (2018). The authors present
three different kinds of policy: (i) progressive, policies that make low-income house-
holds better off relative to high-income households; (ii) regressive, policies that have
the opposite effect; and (iii) proportionate, policies that equally affect high- and low-
income households. They identify four factors why households with low incomes are
affected differently by individual climate policies; the factors are: budget constraints
that lead households with low incomes to prefer different consumption baskets; have
higher discount rates/feature borrowing constraints that prevent them from procuring
more efficient durables; have different skill endowments and hence wages; and, earn
less income from capital and land. They find that key climate policy tools such as
carbon taxes for different fuels, certain mandatory standards, subsidies and regula-
tory tools, can be regressive. They affirm that while several ‘pure’ climate policies
can be regressive, the costs and impacts of climate change are also likely to fall dis-
proportionately on low-income households. They suggest to invest more in research
on the distributional effects of climate policies; improve policies and making them
less regressive; develop climate policies that benefit low-income households, such
as support for energy-efficiency investment targeted at low-income households.
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Islam and Winkel (2017) offer a unifying conceptual framework for understand-
ing the relationship between climate change and social inequality. The authors affirm
that available evidence indicates that this relationship is characterized by a vicious
cycle, whereby initial inequality causes the disadvantaged groups to suffer dispropor-
tionately from the adverse effects of climate change, resulting in greater subsequent
inequality. The paper identifies three main channels through which the inequality-
aggravating effect of climate change materializes: (i) increase in the exposure of the
disadvantaged groups to the adverse effects of climate change; (ii) increase in their
susceptibility to damage caused by climate change and (iii) decrease in their ability
to cope and recover from the damage suffered.
OECD (2017) argues that boosting economic growth, improving productivity and
reducing inequalities need not come at the expense of locking the world into a high-
emissions future; stating that it is the quality of growth thatmatters. The report affirms
that with a climate-compatible policy package, countries can increase long-run GDP
by up 2.8% on average across the G20 in 2050. In order to foster a sustainable
economic growth, investment in modern, smart and clean infrastructure in the next
decade is a critical factor. The report estimates that $6.3 trillion of investment in
infrastructure is required annually on average between 2016 and 2030 to meet devel-
opment needs globally. An additional $0.6 trillion a year over the same period will
make these investments climate compatible. Finally, the report affirms that finance
and fiscal activities are essential in fostering a sustainable economic growth.
Hallegatte et al. (2016) published a report that emphasizes how climate change
could set back poverty eradication efforts. The report underlines that the future is not
set in stone; therefore, it affirms that there is a window of opportunity to achieve the
poverty objectives in spite of climate change by pursuing both rapid, inclusive and
climate-informed development, combined with targeted adaptation interventions, to
cope with the short-term impacts of climate change and, secondly, immediate pro-
poor mitigation policies to limit long-term impacts and create an environment that
allows for global prosperity and the sustainable eradication of poverty.
Cludius (2015) analyses two energy and climate policy instruments, namely,
renewable energy policy and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU
ETS), in the context of the distribution of costs and benefits arising from these poli-
cies. The author shows that, contrary to public perception, the distributional outcomes
are not an inherent feature of the energy or climate policy instrument at hand, but are
largely determined by the way in which it is designed. Indeed, industry exemptions
from contributing to the cost of both renewable energy policy and emissions trading
have been generous and allowed for considerable profits to the companies covered by
those schemes. This has led to a situation where households bear the majority of the
direct costs associated with those policies. The analysis indicates that low-income
households are particularly affected by the associated price increases, because they
spend a large fraction of their income on electricity and other emissions-intensive
goods. There is scope for governments to improve the situation of (low-income)
households through three mechanisms: a reduction of price; household income via
financial assistance to households; and energy efficiency measures needed to reduce
household consumption of electricity. Finally, the author suggests that there is no
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basis for pitching climate against equity concerns, but rather there are many oppor-
tunities for policymakers to formulate an integrated approach that addresses both
issues concurrently.
Dercon (2014) underlines that due to their initial poverty and their relatively high
dependence on environmental capital for their livelihoods, the poor are likely to
suffer most due to their low resources for mitigation and investment in adaptation.
The paper focuses on three elements of green growth policies: pricing and regulation
to internalize environmental capital costs; low-carbon and other environmentally
sensitive public investments and ‘green’ adaptation and other resilience-enhancing
investments. The report argues that green growth could potentially have important
negative consequences for the poor that may even outweigh the benefits for the poor
from growth. The author states that environmental pricing and regulation may have
considerable negative consequences for the poor as consumers, and would require
specific social protection measures to compensate for price rises. Therefore, the
authors warn that promises that green growth will offer a rapid route out of poverty
are not veryplausible; theremaywell be less rapid an exit thanwithmore conventional
growth strategies.
Grösche and Schröder (2014) assess the redistributive effects of a key element
of German climate policy, the promotion of renewables in the electricity generation
mix through the provision of a feed-in tariff. The authors show that the tariff shapes
the distribution of households’ disposable incomes by charging a levy that is propor-
tional to household electricity consumption and by transferring financial resources
to households who are feeding green electricity into the public grid. The paper anal-
yses the question whether the feed-in tariff scheme increases income inequality in
the society and thereby conflicts with the general social goal to reduce disparities
in peoples’ disposable incomes. They state that the share of renewable fuels in the
electricity generation mix increased under the regime of the feed-in tariff from 7%
in 2000 to about 20% in 2011, but also imposed substantial cost to the electricity
consumer by subsidizing renewables.
6 The Global Energy Transition and the Global South
Hirsch et al. (2017) provide an overview of the different just transition, energy trans-
formation and climate justice discourses of the previous years and how they are
ultimately reflected in the Paris Agreement. The authors show how these discourses
overlap in terms of transition narratives and policy demands, and they affirm that the
shared value base could serve as a starting point for building alliances, which are
necessary to make just transition become a reality. The report outlines eight princi-
ples related to the just energy transition designed tomake justice applicable to energy
transition processes in developing countries, which go beyond an abstract call for
justice. These principles cover the climate, socioeconomic and political dimensions
in a balanced way to reflect the legitimate justice claims of a broad range of poten-
tial allies for a just energy transition alliance. These principles are then applied as a
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reference framework for 12 countries of the Global South (China, India, Vietnam,
Philippines, Nepal, Fiji, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania, Mexico, Costa Rica and
Jamaica). The just energy transition country assessments have shown that neither are
countries who internationally claim to be climate champions in terms of energy tran-
sition necessarily performing well in terms of the social and political dimension of a
just transition, nor are those who claim to pioneer justice automatically in the lead in
transforming their energy systems in a way that is consistent with a 1.5/2 °C pathway.
The scoring indicates that country performance is generally strongest in terms of the
climate and energy dimension of the transition, while countries are doing less well
in terms of addressing the socioeconomic dimension of a just energy transition.
7 The Geopolitics of Renewable Energy
One of the most analysed topics related to the shift from geopolitics of oil and gas
to geopolitics of renewable energy. The most relevant work is the book edited by
Scholten (2018), which is the first volume to explore the geopolitical implications of
a transition to renewable energy. The book tackles a wide variety of topics, namely,
winners and losers of the newemerging global energy scenario, the change in regional
and bilateral energy relations between established and rising powers and the gover-
nance responses to the transition as well as infrastructure developments. The authors
affirm that the future geopolitical world of energy will be a mixed between the one
of renewables and the one of conventional energy. It will be different because it will
be a more decentralized system; it will be similar to the conventional energy because
bigger projects in renewable suffer from very similar security issues, for example,
where and who will control certain pivotal power lines. The book states that the
geopolitics of conventional energy and that of renewable energy will exist next to
each other for a period of several decades.
Overland (2019) addresses four emerging myths about the geopolitics of renew-
able energy, seeking to stop them developing further. The four emerging myths
are: competition over critical materials; new resource curses; electricity disruption
as a geopolitical weapon; cybersecurity as a geopolitical risk. Regarding the first
myth, Overland affirms that energy transition is about mainly technology and inno-
vation; therefore, she believes that it is highly probable that there will be technolog-
ical improvements and cost reductions in some areas. About the second myth, she
affirms that renewable energy for export could potentially require more long-term
maintenance of infrastructure, generate more local jobs and produce more stable
revenues than oil and gas have done, especially compared to oil exporters with oil
and gas production located offshore and dominated by international oil companies
and workers, such as Angola. The third myth claims that interstate electricity cut-offs
could become an important foreign policy tool. However, the author explains that
net-importer countries will still have the option of developing their own renewables
potential and thus face long-term make-or-buy choices. Lastly, the author affirms
that the fourth myth—cybersecurity as a geopolitical risk—is overstated sometimes.
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She points out that it is probable that increased use of renewable energy will lead
to greater decentralization and this may actually make the system more resilient. In
conclusion, Overland affirms that renewable energy resources are abundant but dif-
fuse, technologies for capturing, storing and transporting them will instead become
more important. International energy competition may, therefore, shift from control
over physical resources and their locations and transportation routes to technology
and intellectual property rights.
Gielen et al. (2019) explore the technical and economic characteristics of an
accelerated energy transition to 2050, affirming that energy efficiency and renewable
energy technologies are the core elements of that transition. They notice that coun-
tries around the world are in the midst of an energy transition that appears to favour
electricity as the preferred final energy carrier, which is favourable from the perspec-
tive of both renewables and energy efficiency. Indeed, electricity is an efficient energy
carrier and it becomes a clean source of energy when it is sourced from renewables.
Their analysis shows that the decarbonization of the energy system is affordable,
since the additional cumulative investments over the 2015–2050 period would be
$27 trillion, equivalent to $0.77 trillion per year on average in the same period. Also,
the energy transition would produce new jobs (around 19 million additional direct
and indirect jobs in 2050) offsetting the loss of old jobs (around 7million); therefore,
the global energy transition results in 11.6 million additional direct and indirect jobs
in the energy sector.
Hache (2018) aims to analyse the geopolitical consequences of the spread of
renewable energies worldwide. Despite it would be tempting to conclude that the
energy transition to renewables will gradually end today’s geopolitics of fossil fuels,
he believes that new challenges induced by energy transition policies could para-
doxically turn out being as complex as today’s geopolitics of energy. Local and
decentralized relations could indeed add a new geopolitical layer to current tradi-
tional actors, while technical, economic, sociological, behavioural, spatial and legal
dimensions could also complicate the emerging puzzle. A substantial increase of
renewables into the wold’s energy mix could lead to new, unexpected interdepen-
dencies such as dependencies to critical materials, a new geopolitics of patents and
the implementation of renewable diplomacy.
Stratfor (2018) publishes an assessment on how renewable energy will change
geopolitics. Since the increasing relevance of the renewable sources, there will be a
significant geopolitical shift from the current energy geopolitical scenario. It affirms
that some countries will fare better than others in the course of the transition, for
instance, Germany, the US and China. Indeed, China has raced ahead to become the
world’s unrivalled leader in the manufacture of clean energy products, in the past
decade, as well as the world’s biggest miner and supplier of rare earth materials,
biggest deployer of renewable energy capacity and biggest market for electric vehi-
cles. It affirms that smaller countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Uruguay, Morocco
and Kenya could gain outsize regional influence as a result of the transition, thanks
to their potential for exporting renewable energy and technology. The main losers
will be traditional oil exporters, such as Venezuela, Kazakhstan and the GCC states.
The article argues that renewable energy probably will not have the same power to
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spark large-scale military confrontations, especially in the Middle East, inspiring
increased cooperation among states by encouraging regional grid integration. How-
ever, it highlights some risks, such as cyberattacks and interruptions in supply of
clean tech minerals. Finally, it affirms that trade will continue to be a source of con-
flict among states, for example, on intellectual property theft, dumping and domestic
content requirements, undermining the global trading regime if they become heated
enough.
O’Sullivan et al. (2017) provide the reader with a discussion about the shift of
energy geopolitics from the one related to fossil fuels to the one of renewable energy
sources. The paper discusses seven mechanisms through which renewables could
shape geopolitics. First, the authors affirm that cartels could develop around mate-
rials critical to renewable energy technologies. Second, they assess that in a world
in which renewables are the dominant source of energy, capital for investment and
technology may increasingly become sources of international cooperation or rivalry.
Conflicts might be developed over the transfer of technology between developing
and developed countries as well as over renewable energy infrastructure. Third, they
affirm that the prevalence of the resource curse could be affected by a rise of renew-
able energy, in different ways, namely: petrostates will lose access to the high rents
associatedwith the curse; whether countries that produce large amounts of renewable
energy are likely to become subject to the curse; and potential for a new resource
curse in countries rich in rare earth elements. Fourth, the geopolitical complexity
of greater electric interconnections between nations, which could create both more
vulnerabilities for electricity importers and more interdependence, reducing risks of
conflict. Five, the reduction of oil and gas consumption could lead political reform
and economic diversification in the fossil fuel producers; but it might lead also to
political instability. Six, renewable sources will reduce the risk of conflict and insta-
bility that climate change would otherwise generate; Africa is identified as the region
where large-scale deployment of renewables may have significant geopolitical con-
sequences. And seven, renewables could help to foster sustainable energy access,
contributing to lasting solutions to instability and conflict.
Scholten and Bosman (2016) explore the potential political implications of the
geographic and technical characteristics of renewable energy systems. The authors
do so through a thought experiment that imagines a purely renewable-based energy
system, keeping all else equal. The major implications for renewable energy base
markets found by the authors are two: first, countries face a make-or-buy decision,
meaning that they have a choice to produce or import energy; second, electricity
is the dominant energy carrier, implying a more physically integrated infrastructure
with stringent managerial requirements. They illustrate the strategic concerns arising
from these implications with two scenarios: continental, following a buy decision
and more centralized network; and National, following a make decision and more
decentralized network. Three observations stand out compared to the geopolitics of
an energy system based on fossil fuels. First, a shift in considerations from getting
access to resources to strategic positioning in infrastructure management; second, a
shift in strategic leverage fromproducers to consumers and those countries being able
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to render balancing and storage services; and third, the possibility for most countries
to become a ‘prosumer country’may greatly reduce any formof geopolitical concern.
Johansson (2013) explores the security aspects of future renewable energy sys-
tems, affirming that renewable energy systems can improve some aspects of security,
but they will not automatically lead to the removal of all types of security problems
and new problems will most certainly arise. He outlines that the approach to the
energy systems as a subject generating or enhancing insecurity can be divided into
three different types of risk areas: economic-political, technological and environ-
mental. Regarding the first type of risk area (economic and political risks) he pointed
the argument for assuming a reduced risk of single countries being able to exert pres-
sure or influence on individual countries is that renewable energy sources are less
concentrated and available in all countries. He affirms the renewable energy source
with the greatest technological risks is probably hydropower, where dam safety is
a significant issue, while about the third type (environmental risks) he declares that
renewable energy will generally lead to a reduced impact in terms of climate change
compared with fossil fuels as long as it is sustainably produced. In conclusions, he
affirms that themain advantage of renewable energy from a long-term energy security
perspective is the fact that it is based on flows instead of exhaustible stocks.
8 Minerals and Metals for Low-Carbon Technologies
Another relevant topic that will be analysed in the book is the minerals and metals
for low-carbon technologies, which are often believed as new geopolitical leverages
in the global energy transition. IISD (2018) published a report in which identifies
23 key minerals that will be critical to the development and deployment of renew-
able technologies, such as solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicles and energy
storage technologies. It affirms that a substantial percentage of the minerals required
for green energy technologies are located in states with high measures of fragility
and corruption; cobalt, graphite, copper and rare earths are of particular concern.
Analysing the degree of state fragility and corruption, the report shows a picture
where potential hotspots emerge, particularly in South America, sub-Saharan Africa
and Southeast Asia. The report states that the increased extraction of many of the
identified minerals has, in the past and at resent, been linked with local grievances,
tensions and violence, in the worst cases. It examines five case studies: cobalt in
the DRC, rare earths in China, Nickel in Guatemala, bauxite and alumina in guinea,
lithium in Zimbabwe. Therefore, it highlights the need to ensure the responsible
sourcing of the minerals required for green energy technologies and it recognizes
some progress, such as strong guidance on responsible supply chains.
Also, the World Bank (2017) took into considerations, the role of minerals and
metals for a low-carbon future. The report examines which metals will likely rise in
demand to be able to deliver on a carbon-constrained future, particularly aluminium,
cobalt, copper, iron ore, lead, lithium, nickel, manganese and rare earths. The report
The Global Energy Transition: A Review … 15
focuses on wind, solar and energy storage batteries as they are commonly recog-
nized as key elements in delivering future energy needs at low/zero GHG emission
levels. The study addresses what materials are required in the scaled-up production
of these technologies and to what degree will that demand be driven by a range
of the global climate scenarios. The report shows that the technologies assumed to
populate the clean energy shift are in fact significantly more material intensive in
their composition that current traditional fossil-fuel-based energy supply systems.
It provides precise estimates on the actual demand for metals which is predicated
by at least two independent variables: the extent to which the global community
of nations actually succeeds in meeting its long-term Paris climate goals and the
nature of intra-technology choices. Finally, the report examines how resource-rich
developing countries might best position themselves to take advantage of the evolv-
ing commodities market responding to a low-carbon energy transition. The shift to
low-carbon energy will produce global opportunities with respect to a number of
minerals. The Latin America region (Chile, Brazil, Peru, Argentina and potentially
Bolivia) is in an excellent position to supply the global energy transition. Africa,
with its reserves in platinum, manganese, bauxite should also serve as a burgeoning
market for these resources. With respect to Asia, the most notable finding is the
global dominance China enjoys on metals, both production and reserve levels. India
is dominant in iron and steel, while Indonesia has opportunities with bauxite and
nickel, as does Malaysia and Philippines to a lesser extent. Lastly, the report affirms
that, in Oceania, the massive reserves of nickel to be found in New Caledonia should
not be overlooked.
Bazilian (2018) considers the implications of the critical role of minerals and
metals in the current ‘energy transition’. He affirms that the location of the critical
minerals and metals shows the clear need to focus on issues around environmental,
social, trade and other governance-related issues. Indeed, governance issues can
have a major impact on the reliability of the supply of these materials. The author
points out that the largest potential reserves exist in developing countries, which
are especially dependent on the revenues from mining and this typically serves to
exacerbate governance challenges.
In a study, de Ridder (2013) focuses on the geopolitics of minerals for renewable
energy technologies. He pointed out that minerals are not scarce because there are
not enough minerals to be found in the Earth’s crust; the total availability of minerals
in the earth’s crust in itself is irrelevant for the geopolitics of minerals for renewable
energy. Mineral supply depends on whether known mineral deposits are profitable
for extraction with current or future technology and under current or future market
conditions. The degree of reliance depends on what services and products countries
produce and on their economies’ position along the supply chain; countries that
produce renewable energy technologies sit closer to the refining stage in the supply
chain than other countries. He underlines the fact that the global energy transition is
taking place within the transition of international system towards a multipolar world,
while some state capitalist tendencies are becomingmore prominent. The paper looks
at how both import-dependent and mineral producing countries are responding to
16 M. Hafner and S. Tagliapietra
these developments and what the implications are for the balance of cooperation and
conflict.
Neil and Speed (2012) published a report about the strategic implications of
China’s dominance of the global rare earth elements (REE) market. The authors
highlight that China’s de facto monopoly on rare earth mining and processing and its
growing control over rare earthmanufacturing enable Beijing to powerfully influence
global supply. They affirm thatChina’s near-total domination of the rare earthsmarket
is likely to continue over the near term as Beijing works to consolidate its position
as the principal global REE supplier. This situation poses a threat to some military
capabilities of the US and its principal allies. Nevertheless, due to this dominance,
even if the US and its allies take steps to launch, subsidize and protect domestic
rare earth mining, processing and manufacturing industries, such measures will take
time to become productive, and are unlikely to prevent near-term shortages of these
elements. Over the longer term, China’s domination of the rare earths market is likely
to wane as its reserves are drawn down; as new sources of supply are developed;
as recycling becomes increasingly cost-effective; as new technologies replace rare
earth-dependent technologies; and as the governments of the advanced, industrialized
states look at alternative means to implement ‘green’ policies and practices.
9 Governing the Global Energy Transition
Goldthau et al. (2018) affirm that the energy transformation essentially implies a
systemic shift; from a global perspective, the low-carbon transformation is likely to
render the energy system more sustainable, but also much more heterogeneous. The
energy transformation will successively reduce dependence on imports, promising a
‘security dividend’. If more energy is produced locally, this as an impact on the rela-
tions between producer, transit and consumer countries. The authors explain also new
risks and challenges, notably in the area of grid stability and cybersecurity. Geopo-
litically, the restructuring of the energy system will not threaten the major oil and
gas producers as quickly and existentially as is generally assumed. A heterogeneous,
fragmented energy system would neatly fit an increasingly multipolar world order
underpinned by a more protectionist stance towards trade. Yet, mercantilist energy
policies present the threat of spiralling rivalries between ‘energy block’. Therefore,
the authors affirm that this conditionmakesmultilateral cooperation an indispensable
policy goal in order to radically and rapidly restructure the energy systemworldwide.
WEF (2018) assesses the effective energy transition of 114 countries’ energy
systems, thanks to an index, the Energy Transition Index (ETI). Through the ETI,
the report highlights that over the last 5 years, more than 80% of countries improved
their energy systems, but further effort is needed to resolve theworld’s energy-related
challenges. Secondly, countries can foster progress in three ways by: establishing
favourable conditions for energy system stakeholders, targeting improvement across
all three triangle dimensions, and by pursuing improvement levers with synergistic
The Global Energy Transition: A Review … 17
impact across the system. Thirdly, countries follow different transition paths and
need to develop country-specific roadmaps.
Goldthau (2017) explains that, in economic terms, energy assets will move further
up the value chain, from commodities to technologies. The author states that there
will bewinners and losers: technology leaders (OECDnations andChina)will benefit
most, while countries lacking technology and capital, mainly in the global south, will
lose out as well as countries that are rich in fossil fuels could become unable to sell
oil or coal, with their economies deeply damaged. Goldthau states that to avert this,
the low-carbon transition needs to be governed globally and three factors are key:
credible and legitimate leadership; information about climate-related risks to guide
investment and global partnerships to advance low-carbon technology. He suggests
the G20 as the coalition of nations well placed to take the helm in this transformation.
Indeed, about being a credible and legitimate leadership, the G20 includes nations
that lead in technology and those that lag behind; industrialized economies; rising
powers; resource-rich nations and resource-poor ones. Second, G20 could become
globalmechanism needed to share information about climate-related investment risk,
especially through its Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures. Third,
it would establish global partnerships between technology leaders and laggards to
advance the take-up of low-carbon technologies.
In a paper, Andrews-Speed (2016) aims to demonstrate the benefits of applying
a wider set of institutional theories to the study of the low-carbon energy transition.
He draws principally on rational choice and historical institutionalism with selective
reference being made to key concepts within social and organizational institution-
alism as well as discursive institutionalism. The paper has sought to show that a
broader institutional perspective provides useful insights into the wider context of
the organizational field or socio-technical regime. In particular, it has drawn attention
to how the general features of the political and economic system and of the national
culture may shape the nature, pace and direction of the low-carbon energy transition.
Roehrkasten et al. (2016) publish a study about the G20 and sustainable energy
within the global energy transition. The study analyses theG20’s potential for advanc-
ing a global transition to sustainable energy. It comprises short studies on the energy
trends and the domestic and international policy priorities of 13 G20 countries—
Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Turkey and the US—plus the EU. Despite all of the G20
members covered in this study remain highly dependent on fossil fuels, all of them
adopted the Paris Agreement. The authors state that a concerted action by G20 coun-
tries can offer an important boost to building a sustainable, low-carbon energy system.
Therefore, it is essential that the G20 deepens its engagement in key areas, such as
renewable energy, energy efficiency, access to energy. Global energy governance
faces significant challenges, because governments have been hesitant to engage in
global cooperation on energy, mainly due to sovereignty concerns. The study identi-
fies a promising approach is that the G20 partners cooperate with other international
institutions, including IEA and IRENA. TheG20 can complement and add coherence
to the global energy institutional landscape by entitling existing institutions to carry
on its initiatives.
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Agreeing with the argument that the global energy transition could occur much
faster than research on historic transitions suggests, Kern and Srogge (2016) argue
that at the heart of the pace of low-carbon energy transitions is firm political commit-
ment at all levels of governance. They highlight three main aspects—agency, inter-
national dynamics and the Paris Agreement—which make them optimistic about
an acceleration of the global energy transition towards low carbon. They affirm
that accelerating the decarbonization of the global energy system is by no means a
straightforward exercise but requires hard political work as well as strong political
commitment to fighting climate change. They argue that the Paris Agreement has
ushered in a new era in which decarbonization and a focus on energy demand reduc-
tion and increasing energy efficiency will become the ‘new normal’, thereby leading
to a new paradigm in thinking governing energy transitions.
Instead, Van deGraaf (2013) analyses fragmentation in global energy governance.
He explains why the creation of additional institutions is highly unlikely according
to conventional institutionalist thinking. The paper proposes an explanation for it,
based on the capture of institutions by particular states or interest groups. The capture
of an institution can spur the creation of a countervailing organization if there exists
a sufficiently strong coalition of dissatisfied states in which the incumbent institution
has lost domestic support. He argues that the push to create IRENA can be viewed
partly as a symbolic action, taken for internal political reasons of some countries, and
therefore challenges the strict functionalist understanding of institutions, revealing
that not all institutions are created with the sole purpose of reducing transition and
information costs. The author uses the case study as a reminder that international
organizations are not neutral vehicles but embody certain interests and principled
beliefs. He states that the creation of a specialized renewable energy agency raises
the spectre of further institutional fragmentation in global energy governance along
sectoral lines with each sector having its own international institution.
Goldthau (2011) lays out the main challenges that need to be addressed during the
looming energy transition process. He declares that global governance arrangements
need to be inclusive, commit involved actors to achieving a low-carbon future, allow
for feedback mechanisms within various levels of the process and be adaptive to
previously unperceived challenges along theway. In general terms, the author affirms
that future research on global energy governance will need to link the still de-coupled
research areas of energy security, energy access and climate change, and address them
in the context of a looming energy transition. He underlines that current research bias
towards the ‘who?’ in global energy governance needs to give way to asking more
of ‘what needs to be governed, and how?’.
10 Financing the Global Energy Transition
The last topic analysed is related to need to finance the global energy transition.
Christianson et al. (2017) affirms that finance provided and catalyzed by multilateral
development banks (MDBs) will help pay for implementation of the UN Sustainable
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Development Goals and the Paris Climate Agreement in many developing countries.
The authors notice that it is less known about how investments across their entire
energy supply portfolios relate to achieving sustainable development and climate
change objectives. The report underlines that the different investment patterns seem
to reflect the different mandates of theMDBs, theWorld Bank andADBworkmainly
with public counterparts, while the IFC works with the private sector.
Hall et al. (2018) point out that up to $61 trillion of power systems is needed to
fulfil the Paris Agreement, affirming that the mobilization of so much capital is a
huge challenge for the world. Indeed, it is unlikely that this kind of amount would
be sourced from one form of finance alone. Therefore, it is more likely that vari-
ous mixes of state, commercial and ‘alternative’ money capital will be required for
low-carbon energy transitions. The paper uses a comparative analysis of two devel-
oped economies (Germany and UK) to explore how ‘alternative’ forms of finance
operate in each nation’s energy investment landscape. The authors find that alterna-
tive finance is often set in opposition to commercial capital. Alternative finance in
both nations is motivated by financial justice outcomes that are poorly understood
in current energy policy. They identify the six categories of justice most relevant
to financing energy transition, which are: affordability, good governance, due pro-
cess, intra-generational equity, spatial equity and financial resilience. Energy policy
that seeks to mobilize capital, should take account of all six principles. The analysis
shows that taking account of the variety of capitalism in each nation, and its attendant
financial institutions can illuminate several ways in which these principles can be
operationalized, from pursuing financial innovation through alternative platforms to
expanding public or mutual banking provisions.
IRENA (2018) affirms that the landscape of renewable energy finance has evolved
rapidly. Investment reached a comparable milestone in 2015, when renewable power
technologies for the first time attracted more finance than non-renewable power
technologies. Clearly, investment levels are highly responsive to policy changes.
The East Asia-Pacific region was the dominant destination for renewable energy
investment, with China as the main driver. The report outlines the significant role
of the private sector; indeed, private sources provide the bulk of renewable energy
investment globally—over 90% in 2016. Private investors overwhelmingly favour
domestic renewable energy projects—93% of the private portfolio in 2013–2015—
whereas public investment is more balanced between in-country and international
financing.
Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre & BNEF (2018) publish a report representing
global trends in renewable energy investment in 2018. The report underlines that the
leading location by far for renewable energy investment in 2017 was China, account-
ing for $126.6 billion or 45% of the global total. This figure has been affected by the
extraordinary solar boom in China in 2017. Due to policy uncertainties, renewable
energy investment in the US was far below China, at $40.5 billion. The report shows
that also Europe suffered a big decline of 36% to $40.9 billion, mainly due to a sharp
decline in UK investment, due to the end to subsidies for onshore wind.
OECD/IEA & IRENA (2017) publish a report on the perspectives for the energy
transition. Their analysis finds that the energy sector transition could bring important
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co-benefits, such as less air pollution, lower fossil fuel bills for importing countries
and lower household energy expenditures. The energy transition is often linked to
significant amounts of money in order to achieve it. However, the report shows that
while overall energy investment requirements are substantial, the incremental needs
associatedwith the transition to a low-carbon energy sector amount to a small share of
world GDP. Indeed, according to IEA, additional investment needs would not exceed
0.3% of global GDP in 2050, while according to IRENA, the additional investment
required would be 0.4% of global GDP in the same year with net positive impacts
on employment and economic growth.
IISD (2017) articulates how fossil fuel subsidy reform can contribute to a just tran-
sition and how this reform can be more successful under a just transition framework.
Fossil fuel subsidies are a barrier to just transition and green economies because they
are often socially regressive. The report identifies three core elements for a success-
ful reform: getting the prices right; managing impacts and building supports. The
report states that the scale of finance required for the transition is expected to be in
the order of many billions of dollars; there is no guarantee to provide the scale or
targeted supports required to foster the transition; and fossil fuel subsidies total at
least $425 billion per year, which, if removed could go a long way to financing just
transition. Therefore, reforming fossil fuel subsidies will contribute to the transition
to green economies by removing supports for fossil fuel sectors that harm the envi-
ronment; utilizing the revenue raised from reform can go a long way to supporting
the policies required for just transition.
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Regional Insights
The European Union and the Energy
Transition
Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega and Carole Mathieu
1 Introduction
The low-carbon energy transition in the world is today taking place unevenly and
too slowly to preserve the climate and biodiversity. CO2 emissions have been rising
(2016, 2017, and 2018) albeit they should peak rapidly according to Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports. 2019 and 2020 could see a first
slow down though due to the global economic situation and greater deployment of
renewables and use of gas in replacement of coal power. But way not enough to fol-
low pace with an 8% yearly decline needed toward 2030 for a significant chance to
limit global warming to 1.5 °C. Theworld is experiencing unprecedented heat waves,
forest fires, accelerated glacier melt, draughts, and extreme weather events, resulting
from climate change and potentially contributing to harmful feedback loops. And
governments’ commitments are insufficient: in the long term, with the current poli-
cies in place, the world is on a +3 °C trajectory (IPCC 2018). While our house is
burning, President Trump has introduced a process of withdrawing from the Decem-
ber 2015 Paris agreement1 and has been diluting multilateral efforts such as in the
G7 or G20. Brazil is returning to a policy of deforestation, and Australia is putting
short-term economic gains before climate action. Massive fires covering two times
the size of Belgium have not yet prompted a policy change. At this stage, only a
global recession could curb emissions, provided that recovery measures are then
aligned with the Paris Agreement. Most countries in the world have not yet kick-
started a low-carbon transition process and in the best cases, renewable deployment
1Thiswithdrawal, effective inNovember 2020, should not hide three realities: the boom in deploying
renewable energy sources in the US is going ahead, albeit more slowly, and the US intends to vie
with China for the leadership in the innovation of low-carbon technologies. Moreover, US civil
society, certain states like California, cities and companies remain mobilized and influential.
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just avoids building additional coal-fired power generation capacity. Electricity sup-
ply security and economic development are legitimate priorities of many emerging
economies, ranking higher than the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. At best,
their concern is about reducing air pollution in cities, which often but not always
comes with co-benefits in terms of climate change.
Despite the sense of urgency, the inertia of energy systems is strong and coal
and oil are going to continue dominating the global energy mix for a long time.
With rising demand for electricity, a fundamental challenge is to decarbonize the
power sectors globally, while also spending important efforts on the heating and
cooling, industry and transport sectors, and on other greenhouse gases than CO2,
such as methane. The world needs a minima to double investments into renewable
energy sources and energy efficiency, as well as the deployment of a mix of solutions
including energy efficiency, reforestation, Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage
(CCUS) technologies, decarbonized hydrogen, biofuels, biomass, electric vehicles,
LNG in the maritime and road freight segments, and nuclear. Last but not least,
efforts to fund adaptation measures still need to be strengthened considerably.
Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has stepped up its environmental policies and has
been able to expand and increasingly integrate both energy and climate policies. This
process has seen the introduction and reinforcement of longer term decarbonization
objectives, and a growing role of the climate dimension in EU’s internal and external
energy policies. The EU set for itself sustainable energy targets for 2020, which
will be achieved (with some concerns though remaining over energy efficiency) and
actively participated in the December 2015 Paris Agreement process.
Responsible for 10% of global yearly emissions, the EU has become a global
leader in the energy transition. Decarbonization targets for 2030 have been rein-
forced in 2018 and a debate over longer term (2050) decarbonization options and
pathways has been opened in 2019, with a growing consensus on the need to tar-
get climate neutrality by 2050. EU’s energy policy is now a decarbonization policy
with several pillars: decarbonization and competitive, secure, and integrated energy
markets. Yet this is a long and complex process and the long journey toward full
decarbonization has just been started, while climate and biodiversity preservation
call for unprecedented, massive, and urgent action. Despite having remarkable poli-
cies and ambitions, the EU is also confronted with inconsistencies and shortcomings.
Matching ambition with actions will be the most challenging.
Following the 23–26May 2019 European elections and the newfive-yearmandate
for the European Parliament and the European Commission starting on November
01, 2019, and against the backdrop of rapid degradation of the global climate and
biodiversity situations, the EU energy and climate policies are at a turning point and
on the threshold of unprecedented developments. Ursula van der Leyen, President
of the European Commission, referred to environmental protection as the “greatest
responsibility and opportunity of our times” and committed to proposing a Green
Deal in the first 100 days of hermandate.Over the summer of 2019, a swift, broad, and
radical reaction has gained political support and a majority of Europeans see climate
action as a priority. The next challenge is to clarify decarbonization pathways, define
the key priorities, and adopt the right instruments and policies. In terms of industrial
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and economic cycles, 2050 is practically tomorrow. Lastly, citizens are often not
willing to bear a high financial burden for the transition. Cost-efficiency, and fair
redistribution of costs and dividends among citizens, Member countries, economic
sectors, and territories, will be essential.
This chapter looks at some of the strategic energy and climate policy issues for
the next five years, elaborates on how the EU energy and climate policies may be
shaped, and what are the global implications.
2 The Status of the European Energy Transition
The EU is almost on track to meet its 2020 climate and energy package targets (the
20–20–20 objectives),2 a policy that had been enacted in 2009. In 2018, renewables
accounted for over 32% of total electricity generation and CO2 emissions from the
power sector saw a slight decrease from 2017 and an overall significant fall from
1990 levels. In most countries, renewable investments are strong, notably in solar
power, with falling deployment costs, especially for offshore wind.
The EU has developed a number of useful tools to support the energy transition:
the European Investment Bank, the Emission Trading System (ETS) which has been
reformed, pushing up carbon prices over 20 EUR/tons for the first time in a lasting
manner since summer 2018, and several infrastructure investment funds, as well as
innovation funds and programs, such as Horizon 2020, becoming Horizon Europe
under the next long-term EU budget.
Most EU governments have introduced plans to phase out coal from power gen-
eration, with 70 GW out of 140 GW of installed capacity expected to be phased out
by 2030. Germany’s coal generation (37%) will be progressively phased out by 2038
at the latest while Poland’s high dependence (80% of power generation) will require
special considerations and incentives to support structural change.
Further steps in this energy transition process included the objective to estab-
lish a European Energy Union developed by the European Commission to foster
the integration of energy markets and convergence of policies. The Clean Energy
Package for All Europeans, negotiated and finalized over the period 2016–2018, is a
fundamental, highly complex tool that has introduced improvements in the function-
ing of the internal energy market, encouraged innovation and enabled a more active
role for energy consumers. The EU is betting on the complementarity of its national
energy mixes and the internal energy market to meet the rising flexibility needs as
intermittent renewables are deployed. Institutional changes have also happened with
the creation of a Vice President for the Energy Union and the adoption of a Reg-
ulation on governance, requiring Member States to adopt consistent planning tools
and engage in cross-border consultations, while also giving the EU Commission the
220% increase in energy efficiency, 20% reduction of CO2 emissions from 1990, and 20%
renewables in final consumption by 2020.
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Fig. 1 GHG emissions in
the EU by sector, in 2017.
Source European
Environmental Agency
right to review and issue recommendations on the draft plans. The challenge is now
to ensure a proper implementation of the package.
With the completion of the 2016 Clean Energy Package, the EU has confirmed
the permanence of its climate commitments and its increasing role in policies imple-
mented nationally. This is reflected in the commitment of raising the share of renew-
ables to 32% of final energy consumption (from an initial target of 27%) and improv-
ing energy efficiency by at least 32.5% by 2030 (up from 27% compared with 2005).
Decisively also, in raising the objective to reduce CO2 emissions from 30 to 40% by
2030 compared with 1990. Lastly, the package took steps to improve electricity mar-
ket integration and security (capacity reserves, cross-border flows) and to accelerate
the decarbonization of the transport sector (Fig. 1).
These positive results nevertheless hide strong discrepancies among Member
countries and important challenges. These include, notably:
– Costs of renewable support schemes grow, not least due to the increasing grid
costs; bottlenecks in high transmission lines are not removed, such as in Ger-
many, where four north south lines are planned but will face huge delays; social
resistance to renewables and transmission lines is growing, with over 40,000 wind
miles installed in Germany and 8000 in France; Overall system costs will further
increase with the need to deploy electricity storage technologies, or demand-side
management systems. There is a strong case for incentivizing larger renewable
projects in suitable locations, where grid connection costs can be minimized. Yet
acceptability issues can be an obstacle to cost-effective deployment of renew-
able energy sources, as recent experience shows in France. It remains to be seen
whether reaching 65% of final electricity consumption as is planned in Germany
with mainly wind and solar will be possible—that would require at least dou-
bling the number of installed windmills considering that the best spots are often
already taken, that interconnection challenges arise, grid costs increase and that
social acceptance for mills and grids is increasingly a challenge. Last but not
least, the land costs for solar could increase—the declining deployment trends in
H1 2019 for renewable energy sources in Germany and France require a careful
watch in this context.
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– Lignite in most cases is more competitive than natural gas for power generation
so that in Germany, for example, the increasing deployment of renewable energy
sources has kept coal generation at almost steady level in past years while gas-
fired power generation took a hit. The situation is now improving with the fall in
gas prices and higher costs for CO2 allowances, enabling a market-driven switch
between low-efficient coal plants and high-efficient gas plants. France has made
nuclear power a pillar of its mix and benefits from the legacy of its very low
emitting power generation fleet. It has been proposing to complete the EU ETS
with a regional floor price for CO2 in the electricity sector, in order to accelerate
and facilitate the phasing out of coal, which Germany has refused so far in order
not to give advantages to France, an important industrial competitor and electricity
exporter (Matthes 2017). This position could change though as a further reform
of the ETS is planned. In line with the 2018 coalition agreement, Germany aims
at producing more than 65% of its electricity from renewable energy sources by
2030 (35.2% of output in 2018).
– The EU has no competence in tax policy, nor on the energy mix of national coun-
tries, nor on social policy. A question is whether to enlarge the ETS to other sec-
tors currently not covered (aviation, buildings, maritime transport…) or whether
to proceed with separate taxation of these sectors. Moreover, the ETS could be
fully replaced by a tax system at EU level, which would be politically challenging
but worth discussing. The ETS only covers about 45% of total EUCO2 emissions.
Its latest reform was driven by the creation of a capacity reserve mechanism and
was an important step forward as prices soar to over 25 EUR/tonne, yet further
reforms will be needed to reflect the withdrawal of the United Kingdom following
Brexit, but also the closure of coal-fired power plants, the increasing deployment
of renewables and higher energy efficiency targets. The carbon market could still
concentrate on accelerating low-carbon investments in heavy industries, but the
price incentives are limited in this case because of the free allocation of quotas
and measures taken nationally to compensate the indirect cost of CO2 for energy-
intensive consumers. These developments once again challenge the relevance of
carbon pricing tools in Europe. Examination of the question is today compart-
mentalized, as unanimous voting by Member States prevails in tax matters. The
next ETS reform is expected in 2021.
– Efforts in energy efficiency have slowed down and while low hanging fruits have
been tapped, the challengewill be to further deepen efforts in the residential sector
and transport sectors. After a gradual decrease over 2007–2014, primary and final
energy consumption have increased again over the recent years, in part because
of higher economic activity and relatively low fossil fuel prices, but also because
of soaring sales of large cars and a slow down in energy efficiency improvements
in the building sector. The trend will have to reverse shortly if the EU wants to
fulfill its 2020 commitments.
– The decarbonization has so far largely focused on the power sector, with mixed
results, but not yet on the transport and industry sectors. The Clean mobility
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package adopted in early 2019 is an important milestone in accelerating the decar-
bonization of the transport sector. The new 2030 targets will accelerate electri-
fication but not remove the thermal engine. They will be hard to achieve and
drew very strong resistance from the automotive industry as they were negoti-
ated. Fundamental decisions must also be made as to whether the mobility will be
all-electric or whether one should give a greater role to hydrogen, green gases, or
LNG/CNG, especially for freight transport. If biofuels, alongside hydrogen, are
the only realistic ways in future to decarbonize partly the aviation sector, then a
lot of innovation funding should also go in this direction.
– Most of the focus has been on CO2, but not so much on other polluting gases such
as methane—at a time when President Trump is taking steps to ease regulation
on US methane emissions and when gas flaring is increasing globally, notably in
the US.
– There are important discrepancies among member states’ priorities and the recent
submission of national climate plans shows that progress toward the common
targets is uneven and thatmore than a lastmile ismissing to reach the set objectives.
The gaps between aggregated contributions and the EU targets could be as big
as 1.6% points for renewables, and as big as 6.2% points for primary energy
consumption (European Commission 2019a, b, c).
– Set aside long-term contracts with guaranteed prices for renewables projects,
there are no price incentives for long-term investments into low-carbon electricity
generation capacity, due to the increased volatility on wholesale markets and the
expected decline in prices as more renewables with zero marginal production
costs are connected, especially during day time. This fundamental market failure
is not addressed and will become a growing issue given that the current generation
overcapacities will progressively be reduced and that massive investments will be
needed to offset the ageing thermal fleet (coal, gas, and nuclear) and expand low-
carbon assets. With more renewables, wholesale prices will become increasingly
volatile and could well decrease instead of increasing as could be the case in the
medium termwhile carbon prices grow and large thermal capacities are still in the
mix. The shift to decentralized production and self-consumption is also triggering
new challenges in terms of regulation and distribution of network costs between
the different categories of power consumers. To avoid a potential “death spiral”
and excessive cross-subsidies, the structure of unitary grid fees may need to be
adjusted.
– There are strong divergences as to how far electrification of uses can or should go:
while it will have to increase in the transport or residential sectors, the gas industry,
for example, claims it needs to continue playing a key role in pointing to the unique
value of the gas and storage infrastructure as energy systems will need greater
flexibility, especially for the winter, and as the transition needs to happen at the
lowest costs possible,which the existing, sunk cost gas infrastructure can facilitate.
Yet decarbonizing natural gas is expensive and can only be realized in a system
approach. Producing biomethane, for example, costs almost eight times more
than natural gas (at 01/2020 prices), but the simple cost comparison with other
fuels has limits: when externalities from biomethane production are included (in
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terms of CO2 footprint, territorial development, energy security, agro-ecological
transition, replacement of fossil fuels in the transport sector) biomethane has
clear advantages.. What matters is to properly understand and assess what are
the future impacts on electricity demand flexibility, on managing peak loads,
and hence on short and longer term storage, what are technological options for
electricity storage and their costs, and also to have a clear vision in terms of
sequences of the energy transition: natural gas will play a key role for the next
decade in providing system flexibility, especially if it is cheap and competitive
(which is the case in mid-2019 but could change again), before progressively
having to disappear (unless one produces decarbonized hydrogen from gas with
CCUS). If climate neutrality is the ultimate objective, remaining emissions that
are to be compensated through carbon sinks will not come from natural gas, but
from the agricultural or aviation sectors, or specific industries. And the switch
to “green gases” is important but will not impede a progressive yet necessarily
important reduction in the role of natural gas per se, that could nonetheless boom
elsewhere in the world if it is competitive so that global gas players will be able
to adapt their strategies. Decarbonized hydrogen will have to play a key role in
the refinery sector first and then to decarbonize the industrial sector and probably
also, parts of the maritime and freight transport segments. It remains to be seen
whether decarbonized hydrogen will play a role in the passenger car segment,
residential heating, or electricity storage to meet seasonal fluctuations.
3 The New Political Context from 2019: Pressure
for Accelerating and Deepening the Energy Transition
In 2018, discussions have opened on objectives and strategies for 2050, with the
exploration of trajectories going as far as carbon neutrality by 2050 in an unprece-
dented joint undertaking involving many Directorates from the Commission (Euro-
pean Commission 2018). Different trajectories and energy mix options were laid out
for different decarbonization objectives in thismajor exploratory analytical document
that aims at informing discussions on the options available.
Systematic transformations in governance and public policies, company strate-
gies, and citizens’ behavior are required. These transformations need to be grounded
in the broadest consensus possible. Indeed, European policies so far were established
in a context and with objectives that do not correspond to deep decarbonization and
were largely focusing on market integration, competition, and supply security in
order to serve the consumers’ interests. The challenge now is to adapt them to this
profound transformation.
After the European election that saw climate issues dominate concerns of citizens
inmanyMember States, and in the face of the growing climate urgency, the discussion
over the 2050 targets has clearly shifted: while carbon neutralitywas opposed notably
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by Germany, all but one EU member states now decisively support that objective as
highlighted at the December 2019 European Council.
The presentation of the European Green Deal on December 03, 2019 marked a
tipping point. The Green Deal is targeting all pollutions and environmental degra-
dations. It is a sustainable economic growth strategy which aims at fostering the
well-being of Europeans. It aims at decarbonizing all economic sectors, cutting all
greenhouse gas emissions, mobilizing more funds and budgets, aligning all Member
countries and policies as well as using all available solutions and low-carbon tech-
nologies. The Green Deal announcement showcased the new European raison d’être
ensemble. And a clear commitment to avoid social and territorial inequalities—a
Just Transition Fund has been created to help vulnerable regions. This means clos-
ing the chapter of marginal improvements and considering profound socioeconomic
changes.
At the same time, the EU has agreed on a taxonomy of sustainable investments,
setting a global benchmark that will empower finance to foster the energy transition.
A number of action plans are to be rolled out across 2020. A Climate Law is to be
enacted, precising the objective and the policy framework. Objectives for 2030 are to
be revised.An industrial strategy for low-carbon technologies is to be released, focus-
ing notably on batteries and clean hydrogen. The aims should be to secure critical
metals, design norms, protect industries, support the scale-up of innovation, create
ecosystems and clusters along the value chain, impose carbon low-carbon footprints
in tenders and materials (eco-design directive), and foster recycling operations. A
new budget for 2021–2027 with higher spending toward climate change mitigation
is to be agreed upon. An external strategy will follow. This Hercules task will not be
an easy journey and there are already controversies, obstacles, and resistances. But
the EU has shown that as one of the world’s largest historical emitters, it is taking
its responsibilities in bearing higher costs and is aiming for global leadership. If
successful, this could reinforce EU’s influence globally.
The key challenge now is to deliver as the easy low hanging fruits are no more
available. There is no magic solution. The European Green Deal will require new
financing (a 1 Trillion package until 2030 has been identified, which is likely to
be insufficient though) but also the better use of existing tools and their refocusing
on climate concerns. Targeting climate neutrality by 2050 requires choosing the
most cost-competitive options and trajectories, fostering regional coordination of
policies and investments, avoiding stranded assets, picking the right technologies,
and giving them the large deployment scale and perspective needed to reduce costs.
It requires giving the industry the rights tools, incentives, and protection to conduct
this transformation while remaining competitive. While technological neutrality is a
condition for political consensus and efficiency, a holistic approach focusing on the
entire system costs is needed, rather than an individual focus on specific technologies
or sectors that masks the system-wide implications.
Another policy challenge is to accommodate the new role played by cities and
regions, in order to facilitate structural change and strengthen regional cohesion.
And last but not least, to ensure social cohesion and a fair distribution of costs and
benefits from this transition that will have to rely on a large consensus and joint
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action from the industry, the citizens and the government. The costs of reaching
carbon neutrality will be very high, yet much lower than refusing to take action and
facing the most adverse impacts of climate change. The social acceptability of this
transformation will depend on two main factors: the ability to provide assistance to
those who will be the hardest and most directly affected by the changes, such as
low-income households and works in the carbon-intensive sectors; and the ability
to make the energy transition a lever for creating quality jobs and added value on
the EU territory. Without a robust and steady support from the population, efforts in
decarbonizing the economy are at risk of being delayed, diluted or called in question
at each election round, which would make the whole process ineffective and costlier.
There is no denying that carbon pricing will need to cover all sectors and increase
in a progressive and predictable manner. Acting in a facilitating role, the EU should
revise the 2003 Directive on energy taxation to not only ensure that inefficient fossil
fuel subsidies are removed and that environmental considerations are included in all
national schemes, but also require that fiscal equity is given due attention.
The EU will have to review its state aid policies and the market liberalization
and competition dogmas from the 1990s and 2000s as the deep decarbonization
of the power system cannot happen in the current market environment. More state
intervention is needed to guarantee long-term prices, reduce risks, and borrowing
costs. This will have to include nuclear power, which is controversial given the
opposition fromAustria, for example, but one thing is clear: there will be no effective
and deep decarbonization by 2050 without new nuclear power constructions in the
EU that at least compensate for the closure of ageing plants, even extended. But new
investments in nuclear will be impossible without guarantee schemes like the ones
implemented in the United Kingdom (UK) for Hinkley Point C. These triggered an
investment decision by state-owned utility EDF, but proved to be insufficient for
private actors like Hitachi. Against this backdrop, it is worth paying attention to
UK’s envisaged introduction of a “Regulated Asset Base” (RAB) model for new
nuclear project, as being planned by the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and
Industrial Strategy. Its goal is to reduce the cost of raising private finance for new
nuclear projects, thereby reducing consumer bills and maximizing value for money
for consumers and taxpayers. In the coming months, a discussion will have to start
on a new electricity market design to facilitate the large investments needed.
On a similar note, a political agreement is needed to bring down the climate wall
between western and eastern European countries. This agreement should include on
one side strong commitments for a rapid coal phase-out, and on the other side the
mobilization of the dedicated Just Transition Fund complementing existing instru-
ments (Cohesion policy, Modernization and Innovation funds, Invest EU, etc.), and
focused efforts by the European Investment Bank to support integrated territorial
development strategies in carbon-intensive regions.
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4 Strategic Economic Challenges Ahead
a. The industrial dimension of the energy transition
The energy transition process bears new industrial risks and threats related to the
control of value chains of low-carbon technologies and the operation of systems:
• technologies, innovations/intellectual property and low-carbon technology value
chains (autonomousmobility, nuclear power, decentralized production, renewable
energies)3;
• access to markets and tenders (in public transport, nuclear energy, wind and solar
power, hydroelectricity infrastructures, sustainable cities).
• assets (investments and shareholdings in companies operating in electricity, gas,
digital technologies, data-processing and data);
• standards (electricity, batteries, electric mobility, interconnectors, networks, data
protection);
• cyber-security;
• information and image.
The EU will have to take further actions and steps to address these challenges
which it has started to recognize. The EU regulatory framework needs to foster both
demand and competitive supply of low-carbon solutions. That will require to further
confront policies and actions from emerging and established powers such as China
(and itsMade in China 2025 strategy) or the USA.
China has defined a Made in China 2025 strategy which includes an empower-
ment dimension and the mastery of energy technologies. The country has already
taken, or is seeking to take, dominant positions in the whole value chain of the
main technologies involved in the low-carbon energy transition. This is the result
of a proactive strategy which combines internal support for innovation (one-third of
patents in low-carbon technologies are Chinese) (IRENA 2019), an industrial policy
(large state groups receive financing, demand-side support, a capacity to take risks
and cooperate throughout the value chain), and technological looting or the transfer
of technology as a condition for Foreign Direct Investment. China moreover benefits
from its huge domestic market which provides economies of scale while competition
between state groups is weak. The country also benefits from the errors and mistakes
of its competitors, notably the EU andmost of itsMember States. They have left aside
some of these issues and even directly contributed to China’s dominance by trans-
ferring polluting industries to China, and by accepting forced technology transfers.
Moreover, for a long time they only protested weakly against very unequal Chinese
3Strategic technologies in the energy transition include nuclear power; onshore and offshore wind
turbines and their magnets; the next generation of photovoltaic cells and inverters; cars with highly
efficient combustion engines; batteries (especially 4th generation) for mobility and stationary stor-
age; decarbonized hydrogen; electricity storage systems using hydrogen and batteries; smart grids
and demand response solutions; recycling technologies; digital technologies and technologies for
protection against cyber risks.
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market access rules, despite China’s membership of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) since 2001.
China hasmastery of certain value chainswhich could give it economic supremacy
not only in its large domestic market but also abroad: critical metals and rare earths,
their refining, the special alloys of certain metals, innovation, the manufacture and
assembly of technologies (90% of solar panels, more than 50% of onshore wind tur-
bines), third-generation nuclear reactors (China’s first project is under construction),
batteries, personal and public transport vehicles using electricity or hydrogen (Voïta
2018; IEA 2018)), equipment for managing smart grids or for telecommunications
networks (5G), and soon technologies related to artificial intelligence.
Lastly, China’s state companies have unparalleled investment capacities and are
making major acquisitions abroad, especially in Europe. They are looking to invest
funds at attractive rates of return, but also to take control of technologies, to under-
stand markets and their functioning better, in order to transform their standards, to
sell their technologies and identify new assets to acquire. For example, the Three
Gorges Company is operating in more than 40 countries and looking to buy assets
in the EU.4 So is the State Grid Corporation of China, which has earnings of more
than $300 billion (in 2017) and is seeking to expand its assets across the globe. The
development of the 5G network will play a role in piloting energy systems, and is
witnessing the Chinese giant Huawei challenge Western companies like Nokia and
Cisco.
This dimension will be particularly accurate with regard to the battery and electric
car industries that are currently expanding. The EU will have to further develop its
European Battery Alliance (Mathieu 2019) and lay out a mineral strategy to address
the critical metals challenge and China’s increasing domination of that segment
(extraction and refining), implement social responsibility standards, foster innovation
to reduce dependency on critical metals, ensure that the low-carbon technologies are
built in the EU territory and create local value and jobs and decisively, push forward
the circular economy concepts to foster the recycling of metals and plastics, and
define and implement the necessary standards. Instruments such as the measure of
the carbon footprint of products, or localization norms, will be important.
b. Focus on the vulnerabilities in critical metals
Our economies have a growing need for critical metals and rare earths in defense,
electronics and communications industries, aswell as in low-carbon energy transition
technologies (alloys, two-thirds ofwind turbines use permanentmagnets, LEDs, solar
panels, glass, smart grids, and digital technologies and batteries).5 These so-called
critical or strategic metals have exceptional optical, catalytic, chemical, magnetic,
and semiconductor properties, for example, neodymium and samarium, allowing
super-powerful magnets to be made. Some 30 metals are considered indispensable
and difficult to substitute (European Commission 2017).
4See: www.ctg.com.cn.
5Car batteries require 10–20 kg of cobalt and up to 60 kg of lithium and other critical metals and
rare earths such as neodymium or dysprosium. Solar panels use indium and silicium.
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The geographic distribution of these resources, the issues related to the extraction
and refining of these metals, the structure of the mining industry as well as their
(un-)availability in markets raise numerous challenges. These include geological,
political, environmental, technological, social and economic risks which lead to vul-
nerabilities in the supply chain and so create risks to the value chains of technologies
that use them.
The criticality of these metals and rare earths has been much studied and varies
depending on the metals and their routes to specific markets: nobody can predict
which battery technologies will emerge in the long term, for example, or how solar
panels will be built.
These metals are often by-products of more abundant metals, but are present in
minute proportions.6 A ton of rock needs to be processed just to provide a few grams
of platinum. Quantities produced are often tiny compared to other metals: 15 million
tons of copper are mined each year and only 600 tons of gallium; 2 billion of iron are
produced compared to 200,000 tons of lithium. The quality of deposits varies while
the concentration of critical metals may range from 0.5 to 15%, depending on the
mines and metals.
Significant environmental issues exist on top of these geological challenges
because refining uses lots of water, electricity, and often chemical products for hydro-
metallic processing with acid. Chile has very large lithium deposits, but needs to
ration its production because of water shortages and also competition from copper
in particular. Developing infrastructures to transport water is expensive, and this
intensifies the criticality of the metal given strong demand growth.
Economic risks are substantial because there are tensions both in supply and
demand, aswell asmarket structureswhich are often oligopolistic, or even dominated
by Chinese companies. Strong price volatility of some of these resources is another
source of concern as it complicates investment and recycling: this is so notably for
cobalt whose price surged before falling in early 2019.
The supply of these metals is concentrated in a small number of countries many
of which are not members of the OECD (accepting Canada, Chile, and Australia).
They include China, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Argentina, Bolivia,
Russia, South Africa, Kazakhstan, and Brazil.
Mining investment in recent years has concentrated in Latin America and to a
lesser extent in Africa. Supply takes a long time to adapt to demand, because the
development of mining projects is long to implement. These projects are risky and
their profitability is often problematic because of price volatility, and prices were
also low for a long time. This situation encouraged the closure of mining activities in
Europe and North America, while reinforcing the concentration of such activities in
the hands of Chinese companies. The latter do not integrate pollution costs, and they
have access to cheap credit, cheap labor, or integrated business structures in which
losses in one segment of the value chain are compensated by profits elsewhere.
6Cobalt is a by-product of nickel and cooper, gallium is a by-product of aluminum; indium and
germanium are by-products of zinc for example.
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Supplies are often not available in transparent, open, and liquid markets: a share
of world production is often allocated outside the market. Rosatom is an important
producer of good quality lithiumwhich is used in the Russian nuclear and/or military
sector. Only surpluses are sold on markets. Cobalt is mined in the DRC, which
accounts for 60% of global output, and is largely bought directly by the networks of
integrated Chinese companies without it being possible to know exactly the output
figures of small artisanal mines for example.
Production companies often operate oligopolies, and China has increased its
investments and shareholdings and often dominates the extraction and refining of
critical metals and rare earths. Thus, five companies account for 90% of global
lithium production, and apart from Abermal and FMC, three of them are Chinese
or have Chinese capital (SQM, Tianqi Lithium, and Jiangxi Ganfeng Lithium). The
mining of cobalt worldwide is dominated by a few companies including Glencore or
Chinese companies which are extending or developing their operations everywhere:
in the DRC, in Madagascar, Greenland, and Bolivia. Refining cobalt and lithium
is very polluting, and is concentrated in China because producer countries mainly
sell intermediate products.7 This spectacular strategy by China to expand mining
activities and buy up assets has several aims: meeting its needs for metals which are
not available in China; pre-empting markets; dealing with growing environmental
problems in China; developing more competitive resources; and limiting declines
in its own reserves (Seaman 2019). Lastly, apart from these issues, conditions for
accessing resources may change: while Argentina and Australia have a very stable
investment framework, the DRC has recently adopted a new mining code which
increases royalties from 2 to 10% and plans further increases as mining nationalism
is developing notably along the lines of the Bafokeng in South Africa. These devel-
opments are often perfectly legitimate but constitute risks for investors and favor
actors who can protect themselves from them.
The demand for critical metals is expanding rapidly and is concentrated in emerg-
ing countries or countries which are technologically advanced, especially the EU, the
US, Japan, and China. Demand for lithium is set to triple by 2025, to reach 600,000
tons per year, and increase by 20% for copper, and could rise by 60–100% for cobalt
according to various scenarios, requiring at least an increase in output equal to that
of the DRC. More generally, the energy transition is likely to be as hungry for other
metals and resources which for the moment are not critical, but which could become
so. These include copper, iron, or even sand for cement.
Control over the supply chain of critical metals is a strategic asset in developing
low-carbon technology value chains and developing advantages over competitors.
The EU greatly depends on imports to cover its growing needs because it practi-
cally produces none, even though it has non-negligible reserves. The investment
framework there, however, is relatively unfavorable and societal opposition is an
obstacle despite rising prices and low-interest rates which should allow production
to be relaunched. Finland is exceptional in creating a mining cluster8: projects have
7The refining giants are Huayou, its subsidiary CDM, Jinchuan and GEM.
8See: www.miningfinland.com.
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been launched on the Keliber site especially so that 11,000 tons per year should
be produced by 2020, while the country has a significant lithium refining industry
which will allow it to become a hub in batteries, just as New Caledonia is for nickel.
There are some French and European mining and processing groups, such as Eramet,
Solvay, Umicore, Imerys, ThyssenKrupp. But their size and global weight are far
behind the Asian, Swiss, Canadian, and American giants. There is significant output
potential in Greenland but this has already been partly captured by China. Mining
projects are emerging in Portugal, Serbia, Hungary, and Germany, but they only rep-
resent about 5% of global annual investment and do not change the overall situation:
European dependency on imports will grow.
In a context of heightened economic and technological rivalry, China has a strate-
gic advantage because it can favor its companies at the expense of European cus-
tomers and so limit the availability of resources or create distortions in competition or
use its grip on the chain of criticalmetals to obtain economic, trade, and technological
advantages over European actors. There are important risks in terms of value chains,
employment, as well as foreign economic and industrial dependencies. China has,
for example, already temporarily reduced its exports of rare earths to Japan following
political tensions (Lepesant 2018). Although strategies based on cartel behavior and
pressure have not been pursued openly, vulnerabilities remain.
The concentration of resources in a small number of countries outside the OECD,
the oligopolistic nature of markets and the fact that these resources are in the hands of
powers which are often rivals (especially China and Russia) generate risks for access
to resources, and even of emergence of cartels. Both could raise the total costs of the
energy transition and block or threaten the development of national industries. This
is especially so as competition is strengthening from military technologies, which
are also big consumers of critical metals. Faced with trade tensions from the US,
China may enhance its strategy of self-sufficiency and reinforce its pre-emption of
resources.
Issues related to water, pollution, and the social conditions of mining are also
a challenge to corporate social responsibility for European economic actors. There
are up to 100 million informal mineworkers in the world who sometimes work in
deplorable safety and environmental conditions, while working conditions often do
not comply with the standards of the International Labor Organization. The EU
should push for higher ESG standards in its imports of critical metals or related
materials.
These challenges, risks, and even threats are not new and have been the subject
of political and strategic consideration for several years. The EU has a list of 27
critical metals out of 61 that are taken into account (European Commission 2019a, b,
c). The US has a substitution strategy, while NATO has formulated goals for reducing
dependency of the military industry on China. Yet given the ever greater hegemony
of China and the rising challenges of energy transition, a new strategy and evaluation
of risks are required.
The European Union and the Energy Transition 41
c. The battery cells chain
The demand for Electric Vehicles (EVs) is set to rise strongly as of 2020, due to the
combination of: lower costs for electric batteries; restrictions imposed on vehicles
with combustion engines (new European emission standards, and traffic restric-
tions in cities especially); the development of charging infrastructures, and above
all the serious commitment of global and European car producers, partly linked to
the “dieselgate” scandal. Sales of EVs jumped between 2017 and 2018 and should
account for nearly a third of light vehicles sales by 2030. In a favorable scenario,
there could be 220 million electric vehicles on road by 2030 compared to 3 million
today (IEA 2018).
Factors determining this path include changes in public support measures; the
cost of batteries; vehicle autonomy; the availability of fast-charging infrastructures;
the environmental and societal footprint of cars; competition and trade strategies;
and antipollution regulations in force.
Systems linked to electric vehicles are expanding rapidly but face the following
drawbacks:
• the value chain is largely dominated by Asian actors benefiting from subsidies
and economies of scale (China, Japan, and Korea), especially in battery cells
production. European carmakers need to control the risk of competition moving
upstream in the sector;
• load challenges should not be neglected: the development of networks, the man-
agement of peaks, and the charging speed: 1 million vehicles generate only about
2 TWh of extra consumption, yet there may be challenges in terms of power
demand surges. The partial electrification of France’s vehicle fleet could lead to
demand peaks of up to 10 GW, whose consequences on the network must be
anticipated;
• if the carbon footprint of electric vehicles is really to be lower than for conven-
tional vehicles, then they need to be charged with low-carbon electricity. This is
the case in France, but not in Poland, for example, which has strong ambitions
for reducing city pollution. European regulation at present does not take into
account the electricity mix of vehicles. Likewise, life-cycle assessments show
that battery manufacturing conditions require substantive amounts of energy and
therefore the location of battery gigafactories should also be decided on the basis
of environmental criteria;
• without a significant improvement in the energy density of batteries, the search
for greater autonomy will run into technical-economic limits. Indeed, the greater
vehicle autonomy is, the heavier batteries are and the more metals they consume
(500 kg for a Tesla). The creation of interchangeable batteries could nevertheless
facilitate the expansion of electric vehicles used for long distances, and reduce
charging times.
A combination of technological options should, therefore, be favored so that the
goals of cutting CO2 emissions are best achieved in three types of usage:
42 M.-A. Eyl-Mazzega and C. Mathieu
• electric mobility: city buses, city fans, cars, two-wheelers, and off-road vehicles;
• carbon-free hydrogen mobility: professional mobility (trucks, long-distance
transport), certain trains, shipping; in the long run, possibly aviation;
• natural gas mobility, based on LNG and NGV, but also renewable gas as much
as possible: maritime and river transport, long-distance freight transport, family
vehicles (presently 1.3 million in the EU). There will still be other forms of
pollution like nitrogen oxides, and innovation needs to take place, for them to be
filtered especially;
Given that Asian manufacturers are today best placed to capture the bulk of global
battery demand, the recent launch of a “European Battery Alliance” is to be wel-
comed. It is intended to foster the emergence of a European industrial ecosystem
by creating a favorable framework for investment in manufacturing capacity. Initial
discussions began in the autumn of 2018 and led to a clear diagnosis: without major
contracts with the European car industry, it will not be possible to have European-
led projects that aim directly at achieving an annual production capacity of around
30 GWh per year each, based on the model of the Tesla-Panasonic Gigafactory in
Nevada. European car producers are indeed in global competition and believe their
negotiating capacity with Asian cells suppliers is sufficient to obtain, today at least,
the best cost/performance levels. However, the balance of power is likely to evolve
and it is important to be fully aware of becoming technologically dependent on Asia,
knowing that a global capacity shortage cannot be excluded. It is, therefore, impor-
tant to support all intermediate projects (producing 8–10 GWh per year) by 2025,
in order to enter the industrial race and establish the credibility of European suppli-
ers, and for order books to be expanded in the future as development strategies are
pursued.
The European Battery Alliance could foreshadow a revival of a European indus-
trial policy which needs to take into account changes in the international rules of
the game and find an equilibrium between a wait-and-see position and dirigisme.
The Battery Alliance is open and not prescriptive. It is geared to mobilizing private
actors and the search for industrial synergies between European actors. The alliance
should also draw on a proactive approach by public authorities. All avenues should
be explored to improve cost and non-cost competitiveness of European battery man-
ufacture, including an accompanying differentiation strategy; promoting European
supply by introducing standards concerning the environmental footprint of batteries;
and introducing criteria for the public procurement of electric buses for example.
Investment decisions should also be facilitated by mobilizing public funding instru-
ments (the EIB, R&D programs, IPCEI status authorizing state aid for transnational
industrial projects, etc.), or even the design of skill development plans to favor better
matching of market needs. Lastly, this new industrial policy should include an exter-
nal dimension, especially a frank dialogue with China on barriers preventing access
to its gigantic electric vehicle market. Success is not guaranteed, but this European
BatteryAlliance demonstrates a willingness to act without delay, in consultationwith
European industrial actors and by activating all the available levers of public policy.
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From this point of view, it is to be hoped that the approach will be renewed for other
technologies considered to be strategic for the future of the energy transition.
d. The external dimension
With the expected acceleration and deepening of the European energy transition
efforts and policies, the external context will become critical and dedicated and
specific policies will have to be developed in order to protect the European transition
process. The risk for the EU is to lose its competitiveness, that its economies and
companies are weakened, that imports replace carbon-intensive production in the EU
(“carbon leakage”) and that external actors steel EU’s innovations and technologies.
It is also that external actors use information technologies to destabilize social and
political processes related to this systemic economic and social transformation. Last
but not least, it is that the EU is a global island that is pushing for climate neutrality
while the rest of the world is on a business as usual trajectory.
The EU will have to develop power instruments, and to make use of these instru-
ments when needed. It could not stop Trump from leaving the Paris Agreement, but it
could keep the agreement alive. It could seal a climate pact with China in April 2019.
It could not so far prevent Brazil from destroying its Amazonia forest, but is hav-
ing influence on India, for example, that could strengthen its climate commitments.
Overall, instruments that could be mobilized are
– Trade agreements, which so far have no binding climate obligations as highlighted
by the Mercosur agreement and follow-up controversy;
– Carbon border adjustment mechanisms at EU’s borders for certain goods;
– Public finance: the EBRD, direct contributions such as to the Green Climate Fund,
development aid;
– Public diplomacy in bilateral relations and multilateral institutions (OECD, G20,
G7);
– Sanctions such as trade restrictions, or limited access to cooperation mechanisms
Priorities for actions or issues that will increasingly be in the focus include
– Raising national climate commitments from leading emerging and OECD
economies;
– Stopping direct or indirect investments/financing of coal-fired power generation
globally;
– Scaling up sustainable electrification in Africa and revisiting multilateral aid
mechanisms and projects;
– Greening suffocating cities in emerging economies;
– Fighting deforestation and reforestation;
– Reducing fossil fuel subsidies;
– Improving energy efficiency efforts, especially in the Eastern and Southern
neighborhood;
– Reducing the carbon footprint of maritime transport;
– Reducing fugitive methane emissions such as from the natural gas sector.
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5 Conclusion
The year 2019marks a turning point in the European energy transition process which
ultimately culminated with the adoption of the carbon neutrality by 2050. This will
require systemic transformation of the EU economies and societies, of its energy
policies which will have to include a strong industrial component and decisively,
of its external policies. One does not know if the EU will succeed, but this can be
achieved. To succeed, the EU will have to reshape all its domestic policies and prior-
ities toward that fundamental goal, while maintaining social and political cohesion.
Launching a European Green Deal andmainstreaming the climate neutrality target in
all EU policies will have tremendous repercussions for the rest of the world, possibly
generating new tensions, but also fueling new alliances and profound geopolitical
and geoeconomic transformations.
At the start of this new political cycle for EU institutions, it is essential that the
following dimensions are addressed.
Defining carbon neutrality in including imported emissions, determining respon-
sibilities for setting and enforcing climate targets and raising the 2030 targets,
reforming the ETS further, notably post-Brexit.
Increasing the capacity for states, regions, and cities to experiment new ways of
supporting investment and innovation in low-carbon technologies, while working for
enhanced cooperation in the industrial and regulatory fields. These initiatives would
begin on a voluntary basis but could be supported and coordinated by a European
Energy Transition Agency.
• Implementing a common electricity strategy between France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Germany within a context of readjusting national electricity
mixes and progressive decarbonization. This analysis of regional production equi-
libriums should also feed the debates on themost relevant interconnection scheme
post-Brexit, and on whether new nuclear power stations should be built in the
coming decades.
• Given vulnerabilities in critical metals, the EU needs to act and favor new, respon-
sible mining projects on their land, and link their development aid to the imple-
mentation of environmental and social standards in the mining sector, while sup-
porting traceability initiatives. Four areas must be pursued simultaneously on the
demand side: re-use, recycling, reduction, and reindustrialization.
• Consolidating Europe’s industrial policy for low-carbon technologies, by drawing
on the initial lessons of the European Battery Alliance. Drawing on a sound
diagnosis of present and future technological dependence, as well as on a close
dialogue with academia and business, the EU should mobilize all possible public
policy tools available (regulations and standards, funding, education, etc.) in order
to improve Europe’s cost- and non-cost competitiveness. At the same time, the EU
should organize a frank dialogue with its trade partners to guarantee fair access
to their domestic markets.
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• Accelerating work on the taxonomy in order to promote the large-scale develop-
ment of green and responsible finance and to encourage investments compatible
with the Paris Agreement within the EU, but also with emerging countries.
• Developing a strategic, coherent, and coordinated external energy and climate
strategy that would aim to protect the European energy transition process and
develop and accelerate the energy transition not only globally, but also decisively,
in the EU Eastern and Southern neighborhood, where emissions are 20% higher
than in the EU and could grow further (Eyl-Mazzega 2020).
The energy and climate dimensions have been increasingly dominating the EU
policy agenda. A new, broader definition of energy security is required to frame EU’s
actions and policies. It would entail
• continuous, unimpeded, and guaranteed energy supplies;
• the competitiveness of energy prices in a context of international economic
competition;
• the decarbonization of energy sources and their use;
• the mastery and control of innovation, as well as of economic and technological
value chains;
• the smooth operation and reliability of integrated, low-carbon energy systems;
• social and territorial cohesion, which are prerequisites for a sustained low-carbon
transition.
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US Clean Energy Transition
and Implications for Geopolitics
Jonathan Elkind
1 Introduction
The impacts of climate change pose severe challenges around the globe: rising sea
levels, disrupted precipitation patterns, altered agricultural conditions, increasingly
frequent droughts, brutal heat waves, and severe storms to name a few. Different
regions of the United States will encounter all these impacts, just as is true elsewhere
around our globe. Consequently, those Americans whose livelihoods or homes are
vulnerable to a changing climate, and especially those who do not share in the
country’s overall prosperity, are at risk.
In addition, however, there is another form of risk that climate change poses for the
United States: geopolitical risk. This country has been central to historical emissions
of greenhouse gases and is today the world’s second-greatest emitter of greenhouse
gases. It is no less central to the global efforts to refine climate science and develop
climate solutions, but it is preoccupied by a bitter, protracted debate over current and
future climate policy.
So precisely when scientists and citizens around the globe are calling for an accel-
erated and scaled-up response to globalwarming, national leaders in theUnited States
are profoundly divided overwhether and how to contribute to climate solutions. Some
Americans–especially policy-makers in leading states and municipalities and execu-
tives inan increasingnumberof companies–seeclimateasanexistential challenge that
requires a local, regional, national, and global response. These leaders intend for the
United States to be part of the global solution.Others–especially Federal officials dur-
ing the TrumpAdministration andmany leaders in one of the twomajor U.S. political
parties–view climate with disdain and are abdicating the country’s duty to respond.
Already, this conflicted stance is causing damage to U.S. geopolitical interests.
In the coming period, either the United States will return to playing a proactive and
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constructive role on climate change mitigation, or its influence and key relationships
with partners around the globe will suffer serious harm. This chapter reviews the
complicated and internally contradictory U.S. attitudes about the clean energy tran-
sition from the perspective of debates, bottlenecks, and progress occurring at the
Federal, state, and municipal levels.1 It then assesses the implications of the climate
issue for the geopolitical interests of the United States.
2 U.S. Climate Policy: Struggling for Speed, Scale,
and Durability
Many policy analysts have referred to climate change as a “wicked problem”–a
challenge of extraordinary complexity that defies easy resolution (APSC 2007). This
rubric fits the climate challenge well because responding to climate change requires
policies with a highly unusual combination of attributes that exist in tension with
one another. This reality has greatly complicated the American response to climate
for years, and especially in the last decade.
Success in responding to climate change requires policies that combine (a) speed,
(b) scale, and (c) durability. The first part of the puzzle–speed—is easy to grasp for
anyone who accepts the findings of the vast majority of the international scientific
community: Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) are rising due
to human activity, and these concentrations are causing unprecedented changes in
the global climate. Climate science is far from simple, and important uncertainties
remain, especially in regard to regional climate impacts over the medium and long
terms. But as successive analyses from the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change and other authoritative sources such as the US National Academies of
Science, Engineering, and Medicine have repeatedly documented, human beings are
changing the climate by engaging in activities that result in GHG emissions, chiefly
through energy-sector emissions of carbondioxide (IPCC2018;McNutt et al. 2019).2
Responding quickly is clearly a necessity for successful climate policy.
1The Federal government of the United States formulates national-level policy and legislation.
Throughout this chapter, the terms Federal and national are often used synonymously.
2The IPCC’smost recent assessment, which examined the implications of an effort to limit aggregate
temperature rise to 1.5 °C, garnered a great deal of public attention around the globe because it stated
starkly the necessity of urgent changes, starting immediately, especially in regard to the global energy
economy (IPCC 2018). No less noteworthy was a short press statement, issued seemingly out of
the blue by the presidents of the US National Academies in mid-2019. It reiterated the conclusions
of the Academies’ repeated climate assessments. The fact that the Academies’ presidents felt it
important to issue such a reiteration is itself testimony to the sense of alarm that the U.S. scientific
community feels in light of policy-makers’ seeming inability to take action on climate change. The
statement read in part: “Scientists have known for some time, from multiple lines of evidence, that
humans are changing Earth’s climate, primarily through greenhouse gas emissions. The evidence
on the impacts of climate change is also clear and growing. The atmosphere and the Earth’s oceans
are warming, the magnitude and frequency of certain extreme events are increasing, and sea level
is rising along our coasts.” (McNutt et al. 2019).
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A second required attribute is scale. No climate solution can be successful alone
if it only addresses a narrow slice of total global greenhouse emissions. This is
true in the case of sector-specific emissions reductions that are not accompanied
by other, parallel measures addressing other sources of emissions. In the United
States, as we will see shortly, laudable emissions reductions have occurred in the
electric power sector, but they are insufficient because they have not been matched
in sectors such as industry and transportation. It is equally insufficient to apply
approaches that address emissions in one set of countries without also addressing
emissions elsewhere. The risk of simply “exporting” emissions by creating incentives
for industrial activity (and thus employment) to move off-shore has historically been
a sensitive and often legitimate argument used by certain policy advocates in the
United States and elsewhere who worry that poorly designed climate policies could
harm national economies without meaningfully reducing emissions. The growth of
U.S. oil and natural gas production over the past decade creates new complexity in
regard to concerns over causing emissions to move to other countries.
A third necessary attribute is durability. Barring surprises in climate science, the
business of building and sustaining climate-friendly economies must become an
indefinite part of our global future. We need to become so skilled and effective at
climate mitigation that we can maintain our level of effort without flagging. Indeed,
over time we may need to respond to climate change with progressively more robust
and far-reaching measures. We will not succeed in this effort if citizens feel that
their quality of life is suffering unduly, or more than their neighbors. We must find
solutions that will be durable over time, solutions that will not fall victim to popular
backlash the next time we have an economic downturn.
Here it is worthwhile to flag the fact that some policy prescriptions for mitigating
global warming could translate into major socioeconomic impacts. For example,
some environmental advocates argue in regard to fossil fuel production that the
United States should “leave it in the ground,” and should in fact end fossil fuel
consumption before the year 2030. But the oil and gas industries currently employ
over 1.4 million Americans (NASEO-EFI 2019). This does not mean that the United
States should fail to respond to the climate challenge in a timely and effectivemanner.
Nor should one forget that the low- and no-carbon energy economy is resulting in the
creation of many new jobs across the country. But the new clean energy jobs do not
magically appear just where old jobs are being lost, and they do not always require
the same skillsets that oil and gas workers have. These facts underscore the need for
policies that adequately account for the impacts on hundreds of thousands of people’s
livelihoods. Most of those same people are voters; for the chosen climate policies
to be durable, they must account for near-term negative socioeconomic impacts; the
policies must provide for what many have come to refer to as a “just transition.”
Adding to the complexity of this triple challenge is the fact that is not easy to imple-
ment policies and measures that simultaneously deliver speed, scale, and durability.
For example, as will be discussed in greater detail below, twenty-nine of the fifty US
states have found it to be comparatively straightforward to institute renewable port-
folio standards (RPSs) that prescribe greater and greater shares of non-emitting wind
and solar power in the electricity resource mix. An RPS can thus be implemented
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on a relatively speedy timeframe, and RPSs seem relatively durable in that many
consumers express support for clean energy. But, important though these standards
may be as early wins for avoiding GHG emissions, they will prove insufficient to
respond to the totality of climate change because they fall short on scale; currently-
available and currently foreseeable renewable power technologies do not address
emissions from certain hard-to-abate sectors such as steel, cement, or heavy-duty
transport (especially by air and sea).3
Other policy approaches might in theory deliver speed and scale but fail to offer
durability. After the protracted and unsuccessful attempt to enact a cap-and-trade
system during President Obama’s first term in office, and after his Republican polit-
ical opponents made clear that they intended to oppose almost any Obama proposals
in order to handicap him politically, the Obama Administration concluded that there
was no chance of securing bipartisan legislative compromises to enable progress on
climate—one of Obama’s highest policy priorities. His Administration chose instead
to implement policies that they felt could be based on existing legal authority. Thus,
the Obama Clean Power Plan (CPP), which aimed to reduce power-sector emissions
(discussed more below), was implemented pursuant to authority in the Clean Air
Act. For the Obama team, this choice to opt for comparative speed seemed like
the only path forward at the time. Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court later sus-
pended implementation of the CPP because of questions about whether the particular
requirements under the Plan exceeded Clean Air Act authorities. And when Obama
was succeeded by Donald Trump, the new U.S. Administration set about an exten-
sive effort to dismantle the Clean Power Plan as well as many other Obama climate
initiatives (Adler 2019).
Lastly, other policy prescriptions can excel in terms of their scale and perhaps
even durability, but they face a significant challenge in terms of the speed with
which they can be enacted. Arguably the classic example of this dynamic is the
longstanding effort to introduce an economy-wide price on U.S. carbon emissions.
If designed well, such an instrument could exert broad and powerful pressure to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions with modest energy price impacts.4 And indeed,
more USMembers of Congress and policy advisors are currently expressing support
for carbon pricing than at any time in recent memory. Nonetheless, the politics
surrounding a carbon tax and other pricing mechanisms are especially daunting in
the United States because of the country’s almost legendary opposition to taxes. Few
3A possible exception to this statement about the difficulty of using renewables to address hard-to-
abate sectors could be solutions like so-called “green hydrogen”—where renewable power sources
are employed to electrolyze water and produce hydrogen. Whether green hydrogen can, over the
medium term, prove to be a commercially viable options remains to be seen.
4Colleagues at the Center on Global Energy Policy, led by Dr. Noah Kaufman, have undertaken
important work assessing potential design tradeoffs and implications of a carbon tax at the Federal
level in the United States. Their analysis examines the emissions reductions that could be achieved
with different levels of a tax, designed in different ways, as well as the macroeconomic, fiscal, and
distributional impacts of potential carbon taxes. Their work makes clear that if a well-designed
carbon tax could be instituted, it could be a powerful incentive for emissions reductions and could
even reduce energy expenditures of many households, including less-affluent households (Kaufman
and Gordon 2018).
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analysts expect that any meaningful carbon pricing mechanism will be instituted
under the Trump Administration. Carbon pricing’s potential strengths in terms of
scale and durability thus are not matched in terms of speed.
With this understanding of the importance and challenge of implementing climate
solutions that integrate speed, scale, and durability, let us now examine the status
and main trends of the clean energy transition in the United States.
3 Headline Trends in the U.S. Clean Energy Transition
At present, the United States is the world’s second-largest emitter of greenhouse
gases. The U.S. energy sector represents more than 80% of total U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions. Consequently, the country’s success in executing the transition to clean
energy has massive implications for the success of the global response to climate
change.
Over most of the past decade, the United States has recorded mixed results on
the transition to clean energy. The progress that has occurred has largely been in
the electric power industry, and largely thanks to energy market developments and
technological advances. Policy at the national level and macroeconomics have each
played contradictory roles over this same timeframe, with some years when they
contributed to clean energy progress and other times when they led to retrenchment.
State-level andmunicipal policies, however, have played a progressive and important
role, as we will discuss below.
The electric power sector has achieved the greatest clean energy results. That
sector represented nearly 80% of total reductions in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions
from 2008 through 2017, with its CO2 emissions dropping by more than 25%, from
2.4 to 1.8 gigatonnes (EIA 2019a). After decades as the leading sectoral source of
greenhouse gas emissions, the power sector fell to second position, with emissions
lower than those from the transportation sector, as shown in Fig. 1. The greatest
contributing factors for this change have been fuel-switching from coal to natural
gas5 and, more recently, the growth of investments in solar and wind energy, the
results of which can be seen in both the precipitous drop-off in coal consumption
shown in Fig. 2 and the decrease in power generation from coal in Fig. 3.
The industrial sector, which represents slightly more than one-fifth of total U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions, saw sustained improvements in recent years in the clean
energy transition, but that trend appears now to have halted. Industrial emissions of
carbon dioxide fell by 22% over the two decades from 1997 to 2018, from 1.8 to 1.4
5The emissions reductions resulting from coal-to-gas fuel-switching are the subject of ongoing
debate in the expert community. Some peer-reviewed analysis suggests that standard methods for
estimating leakage of methane in the oil and gas supply chain are significantly underestimating
actual leakage rates. See, for example, Alvarez et al. (2018). Particularly for United States, where
increased production and power-sector consumption of natural gas have been such an important
feature of recent years, accurate understanding of methane leakage rates will play a vital part in
evaluating true emissions rates and emissions reductions.
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Fig. 1 U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by sector. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA
2019a)
Fig. 2 U.S. total energy consumption by fuel (1950–2018) in quadrillion Btus. Energy Information
Administration (EIA 2019b)
gigatonnes. Changes in energy-related industrial emissions over that period reflected,
among other factors, overall economic activity, structural features inAmerican indus-
try (e.g., shares of energy-intensive industries in the overall mix), and technologies
employed in energy-intensive industries (such as the adoption of higher efficiency
technologies for heavy energy consumers like steel-making).
The residential and commercial sectors, which together represent just less than
30% of total greenhouse gas emissions (roughly 15% from residential, 14% from
commercial), have held reasonably steady over the past decade. Key factors in these
sectors’ energy consumption and GHG emissions levels have been weather-related
parameters, translating into the number of heating- and cooling-degree-days, and
the efficiency of household equipment and appliances, which has improved steadily
(EIA 2019b).
The sector that has been most clearly moving backward in terms of greenhouse
gas emissions is transportation. This sector is an especially important bellwether for
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Fig. 3 Electric power generation (Billion kWh) and emissions (MMT CO2 Eq.). U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA 2019a)
progress in the U.S. clean energy transition, as transportation represents over 70% of
U.S. petroleum consumption and nearly 29%of total energy use (EIA2018). For each
year since 2012, transportation emissions have grown (EIA 2018), and transportation
has surpassed electric power as the single largest source for greenhouse gas emissions
by sector.
Whether transportation demand and emissions will continue to grow is a critical
component of the future U.S. clean energy transition. Since 2004, the efficiency of
the U.S. road vehicle fleet has increased steadily, with light-duty vehicle efficiency
improving by 29% over that period and CO2 emissions per mile dropping by 23%
(EPA 2018). The improvement since 2004 has been undercut, however, by increases
in fuel demand for aviation and freight vehicles (Houser et al. 2018) and increases in
the amount of vehicle-miles-traveled (VMTs) for light-duty vehicles, which grew by
49% over the period from 1990 to 2017 (FHWA 2018). VMT increases in turn reflect
a variety of factors, including population growth, overall economic growth, land-use
patterns (especially urban sprawl), and consumer responses to low fuel prices (EPA
2019a). The Trump Administration announced its intention to freeze increases in
vehicle efficiency requirements under the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ)
standards, a proposal that is still being reviewed as of this writing, discussed in more
detail below.
One transportation trend that holds the promise of reduced GHG emissions is the
electrification of the light-duty vehicle fleet. After years of only gradual sales growth,
and total numbers amounting to less than one percent of the total vehicle fleet on the
road, electric vehicle (EV) purchases boomed in 2018. Sales grew by more than an
80% increase to bring the total fleet to over 360,000 EVs (Pyper 2019). EVs are not
yet of sufficient scale to materially alter the emissions profile of the transportation
sector in the near term, but they may now be gathering momentum with car buyers.
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4 Federal Policy for Clean Energy
Having surveyed the major trendlines in the U.S. clean energy transition—trendlines
that are far from uniformly encouraging—we now turn to a discussion of policy at
the Federal, state, and local levels. One finds a country whose Federal-level leaders
have struggled to reach consensus on what constitutes effective policy with regard
to climate change and the clean energy transition. Indeed, political leadership in the
United States splits into those who are convinced that we need an urgent and broad
response, and those who say they see no problem to respond to.
During the past decade and a half, the U.S. Federal government has played a
variety of roles in regard to the clean energy transition. The first U.S. president in
this century, President George W. Bush, did not prioritize policies intended to spur
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. The Bush Administration did, however,
sustain strong investments in scientific understanding of the global climate system,
which have been a foundational part of U.S. Federal policy since the administration
of his father, George H.W. Bush. Moreover, through both policy and legislation, the
George W. Bush Administration gave prominent emphasis to energy research and
development, much of it targeting clean energy R&D.
From the very start of PresidentBarackObama’s term in office in January 2009, his
Administration signaled that it saw climate change as a top policy priority. President
Obama described climate change as one of the defining challenges of the current age,
a moral threat imperiling the future of humanity. In his first term, Obama included
funding of more than $90 billion for the deployment of clean energy technologies in
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which the U.S. Congress passed in
response to the 2008financial crisis (WhiteHouse 2016a).Obama also tried but failed
to pass economy-wide legislation sponsored by Democratic Representatives Henry
Waxman of California and EdwardMarkey ofMassachusetts that would have capped
emissions of greenhouse gases from the power sector and many other industrial
sources and established a trading system for GHG emission reductions (CBO 2009).
The failure of the Waxman–Markey cap-and-trade measure was a bitter defeat. In
its wake, the Obama Administration sought during its second term to respond to
climate and the clean energy transition by taking actions based on its interpretation
of existing legal authority.
The centerpiece of this executive action was President Obama’s Climate Action
Plan (CAP), released in June 2013 (White House 2013). CAP called for a portfolio of
actions aimed at reducingU.S. greenhouse gas emissions and increasing the country’s
preparedness for the impacts of climate change, plus enhanced collaborations with
key international partners. The single most significant element of CAP in terms of
projected emissions reductions was its instruction to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to promulgate new regulations to limit greenhouse gas emissions from
electricity generating plants. The Clean Power Plan (CPP), as this new program of
regulations came to be known, called for newly built and existing power plants to
emit less than prescribed maximum levels of CO2 per unit of output. During the
CPP’s development, the plan was expected to drive retirements of subcritical coal
plants and older, inefficient gas-fired plants.
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In reality, two considerations emerged that meant that CPP never lived up to
the Obama team’s expectations. First, many utility companies were opting to retire
those high-emitting coal plants anyway, and even faster than the CPP required. Local
pollution requirements (such as those limiting emissions of mercury), favorable eco-
nomics for high-efficiency natural gas plants, and plummeting costs for solar or wind
power plants meant that coal plants were increasingly unattractive for utilities. More-
over, twenty-seven states introduced legal challenges to the CPP, and the Supreme
Court temporarily “stayed” (or halted) the CPP’s legal implementation. When Pres-
ident Trump came into office, his Department of Justice announced that it would not
proceed with a legal appeal against the stay. In June 2019, Trump’s EPA issued a
much weaker proposal, the so-called Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule, which
called for improvements in the operating efficiency of remaining coal plants, but
which was projected by many analysts to have no discernible impact on reducing
power-sector GHG emissions. The ACE rule was immediately challenged in court
(Friedman 2019).
Another major component of the Obama CAP was a concerted focus on the
energy efficiency of vehicles, buildings, appliances, and equipment. CAP called for
the promulgation by the U.S. Department of Energy of new appliance and equipment
standards that would, by 2030, result in a cumulative total of three billion tonnes of
avoided CO2 emissions. CAP also focused on transportation-related greenhouse gas
emissions—through the first-ever efficiency standards for heavy-duty vehicles as
a complement to the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) increases that the
ObamaAdministration had set in place during its first term, and also through research
and communications that would facilitate the adoption of electric vehicles.
CAP also set in motion new efforts to assess and reduce the leakage of methane
from both energy- and non-energy-related sources. A final energy-related aspect of
CAPwas its call for extensive international leadership by agencies of theU.S. Federal
government, including throughmechanisms such as theCleanEnergyMinisterial and
collaborative bilateral research efforts with China, India, and other key partners.
The Obama Administration pledged through its Nationally Determined Contribu-
tion (NDC) under the Paris climate agreement to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions
by 26–28% by 2025, using a 2005 baseline. The Obama Administration also recog-
nized that the goal of protecting the global climate would require far greater, sus-
tained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. For this reason, the Obama Admin-
istration prepared, and formally submitted at COP-22 in Marrakech in November
2016, the U.S. Mid-Century Strategy for Deep Decarbonization. The Mid-Century
Strategy proposed to extend out to mid-century the downward-sloping emission tra-
jectory started by the 26–28% reductions of the U.S. NDC and indicated the kinds
of changes that would be necessary to achieve deep decarbonization by 2050 (White
House 2016b).
The Mid-Century Strategy was announced after the 2016 presidential election,
and it was already clear from statements of the incoming President that the new
Administration was likely to think very differently about climate change and the
role of Federal policy in responding to it. President Donald Trump came into office
pledging to remove regulatory burdens from American business, even regulations
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intended to protect the environment or public health. Trump appointed as key mem-
bers of his initial cabinet and sub-cabinet people who had long histories as climate
skeptics—such as Scott Pruitt, Trump’s initial Administrator of the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency. Obama’s sense of urgency about climate—his call to
answer a moral struggle—was long gone. The United States now had a president
who, as a candidate, had referred to climate change as a hoax.
In numerous public remarks and Congressional hearings, Administration officials
called into question the science of climate change (Gustin 2018). Administration
officials and the President himself repeatedly accused his predecessor of engaging
in a “war on coal.” The Trump team pledged to “end the bureaucratic blockade”
that they accused the previous Administration of creating. They promised to put
miners back to work across the United States (Perry et al. 2017). In June 2017,
the President announced his intention to withdraw the United States from the Paris
climate agreement.6
Text Box A: Proposed budget cuts for clean energy R&D
The Trump White House proposed deep cuts for fiscal 
years (FY) 2018, 2019, and 2020 in appropriaons for the 
U.S. Department of Energy in precisely those elements 
that provide the greatest Federal support for clean 
energy R&D. Congress refused to comply. Proposed cuts, 
averaged over those three years, were as follows: 
• Advanced Research Projects Agency for Energy 
(ARPA-E) -- 123% cut 
• Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing 
(ATVM) LOAN program – 91% cut 
• Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy (EERE) – 74% cut 
• Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy 
Reliability (OE) and successor offices – 17% cut 
• Office of Fossil Energy (FE) R&D progs – 20% cut 
• Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) – 31% cut 
• Office of Science – 11% cut (incorporates clean-
energy-related basic science such as fusion, 
basic energy science, high energy physics)
6It is important to note that President Trump announced his intention to withdraw the United States
from the Paris climate agreement, but contrary to many assertions, the United States has not yet
withdrawn from the Paris agreement. Trump’s intention can only be fulfilled, in accordance with the
terms of the agreement, after the elapsing of a prescribed amount of time. This means that the actual
withdrawal cannot occur until the day after the 2020 U.S. election. Until that time, U.S. negotiators
continue participating in meetings occurring under the terms of the Paris agreement.
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Trump Administration spokespeople summed up their energy policy as the pro-
motion of “energy dominance.” Likemany political slogans, the practical meaning of
“energy dominance” never came to be crisply defined. What was clear was that the
Trump Administration favored a production-oriented, export-oriented approach to
energy policies—one where environmental protection was more likely to be treated
as an unwelcome hindrance than an essential building block.
As part of the Trump de-regulatory agenda, the new Administration set about
dismantling many of the policies that the Obama team had used to create incentives
for the clean energy transition. EPA Administrator Pruitt halted the implementation
of the Clean Power Plan and set inmotion a re-writing of vehicle efficiency standards.
Pruitt also announced the intention not to implement new rules on methane leakage,
a move that was quickly rejected by the courts.
In reality, removing regulations is not as simple as some in the Trump Admin-
istration may have wanted for people to think. The Administrative Procedures Act
requires that new regulations be justified by benefit-cost analysis and be enacted only
after public notice-and-comment procedures. The same strictures apply when one
is removing existing regulations; the action must be justified by benefit-cost anal-
ysis and must undergo notice-and-comment. Many of the de-regulatory “victories”
trumpeted by the Trump Administration were therefore premature claims (Adler
2019).
Another feature of Federal policy on clean energy under President Trump has
been his selective—and climate-unfriendly—budget-cutting agenda. Here, the Pres-
ident persistently sought to cut parts of the Federal budget that would facilitate the
clean energy transition—programs aimed at deployment of current technologies and
those focused on development of the next generation of technologies. Text Box A
presents the average funding reductions (in percentage terms) that the Trump White
House requested in its first three budget proposals. Both from the Administration’s
persistence and from its public comments, the Trump team made clear that these
proposed cuts reflected the Administration’s broader hostility toward engaging on
climate change. For example, in presenting Trump’s first budget request to the press
in March 2017, then-budget director Mick Mulvaney dismissed the notion of fund-
ing for climate-related research: “We’re not spending money on that anymore. We
consider that to be a waste of your money” (Phillip 2017).
Under the U.S. constitution, however, the Executive Branch does not have uni-
lateral decision-making authority regarding the Federal budget. The White House
proposes each fiscal year’s budget to Congress; the Legislative Branch then develops
and passes appropriation bills. Generally speaking, enacted budgets substantially
reflect Congressional priorities—not simply those of the White House. The Presi-
dent can, theoretically, veto Congressional spending bills, but doing so can alienate
members of the President’s own party. Once the budget is signed and enacted, it must
be implemented by the Executive Branch. Congressional decision-making is often
motivated in part by funding for institutions in Congressional members’ home dis-
tricts, and consequently most clean energy R&D budgets have actually grown over
the years since President Trump came into office (DOE 2017, 2018, 2019).
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One particularly positive development for Federal-level clean energy policy dur-
ing Trump’s tenure was the provision, in the Bipartisan Budget Agreement from
February 2018, to expand the provisions of the so-called 45Q tax credits. The
expanded tax credits were expected to provide meaningful incentives for the devel-
opment of carbon capture, utilization, and sequestration (CCUS) projects. CCUS is
viewed by many as a critical area for technological progress to enable a successful
response to climate change.
If, as we have seen above, Federal policy on climate change suffered from pro-
nounced political divisions in policy, an obvious question is whether the 2020 presi-
dential election will bring more pendulum swings or perhaps a new national consen-
sus on climate. It would certainly defy popular expectations to suggest that President
Trumpmight relent in his hostility toward climate in the remainingmonths of his cur-
rent term. And the current president can almost certainly be relied upon to veto most
climate legislation—if indeed any such legislation could pass the Republican-led
Senate and reach his desk. Nonetheless, starting after the 2018 midterm elections,
members of both the President’s own party and the Democratic opposition began
spending an increasing amount of time considering policy options ranging from the
mild to the ambitious. At a minimum, these options hint at the possibility of legisla-
tion that could pass the Congress and be placed before the next president, whether
that is a second-term President Trump or a newly arriving Democrat.
Some of the main policy proposals that are circulating in the U.S. Congress and
among other political leaders include these: First, a number of Republican mem-
bers of Congress are exploring ideas to support clean energy innovation, often with
support from Democratic counterparts. Many of these ideas are comparatively non-
controversial. Some focus on support for next-generation nuclear energy or CCUS
technologies. Another and more hotly debated area of focus has been carbon pricing.
A veritablewho’s-who of former Republican cabinetmembers and a number of noted
Democrats, for example, have formed the Climate Leadership Council and called for
the passage of a carbon tax. Notwithstanding vigorous opposition from the Repub-
lican Congressional leadership, one Republican representative, Carlos Curbelo of
Florida, even proposed legislation for a carbon tax in the summer of 2018, only to be
defeated by a Democratic opponent in the November 2018 midterm elections. Over
fifty Democrats have signed on as joint sponsors of carbon tax legislation in the 2019
Congressional term, with very cautious Republican support, although the prospects
for such proposals is highly uncertain.
Many observers partially attribute the new Congressional attention on climate
policy proposals to the fact that the midterms delivered a newDemocratic majority in
the House of Representatives. With the Democrats’ resulting ability to set legislative
and hearing agendas, climate ideas that never saw the light of day under Republican
control of the House of Representatives are now up for detailed debate.
Another factor that is sometimes credited for the renewed vigor in climate debates
is the proposal known as the Green New Deal (GND). The GND is an expansive
set of goals, advocated most prominently by first-term Representative Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez of New York. It calls broadly for (a) rapid and deep decarbonization
accompanied by (b) employment guarantees in the clean energy sector, especially
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including minority and economically disadvantaged communities, (c) health care
reform, and (d) measures to address local pollution problems that have beset many
low-income minority populations. The GND was embodied first in a non-binding
resolution that was passed by the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives
in early 2019 (Congress 2019).
Despite the fact that the GND was not immediately translated into formal legisla-
tive proposals, and despite the fact that it served as a political pinata for President
Trump and certain other Republican leaders, many of whom equated it to socialism,
the GND seemed to alter the political playing field on climate and clean energy. It
seemed to capture a growing sense of public concern about climate change—which
is reflected in opinion polling especially among Democratic voters. Each Demo-
cratic presidential candidate was asked on the record whether she/he supported the
GND. Widespread climate protests in numerous American cities (and in other cities
worldwide) only intensified the pressure for accelerated climate action.
Republicans also felt forced to respond to the pressure created by public opinion
and the GND. One Republican Representative, Matt Gaetz of Florida, proposed an
alternative package entitled theGreenRealDeal,which contained certain pro-climate
measures but stripped out theGND’s broader socioeconomic ambitions. Former Rep.
Curbelo summarized the dynamic surrounding the GND by giving public credit to
its proponents: If we Republicans do not like the Green New Deal’s elements, he
said, we will have to say what we as a party do support.7
5 State-Level Policies for Clean Energy
If Federal-level policy under the Trump Administration markedly moved away from
focusing on the clean energy transition, and if the field of play on climate was
confused and uncertain as the next presidential election approached, the same could
not be said for the majority of states and a significant number of municipalities. Here
one saw a mounting sentiment that responding to climate change is a policy priority.
A plurality of the 50 states—states with Democratic leaders as well as some with
Republican leaders—banded together in a variety of formats and initiatives to reject
very publicly the climate-hostile policies that have dominated the views of the Trump
Administration. Some elected to put in place policies that create direct incentives to
build low- or no-carbon energy systems or create indirect incentives to do so. Others
pledged to reduce their state-level emissions to levels in keeping with the Obama-era
pledge under the Paris climate agreement. Others laid out sweeping programs for
deep decarbonization by mid-century.
7Curbelo’s on-the-record comment was made in the course of a program on proposed climate
solutions hosted by the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University (CGEP 2019).
For an excellent analysis of the Green New Deal and its significance in the debates about Federal
climate policy, see Bordoff (2019).
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Fig. 4 States, cities, and other entities pledged to fulfill Paris pledge (as of 2018). America’s Pledge
(AP 2018)
President Trump’s Rose Garden announcement in June 2017 that he intended
to withdraw the United States from the Paris climate agreement triggered vocifer-
ous, public rejection by a number of governors. Most prominently and immediately,
Governor Jerry Brown of California, Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York, and
Governor Jay Inslee of Washington declared that their three states would adhere to
the emissions reductions pledged in the Obama Administration’s Paris pledge, and
they called for others to join them.
Their grouping came to be referred to as the United States Climate Alliance.
As of this writing it includes 25 states and one territory in its membership. The
Climate Alliance thus represents 55% of the population of the United States, 40%
of U.S. GHG emissions, and 60% of the total U.S. economy, or $11.7 trillion on an
annual basis (USCA 2019b). As can be seen in Fig. 4 (which is itself already dated
since several additional states subsequently joined the Climate Alliance), the states,
cities, and other entities pledging themselves to fulfill the Paris climate pledge are
heavily—but not exclusively—clustered along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts with
other concentrations in the industrial Midwest and a scattering of participants across
the Plains states (AP 2018).
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Fig. 5 States employing Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) and Clean Energy Standards
(CESs). Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE 2019)
The states participating in the Climate Alliance committed to reduce their emis-
sions in a manner consistent with the Obama-era Nationally Determined Contri-
bution—namely, by 26–28% below 2005 levels by 2025. They also committed to
track and report their progress, to institute new policies to reduce carbon pollution
and promote the clean energy transition, and to facilitate knowledge-sharing so that
states can learn from each others’ experience (USCA2019b). The participating states
represent a considerable mass: If collectively they formed a single national economy,
they would rank third in the world, smaller than only the entire United States and
China (USCA 2019a; AP 2018).
Arguably the single most visible state-level policy that has been used to incent
deployment of clean energy is the renewables portfolio standard (RPS). RPSs apply
to 56%of retail electricity sales nationwide (Barbose 2018). RPSs typically prescribe
the share of total electricity sales that must come from renewable generation sources
in the course of a year. Different states’ RPSs are not uniform in scope, application,
or rules, however, because they are developed under the authority of individual state
governments and therefore respond to state-level politics, resource endowments, and
policy priorities. Some apply to all electric utilities in the state; others apply only
to investor-owned utilities but not to municipally-owned utilities or cooperatives (or
perhaps they apply to munis and coops, but with less stringent requirements). Some
have caps on the cost of the RPS. Some mandate the absolute amount of generating
capacity rather than percentage share of retail sales coming from renewable energy
generation (Barbose 2018).
As is shown in Fig. 5, a total of 29 of the 50 states in the union, plus the District
of Columbia and three U.S. territories, now employ legally-binding RPSs. Many of
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these states have progressively increased the stringency of their standards in recent
years as costs for wind and solar power dropped and concerns about climate change
rose. In fact, in the decade from 2009 to 2018 alone, states elected to strengthen their
RPSs on 65 occasions (some doing so more than once) (Barbose 2018). Seven states
now have RPSs requiring utilities to generate 50% or greater shares from renewables
(NCSL 2019). In addition, a growing number of states are instituting clean energy
standards (CESs)—sometimes as an alternative structure to an RPS and sometimes
as a complement thereto. Because CESs generally permit the use of other non-GHG-
emitting technologies such as nuclear power or natural gas paired with CCUS, CESs
are expected to facilitate greater flexibility and thus greater cost control as states
move toward higher levels of decarbonization.
The legal status of these RPS and CES programs varies. Some are simple pol-
icy goals; others are binding requirements from state-level utility commissions and
still others are enforceable mandates enshrined in state-level law. The unmistakable
trend toward progressively greater ambition is clear—including 100% carbon-free
electricity in several states and net-zero-carbon entire economies in other states.8
Among these is California, which now has an RPS of 50% by 2026, followed by
a 60% RPS by 2030, followed by a requirement of 100% net-zero-carbon electricity
by 2045. The latter step leaves open the use of clean generating resources other than
wind or solar—namely, nuclear, or hydro-electric, or carbon capture and utilization
or storage paired with either industrial installations or natural gas power generation.
The legally binding timelines are also augmented by non-binding executive orders
that call for (a) economy-wide carbon neutrality by 2045 plus (b) an economy-
wide reduction of all GHG emissions by 80% below baseline by 2050 (EFI 2019).
California’s policies bear particular significance because of the sheer size of the
state’s economy. If it were an independent nation, it would have the fifth-largest
economy in the world.
Also noteworthy are the ambitious new clean energy requirements for the state
of New York, which became law in June 2019. Under the mandate provided by
the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, New York will have 100%
carbon-free electricity by 2040 and a net-zero carbon economy as a whole by 2050—
including sectors such as industry and transportation, which present greater decar-
bonization challenges than the power sector (Roberts 2019). And other states have
also enacted or are considering laws or goals to deeply decarbonize their power
sectors or entire economies—including Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington.
8State-level interest in clean energy and particularly clean electricity does not always coincide with
state leadership that attaches an explicit priority to pro-climate policies. Nor does support for clean
energy development align neatly with leadership by the typically more pro-climate Democratic
party. The state of Texas, for example, has been a predominantly conservative and petroleum-
oriented state for years and has had a succession of Republican governors. Nonetheless, Texas is a
hotbed of wind power with over 22 GW of installed capacity. In this regard, it would rank sixth in
the world if it were an independent nation (Irfan and Zarracina 2019).
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Several U.S. states have also introduced legally binding structures that place a
price on carbon emissions that are expected to help accelerate the clean energy tran-
sition. The California Greenhouse Gas Emissions Cap-and-Trade Program, which
was created as a result of the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (also
known as Assembly Bill 32), took effect in 2012 and now covers 85% of the state’s
greenhouse gas emissions. It prescribes that 2030 emissions levels should be 40%
below 1990 levels and establishes emissions caps and a quarterly trading system for
covered facilities. It is also linked to a similar program in the Canadian province of
Quebec (CARB 2019).
Nine northeastern states participate in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI)—Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont—with New Jersey slated to join in
2020 (RGGI 2019). RGGI, which was created in 2009, covers emissions from elec-
tricity generating plants with a capacity greater than 25 MW. States participating in
RGGI have the obligation to create and implement programs to deliver annual power
generation emissions reductions of 2.5% to 2020.9
In addition to the electric power sector, certain states have also implemented
clean energy policies in the transportation sector, some of which policies interact
in complementary fashion with Federal transportation policies, and some of which
exist in some tension with policies from Washington, D.C. As an example of the
latter, California has a long history of seeking more stringent automobile efficiency
standards than those enshrined in the national CAFÉ program.
Since the passage of the Clean Air Act in 1970, California has repeatedly sought,
and usually secured, the authority to impose more stringent vehicle standards within
the state than are applied elsewhere across the nation, based on the rationale that
(a) it had efficiency standards in place before the national program was established,
motivated by the state’s long struggle with smog, and (b) California’s stricter stan-
dards protected the state’s public health and environment better than the weaker
national requirements. Over time, a dozen other states adopted California’s more
exacting fuel economy standards as well. In 2012, the Obama Administration set in
place a package of elevated efficiency standards for passenger cars and light trucks
produced from 2017 to 2025, in exchange for which California agreed to harmonize
its own regulations with the new Federal requirements. In April 2018, however, the
Trump Administration halted the implementation of the Obama package. California
brought suit against the Administration, charging it with arbitrary and capricious
action. Sixteen other states and the District of Columbia joined that lawsuit, which
is still pending as of this writing.
Beyond vehicle efficiency standards, state-level policies for clean transportation
have included a wide range of other measures. California and nine other states have
established percentage sales targets for so-called “zero-emission vehicles,” meaning
9One facet of both RGGI and the California-Quebec cap-and-trade systems is that to date they have
resulted in modest prices per allowance—only $5.62 per RGGI allowance in June 2019 (RGGI
2019), $17.45 per California allowance in May 2019 (CARB 2019). Nonetheless, supporters of the
two programs claim that they are driving clean energy investments.
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battery electric vehicles, hydrogen vehicles, and others with no tailpipe emissions.
Numerous states provide preferential treatment on the roads for what have been tradi-
tionally referred to as “alternative fueled vehicles,” with the benefits including access
to high-occupancy lanes on congested roads, or reduced taxes. Some of these bene-
fits have been made available not only to battery electric vehicles or high-efficiency
internal combustion vehicles like hybrids, but also to vehicles that simply have the
capability to burn part-ethanol fuel, which has given rise to debates over the envi-
ronmental merits of corn-based ethanol. An increasingly important set of state-level
policy interventions has been in the area of charging infrastructure for EVs.
6 Clean Energy Policies in U.S. Cities
Just as has been true with a number of U.S. states, many cities and towns have chosen
to institute policies to promote the clean energy transition, even though national
policy does not currently prioritize that transition. Action by cities carries potential
significance because of several factors. For starters, America’s urban areas represent
between 70 and 80% of the total population. In addition, many of the decisions that
exert significant influence on future emissions occur at local levels.
Land-use patterns reflect local zoning rules, for example, and those rules affect
materially considerations such as the degree of urban sprawl, which both spurs indi-
vidual vehicle use and creates structural challenges for the development of public
transit systems. Transportation plans usually are driven by concerns at local levels,
although funding usually combines local, state, and Federal resources. On the other
hand, many cities lack certain authority, financial power, independent market status,
or other attributes needed to implement and sustain effective low-carbon policies.
Thus, the role of city-level clean energy policies can be important, but cities do not
always have at their disposal all the tools needed to ensure delivery of the desired
outcomes.
Municipal-level policies promoting the clean energy transition include some of
the same features as state-level policies such as goals for zero-carbon power supply,
goals for deep decarbonization by mid-century, and collaborations to signal con-
tinuing focus on political commitment. In regard to clean power supply, a growing
number of cities and towns have instituted mandates requiring that all electricity
be supplied by renewable energy sources. Some of the earliest cities and towns to
adopt such policies were modest in size—such as Aspen, Colorado; Burlington, Ver-
mont; and Greensburg, Kansas. More recently, however, many major cities have also
adopted municipal clean power supply policies—including New York, Los Angeles,
Washington D.C., and others.
American cities are also employing a wide array of other policies to promote the
clean energy transition. These range from the development of sustainable transporta-
tion plans and increased efficiency standards for municipal vehicle fleets to energy
conservation building codes and efficiency-/climate-related procurement processes
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(such as bulk purchasing arrangements for municipal electric vehicle fleets or for
zero-carbon electric power to be used to operate city facilities).
In addition, over 400 U.S. cities and towns representing more than 70 million
inhabitants (more than 20% of the population of the United States) have joined
the Mayors’ National Climate Action Agenda, also known as the Climate Mayors
coalition. Under this effort—initiated in 2014 by Eric Garcetti, the mayor of Los
Angeles; Annise Parker, then the mayor of Houston; and Michael Nutter, then the
mayor of Philadelphia—cities commit to developing and publicizing near- and long-
term climate targets, engaging in peer-to-peer learning, and collaborating on policy
development and advocacy. For example, the bipartisan Climate Mayors initiative
filed formal statements opposing the Trump Administration’s repeal of the Clean
Power Plan and its review of the CAFÉ standards for vehicles (Climate Mayors
2019). Many cities also participate in major international groupings of cities such
as the Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance and the C40 grouping. These groups promote
exchanges of best practice and advocate for cities’ interests on global climate issues,
including at the meetings of the Conference of Parties under the UN Framework
Agreement on Climate Change.
7 Geopolitics and the U.S. Clean Energy Transition
The preceding discussion has outlined the tensions and contradictions that constitute
the current state of play in the transition to clean energy within the United States.
The reality is one that defies simple, overly broad generalizations: The United States
has certainly not achieved broad societal agreement on aggressive reductions in
greenhousegas emissions, especially not at the level of national politics. Thedivisions
are stark, and they are powerful as a political “wedge issue”—a cudgel that can be
used by partisan actors to attack opposing leaders. Nonetheless, it is inaccurate to
assert that the country is failing entirely to address climate.
Progress has occurred in certain areas, even in the face of the national-level polit-
ical divisions. The U.S. Congress continues to support scientific and technological
research and development in regard to both the operation of the climate system and
clean energy technologies that can deliver solutions. Numerous states and cities have
made clear that they “are still in” and intend to adhere to emissions cuts pledged by
the Obama Administration under the 2015 Paris climate agreement. Moreover, the
political sands appear to be shifting slightly at the national level. President Trump
has given no indication that he intends to soften his opposition to action on climate.
But physical calamities that are thought to be occurring with increasing severity and
frequency as a result of a changing climate are afflicting voters more and more—
including those who have traditionally supported the Republican party. More and
more legislators from the President’s own party are generating legislative proposals
that call for enhanced clean energy research and development, energy efficiency, and
even in some rare cases a price on carbon.
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Thus, at present the U.S. transition to clean energy at the national level is charac-
terized by tensions: a mounting sense of urgency on one side, a stubborn denialism
on another, and halting steps forward on a third. These tensions seem unlikely to dis-
appear completely over the next decade, but based on the increasing prominence of
the climate issue in public policy debates, the country is likely to move along one of
two broad paths over the coming decade: Under one path, U.S. policy would continue
to be riven by political fragmentation, climate rejectionism, and the resurgent isola-
tionism (including in regard to international climate cooperation) that has flourished
during President Trump’s tenure. Under an alternative path, the United States would
shift to a mode of greater national action—to a sense of purpose and possibility to
achieve deep decarbonization by mid-century. These alternative scenarios imply in
turn distinct geopolitical implications for the United States and others around the
globe, the topic to which we now turn.
A two-way relationship links the U.S. clean energy transition and the world of
geopolitics. The timing, extent, and nature of the U.S. transition causes impacts in
numerous geopolitical dimensions—including international partners’ trust of U.S.
leadership and relationships with key partners around the globe.
No less important are links that run in the opposite direction—ways in which
geopolitics exert influence on the U.S. clean energy transition. Table 1 summarizes
this two-way relationship under two alternative scenarios—one in which the U.S.
remains divided and ambivalent in its commitment to clean energy, and the other in
which it renews its focus on responding to climate and acts with renewed purpose
and commitment.
Several main features emerge from a review of the links between the U.S. clean
energy transition and the world of geopolitics. One is that U.S. actions on clean
energy and climate seem likely to forge strong impressions around the globe about
whether the United States is a heedless contributor to a massive problem or a leading
force for solutions. International partners in typically well-heeled settings such as
the United Nations and its agencies, the G-7, the G-20, and even the Arctic Council
have repeatedly experienced petulant behavior from the Trump Administration. U.S.
representatives insisted that climate be given reduced prominence if any at all.
To leaders and voters elsewhere around the world, such a refusal to acknowledge
what is a matter of broad scientific consensus, and is an issue with life-or-death
implications for some, is wholly inconsistent with the actions of a country that wishes
to be influential on the world stage. Thus, continued U.S. reluctance on climate, if
that scenario plays out, can reasonably be expected to cause damage to American
prestige, soft power, and influence. Less clear, however, is whether any such damage
to U.S. prestige would recede into memory if the more favorable scenario occurs and
the United States returns to acting with a renewed sense of purpose on climate.
A second geopolitical dimension that merits note is that the posture of the United
States on the clean energy transition has major implications for the credibility and
effectiveness of international institutions such as the United Nations, and interna-
tional cooperation in general. The Paris climate agreement, which President Trump
declared his desire to leave at the earliest permissiblemoment, was a triumph of inter-
national diplomacy. Its strength lies in its flexibility, its emphasis on differentiated
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national action, its call for regular assessments of progress, and its ability to marshal
momentum for additional action if countries fail to institute sufficiently strong and
timely mitigation measures.
Paris embodied critical features forwhichAmerican negotiators called for years.10
Indeed, in several regards, the Paris agreement amounted to a conscious departure
from the structures that were agreed in the Kyoto protocol of 1997 and the Copen-
hagen accord of 2009 (Stern 2018). If the U.S. Federal government not only walked
away from the Paris climate agreement but also persisted in its hostility to the very
idea of a clean energy transition, this behavior would create ample justification for
people around the globe to conclude that the United States cannot be relied upon to
play a consistent and constructive role in international cooperation and diplomacy. If
on the other hand, the U.S. Federal government returned to the business of providing
national and international leadership for the clean energy transition, then solving
hard problems would seem to be more within our reach.
A third geopolitical dimension worth highlighting is that the current reluctance of
the U.S. Federal government to press ahead with the clean energy transition comes
against a particular geopolitical backdrop—an assertive China that is simultaneously
a major geopolitical challenge for the United States and also an essential partner in
managing the global climate problem. Beijing under President Xi has been excep-
tionally self-confident and proactive on the global stage. The massive Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), for example, makes available massive amounts of capital that are
presently not rivaled by the scale of funds available from the Bretton Woods institu-
tions, bilateral aid programs, or private capital flows. To date, despite declared goals
of creating a “green” Belt and Road, the Initiative has instead mobilized billions for
coal-fired power plants, whichwill pollute air andwater in the recipient countries and
will emit decadesworth of carbon dioxide affecting the global climate. Regardless, as
long as Washington is inclined toward greater isolationism, budget cuts for develop-
ment assistance and diplomacy, and Federal inaction on the clean energy transition,
the United States will be unable to offer a meaningful alternative for decision-makers
in emerging economies. Beijing’s development model can mobilize capital quickly,
and even if it results in more coal plants, that may be fine from the perspective of
some political leaders in certain capitals of the developing world (Elkind 2019).
Just to make the U.S.–China relationship a still more complicated part of the
present calculation, China is not just a competitor but also an essential partner in
dealing with the global climate problem. No country emits more GHGs than China
(26.8% of total GHG emissions in 2017), but the United States, which represents
a much greater share of historical emissions is number two (13.1% in 2017) (UN
Environment 2018). Success therefore requires effective action by both China and
the United States to execute the clean energy transition at home, and ideally to
10A number of observers have criticized the Paris agreement for failing to institute binding, top-
down reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and penalties for those countries that fail to meet
their targets. Nothing short of such stringent requirements, the argument goes, corresponds to the
urgency of the climate problem. This viewmisses entirely the nature of climate change as a “wicked
problem,” as discussed earlier in this chapter. The climate challenge requires a more nuanced and
flexible diplomatic response (Stern 2018).
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promote solutions in other countries as well. In the face of ongoing disputes over
tariffs, intellectual property protection, technology theft, market access, exchange
rates, the South China Sea, economic sanctions, and many other matters, the U.S.–
China bilateral agenda is overloaded. Nonetheless, the two countries need each other
on climate. There is no alternative.
The U.S.–China relationship is not the only one that affects, and is affected by,
U.S. decisions about clean energy. The United States has numerous longstanding
ties that have been framed in part by U.S. support for rules-based international trade.
Some of these relationships may, to some degree, actually suffer if the United States
shifts back to a more proactive Federal effort to promote the clean energy transition.
Leaders in the oil-producingGulf Arab states, for example, mayworry about whether
the United States will remain engaged as a constructive partner for them, invested in
their countries’ long-term security.11 Concerns of this type appear to be encouraging
the growth of new relationships, such as the OPEC–Russia relationship and new
engagement between Riyadh and Beijing. Even in a world characterized by reduced
U.S. importation of traditional fuels (whether as a result of the clean energy transition
or simply the last decade’s growth in U.S. domestic hydrocarbon production), the
United States will continue to have an interest in international trade in goods and
services. This reality may limit the extent of change in U.S. relations with the Gulf
Arab partners, but some change is afoot regardless.
A final geopolitical consideration that could arise from U.S. policies on the clean
energy transition relates to materials required for production of low-carbon energy
systems.Analysts and policy-makers have recognized for some time that clean energy
technologies rely on a number of critical materials whose supply chains are not very
diversified (DOE 2011). Indeed, concerns have arisen because the predominant sup-
ply of a number of those materials is controlled by Chinese companies, and China
attempted to exploit that dominance in 2010 after a fishing dispute with Japan (Brad-
sher 2010). As the United States and other economies proceed with the clean energy
transition, their ability to deploy cost-effectively energy-efficient lighting, wind and
solar generating plants, batteries, and other technologies will require adequate and
assured supply chains for critical materials. This does not mean automatically that
problems will arise with the availability of critical materials; new supplies, innova-
tion, and re-use may all help to alleviate any shortages. But the transition to clean
energy will nonetheless place in the spotlight a new set of supply relationships that
will need to be managed effectively.
11A further complication: The very same Gulf Arab states, where some leaders worry about a
potential reduced long-termU.S. commitment to the region, are among those countrieswith themost
to lose as median temperatures rise. For an excellent discussion of climate change vulnerability in
the Gulf, see Krane (2019). In this case, the links between geopolitics and the clean energy transition
amount to a situation in which geopolitical strains may arise from either action or inaction on clean
energy and climate.
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8 Conclusions
Especially since the end of the Second World War, the United States has played a
major role on the geopolitical stage. It has sought to influence the rules that governed
international trade, global financial systems, security interests, and even environ-
mental standards. The issue of climate change presents an unparalleled challenge to
the postwar global order because the roots of global warming run so deep in how we
conduct our daily lives and operate our economies. To address this “wicked problem”
requires unprecedented ingenuity, dedication, and persistence. It requires policies at
all levels of governance that combine speed, scale, and durability.
To date, unfortunately, the very country that has played such an important geopo-
litical role since the middle of the last century has not demonstrated clear and con-
sistent leadership when it comes to climate. To be sure, especially during the Trump
presidency, leaders at the state and municipal levels across the United States have
signaled a progressively greater willingness to act on the climate problem. At the
national level, however, the political leadership of the United States remains divided.
There is a possibility that the United States is approaching a turning point fromwhich
there could emerge a restored national focus on solutions for clean energy and cli-
mate. An alternative option, however, is that the United States continues to struggle
to find a unified voice on these matters.
If climate change is indeed one of the defining issues of our day, then the geopolit-
ical implications of the U.S. clean energy transition are hard to exaggerate. Without
American climate leadership, it is hard to imagine global success in responding
adequately, and in this scenario American standing on the world stage will be sig-
nificantly diminished. With American leadership, one can imagine the possibility
of success in responding to the threat of climate change. But the hour is late, and
indecision by U.S. political leaders is already taking a toll on American interests on
the global stage.
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China: Climate Leader and Villain
Michal Meidan
1 China’s Changing Energy Landscape
Since China’s reform and opening up in 1978, the country has undergone a profound
transformation: The Chinese economy in 1978, as measured in Gross Domestic
Production (GDP) stood at $150 billion (current US$ according to the World Bank
(2019), and was half the size the Italian economy. Three decades later, China’s
economy is the second largest in the world and its per capita GDP has grown by
nearly 24 times from 1978 to 2017. Even though income inequality has increased
dramatically, the country has all but eradicated extreme poverty, with the share of
China’s population living in extremepoverty (according to theWorldBankdefinition)
plummeting from 90% in 1971 to less than 2% by 2013.
Significantly, in 1980, agriculture was a larger part of the Chinese economy than
industry and services, but it now accounts for under 10%, while the service sector
is approaching 40%, and industry accounts for the lion’s share of economic activity.
Urbanisation has therefore been a defining feature of China’s economic transfor-
mation, with the rural population, which accounted for roughly 85% of China’s
population on the eve of China’s reform and opening up, now down to around 40%
(World Bank 2019).
1.1 A Voracious Appetite for Fossil Fuels
Fuelling the country’s rapid industrialisation and urbanisation process is a voracious
appetite for energy, with primary energy consumption increasing sevenfold, from just
under 400 million tonnes oil equivalent (toe) in 1978 (BP 2019), to 3.27 billion toe
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Fig. 1 China’s energy mix 1978, 2018. While China’s energy mix still relies heavily on coal, it has
become much more diverse over the course of the last four decades. Source BP
in 2018. Domestically produced coal accounted for 70% of the energy mix in 1978,
alongside oil which accounted for another 23%. In the late 1970s, China consumed a
mere 17% of global coal (BP 2019), but by 2018, however, China burned 1.9 billion
toe of coal, half of the coal used worldwide (see Fig. 1).
In light of China’s heavy reliance on coal, the country has, since 2006, become
the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2). In 2018, according to the BP
Statistical Review (BP 2019), the country accounted for 28% of global CO2 emis-
sions—more than theUS and theEUcombined,with coal accounting for an estimated
70% of energy-related CO2 emissions (Myllyvirta 2019).
China’s carbon footprint has also expanded due to the country’s oil demand,which
has tripled over the past 20 years, from 4.1 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 1998,
to 13.5 mb/d in 2018 (BP 2019). Urbanisation and rising incomes have increased the
number of passenger vehicles on China’s roads. Indeed, in 2010, China’s passenger
vehicle park was estimated at 55million vehicles, but in 2018, it counted 199million.
Still, there are currently only 150 vehicles per 1,000 persons in China, compared to
around 600 vehicles per 1,000 persons in France and Germany, and as the middle
class continues to grow wealthier and buy cars, oil demand is set to rise further.
That said, China’s ambitious programme to electrify its fleet could displace some oil
demand growth in the future, allowing the country also to tackle local air pollution
problems. But with a power sector heavily reliant on coal, until China decarbonises
the power sector, electric vehicles only displace the problem. At the same time, air
travel and demand for consumer goods (and the freight to transport them around
the country) have all contributed to the surge in China’s oil demand growth and
will continue to fuel the country’s reliance on crude oil. But with limited domestic
reserves, China has become dependent on imported crude, leaving it vulnerable to
geopolitical disruptions in producer countries across the globe, and especially in the
Middle East, which supplies just under half of China’s total imports (see Fig. 2).
This surge in China’s external exposure to natural resources has been just as rapid
as its economic boom: In 1993, China became a net importer of oil for the first time,
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Fig. 2 China’s crude oil imports by region, mb/d. Source China Customs
and 10 years later, it was importing 5.6 million barrels per day (mb/d), roughly the
equivalent of Iranian and Iraqi oil production combined that year. By 2018, China’s
crude oil imports reached 9.2 mb/d.
1.2 Changing Policy Priorities
Over the course of the past four decades, since the ‘reform and opening up’ and espe-
cially since the country’s accession to theWorld Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001,
to accommodateChina’s rapid economic development, energy policywas geared first
and foremost towards ensuring ample supplies: to keep factories churning, to deliver
energy from producer hubs to consumer centres, and to keep the rising numbers of
urban homes warm in winter and cool in summer. But as China’s appetite for energy
continued to grow and outstrip its domestic production, the country’s policymakers
began fretting about rising dependence on waterborne flows of commodities and the
US’s ability to curb supplies via maritime routes (Downs 2019; Meidan 2014). Chi-
nese companies, with government support, embarked on costly M&As and overseas
infrastructure investments, hoping to secure a footprint across the energy value chain.
Producer countries from the Middle East through to the Americas saw new oppor-
tunities to produce and sell commodities to China, and also to attract investments in
infrastructure, even in conflict-torn countries.
China’s concerns about import dependence were gradually also compounded by
the rising toll of environmental degradation (Meidan et al. 2009). China is home to
around 20% of the world’s population but has five to seven percent of freshwater
resources and under 10% of the world’s arable land (Ely et al. 2019). China’s mega
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deltas are particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels,while hazardous smog in densely
populated cities—from industrial activities and road transport—is driving demand
for the government to tackle air pollution (Ramaswami et al. 2017). Moreover, health
problems due to air pollution are estimated to have led to the loss of about 133million
workdays in China in 2007, or 1.34% of real GDP (ChinaPower 2016).
Yet unlike many developed economies, that began to regulate air pollution after
their de-industrialisation was underway, the Chinese economy continues to grow
and industrialise, leaving the government to grapple with the need to protect its envi-
ronment while also ensuring affordable and secure sources of energy. The need to
diversify the domestic energy mix and ensure more sustainable fuels for growth has
coincided with a broader desire to shift the country’s economic structure away from
industrial-led growth towards a consumption-driven development path. Environmen-
tal protection which was once seen as a costly impediment to growth has become
both a social necessity and an industrial opportunity.
This change in priorities was reflected in the 12th Five-Year Plan (12th FYP,
spanning 2011–2015), in which the government set out for the first time binding
targets for a 16% reduction in energy consumption per unit of GDP, an 8% reduction
in sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions and a 10% reduction in nitrogen oxide (NOx)
emissions by2015, from2010 levels.As a result, PM2.5monitoring efforts intensified
with the government setting more stringent targets for heavily polluted regions. The
12th FYP also incorporated a number of specific measures to shut down heavily
polluting industrial facilities and expand the use of clean energy, including natural
gas. Against this backdrop, China introduced its first ‘Airborne Pollution Prevention
and Control Action Plan’ in 2013 (Action Plan 2013), which recognised coal as a
key driver of air pollution and sought to limit its use (ChinaPower 2016).
The Action Plan 2013 establishedmid- to long-term targets for reducing total coal
consumption and cutting its share of the energy mix (Miyamoto and Ishiguro 2018),
replacing industrial coal furnaces with natural gas. Gas demand, which has long
played second fiddle to both the coal and oil industries, began to surge on the back of
the coal-to-gas switch. In the early 2000s, natural gas was largely used as feedstock
in industry and only played a marginal role in the power sector, where coal remains
the dominant fuel. While this still holds true for the power sector, the coal-to-gas
switch as mandated by the Action Plan 2013 led to a strong surge in industrial and
commercial gas consumption. As a result, China’s natural gas demand went from
177 bcm in 2013 to 280 bcm in 2018 (Fig. 3) but the strong uptick in demand also led
to an increased dependence on imported gas, mainly liquefied natural gas (LNG).
But with global oil and gas prices falling on rising US shale production, sup-
ply security become a secondary concern in Beijing. Moreover, in the early Trump
years, increased oil and gas imports from the US were touted as a potential way of
evening out some of the US–China trade deficit, with Chinese traders increasing their
purchases of US crude oil and looking to sign long-term LNG contracts.
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Fig. 3 China’s natural gas demand, BCM. Source NDRC, BP
1.3 China’s ‘Energy Revolution’: The Nexus Between
Energy and Technology
China’s 12th FYP ushered in more than a change in energy policy priorities. It
was designed to address the ‘Four “Uns”’, as articulated by former Premier Wen
Jiabao, and change course for an economy that was deemed ‘unstable, unbalanced,
uncoordinated and unsustainable’. As such, it also saw the convergence of China’s
industrial upgrade plan and its energy priorities. In mid-2014, the country announced
an ‘energy revolution’, which was later formalised in a publicly released policy
paper setting out the main overall targets and strategies for China’s energy sector
through 2030 (NDRC 2016). The energy revolution spans energy consumption, by
mandating demand-side management for industry and changing consumer habits;
energy production—calling for enhancing efficiencies and reducing emissions from
China’s energy infrastructure and energy technology and also includes an effort to
develop, commercialise and diffuse next-generation energy technologies through
innovation and international cooperation.
In the context of China’s industrial programme, climate changemitigation became
an opportunity for underpinning China’s economic transition and a potential means
of advancing China’s bid for global technology leadership (Geall 2017). And given
the country’s scale and strong ability to incentivise industrial outcomes, it has proven
capable of rapidly driving change. The 12th FYP highlighted seven strategic emerg-
ing industries that would receive preferential support, including renewable energy
technologies and electric cars. The subsequent plan, the 13th Five-Year Plan (13th
FYP; 2016–2020), continues the emphasis on clean technologies, although it aims to
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give the market, rather than state subsidies, a determining role in selecting the most
competitive green industries and technology leaders (Geall, 2017).
China has since become the global leaders in renewables. In 2012, China’s
installed capacity of wind and solar power was 61 GW and 3.4 GW, respectively,
while the annual electricity generated by renewables was only 2.1% of China’s total
consumption. By 2017, China’swind and solar power capacity had increased to 168.5
GW and 130.06 GW, respectively, and renewables were generating 5.3% of China’s
electricity supply (Linster and Yang 2018). Installed solar capacity has outstripped
the 110 GW targeted in the 13th FYP, with 186 GW installed in June 2019. Similarly,
wind capacity is largely on track to meet its 13th FYP target of 210 GW of installed
capacity, having reached 193 GW in June 2019.
On the back of increased manufacturing capabilities, the average price of global
PV modules decreased by 79% from 2010 to 2017. At the same time, the subsidy
programme was draining central government coffers, with the total amount of wind
and PV subsidies in 2017 estimated at about 170 billion yuan (Lin and Yang 2018)
and a source of global trade friction, as Chinesemanufactured solar PVmoduleswere
the target of anti-dumping measures. But ultimately, Chinese companies’ ability to
reduce costs and support investments globally in the ‘low carbon’ economy have
supported wider efforts to tackle climate change (Goron 2018).
Moreover, since 2015, China has invested over US$100 billion a year in domestic
renewable energy projects, almost double the US’s $64 billion in 2018 (BNEF 2019).
Of over 8 million renewable energy jobs globally, 3.5 million were in China in 2015
and the Chinese government estimates that between 2016 and 2020, new investments
in renewables will create 13 million jobs (Jaeger et al. 2017). China has therefore
been driving global renewables consumption growth, both by installing capacity at
home and exporting solar panels andwind turbines. As such, China’s decarbonisation
goals and commitment to the UN climate process are consistent with and supportive
of its key economic and technological ambitions, namely, the domestic economic
rebalancing away from energy-intensive heavy industries towards innovation and
services.Moreover, increasing the share of renewables in the energymix also supports
China’s energy security by reducing import dependence and limiting the effects of
geopolitical conflict or price volatility on energy supply.
2 Climate Leader or Climate Villain?
China’s commitment to its ‘energy revolution’ suggests that renewables will account
for a growing share of the country’s energy use while supercharged efforts to spur
innovation are already turning Chinese companies into global leaders in the tech-
nologies underpinning the energy transition. To date, China’s domestic efforts have
altered the country’s international position markedly, too. China was cast as the
villain of global climate talks in Copenhagen in 2009, but has become an active
participant, if not a de-factor leader, in climate diplomacy especially since Presi-
dent Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris agreement created a leadership
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vacuum. The commitments to rebalance the Chinese economy, phase out coal grad-
ually and develop energy technologies suggest that China will stick to its pledges.
Whether or not China voluntarily assumes climate leadership globally is perhaps a
moot point, but the technological and economic changes within China suggest that
it will inevitably play a more prominent role globally. That said, how China is per-
ceived globally will depend not only on its exports of clean energy but also on how it
manages its own energy transition. There are already signs that China could become
both a climate leader and villain, with respect to its domestic energy consumption
and its overseas investments.
2.1 Electrification Before Decarbonisation
It is important to note that China’s ‘energy revolution’ emphasises air quality, rather
than carbon mitigation, with mandatory targets to reduce air pollutants such as SO2
andNOxwith less emphasis ongreenhouse gas emissionsmore broadly. The plan also
reiterates China’s climate change commitments undertaken in the Paris framework,
to peak CO2 emissions around 2030 or earlier, and to reduce carbon emission per
unit of GDP by 60–65% compared to 2005, without, however, setting an absolute
cap for carbon emissions. Put simply, China’s air quality and climate policies have
been developing relatively autonomously from each other with air pollution the
main source of concern for the Chinese government. Air pollution is perceived as
an environmental problem, while climate change has been framed as a development
issue and until March 2018, each policy was under the supervision of different parts
of the state administration (Yamineva and Liu 2019).
In addition, China’s energy transition is at the intersection of a number of policy
priorities whose relative importance for decision-makers can fluctuate. In 2019, for
example, given the decelerating economy and a weak industrial complex, air pollu-
tion woes are falling slightly in importance, in large part because the largest polluters
are impacted by the economic moderation. So, costly efforts to mitigate air pollution,
such as the coal-to-gas switch, are also slowed. At the same time, given the ongoing
trade war with the US, concerns about supply security and import dependence are
resurfacing. It is perhaps too early to tell, at the time of writing, whether China’s eco-
nomic slowdown and its frictions with the US are secular rather than structural trends
and while a number of long-standing policy priorities, such as the economic rebal-
ancing and the adoption of cleaner energy, will maintain their importance, the speed
and scope with which they will be pursued will depend on these macroeconomic and
geopolitical trends.
When considering China’s future energy mix, there are a host of possible scenar-
ios, which suggest dramatically different demand profiles for China. On one hand,
China’s National Renewable Energy Center (CNREC 2018) estimates that under
current policy guidelines, China’s fossil fuel consumption can peak in 2020 and
decline gradually through 2035. By 2035, the share of coal in the energy mix would
be just over 10% as its use in the power and industrial sectors would fall. At the same
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Fig. 4 Installed renewable capacity, GW. Source China Electricity Council
time, oil demand would also begin to decline due to higher levels of electrification
in transport and industry. And with the rise of renewable energy, China would not
need gas to serve as a bridge between coal and renewable energy. With improved
economics, according to the CNREC, China could require an additional 80–160 GW
of new solar PV installation and 70–140 GW of new wind capacity per year. Such
an aggressive rollout likely assumes that China manages to overcome a number of
challenges, related to the rigidity of the domestic electricity market (Chen 2017) and
to develop the intelligent infrastructure required for its effective deployment (Fig. 4).
Indeed, CNREC considers an even more aggressive scenario whereby coal con-
sumption falls even further, thanks to a faster adoption of renewables, but these
scenarios should be contrasted with how China’s fossil fuel industry views the coun-
try’s energy future. CNPC, China’s largest oil and gas company, in its 2050 outlook,
expects primary energy demand to peak between 2035 and 2040 (CNPC 2016) and
while the share of coal in the energy mix will continue to fall through to 2050, in
2035 coal will still account for roughly a third of primary energy demand. Indeed,
absolute demand for coal is expected to remain at 2018 levels until 2025, given its
importance in power generation. CNPC sees coal’s share of the energy mix continue
its decline but it will still remain the single largest supply source through to 2050.
In power generation, according to CNPC, coal is set to peak only in 2030 and even
as industrial coal use declines after 2030, coal in petrochemicals will offset some of
that fall (Fig. 5). To be sure, falling costs of renewables and reforms in the Chinese
power sector could allow for the more progressive scenarios in China to materialise,
but in the near term, the country may well electrify much faster than it can decar-
bonise. China’s international stance will look very different in each of the above
scenarios, and its domestic demand for clean energy technologies and equipment
will also determine the availability and price of exports.
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Fig. 5 China’s power demand forecast, trillion kwh. Source CNPC
2.2 China Commercialises and Exports Clean Tech
By virtue of China’s scale, the rapid ramp-up of renewables in the country has cata-
pulted Chinese companies’ status globally. Chinese solar manufacturers account for
about 60% of global solar cell production, with a recent ranking suggesting also that
thesemanufacturers are also among the highest qualitymanufacturers globally (Geall
2017). Similarly, China in 2018 was the largest wind market (for both onshore and
offshore), leading Chinese manufacturers to capture almost half of the global market
(Lacal-Arántegui 2019) yet when discounting installations in China, European man-
ufacturers remain more dominant globally. Indeed, while Chinese companies have
also helped cost reductions globally, research suggests that they experience difficul-
ties when developing global products and competing in terms of innovation. Chinese
firms mainly file patents in the domestic markets but seem to have limited innova-
tion competitiveness globally (Cao et al. 2018; Pan et al. 2019). Whether China is
a leader or a follower in renewable energy manufacturing remains a topic of debate
(Tyfield et al. 2014), but it is still undoubtedly the biggest investor in cleantech and
the largest market, capable of commercialising new energy products. Globally, China
has invested an estimated $44 billion in clean energy projects in 2017 (IEEFA 2018),
and the International Energy Agency forecasts China will build 40% of the world’s
wind energy capacity and 36% of global solar capacity from 2015 to 2021.
China’s largest power utility, State Grid Corporation has followed in the renew-
able manufacturers’ footsteps to expand its global reach. Within China, State Grid’s
investment in long-distance high-voltage power transmission lines has been an impor-
tant factor in alleviating some of China’s curtailment issues. State Grid has also set
out its vision of creating a global supergrid called the ‘Global Energy Interconnec-
tion’ (GEI) that aims to link every continent with undersea transmission cables to
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power the world with green electricity (IRENA 2019). In the interim, however, State
Grid focuses on smaller scale projects globally.
Beyond exports of renewable energy infrastructure, China’s efforts to increase
energy efficiency at home have brought it to the forefront of new technologies driv-
ing efficiency gains. China now accounts for roughly half the global market for
energy service companies, including connected devices which allow real-time con-
trol of energy consumption. China is now the largest market for smart metres, having
installed more than 500 million (IEEFA 2018), and ongoing progress in developing
connected devices and smart energy management systems will gradually allow it to
expand its global footprint, much like it is currently doing with lithium-ion batteries
and electric vehicles.
China’s lithium-ion battery production capacity is growing rapidly, supported
by Beijing’s goal of making China the leading country in the global EV supply
chain. Chinese companies are expected to hold 121 gigawatt-hours (GWh) of battery
production capacity by 2020, dwarfing Tesla’s 35 GWh (IEEFA 2018). Already in
2016, an estimate of 200 energy storagemanufacturers produced a combined capacity
of 120 GWh of energy storage that is scheduled to be operational by 2018. That year,
China’s lithium-ion battery shipments increased by 80% year on year (Vorrath 2017).
More broadly, bothChinese companies andBeijing are focusing on energy storage
solutions. In October 2017, the Chinese government issued its first national policy
document guiding the energy storage industry, outlining two stages of development
through 2027. The policy document views the first phase running through 2022,
during which domestic storage technology production to reach advanced interna-
tional standards, with preliminary accomplishments in creating a standards body.
Subsequently, throughout the 14th FYP, China aims to develop a mature industry
with world-class, internationally competitive technology. Subsequently in 2018, the
government announced a major storage push to help address curtailment of domes-
tic renewable energy generation, followed by an additional two-year action plan in
2019–2020 to support R&D in energy (NDRC 2019). Under the programme, the
government will issue subsidies to encourage the construction of energy storage
facilities and support trials of new storage technology testing pumped hydro stor-
age, compressed air storage, magnetic energy storage and large-scale battery storage
deployments. The Chinese government aims to maintain domestic manufacturing
control over the whole supply chain for energy storage—from raw materials, battery
technology and supercapacitors to micro-grid and smart-grid equipment.
While battery and storage technologies are critical elements of the energy transi-
tion, they are also a key component in electric mobility. Electric car manufacturers
have been identified by the Chinese government as potential ‘indigenous innovation’
rivals for incumbent auto-manufacturers and with strong incentive schemes, China in
2018 was the largest electric vehicle market globally (IEA 2019) with a stock of 2.3
million units; it accounted for almost half of the global electric cars, having sold 1.1
million electric cars that year. China is also the largest market globally for electric
two- and three-wheelers and for low-speed electric vehicles (LSEVs), estimated at
5 million units. Yet the EV fleet consumed an estimated 58 terawatt-hours (TWh) of
electricity in 2018, with China accounting for 80% of that demand.
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These latest data points highlight a number of unique facets of cleantech diffu-
sion in China: regardless of whether Chinese companies are leaders or followers
in innovation, strong government backing allows them to commercialise new prod-
ucts rapidly. Moreover, disruptive innovation has emerged in China from lower tech
products, including electric two-wheelers and LSEVs, defying government policies
(Zhou et al. 2018) and escaping the reach of high-tech innovation in large firms
(Tyfield 2014). Chinese cleantech companies could therefore export a wide array of
products to both developed and less affluent markets.
2.3 How Green Are the Belt and Road?
One case in point is China’sBelt andRoad initiative (BRI), the country’smultibillion-
dollar infrastructure investment plan. Overseas investments under the auspices of the
BRI have the potential to transform global development towards lower carbon alter-
natives, as seen in the above examples, but it could also lock in high-carbon growth
in developing countries. Ironically, while China’s domestic oversupply of solar pan-
els led to a fall in global prices (and related concerns about China’s trade practices)
through 2016, the country’s record-breaking solar buildout in 2017 absorbed much
of the country’s module output, leading to higher prices for international customers
(IEEFA 2018).
Recent research highlights that between 2000 and 2016, 66% of power sector
lending from Chinese banks went into coal projects. China was involved in 240 coal-
fired power projects in 25 of the 65 Belt and Road countries, with a total installed
capacity of 251GW.Chinese financial institutions have committed or offered funding
for over one-quarter (102 gigawatts GW) of the 399GWof coal plants currently under
development outsideChina (IEFFA2019), including investment in export coalmines,
coal-fired power plants, and the associated rail and port infrastructure in countries
including Vietnam, South Africa, Pakistan and Indonesia. Yet, there is a growing
divergence between state-backed financing and private funding. From 2014 to 2017,
more than two-thirds of China’s energy-sector loans and investments (through banks,
policy banks and state-owned companies) were in fossil fuels (Zhou et al. 2018),
while nearly two-thirds (64%) of cross-border energy-sector investment by Chinese
privately owned enterprises were in renewable energy.
Going forward, China’s global energy investments will likely be determined by
a number of factors, including the state of the domestic market, companies’ desire
to expand their global footprint, and the pull from host countries (Downs 2019),
but barring a radical shift in global demand—i.e. that host countries push back
against investments in coal-fired power plants as they have rejected hydropower
investments—China’s energy exports will both help and hinder the global energy
transition.
A final factor determining China’s exports will be its ongoing tussle with the
US. As the US–China trade war escalates into a deeper geopolitical and commercial
rivalry, China’s clean energy investments, especially to the extent that they could
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begin to set global standards in energy management for example, could become a
source of geopolitical friction.
2.4 The US and China: A Quest for Technological
Dominance
The trade war between the US and China has highlighted a paradigm shift in US–
China relations that is increasingly shaping China’s energy policies and in extension,
the global ramifications of its energy transition. The US Department of Defense’s
latest Indo-Pacific Strategy paper, for example, highlights the ‘geopolitical rivalry
between free and repressive world order visions’ (US Department of Defense 2019).
Officials in the US administration including Vice President Mike Pence and Secre-
tary of State, Mike Pompeo have issued increasingly hawkish speeches regarding
China’s economic statecraft and accusing it of becoming increasingly aggressive
and destabilising. This has vindicated those in China that have argued that the US is
aiming to contain China’s rise, and while the ‘decoupling’ narrative is not endorsed
by Chinese officials, advisers and strategists (Wang 2019) are contemplating what a
commercial Cold War could look like (Meidan 2019).
Up until the trade war, closer US–China relations led to an integration of goods,
capital, technology and people, with a view that this economic integration would
mitigate security competition. But the trade war and the US ban on Chinese telecom
giant Huawei in May 2019 are threatening to decouple supply chains, especially
those that use sensitive technology. Indeed, even if the Huawei ban is lifted, from
China’s perspective, the US’s ability to cut off tech companies from their supply
chains has been made abundantly clear.
A similar case in point is theUSdesignation ofChinese companies for tradingwith
Iran. US sanctions on two subsidiaries of China’s largest shipping company, COSCO
Shipping Energy, in October 2019 ledWestern companies to shun all COSCO assets,
regardless of the ownership structure, for fear of being caught up in US secondary
sanctions. Given these precedents, governments and businesses must now prepare
for the possibility that a Chinese supplier or partner with which they work could
be sanctioned by the US government, offering initial glimpse of de-globalisation
of trade flows and even of technology (Rosset 2019). The takeaway in China has
been that it must indigenise as much as it possibly can. So, even if the ‘Iron curtain’
on technology (Paulson 2018) will not materialise, it is no longer a mere fantasy.
The race between the US and China is increasingly beyond a competition for better
quality technological innovation, but also for standard setting.
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2.5 Controlling Critical Resources
The rising mistrust of the US has also made China acutely more aware of its reliance
on global resources and supply chains. Oil and gas markets are seen to be dominated
by Western companies and US financial institutions, while sea lanes of navigation
are effectively dominated by the US. Not only do commodities transact in US dollars
(for the most part) but also US naval supremacy—which in many parts of the world
as a provision of global goods (i.e. uninterrupted flows)—is an existential threat from
Beijing’s point of view, as it could be used by the US as a means of cutting off vital
supplies from China. China’s growing appetite for imported energy has confronted
the country with the insecurity of its energy supplies. The Chinese government has
deployed vast resources in a bid to hedge against these vulnerabilities with varying
degrees of success.
The energy transition, however, brings with it demand for new types of resources.
Rapid growth in EVs has boosted demand for metals used in power batteries, such as
lithium, nickel, manganese, cobalt, tungsten, magnesium and rare earth. Production
of thesemetals is heavily concentrated among a relatively small number of companies
and in a handful of countries. Roughly, half of the global cobalt supplies, for example,
are located in the conflict-prone Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). China relies
on theDRC for around 80%of its cobalt imports, but it has also effectively established
a monopoly over output in the DRC as well as over intermediate and refined cobalt
(Gulley et al. 2019).
Rare earths are another case in point. While most of the 17 rare earth minerals are
not geologically rare, they are expensive and polluting to mine and produce, leading
the US to limit production and allowing China to rise to predominance over rare
earth production since the 1990s. Beijing has also shown its willingness to use rare
earths exports as a geopolitical tool when in 2012, it issued export restrictions on rare
earth. To be sure, the subsequent rise in prices and fears about China’s dominance
led to investments in additional resources globally. Moreover, efforts are being made
to create cobalt-free batteries, and only a small minority of wind turbines (less than
2% in the US) are built with rare earth elements. Someminerals can also be recycled,
re-used and stockpiled, thereby further reducing their perceived scarcity (Quiggin,
2017).
Nonetheless, by taking the lead on renewables, China has improved its geopolitical
standing in several respects. By producing more of its own energy, China is reducing
its reliance on fuel imports and the risks of energy disruption which could put a brake
on its economic ambitions. Its technological expertise in renewables has established it
as a leading exporter of clean energy technology and could help cement the country’s
technological dominance.
Moreover, China’s investments along the BRI, namely, its investments in power
grids could shape the geopolitics of energy in new and profound ways. While the
US has shaped and safeguarded fossil fuel trading routes, China could shape power
networks going forward. Infrastructure links and the Internet may become new bat-
tlegrounds for influence and control between competing powers (IRENA, 2019) with
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inter-state electricity cut-offs becoming a foreign policy tool, akin to pipeline politics
or sanctions.
Notably, however, electricity trading tends to be more reciprocal than trade in
oil and gas. So cross-border electricity trading will create opportunities for regional
cooperation, and the creation of ‘grid communities’.
3 A Brave New World
China’s emergence as a global economic power and energy consumer in the early
2000s altered the geopolitical landscape of oil and gas. The scale of Chinese demand
growth boosted fossil fuel production and trading, but also raised alarm bells in Bei-
jing about the strategic vulnerabilities associated with its strong appetite for imports.
Concerns about import dependence were gradually overshadowed by the rising cost
of environmental degradation. Yet as China has sought to rebalance its economic
structure and rise up the industrial value chain, government-supported efforts to spur
innovation are already turning Chinese companies into global leaders in the tech-
nologies underpinning the energy transition. Beijing has also been able to capitalise
on these gains to become a global leader on climate. Yet, China’s track record is
extremely mixed. It is the fastest growing renewables market globally and is also the
biggest market for electric mobility in the world, but coal is now and will remain for
the foreseeable future an intrinsic part of the Chinese energy mix.
In its overseas investments, China is fuel-agnostic and technology-agnostic, will-
ing to finance and sell both coal-fired power plants and clean energy equipment and
solutions. The scope and speed with which China chooses to pursue its own energy
transition will remain a key variable in the global energy shift. Indeed, China is
unique in its efforts to decarbonise before it has fully industrialised. As such, China
could electrify its energy use before it decarbonises power. Indeed, despite China’s
commitment to tackling toxic air quality and climate change, it is still committed to
domestic growth and development. To the extent that coal can offer stable, secure
and cheap energy, it will remain a component of China’s energy mix.
As the gulf between the US and China deepens, these contradictions will become
increasingly visible. China may look to slow its shift away from coal while also
accelerating its efforts to become a global leader in clean technologies. As part of
its industrial policy, Beijing will continue to promote the indigenisation of clean
technology as well as research into disruptive innovation. Chinese companies may
becomeboth technology followers and leaders, given the size and scope of themarket.
Some innovation will be catered to domestic needs and may find welcoming export
markets in developing countries but increasingly, as the competition with the US
intensifies, China is already controlling supply chains and shaping the infrastructure
critical to the energy transition.
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Implications of the Global Energy
Transition on Russia
James Henderson and Tatiana Mitrova
1 What Is Energy Transition and How Does It Affect
Different Countries?
The current energy transition can be viewed as the fourth in a series of similar fun-
damental structural transformations of the global energy sector. V. Smil defines the
first energy transition—from biomass to coal—as the period between 1840 and 1890
during which the share of coal in the energy balance increased from 5 to 50% (Smil
2018). The second energy transition is associated with the fast penetration of oil—its
share grew from 3% in 1915 to 45% by 1975—and the third transition involved the
partial replacement of both coal and oil by natural gas, the share of which increased
from 3% in 1930 to 23% in 2017. All these transitions were driven by the compara-
tively higher economic efficiency of the new energy sources. Currently, however, as
we are talking about the beginning of the fourth energy transition (from fossil fuels to
low-carbon energy sources), the situation is quite different. The share of Renewable
Energy Sources (RES) (excluding hydro) in total primary energy consumption in
2017 was 3%, but it is now expanding very quickly. In this fourth energy transition,
in contrast to the previous three, a qualitative new driver is becoming critically impor-
tant, namely, combating global climate change, which has led to the establishment
of compulsory energy sector decarbonization targets.
In a more specific sense, energy transition is a translation of the German term
“Energiewende”, which came into international use in the early 2010s after the acci-
dent at the Fukushima nuclear power plant (OSCE 2013; Trüby and Schiffer 2018).
As one of the most ambitious decarbonization projects for the energy sector on a
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national scale (aiming for a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2020
and by 80–95% by 2050 from 1990 levels), “Energiewende” became a benchmark
for large-scale climate-driven transformations around the world.
Today, energy transition is driven by a complex set of different drivers: climate
agenda, technological progress and the availability of brand new technological solu-
tions which are able to dramatically increase the efficiency of the energy sector and
to change the traditional way that it functions. It has the means to satisfy the desire
of all countries to ensure the competitiveness of their national economies and to
boost development with affordable energy. Last, but not least, it taps into the need to
increase energy security, which, obviously, corresponds to the geopolitical agenda.
Basically, there are several ways in which energy transition affects different
countries:
(1) Direct influence:
• Countries which sign up to international climate agreements are supposed to
comply with their official targets and obligations, changing their energy mix; they
have no choice other than to develop new low-carbon strategies with a strong
focus on RES, energy efficiency and other ways to reduce emissions.
• Global innovation and technological development makes many new technologies
cheaper and more attractive, so often countries—driven by local stakeholders—
opt to promote these technologies voluntarily in order to decrease the cost of
energy and to sustain their economic competitiveness.
(2) Indirect influence (refers mainly to countries which are lagging behind the
energy transition):
• The changing global fuel mix with a growing share of RES limits the demand
growth for fossil fuels, thus resulting in lower than expected export volumes for
coal, oil and gas from resource-rich countries.
• New rules are under discussion in certain parts of the world concerning carbon
tracking of internationally traded goods and the creation of border carbon adjust-
ments (BCAs) as part of the carbon taxation mechanism (Morris 2018; Mehling
et al. 2017). A high carbon footprint for all exported goods might become a
long-term source of instability for economies relying on fossil fuels.
• Banks and financial institutions are assessing climate risks and becoming more
reluctant to provide financing for fossil fuel projects (UNEP 2019). This trend is
most visible in the coal industry (BANKTRACK 2019), and it will create more
obstacles for the further development of conventional energy in resource-rich
countries.
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2 Russia’s Role in the International Energy and Climate
Change Landscape and Energy Geopolitics
Despite the fact that Russia produces only 3% of the world’s GDP and accounts
for only 2% of the world’s population, it is the third largest producer and consumer
of energy resources in the world after China and the US, providing 10% of world
production and accounting for 5% of world energy consumption. Russia consistently
ranks first for global gas exports, second for oil exports and third for coal exports.
With energy production of about 1470 mtoe, Russia exports over half of the primary
energy it produces, providing 16% of global cross-regional energy trade, which
makes it the absolute world leader in energy exports (ERI RAS and SKOLKOVO
2019). Its strategic behaviour regarding energy transition is therefore important not
only for the country itself, but also for the rest of the world.
From a climate perspective, the country ranks fourth globally in terms of carbon
dioxide emissions. Russia continues to rely on fossil fuels, while its GDP energy
intensity remains high amid relatively low energy prices and high capital costs. The
share of RES (solar and wind power) in the energy mix is negligible, and officially
is not projected to rise above 1% by 2035.
From an energy geopolitics viewpoint, Russia is traditionally regarded as a
resource-rich country and is accused of abusing its power as an energy (especially
natural gas) exporter. In the Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2030,
it is explicitly stated that, “energy exports should help to promote the country’s
external policy”. Russia’s use of geopolitical power in the field of energy increased
during the 2000s, mainly due to Russia’s use of its energy exports in its political
relationships with post-Soviet states, as well as the strategic and economic effects of
new Russian export pipelines to Central and Eastern Europe. It was mainly applied
to influence the political behaviour of those countries purchasing Russian energy.
However, the metaphor of an “energy weapon” is misleading: Russia has not used
tough means of influence—the so-called ‘hard energy weapon’—in the context of
Western Europe (Tynkkynen et al. 2017). Nevertheless, the image of a dangerous,
unpredictable player in the global energy geopolitics game has defined Russia for
the last two decades.
3 The Direct Influence of Energy Transition on Russia
As mentioned above, there are two direct ways in which energy transition can influ-
ence different countries: first, through the official targets and NDCs set by inter-
national climate change agreements which influence national strategies to reduce
carbon, and, secondly, by commercial decisions taken by the main investors and
other stakeholders active in the country in order to take advantage of innovations and
green technologies.
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4 Russian Climate Policy and the Paris Agreement
Decarbonization is the main global driver of energy transition. Individual regions,
countries or their associations set goals for reducing the carbon footprint in the energy
sector and introduce mechanisms to stimulate this process—carbon taxes, emissions
trading systems, etc. According to the World Bank Group (World Bank and Ecofys
2018), fifty-one carbon pricing initiatives have been implemented or are scheduled
for implementation in regional, national and subnational jurisdictions. Consequently,
during the period 2008–2017, the carbon content of electricity decreased by 50–100
gCO2/kWh in the European Union, US, Canada, China, Australia, Kazakhstan and
many other countries (Staffell et al. 2018).
Despite the global trend, for many years, the climate agenda and drive for decar-
bonization were not essential factors in the economic and energy strategy of the
Russian Federation. Russia signed the Paris Agreement in 2016, with voluntary
obligations to limit anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions to 70–75% of 1990
emissions by 2030, provided that the role of forests was taken into account as much
as possible. But even with this very low target (which does not require any significant
effort given the country’s economic stagnation), Russia has not ratified the Agree-
ment although it did finally join the Agreement in September 2019 (without official
ratification, just by the decree of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev).
It is still unclear exactly what Russia’s climate goals will be under the Paris Agree-
ment. A few important milestones are envisaged in 2020, including the development
of a Low-Carbon Strategy for Russia up to 2030 and beyond, and the adoption
of a carbon regulation framework. But it is worth noting that there are still many
strong opponents to the Paris Agreement and carbon regulation in Russia, includ-
ing some representatives of the authorities, fossil fuel businesses and the scientific
community. Currently, discussion is mainly focused on delivering good reports and
‘greenwashing’, as opposed to real climate action.
The Paris Agreement is mentioned only once in the draft version of “Russian
Energy Strategy Up to 2035”, a key document defining the country’s strategic pri-
orities in this critically important industry, which was submitted to the government
by the Energy Ministry in 2015, but which has still not been officially approved. It
states that “in 2016, the Russian Federation signed the Paris Climate Agreement,
which included, among other things, the development by 2020 of a strategy of socio-
economic development with a low level of greenhouse gas emissions for the period
until 2050. In order to minimize possible negative consequences for the Russian fuel
and energy complex from the implementation of this agreement, an extremely bal-
anced approach is needed to take into account some additional regulatory measures
to counter climate change” (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation 2017).
This very cautious approach towards decarbonization is driven by several factors:
• Scepticism concerning the anthropogenic nature of climate change dominates
among stakeholders—senior representatives of the Russian Academy of Sciences
as well as many state officials publicly express their doubts over the very concept
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of anthropogenically created climate change. Many experts, academicians and
policymakers see it as a concept manufactured by the West to undermine Russia.
• Secondly, following the economic downturn and restructuring in the 1990s, Russia
de facto reduced greenhouse gas emissions sharply (by about 30%). Between
1998 and 2008 emissions increased in line with GDP growth, while in the period
2010–2016 Russia’s GDP has grown by 73%, while the level of emissions has
increased by only 12% due to further economic restructuring and faster growth of
the financial and other non-energy-intensive sectors (KOMMERSANT 2016). As
a result, Russia is currently well within its emission limits due to the high initial
starting point in 1990 and economic stagnation since then.
• Lastly, Russia’s energy sector has a lower carbon footprint than many other coun-
tries, including Poland, Germany, Australia, China, India, Kazakhstan, the Arab
countries of the Persian Gulf, the US, Chile and South Africa. Around 35% of
electricity is generated by carbon-free Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) and large
hydropower plants, and 48% comes from gas (IEA 2018), with gas gradually dis-
placing petroleum products and coal from the Thermal Power Plant (TPP) fuel
basket (the share of gas in TPP electricity generation has increased from 69 to
74% during 2006–2017).
This background explains why Russia has sidestepped the global decarbonization
trend for so long. Its participation in international environmental cooperation has
always been determined primarily by its external policy objectives. In Soviet times,
participation in global environmental initiatives was a channel of collaboration with
theWest. In the 1990s, it was ameans of integration into the international community
and one of the major areas of cooperation with the US. In the 2000s, Russia used the
environmental agenda to gain trade-offs fromWestern partners along with attracting
foreign investment (Makarov 2016). At present, an understanding of the possibili-
ties to reap benefits from the country’s natural capital is slowly increasing among
Russian political and business elites, so in the longer term Russia’s involvement in
international environmental cooperation may be catalysed by an increasing need for
international re-integration.
5 Businesses Promoting Green Technologies in Russia
Businesses in Russia currently seem to be more preoccupied by the climate and
energy transition agenda than the authorities. Initially, export-oriented companies
started to realize the threat of changing perceptions and regulations for their tradi-
tional business, in particular, steel and aluminiummaking companies, aswell as paper
and chemicals businesses. Producers are now hurrying to implement ESG reporting
to please their investors and to develop “green products” (green steel, green alu-
minium, etc.) using new energy technologies and different offset mechanisms in
order to remain competitive in their core export markets. From their perspective, the
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decarbonization of the Russian energy sector and the expansion of RES is needed
urgently.
There is also a rising cluster of companies interested in RES development as
their main market, namely, equipment producers for solar and wind farms. Several
oligarchs (such asAnatoly Chubais andVictor Vekselberg) have entered this business
and have now become its strongest proponents. Their commercial targets are related
to export expansion and so they are extremely interested in cooperation with other
countries which could become export markets for their equipment. The primary
targets in this respect are the former Soviet republics which prefer not to further
increase their dependence on China. Current volumes of trade are negligible, but it
is possible that at some point this could create tension between Russia and China.
6 National Technology Policy
While not paying particularly serious attention to climate policy, Russia is on the
other hand very sensitive to its rate of technological development. The country’s
leadership clearly realizes that Russia runs the risk of falling behind in the develop-
ment of new energy technologies that have become standard in most of the rest of
the world. This is the reason behind its strict requirements on equipment localization
for renewable energy and smart grids, and numerous import substitution programs.
Despite this realization, energy transition technologies are definitely not the main
focus of Russia’s technology policy. In the key state document which defines prior-
ities in this area, (the State Program for “Energy Development” approved in 2014
and amended in 2019), only the “promotion of innovative and digital development
of the fuel and energy complex” is mentioned as a target, together with many new
technologies in hydrocarbon production and processing. Nothing at all is mentioned
concerning low-carbon technologies (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation
2019a).
The desire to overcome the technological gap and to reduce the potential need for
imports if energy transition becomes mainstream has created some interest among
Russian authorities concerning technologies for energy transition. Several huge grant
programs and networks have been created for this purpose (RVK,Energynet, etc.), but
surprisingly they are mainly focused on digital technologies, rather than low-carbon
ones. Russian authorities regard the digital transformation of the energy sector as a
technological challenge (bearing inmind the high level of current import dependence
for all high-tech equipment and the potential threat of sanctions, which could create
serious problems for national energy security) and this is the reasonwhydigitalization
has become the main driver of energy transition in Russia. In 2018, Vladimir Putin
signed a decree establishing a special state program for the creation of a “Digital
Economy” inwhich energy infrastructure ismentioned as one of the key components.
The Energy Ministry has also developed its special project called “Digital Energy”
(Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation 2019b) which is focused primarily on
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the digitalization of regulation and the creation of a whole institutional framework
for a wide-scale introduction of digital technologies in the energy sector.
As the main drivers of this movement are the fear of technological lag, import
dependence on foreign equipment and, even more importantly, software (especially
given the threat of new sanctions in the energy sector), no large-scale international
cooperation can be expected in this area. Indeed, protectionism and the creation of
various trade and economic barriers is highly likely.
7 Indirect Influence
The indirect consequences of the energy transition are more obvious and sensitive
for Russia. Any changes in the demand for fossil fuels result in lower energy exports,
while the potential introduction of BCA (Border CarbonAdjustments)might become
a threat for all Russian exports, and new rules of behaviour by investors could further
constrain the availability of funding for Russian energy projects.
8 Energy Transition Limits Demand for Fossil Fuels
and Constrains Russian Energy Exports
Energy transition affects regional energy balances, specificallywhenRES implemen-
tation starts to limit growth or reduce overall demand for fossil fuels. For example,
rapid reduction in coal use in the EU energy balance threatens Russian exports to
Europe, which have already dropped considerably during the last decade. The share
of electric vehicles in key markets (China, the US, EU) is forecast to grow rapidly,
which is likely to reduce the demand for petroleum products. In 2018 in India, solar
energy (PV) was 14% cheaper than coal generation, while China will achieve net-
work parity in 2020 which will reduce demand for imported pipeline gas and LNG,
all of which will impact regional energy balances.
For Russia, as for many other resource-rich and energy-exporting countries,
energy transition creates new long-term challenges and calls into question the sus-
tainability of the whole economy, which is highly dependent on hydrocarbon export
revenues. In the period from the beginning of the 2000s, Russia managed to increase
its energy exports dramatically: from2000 through2005, exports grewby an unprece-
dented 56% (ERI RAS and AC RF 2016), exceeding the total energy exports of the
USSR, providing an incredible acceleration of the national economy and underpin-
ning the country’s position on the international arena as an “energy superpower”. But
as the global financial–economic crises came in 2008, the growth in energy exports
halted. The post-crisis years of 2011–2014witnessed very high oil prices but stagnant
export volumes, and a lack of petro-dollar revenues resulted in GDP stagnation at an
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oil price of 110 $/bbl, which was a clear evidence of deep structural economic prob-
lems. More recently, oil and gas export revenues have declined from the heights of
2008–2012 under the impact of falling prices for hydrocarbons. Nonetheless, even in
2017, hydrocarbons provided 25% of GDP and 39% of the country’s federal budget,
65% of foreign earnings from exports, and almost a quarter of overall investment in
the national economy (Trading Economics 2018).
Obviously, the energy transition affects the prospects for Russian fossil fuel
exports, particularly coal and oil, but natural gas exports might also be significantly
affected by a further increase in emission reduction goals. Indeed, economic mod-
elling has shown that climate-related actions outside Russia could lower Russia’s
GDP growth rate by about a half a percentage point (Makarov et al. 2017). ERI
RAS-SKOLKOVO analysis (ERI RAS and SKOLKOVO 2019) has demonstrated
that the role of the fuel and energy complex in the Russian economy will continue to
decline from its peak in 2012–2013, affected by shifts in world energy markets. The
technological transition of the world energy sector from the dominance of fossil fuels
to low-carbon energy resources could lead to a 16% reduction in fuel exports and an
8% reduction in primary energy production in Russia over the next two decades. In
general, by 2040 this could reduce the value added by the fuel and energy complex
by a quarter and value added by supporting enterprises by another 2–3%, due to a
decrease in capital investments within the sector. As a result, average GDP growth
in the country is forecast to slow down between 2016 and 2040 from 1.7 to 0.6% per
annum and the share of the energy sector in Russia’s GDP will decline from 25% to
just 14%. This signifies the end of the dominance of the fuel and energy complex in
the national economy during the Energy Transition.
There is little if any hope within Russia that this downward movement will be
mitigated by internal factors. GDP growth projections have been revised downwards
to 1–2% per annum due to ongoing systemic economic crisis, international financial
and technological sanctions and an unfavourable investment climate. Gone are the
years of high GDP growth (7–8% per annum) in the first decade of this century.
Russia is feeling the impact of a stagnating economy, flat domestic energy demand,
the necessity of keeping domestic regulated prices unchanged and insufficient invest-
ment in the deployment of new technologies. This situation, which limits investment
capacity, is further compounded by the high cost of capital in the domestic financial
market and the negative impact of financial sanctions.
As a result, the global rise in RES targets and the transition towards a decarbonized
energy economy are regarded in Russia as a significant threat for export revenues and
thus for Russian economic, and therefore political, security (GARANT.ru 2017).
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9 Carbon Tracking of Internationally Traded Goods
and The Creation of Border Carbon Adjustments (BCA)
Challenge Russia’s Non-energy Exports
Russia also faces the risk that market barriers for its exports of energy-intensive
goods, which constitute currently 30% of exports, could be introduced. These restric-
tions are currently under discussion in Europe and in other parts of the world and
might soon become an important component of international trade. Under these
circumstances, Russian energy-intensive, export-oriented industries—initially the
metallurgical and chemical sectors—might face significant problems in protecting,
never mind expanding, their niche in export markets.
10 Difficulties in Attracting International Financing
for Fossil Fuel Projects
Another important implication, whichmakesRussia’s perception of energy transition
so negative, is a further increase in the difficulty of attracting international financing
for domestic fossil fuel projects. Many global banks and investment funds have
already removed coal projects from their portfolios, and some have started to refuse
to finance oil projects. Financial sanctions currently in place are already a serious
burden for the development of Russian energy projects, and so further restrictions
due to climate considerations would make life even more difficult.
11 Russia’s Potential for Energy Transition and Its
Geopolitical Implications
As shown above, the climate agenda is not a major policy issue in Russia, while the
competitiveness of the national economy, aswell as its energy security, is already pro-
tected by cheap abundant hydrocarbons (primarily natural gas). As a result, for Russia
the only important driver for energy transition is technological progress and a desire
to prevent the emergence of a strong technological gap between it and other countries.
Nevertheless, despite this limited motivation to promote energy transition in Russia,
there are some areas where the potential benefits are huge and which could cre-
ate substantial value for the Russian economy, attracting considerable investment if
proper regulation was to be put in place. These key areas for Russia are the following:
– Energy efficiency,
– Renewables,
– Decentralization and distributed energy resources, and
– Hydrogen.
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12 Energy Efficiency
Factors relating specifically to Russia—the cold climate, the vast distances, a huge
endowment of natural resources, poor economic organization and marked techno-
logical backwardness—have resulted in its economy having a high level of energy
intensity, 1.5 times higher than the world average and that of the US, and twice that of
the leading European countries (ERI RAS and AC RF 2016). Across practically all
industrial sectors, there is a substantial energy efficiency gap compared not only with
the best available technologies but also with current performance in other countries.
Even with comparatively low fuel and energy prices, the share of fuel and energy
costs in overall production costs in Russia is higher than in developed and many
developing countries (Bashmakov 2013). Before the 2009 economic crisis, Russia
was one of the world leaders in terms of GDP energy intensity reduction rates, and
the gap between Russia and developed countries was narrowing dramatically. A 40%
reduction of GDP energy intensity within ten years was achieved between 1998 and
2008; however, since 2009 this reduction has slowed down and even reversed.
Obviously, for such an energy-intensive economy, issues such as energy efficiency
and conservation are key for any Energy Transition plan: according to analysis from
the IEA 30% of primary energy consumption and enormous amounts of hydrocar-
bons (180 bcm of gas, 600 kb/d of oil and oil products and more than 50Mtce of coal
per annum) could be saved in Russia if comparable OECD levels of efficiency were
to be achieved (IEA 2011). A significant reduction in the growth of energy consump-
tion could be provided by structural energy conservation (changing the industrial and
production structure of the economy), with an increase in the share of non-energy-
intensive industries and products. The next most important factor in constraining the
growth of energy consumption could be improved technical application of conser-
vation processes which could provide a total energy saving of 25–40%. However,
it will be extremely difficult to close the gap with OECD countries—it is actually
widening due to a lack of investment in processes which could quickly renew assets
or improve energy efficiency. If we also include ongoing administrative barriers and,
most importantly, a lack of availability of ‘long money’ and of credits for energy
efficiency projects for small market participants, coupled with the persistence of rel-
atively low natural gas prices in the long term, then Russia could well remain stuck
in a state of high energy intensity. Strong policies are required to change this pattern,
accompanied by a substantial increase in energy prices.
Unfortunately, at present, there appears to be little incentive for anything to
change, unless Russia can develop energy efficiency technologies which could then
be exported to the rest of the world. Internally, it would seem to be too politically
risky either to raise prices or to force spending on energy efficiency at a time of
economic stagnation.
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13 Renewable Energy Sources
Russia’s energy balance is strongly dominated by fossil fuels, with natural gas pro-
viding 52% of total primary energy demand, coal providing 18% and oil-based liquid
fuels a further 18%. Carbon-free sources of energy in Russia are represented primar-
ily by large-scale hydro and nuclear (which enjoys strong state support). The role of
solar, wind, biomass and other sources of renewable energy is negligible—less than
1% of the total supply (ERI RAS & AC RF, 2016). The total share of RES (includ-
ing hydro, solar, wind, biomass and geothermal) in Russia’s total primary energy
consumption was just 3.2% in 2015. By the end of 2015, total installed renewable
power generation capacity was 53.5 gigawatts (GW), representing about 20%of Rus-
sia’s total installed power generation capacity (253 GW) with hydropower providing
nearly all of this capacity (51.5 GW), followed by bioenergy (1.35 GW). Installed
capacity for solar and onshore wind by 2015 amounted to 460 MW and 111 MW,
respectively (IRENA 2017).
According to the draft Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2035 (Min-
istry of Energy of the Russian Federation 2017), the share of renewable energy in
Russia’s total primary energy consumption should increase from 3.2 to 4.9% by
2035. This includes Russia’s approved plans to expand its total solar PV, onshore
wind and geothermal capacity to 5.9 GW by the end of 2024. The foundation for the
growth of RES deployment in Russia is Decree 449, passed in 2013, which created a
legal framework to establish a renewable energy capacity system in the country. The
decree is designed to encourage the development of renewable energy in Russia, par-
ticularly focusing on wind and solar photovoltaics, and to a lesser extent, small-scale
hydropower. Under the new regulatory system, energy developers of projects with an
output of at least 5 MW can bid for capacity supply contracts with Russia’s Admin-
istrator of the Trading System via annual tenders. Winning suppliers are paid both
for the capacity they add to the energy system and for the energy they supply, based
on long-term, 15-year contracts with fixed tariffs. This regulation sets a predictable
legal and regulatory environment that allows developers to commercialize capacity
as a separate commodity to the power itself and ensures the economic attractiveness
of these projects for investors. In return, RES developers are expected to ensure they
can provide the promised capacity, within the right timescale and with sufficient
localization of equipment (Power Technology 2018).
Since then annual renewable capacity additions have risen from 57MW in 2015 to
376 MW in 2018 (320 MW solar, 56 MWwind). What is more significant, however,
is the significant decline of capital expenditure in the renewables auctions which have
taken place during the last twoyears: by 35%forwind and by31%for solar, according
to the Energy Ministry (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation 2019b). This
process was not smooth, as some capacity auction rounds have struggled to attract
bids. Just over 2GW of renewable capacity was awarded in tenders between 2013
and 2016, while the 2017 auction resulted in a total of 2.2GW of wind, solar and
small hydro awarded in a single round. In 2018, 1.08GW of capacity was allocated
between thirty-nine projects.Additionally, in 2017fivewaste-to-energyprojectswere
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introduced to the capacity market scheme, with a total capacity of 335 MW. But in
2018, the tender for waste energy capacity failed, due to strict new requirements for
bidders to provide performance guarantees.
As technological policy is the main driver of Russia’s interest in renewables, the
country is focused on building its own RES manufacturing capacity. Russia has set a
relatively high level of local content which is required to qualify for the highest tariff
rates, an essential component of many Russian RES projects’ long-term feasibility.
The percentage of Russian-made equipment required to avoid tariff penalties was
relatively modest in the early days of the auction system but has now risen to 65%
for wind farms and small hydro, and 70% for solar until 2020, with the long-term
target level of localization set by the government at 80%. These high levels have been
behind the failure of several tenders, especially in wind farm development, for which
there has been little to no Russian-made equipment proposed. The requirements have
encouraged foreign firms to partner with Russian power companies and manufactur-
ers. Several international joint ventures have been established including Fortum and
state-owned technology investor Rusnano’s wind investment fund, andWRSBashni,
a partnership between Spanish developer Windar Renovables, Rusnano and Russian
steel firm Severstal. Wind equipment was localized by Vestas Manufacturing Rus
in the Nizhny Novgorod region, while SGRE (Siemens-Gamesa Renewables) and
Lagerwey are also entering the Russian market (Power Technology 2018).
The problem is that the current support mechanism will expire in 2024. Russia’s
unambitious RES targets and ambitious localization targets will be nearly fulfilled
by this time, and the influx of foreign renewables developers might stop if no new
incentives for the RES market are created. But in order to create these incentives,
the Russian government needs to first confirm the long-term role of renewables in
its energy balance, which is rather difficult to do without a decarbonization agenda.
However, it seems that as a country with the world’s largest natural gas reserves
and the second-largest reserves of thermal coal, Russia does not see any real value in
transitioning from fossil fuels to zero-carbon energy sources. Despite the country’s
massive potential in wind and solar resources and the virtually limitless land avail-
able for development, the availability of oil, gas and coal is suppressing clean energy
development. Diversifying this energy mix towards carbon-free energy sources is a
challenging task: low prices for hydrocarbons, the unfavourable geographical dis-
persal of potential renewable resources from the point of their utilization (they are
mainly concentrated in non-populated areas with a long distance to the centres of
consumption) and their comparatively high costs (caused mainly by the mandated
requirements on localization, which often results in uncompetitive per-unit costs),
are hindering the development of these energy sources in Russia.
According to IRENA (2017), Russia theoretically has the potential to increase
its share of renewables from 4.9 to 11.3% of total primary energy consumption by
2030. However, without a reassessment of its energy strategy priorities and a wider
transformation of its energy system, this will not be achieved. As a result, it seems
that the only real incentive to develop any form of new technology will be the export
market. If Russia could export renewable electricity or technology it might be worth
pursuing, but for domestic use it is a real challenge, unless it becomes significantly
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cheaper. In addition, for the country as a whole, the real economic necessity is to
maintain export revenues, which has resulted in enthusiasm for potential hydrogen
export to Europe, as this is where the real incentive seems to lie.
14 Russia’s Decentralization and Distributed Energy
Resources Potential
Historically, the Russian energy system has always developed in an extremely cen-
tralized way. The Russian electricity sector, for example, relies on a huge centralized
power system, while distributed energy resources, including microgrids based on
renewables, are developing slowly and only in remote and isolated areas. Russia has
one of the world’s largest national centralized power systems with single dispatch
control; as of 2017, the total length of its trunk networks was over 140 thousand km,
its distribution networks were over 2 million km and the installed capacity of power
plants was 246.9 GW. This energy system was created and historically developed
on a hierarchical basis with centralized long-term planning bodies. For decades, the
centralized model has been, and remains, the basis of its energy strategy. The role of
distributed generation has historically been significant only in remote areas of the Far
East, Siberia and the Arctic, which are too expensive to connect to a single network.
However, the penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) into the centralized
system has now begun, with potentially significant consequences for the incumbent
actors.
Decentralization in the power sector began when the role of economies of scale
in power generation globally ceased to be significant due to technological improve-
ments. The catalyst for this change was the emergence in the 1980s of gas turbines
and reciprocated gas engine technologies. It was the reciprocated gas engine global
market that showed steady growth rate (CAGR 17%) until the late 2000s (Diesel and
Gas Turbine Worldwide 2006). In the US, distributed generation has played a role in
the electric power sector for several decades (Rhodium Group 2017). Historically,
these DERs have consisted of dispatchable resources; however, the recent increase of
non-dispatchable PV capacity marks a change in this trend. BNEF’s forecast shows
that the decentralization ratio will exceed 15% (as it did in Germany in 2017) in eight
countries by 2040 (BloombergNEF 2017). Globally, annual distributed generation
capacity additions have already exceeded centralized ones, and non-generation types
of DER have even more potential than distributed generation. The estimated poten-
tial for Demand Response and Energy Efficiency in the US in 2014 (37 GW) was
higher than for CHP (18 GW) or Solar (8 GW) (Rhodium Group 2017). In line with
other countries, the integration of DER into the Russian electricity sector became
noticeable in the 2000s, but in the past seventeen years it was limited to distributed
generation only. The development of this process in Russia is driven not by global cli-
mate change or energy independence concerns, but by the economic considerations
of the largest electricity consumers. Almost all the big Russian industrial companies
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(including oil and gas industry leaders like Gazprom, Rosneft, Lukoil, Novatek and
Sakhalin Energy) are involved in distributed generation projects in order to get a
more affordable power supply. Meanwhile, micro-generation using renewables for
households in Russia is still largely confined to enthusiasts. There are just a few cases
evident in the regions, all of them stimulated almost only by economic expediency
reasons.
However, non-generation types of DER in Russia are only in the very early stage
of development. Demand response technologies began to develop in the country
in 2016–2017, but only a small proportion of power consumption is affected (for
example, 54 MW in the second price zone of the wholesale power market, or 0.1%
of total capacity in this zone). Demand response in retail electricity market is in its
experimental stage, and energy efficiency policies have not yet achieved significant
results. According to I. Bashmakov (Bashmakov 2018), GDP energy intensity in
Russia in 2017 is just 10% lower than in 2007, a disappointing outcome given that the
initial energy efficiency target set in 2008 was to reach a 40% decline in GDP energy
intensity by2020. Substantial federal budget subsidieswere allocated but very limited
change has occurred, and as a result the initial target has been significantly scaled
down to 9.41% and federal funding has been discontinued (Ministry of Economic
Development of the Russian Federation 2018).
Nevertheless, DER has significant potential in Russia. According to a study by
SKOLKOVOEnergy Centre (Khokhlov et al. 2018), it has the potential to cover over
half of the needs for generating capacity (about 36 GW by 2035) if even a small part
is actually utilized. The most promising type of DER in Russia is distributed co-
generation (~17 GW). On-site self-generation units owned by electricity consumers
can provide an additional 13 GW, demand response another 4 GW, energy efficiency
technologies a further 1.5 GW and rooftop PV systems up to 0.6 GW. Indeed, if DER
is fully utilized, the Skolkovo analysis shows that the entire generation gap in 2035
could be covered, although this would require significant acceleration from today’s
levels and a major push by the Russian government to introduce a favourable policy
framework. However, although DER has been widely analysed in international liter-
ature, in Russia there has been no integrated assessment of its potential in response
to future development needs of the national power system and as a result progress is
likely to be slower than might be hoped.
In order to stimulate the maximum utilization of DER technologies, systemic
changes are necessary in the architecture and policy of the Russian power sector,
balancing the interests of new players with the existing model. An optimal combi-
nation of centralized generation and DER will need to be found, but in order to find
such an outcome it will be necessary to develop principles and market mechanisms
for the integration of centralized and decentralized parts and to ensure their reliable
joint operation. The Russian authorities are some way from achieving this at present.
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15 Nuclear
Russia is one of the world’s largest producers of nuclear energy. Its nuclear industry
has a role to play as an existing giant with decarbonization credentials. Russia is
recognized for its nuclear expertise, and it is pursuing an ambitious plan to increase
sales of Russian-built reactors overseas. Currently, it has thirty-nine reactors either
under construction or planned overseas.
Moreover, Russia is attempting to create a new breakthrough in nuclear technol-
ogy: nearly, all of the world’s reactors operate with thermal (slow) neutrons, while
Russia has developed fast neutron reactors, through which it hopes to take the signif-
icant step of closing the fuel cycle. Currently, Russia is a world leader in fast neutron
reactor technology and is consolidating this through its Proryv (‘Breakthrough’)
project. Starting in 2020–2025 it is envisaged that fast neutron power reactors will
play an increasing role in Russia, with substantial recycling of fuel. Indeed, fast
reactors are projected to account for some 14 GWe of capacity by 2030 and 34 GWe
by 2050. If successful this new technology platform envisages a full recycling of
fuel, balancing thermal and fast reactors, so that 100 GWe of total capacity requires
only about 100 tonnes of input per year, from enrichment tails, natural uranium and
thorium, with minor actinides being burned. About 100 t/yr of fission product waste
would go to a geological repository (World Nuclear Association 2019).
16 Hydrogen
Russia remains isolated from international communities and partnerships which are
developing hydrogen technologies and there is no national hydrogen program, and
only in the very end of 2019 the first attempts to coordinate various research groups
and interested parties appeared. At the same time, there are many resources in Russia
capable of producing hydrogen, and there are a number of R&D activities in this area
(most, however, far from commercialization) and also some prospective domestic
demand niches for hydrogen. There is also design work and scientific development
in the areas of production, storage and transportation of hydrogen, as well as its use
in mobile transport. In addition, Russia has enormous potential to produce hydrogen
and export it on a global scale. Therefore, hydrogen technologies are being spoken
about in a positive way both at the largest Russian forums and within the largest
Russian companies (Melnikov et al. 2019).
On the production side, there are proven technologies for producing “grey” hydro-
gen in Russia, similar to those used elsewhere in the world. They are deployed at
oil and gas processing plants, metallurgical plants, etc. (methane conversion). All
hydrogen produced is used on-site—for example, to improve the quality of hydro-
carbon processing. Furthermore, Gazprom andRosatom areworking on technologies
for producing hydrogen with a minimum carbon footprint by using adiabatic con-
version of methane (Aksyutin et al. 2017) and high-temperature nuclear reactors
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(Ponomarev–Stepnoi et al. 2018). These technologies are at a preliminary scien-
tific research stage or (in the case of adiabatic methane conversion) being tested at
an experimental laboratory unit. In addition, Russian developers are also conduct-
ing laboratory tests on hydrogen generation by aluminium–water reaction1 and fuel
processors for the conversion of natural gas and diesel into a hydrogen-rich fuel mix-
ture2 and the release of pure hydrogen from it.3 The Kurchatov Institute and various
research centres at the Russian Academy of Sciences are also engaged in scientific
research in the field of electrolysis.
However, the present work on the transportation and storage of hydrogen is less
developed because it currently tends to be consumed at the place of production.
Gazprom, the owner and operator of Russia’s gas transmission system, has conducted
studies showing the possibility of adding up to 20% hydrogen to transported natural
gas, but real experiments have yet to be conducted.
Nevertheless, the resources for hydrogen production in Russia are huge, mainly
because the country has such vast hydrocarbon reserves and wind potential. In addi-
tion, existing gas transportation infrastructure (including new gas pipeline projects)
and a growing natural gas (LNG) industry could provide a foundation in the long
term for the development of “blue” hydrogen production and export given the low
cost of rawmaterials and the possibility of hydrogen transportation both via pipelines
and in a liquefied form.
According to Gazprom estimates, transporting hydrogen via export gas pipelines
could entail a risk of violating long-term contractual obligations related to gas quality
and would necessitate additional investments in the gas transmission system. There-
fore, the company is considering an alternative, namely, the production of hydrogen
from natural gas at the consumer site after methane has been transported through the
trunk pipelines. Gazprom has valued the European market for hydrogen produced in
this way at 153 billion euros by 2050, according to Bloomberg.
From a Russian perspective, it is also important to note that production of “blue”
hydrogen from steam methane reforming can actually be a relatively green option
because its generation industry has one of the lowest carbon footprints in the world.
Gas-fired thermal power plants dominate in the generation structure (around 48%),
while nuclear power plants (18%) and hydroelectric power plants (17%) exceed the
share of coal-fired power plants (16%). As a result, the carbon content of electricity
produced in Russia is less than in the US, China, Australia, India, Japan, Germany
and other countries. In certain regions, particularly where hydro and nuclear dom-
inate, this creates opportunities for the production of what is effectively “green”
hydrogen via electrolysis with electricity supplied from the regional electricity grid,
without the development of solar and wind power. This can give Russia a significant
potential cost advantage. This has prompted interest from international players. For
example, Kawasaki Heavy Industries plans to revisit a feasibility study on the export
1Joint Institute for High Temperatures of the Russian Academy of Sciences, JIHT RAS.
2“Central Research Institute of Ship Electrical Engineering and Technology” (“Central Research
Institute SET”), Krylov State Research Centre.
3http://www.niiset.ru/index.php/vodedprod.
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of hydrogen produced in the Magadan region to Japan. Although this project has not
yet received a development go-ahead, interest in such initiatives is likely to increase
as the infrastructure develops in the Far East and the cost of hydrogen electrolysis
and logistics technologies goes down.
Even greater opportunities could open up for Russia if its renewable energy poten-
tial is ultimately realized. Currently, the share of green hydrogen produced at RES
plants (electrolysis) is nearly zero. But although the share of wind power in Rus-
sia’s energy balance is currently insignificant (less than 1%), the total potential from
this sector is estimated at 17.1 thousand TWh, which is sixteen times higher than
total generation in Russia in 2018. As a result, many studies of the global potential of
“power-to-x” technology refer to Russia as one of the “hidden champions” as its huge
potential is currently offset by a lack of interest from the state and the stakeholders.
17 Conclusions on Geopolitical Implications for Russia
It is clear from the analysis above that the global energy transition towards a lower
carbon system presents some real threats for Russia. Perhaps the most obvious is
financial, with lower hydrocarbon rents meaning lower budget revenues and slower
economic growth, with implications for government spending and the wealth of the
Russian population at large. This could have implications abroad, if reduced military
spending limits Russia’s hard power, and at home, if the political regime is under-
mined by its ability to satisfy the welfare demands of its population. Furthermore,
these problems could be exacerbated by the fact that Russia may have a weaker posi-
tion in international financial markets as restrictions on the availability of capital for
carbon-intensive industries may well be increased. In addition, even Russia’s non-
energy exports may be impacted if carbon tax adjustments are made for imported
goods in key markets. The combination of all these factors could weaken Russia’s
global negotiating position, which could be further undermined by the increased use
of renewables in countries where Russia has previously exercised leverage through
energy exports. For example, Russia’s position in Southern and Eastern Europe is
likely to be weakened as those countries become less reliant on imported energy
and are able to diversify away from Russian oil, gas and coal. Equally, countries in
NE Asia, where Russia is hoping to gain an increasing foothold, thanks to oil and
gas exports, could also become less engaged with the Kremlin as their energy needs
increasingly focus on alternative sources with lower carbon intensity.
However, despite the presence of these clear threats to Russia’s geopolitical status,
there are also reasons for optimism, thanks to the country’s huge potential as a carbon
sink and as a potential developer of new technology. Firstly, it is possible to envisage
thatRussia could become a leader in the sale of decarbonized oil and gas, in particular,
because it has huge potential in forestry. Ifmanaged properly, then reforestation could
be used by oil and gas producers as ameans to offset theGHG emissions in the supply
chain and also possibly the CO2 emissions at the burner tip. Indeed, some oil and gas
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companies (Lukoil for example)4 are already considering how this strategy might
be used to offset their carbon impact in order to improve their global bargaining
position. Secondly, Russia has huge wind power potential, especially in the Arctic,
and if improvements in technology could allow DC lines to be connected to major
consumers in European and China, then Russia could become a major exporter of
green electricity (The Moscow Times 2019).
Thirdly, Russia is also attempting to develop a unique competence in a new gen-
eration of nuclear technology based on a closed nuclear fuel cycle. If it can become
a world leader in this field, which could transform the outlook for nuclear energy, it
could provide a massive carbon-free energy source for non-OECD countries where
energy demand continues to grow rapidly. It would therefore allow Russia to build
deep relationships with economies in Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia,
expanding its geopolitical influence significantly. Finally, and more traditionally,
Russia could also exploit its gas resources to increase its presence in new market
niches, such as the bunker market where LNG could become a much more desir-
able fuel following the introduction of stricter emissions rules by the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO) in 2020.
In addition to these energy-related issues, Russia could also benefit from the
opening of the Northern Sea Route as the Arctic ice continues to melt. Although the
opening itself would actually be caused by global warming, one key benefit from
increased utilization of a shorter route between Europe and Asia could be to reduce
the carbon footprint of transport between the two regions, thus limiting further emis-
sions impacts and potentially providing Russia with another source of geopolitical
influence, given the importance of this emerging transport route. The implementation
of appropriate national decisions on fuel regulation and environmental requirements
would be required to maximize this potential as a “green” transport option, but it is
certainly possible to see this new source of bargaining power for Russia emerging
over the next decade.
18 Overall Conclusion
In the light of Russia’s current position as a major hydrocarbon exporter and con-
sumer, any notion of a rapid energy transformation is problematic. A large-scale
shift from hydrocarbons to renewable energy sources provides energy consumers
with more choices, meaning that Russia’s control of energy flows becomes a less
effective instrument of (geopolitical) power. Furthermore, since the Russian state
budget is highly dependent on energy export revenues, a major change in this sector
will have a negative impact in many other parts of the economy, including military
funding. Lastly, although Russia has plenty of potential for renewable energy, the
country does not have a heavy focus on the sector at present and is therefore unlikely
to pioneer technological development in the wind and solar industries. Perhaps not
4See LUKOIL CSR policy at https://csr2017.lukoil.com/pdf/csr/en/hse.pdf.
Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia 111
surprisingly then, although Russia is involved in international climate policy, it does
not work to promote it and instead and has to date used diplomacy to influence
international energy and climate policy in a way that rather discourages change. One
key reason for this inactivity is the fact that political power in Russia is ultimately
linked with the control of strategic resources (most importantly, hydrocarbons) and
the export revenues derived from these resources (Tynkkynen et al. 2017).
Russia’s attitude towards Energy Transition is therefore quite controversial: while
acknowledging some of the key trends, the country is basically refusing to accept the
consequences of its main driver—decarbonization—and is focusing only on attempts
to develop technological expertise in its usual centralized manner. Nevertheless, at a
certain point the country will have to develop a long-term vision for both domestic
energy market development and export strategy in order to adapt to the profound
transformation of the global energy system.
However, the domestic market environment is not conducive to the development
of transition-friendly energy sources. The institutional environment is too rigid, there
is not enough capital available and there is a level of cynicism as to whether it is
really needed. The key question is whether the issue of export revenues can be a
catalyst, although there are a number of issues in this regard.
Firstly, the real threat from decarbonization concerns exports to Europe, where
gas demand in particular could suffer with potentially significant consequences for
Gazprom. This has resulted in an initial interest in hydrogen technology, specifically
methane pyrolysis, which allows the production of hydrogen and black carbon and
where Gazprom claims to have a competitive advantage. However, it remains to be
seen whether and how quickly this technology moves beyond the laboratory stage.
In contrast, other markets are less at risk, and as a result it would be a perfectly
justifiable strategy to try and re-focus hydrocarbon exports towards Asia, Africa,
Latin America, and this has indeed become a long-term goal. However, Europe
cannot be ignored because it is too important for short-term revenues, but Russia’s
real energy transition strategy for the next 20–30 years may just be to become the
lowest cost hydrocarbon supplier to emerging economies.
It would also seem that nuclear development could be a part of a transition strat-
egy. It is of course controversial, but arguably Rosatom could become a key export
company, not only providing Russia with additional revenues but also strengthening
its geopolitical influence, especially in non-OECD countries which still have fast
growing energy demand.
Russia may also attempt to establish itself as an equipment and software producer
for green energy, but it remains an open question as towhether it can realistically hope
to compete with China and the US on a technology front. As a result, its best option
may be to make incremental improvements at home while encouraging the coal-to-
gas switching model in emerging economies by continuing to offer low-cost gas (and
to an extent oil) to markets where the cost of energy supply and improving air quality
is more important than any CO2 emission targets.
Finally, one area of competitive advantage in a decarbonizing energy world may
be the potential for reforestation across Russia’s huge geography. Companies are
gradually waking up to this potential, as even if they do not believe in anthropogenic
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emissions as an issue themselves, they can see that a business advantage could be
gained from addressing the problem as perceived by other countries. As a result, use
of reforestation as a carbon offset mechanism, either for direct gain or to add “green
value” to Russia’s hydrocarbon exports, may become a growing theme over the next
decade.
References
Aksyutin OE et al (2017) The contribution of the gas industry to the formation of an energy
model based on hydrogen. Vesti gas science—scientific and technical collection. Environmental
protection, energy saving and labor protection in the oil and gas complex. Special edition - 2017,
p. 12
BANKTRACK (2019) Bank moves out of coal: A guide to the latest new banking sector commit-
ments on reducing coal financing”, https://www.banktrack.org/campaign/bank_moves_out_of_
coal?fbclid=IwAR2AwpQfYxEbIl7hXdQMfqiQhzrWPVaEJb1HzaZtAe1c3ueBwUIstVFhb1g.
Accessed 17 November 2019
Bashmakov I (2018) What Happens to the Energy Intensity of Russia’s GDP? Ecological Bulletin
of Russia 7:8 (in Russian)
Bashmakov I. (2013), “Driving Industrial Energy Efficiency in Russia”, Center of Energy Efficiency
(CENEf), Moscow, March 2013. Available at: http://www.cenef.ru/file/Idustry-eng.pdf (2013).
Accessed 17 November 2019
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2017) “New Energy Outlook”
Diesel & Gas Turbine Worldwide (2006), “30th Power Generation Order Survey”
ERI RAS&ACRF (2016), “Global and Russian Energy Outlook Up To 2040”, Available at: https://
www.eriras.ru/files/forecast_2016.pdf Accessed 17 November 2019
ERI RAS & SKOLKOVO (2019), “Global and Russian Energy Outlook 2019”, Energy Research
Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences & The Energy Centre, Moscow School of
Management SKOLKOVO, Moscow 2019. Available at: https://energy.skolkovo.ru/downloads/
documents/SEneC/Research/SKOLKOVO_EneC_Forecast_2019_EN.pdf. Accessed 17Novem-
ber 2019
GARANT.ru (2017), Presidential Decree of May 13, 2017 No. 208 “On the Strategy of Economic
Security of the Russian Federation for the Period until 2030”, Available at: https://www.garant.
ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/71572608/ (in Russian). Accessed 17 November 2019
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2018) Electricity Information. IEA/ OECD Publications, Paris
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2011) World Energy Outlook 2011. IEA/OECD Publications,
Paris, p 2011
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (2017) “Renewable Energy Prospects for
the Russian Federation (REmap working paper)”, IRENA, Available at: https://www.irena.
org/publications/2017/Apr/Renewable-Energy-Prospects-for-the-Russian-Federation-REmap-
working-paper Accessed 17 November 2019
KhokhlovA.,MelnikovY., Veselov F., Kholkin D., DatskoK. (2018), “Distributed energy resources
inRussia:Development Potential”, SKOLKOVOEnergyCentre,MoscowSchool ofManagement
SKOLKOVO, October 2018. Available at: https://energy.skolkovo.ru/downloads/documents/
SEneC/Research/SKOLKOVO_EneC_DER_2018.10.09_Eng.pdf Accessed 17 November 2019
KOMMERSANT (2016), “Favorable Climate” Kommersant Business Guide, 26 May 2016.
Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2988887 (in Russian). Accessed 17 November
2019
Makarov I.A. (2016), “Russia’s Participation in International Environmental
Cooperation”, Journal Strategic Analysis, Volume 40, Issue 6. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2016.1224062. Accessed 17 November 2019
Implications of the Global Energy Transition on Russia 113
Makarov I. A., Chen H. Y., Paltsev S. (2017), “Finding Itself in the Post-Paris World: Russia in the
New Global Energy Landscape”, MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research,
No. WP-2017-022, Joint Program Report Series Report 324, December 2017
Mehling M., van Asselt H., Das K., Droege S., Verkuijl C. (2017), “Designing Border Carbon
Adjustments for Enhanced Climate Action”, Climate Strategies, December 2017. Available at:
https://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/CS_report-Dec-2017-4.pdf
Melnikov Y., Mitrova T., Chugunov D. (2019), “The hydrogen economy: a path towards
low carbon development”, SKOLKOVO Energy Centre, Moscow School of Management
SKOLKOVO, June 2019. Available at: https://energy.skolkovo.ru/downloads/documents/SEneC/
Research/SKOLKOVO_EneC_Hydrogen-economy_Eng.pdf. Accessed 17 November 2019
Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation (2018), “State Report on the State of
Energy Savings and Energy Efficiency in the Russian Federation in 2017” Moscow, (in Russian)
Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation (2019a) State Strategy “Energy Development”, (in
Russian). https://minenergo.gov.ru/node/323 (2019). Accessed 17 November 2019
Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation (2019b), “Presentation on the results of the Fuel and
Energy Complex functioning in 2018 and its targets for 2019”, Moscow, (in Russian)
Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation (2017), “Draft Energy StrategyUp to 2035”, Available
at: https://minenergo.gov.ru/node/1920 (in Russian). Accessed 17 November 2019
Morris A. C. (2018), “Making Border Carbon Adjustments Work in Law and Practice”, Tax Policy
Center, Urban & Brookings Institution, 26 July 2018. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2018/07/TPC_20180726_Morris-Making-Border-Carbon-Adjustments-
Work.pdf
OSCE (2013) Energy Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy
Supply, Germany’s Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, Federal Ministry for the
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 24 April 2013. https://www.osce.org/
eea/101047 Accessed 17 November 2019
Ponomarev—Stepnoi NN et al (2018) Nuclear energy technological complex with high temperature
gas cooled reactors for large scale environmentally friendly hydrogen production from water and
natural gas. Gas Industry, 11, 2018
Power Technology (2018) Is Russia finally ready to embrace renewable energy? https://www.power-
technology.com/features/russia-renewable-energy/ Accessed 17 November 2019
Rhodium Group (2017) What Is It Worth? The State of the Art in Valuing Distributed Energy
Resources. https://rhg.com/research/what-is-it-worth-the-state-of-the-art-in-valuing-distributed-
energy-resources/ Accessed 17 November 2019
Smil V (2018) Energy and Civilization: A History. MIT Press
Staffell I, Jansen M, Chase A, Cotton E, Lewis C (2018) Energy Revolution: Global Outlook. Drax,
5 December 2018.https://www.drax.com/energy-policy/energy-revolution-global-outlook/
The Moscow Times (2019) Murmansk launches construction of Russia’s largest wind power
park, 24 September 2019. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/09/24/murmansk-launches-
construction-of-russias-largest-wind-power-park-a67406
Trading Economics (2018) Russia GDP Growth Rate. https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp-
growth. Accessed 17 November 2019
Trüby J, Schiffer HW (2018) A review of the German energy transition: taking stock, looking ahead,
and drawing conclusions for the Middle East and North Africa. Energy Transitions, Volume 2,
Issue 1–2, pp. 1–14, December 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41825-018-0010-2 Accessed 17
November 2019
Tynkkynen V, Pynnöniemi K, Höysniemi S (2017) Global energy transitions and Russia’s




114 J. Henderson and T. Mitrova
UNEP (2019) Global Launch of the UN Principles for Responsible Banking, Press-release,
24 September 2019. https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/speech/global-launch-un-
principles-responsible-banking
World Bank & Ecofys (2018), “State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2018”, World Bank, Washing-
ton, DC,May 2018. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/
29687/9781464812927.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y
World Nuclear Association (2019) Nuclear Power in Russia. https://www.world-nuclear.
org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/russia-nuclear-power.aspx. Accessed 17
November 2019
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
A Fine Balance: The Geopolitics




The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region1 presents a curious challenge for
the global energy transition. It remains the global centre of oil exports and is also
a very important gas-exporting zone. Fast-growing populations, energy-intensive
industrialisation, a series of oil-led booms, and provision of subsidised fuels, have
led it to be amongst the highest energy-consuming regions in the world, whether
per capita or per unit of GDP. Its infrastructure, economies, political systems and
international relations have been profoundly shaped by hydrocarbon wealth, even in
those regional countries with a smaller or no hydrocarbon endowment.
At the same time,MENA,with hot andmostly semi-arid or arid climates, and large
concentrations of coastal urban development, is particularly vulnerable to climate
change.Weak and/or repressive states are experiencing continuing political upheaval
and conflict. Although climate change has not yet been a key driver or shaper of these
conflicts, it could become an increasing future stressor, particularly in combination
with economic decline driven by a loss of hydrocarbon rents. MENA, though, has
excellent potential for low-carbon energy through renewables (mostly solar), and
through a geological and industrial endowment suited for carbon capture, storage
and use (CCUS).
1Definitions vary; here the Middle East includes the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) coun-
tries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates), Yemen, Iran, Iraq,
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel/Palestinian Territories, while North Africa includes Egypt, Libya,
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco with Western Sahara.
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The MENA countries are bound together by shared languages, religions and his-
tory. Yet, there are also profound differences between them, including their imme-
diate neighbourhood, geography, colonial legacy, hydrocarbon endowment, non-
hydrocarbon resources, level of economic development, size of sovereign wealth
holdings, ethno-sectarianmake-up, political system, ideology, international alliances
and others. These idiosyncratic factors, as well as different choices and personalities
in their political and business leadership, have shaped so far significantly different
approaches to the global energy transition.
The current ‘energy transition’ globally can broadly be understood as a response
to the imperative of climate change. Previous transitions, as from wood to coal,
and from coal to oil and gas, have been driven by the availability, lower cost and
improved convenience and utility of the new energy source. The current transition
includes the attempt to promote low- or non-carbon energies (renewables, including
solar, wind, biomass, hydropower, geothermal and others; nuclear; carbon capture
and storage); non-carbon energy carriers (mostly electricity, but also hydrogen), for
transport (electric vehicles), energy storage (batteries, thermal storage), industry and
other uses; and improved energy efficiency and productivity (Bazilian and Howells
2019). The attempt to move away from fossil fuels has also been driven by local
environmental and social impacts, by moves by consuming countries to increase
energy security and reduce dependence on possibly unfriendly or unstable hydrocar-
bon exporters, as well as by (largely unfounded) concerns about resource scarcity.
The energy transition also includes the quest for universal access to modern energy.
It is not simply the introduction of new technologies, but also involves the changes
in markets, institutions and regulations that allow or are induced by technological
changes.
The energy transition brings with it shifts in corporate and national power. The
geopolitics of the transition have begun to be considered, for instance, by the Interna-
tional Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (IRENA 2019), and other scholars.2 In
general, this work so far sees a strongly negative impact of the transition on current
major fossil fuel exporters, including many MENA states as well as countries such
as Russia, Venezuela and Nigeria.
In MENA, this transition is also bound up with a geoeconomic transition, which
centres on the shift of oil and gas markets away from traditional customers in North
America, Europe and developed Asia, and towards developing Asian countries,
notablyChina and India. This is accompanied by trends in political power, notably the
possible diminution of the US role in the region (particularly in the Persian/Arabian
Gulf), the greater self-assertiveness of regional powers including Saudi Arabia, the
UAE, Turkey and Iran, and the rising involvement of Russia and in future likely
China and India. The MENA region faces these developments against the backdrop
of global trends, such as a turn against free trade, the rise of populist economic and
social policies, and a fracturing into geopolitical blocs, all further complicating the
transition (Bazilian et al. 2019).
2For example, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/geopolitics-renewable-energy, http://www.
dieterhelm.co.uk/energy/energy/burn-out-the-endgame-for-fossil-fuels-2/.
A Fine Balance: The Geopolitics of the Global Energy … 117
MENAcountries’ responses to the energy transition revolve around four axes. The
first is the restructuring of their economies to cope with lower prices for now, and
permanently reduced hydrocarbon rents in the long term. The second is the attempt
to safeguard the future of their hydrocarbon industries. The third is a gradual but
accelerating move to retool their domestic energy systems for a lower carbon future.
And the fourth is to deal with the geoeconomic transition.
2 The Nature of the Regional Energy Economy
The MENA region contains the majority of the world’s oil reserves: 48.3% of world
oil reserves in the Middle East, with a further 3.7% in North Africa (BP 2019). Its
position in gas is less dominant but still very important, with 38.4% of world gas
reserves in the Middle East and 4% in North Africa. More significantly, its resources
are predominantly in large, conventional high-quality reservoirs with well-developed
infrastructure and close to export routes, resulting in much lower production costs
than the big but costly resources of US shale/tight hydrocarbons, Canadian oil sands
and Venezuelan extra-heavy oil.
As a result, MENA provided 38% of gross world oil exports in 2018, much larger
than any other region (Russia, with 12.8%, was next). It supplied 32.8% of world
LNG exports (from a total 431 billion cubic metres (BCM), but a smaller share of gas
exports by pipeline (4% from the Middle East, mostly within the region, and 5.4%
from North Africa, mostly to Europe, from global international pipeline trade of
805.4 BCM). Even though North Africa’s share of world exports is relatively small,
it is important in the European market by supplying 13% of the continent’s natural
gas consumption and 10% of its oil.
The region has also become a much more significant consuming centre in its own
right. It accounts for 17.3% of world gas consumption, 10.9% of oil consumption,
7.7% of carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion and 6.1% of electricity
generation (BP 2019), although comprising only 5.7% of world population3 and
3.8% of GDP.4 This has been driven by a number of factors: the paucity of other
traditional energy sources (hydropower and coal); the hot, arid climate with a high
requirement for air-conditioning and desalination; the oil-driven economic boom of
2003–14; policies of energy-intensive industrialisation (oil refining, petrochemicals,
aluminium, steel, cement, ceramics); and low, subsidised prices for energy which
have encouraged inefficiency and waste.
The region remains almost entirely dependent on hydrocarbons for electricity
(Fig. 1). However, this is likely to change substantially in the coming decades, as
discussed in Sect. 6. The limited use of hydroelectricity today is virtually all in Iran,
Iraq, Egypt and Morocco; that of nuclear in Iran; and coal in Israel and Morocco.
This hydrocarbon bounty is distributed unevenly across the region (Fig. 2). Some
states (mostly the GCC and Libya) have small populations and large resources;
3World Bank, 2018 or closest available year.
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Fig. 1 Power generation by source, Middle East + Egypt (TWh/year 2018). Source BP Statistical


































Fig. 2 Hydrocarbon endowment per capita (log scale). Source BP Statistical Review of World
Energy 2019; Wood Mackenzie. Includes only total proved reserves of oil and gas; oil reserves
include gas condensate and natural gas liquids (NGLs) as well as crude oil; Other countries not
included due to negligible proved reserves
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this is even more so when considering only the citizen populations, given shares
of expatriates around 90% in Qatar (Snoj 2019) and the UAE (CIA 2019). Some,
such as Iraq, Iran, Algeria, Yemen, Syria and Egypt, have significant resources but
also relatively large populations. And others, notably Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco
and Tunisia, have very little or no hydrocarbon production. Israel is in an anomalous
position by virtue of its recent discovery of major gas fields, and its relative political
and economic isolation from its neighbours. Yet even the oil and gas importers of
the region are linked to their hydrocarbon-exporting neighbours by flows of labour,
remittances and investment (Mohaddes and Raissi 2019).
The region is not highly integrated in trade or energy terms. This is due to the rather
similar nature of exports and comparative advantage between most of the region
states; political and security barriers; and a significant degree of protectionism.
Despite long negotiations, particularly with the UAE and Oman, Iran has not
been able to start gas exports to its Gulf neighbours, due to unrealistic commercial
expectations, political disputes, sanctions and high domestic use. The Arab Gas
Pipeline (AGP) from Egypt to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, and a related pipeline
to Israel, the Arish–Ashkelon pipeline,5 functioned from 2008 to 2012 but were
disrupted by sabotage in Sinai following the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, and gas
shortages within Egypt itself. The most successful regional pipeline, Dolphin, runs
from Qatar to the UAE and Oman, and started deliveries in 2007 to Oman and 2008
to the UAE (EIA 2011). Its operations have not been interrupted by the boycott
of Qatar imposed by the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in June 2017, but it has
not been expanded either. The GCC Interconnection Authority, for electricity, has
also continued to function, but it trades electricity only on an emergency or quantity
basis, not on market terms, and utilisation has only been around 5–6% of capacity
(KAPSARC 2018).
In the absence of reliable access to pipeline gas despite the proximity of huge
resources, Kuwait (2009), Dubai in the UAE (2010), Abu Dhabi in the UAE (2016),
Egypt (2015) (TAQA Arabia 2019), Jordan (2015) (The Jordan Times 2016), Israel
(2013) (MEES 2013), Bahrain (2019) and possibly in future Sharjah in the UAE
(2020), Lebanon (2021), Saudi Arabia (no firm date), Morocco (perhaps as late as
2028) (African Energy 2019) and possibly Tunisia (Songhurst 2019), have turned to
LNG imports. Although far from economically optimal, this has reflected a pragmatic
approach.
Yet, more recently, there have been somemore welcoming suggestions for energy
cooperation, with contracts on gas exports between Israel, Egypt and Jordan; agree-
ments on electricity interconnections of Iraq with Jordan and the GCC; and dis-
cussions of cross-border gas and carbon dioxide pipelines between Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, the UAE and Oman.
5https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Arish%E2%80%93Ashkelon_Pipeline.
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3 Regional Conflict and Weak States
MENA has been a region of particular geopolitical volatility and contestation since
theSecond, perhaps even theFirstWorldWar. Scholars continue to dispute the causes,
butMENAhas seen an unusually high number of inter-state and,more recently, intra-
state conflicts, while other areas that were troubled in the 1960s and 1970s, such as
Latin America and south-east Asia, are now relatively stable and peaceful.
Outright MENA wars include the various Arab–Israeli wars; the Lebanese civil
war (1975–1990); the Iran–Iraq war (1980–88); Saddam Hussein’s invasion of
Kuwait and US-led expulsion (1990–91); the Algerian civil war (1991–2002); civil
war in Syria (2011-present) with various foreign interventions; the Libyan revolu-
tion and subsequent civil war (2011-present); civil war and regional intervention in
Yemen (2015-present); and the US invasion of Iraq, subsequent civil war and con-
flict with the ‘Islamic State’ (2003-present). Accompanying these has been a level
of insurgencies, territorial disputes, revolutions and coups (notably in 2011’s ‘Arab
Spring’), severe international sanctions (at various times, on Iran, Iraq and Libya)
and state repression. Major protests, sometimes to the stage of enforced changes of
leadership, recurred in 2019 in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon and Iraq.
Oil and gas resources have been the direct target of some of these conflicts,
most clearly with the invasion of Kuwait. Oil rents have helped underpin well-armed
autocratic governments with a tendency towardsmilitary approaches to disputes. The
importance of the region for the global economy, and the prevalence of small, wealthy
stateswho have relied on external patrons for security, has led to repeated intervention
by the US, Russia and European countries. Intra-state ‘resource regionalism’ (Mills
and Alhashemi 2018) has encouraged conflicts and separatism over resource-rich
areas, such as the Kurdistan region of Iraq. Regional states have also developed
‘proxies’ and non-state allies in their weaker neighbours. Most notably Iran has
patronised Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi movement in Yemen, but Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Turkey have played varying roles in these countries as
well as in Libya, Egypt, Syria and Iraq.
Resourcewealth has inmanycases underpinned the development ofmodern states.
It has also tended to entrench the power of authoritarian elites, whether republican,
military or monarchical. Under internal stress, these states have proved to be brittle,
with state failure particularly extreme in Yemen, Libya, Syria and Iraq.
The theory of the rentier state was developed by the Iranian economist Hus-
sein Mahdavy (Mahdavy 1970), the Egyptian economist and former prime minister
Hazem Beblawi, and the Italian economist Giacomo Luciani (Beblawi and Luciani
1987). They argued that states with large natural resource endowments or other
‘unearned’ income (such as foreign aid) were not reliant on taxing their people,
but instead served to allocate or distribute the revenues, and that this would create
a large unnecessary bureaucracy while reducing the incentives for hard work and
government accountability.
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Rentierism may be one part of the wider phenomenon of the ‘resource curse’,6
which has been used to describe the various negative effects of a heavy dependence on
natural resource revenues: a lack of competitiveness in the non-resource economyand
in manufacturing exports; slower overall GDP growth rates; an overvalued exchange
rate; high macroeconomic volatility; weak and corrupt institutions; a tendency to
authoritarianism and foreign and civil–military conflict, and a deficit in democracy,
human rights and gender equality.
Some work (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2006) has challenged the very existence
of the resource curse; dismissed it as confusing the direction of causality (poorer
countries have a higher share of natural resources in GDP, not vice versa); argued
that it appliesmostly to oil (not gas,minerals or agricultural resources); suggested that
it applies mostly to the post-1973 period of elevated oil prices (Ross and Andersen
2012)7; or argued that it affects states with poor-quality initial institutions, and that
better institutions bring a ‘resource blessing’. MENA countries also have a complex
political and institutional history,8 including the legacy of Ottoman and Western
imperialism. Nevertheless, many of the posited negative effects of rentierism and the
resource curse, along with some of the benefits, are highly visible in the region.
MENA conflict has repeatedly threatened world oil and gas supplies, going back
to the 1951–1953 nationalisation of Iranian oil and the subsequentUS/British-backed
coup; the 1956 Suez crisis; 1973–1974 oil embargo; and the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
More recently, the Libyan Revolution and the sanctions placed on Iran by the Obama
administration pushed oil prices to a range of $100–110 per barrel. There have been
repeated concerns over oil transit through the Strait of Hormuz in particular, and also
through the northern and southern passages of the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and the
Bab El Mandeb.
In contrast, tensions in the Gulf during 2018–2019 were severe, triggered by
the Trump administration’s decision to abandon the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal with Iran, followed by sanctions intended to cut off
its oil exports entirely. Yet, the September 2019 missile and drone attack on Saudi
Arabia’s Abqaiq oil processing plant, and other strikes blamed on Iran or its allies, as
well as attacks on Iran’s own shipping, had by October 2019 had virtually no lasting
impact on oil prices, despite briefly taking out half Saudi production capacity.
This more relaxed attitude by markets can be explained by a negative outlook
on the world economy and hence oil demand; by the availability of oil in strategic
storage; by the confidence in US shale producers to ramp up production quickly in
the event of a price spike; and, perhaps, to a sense that oil is losing its geopolitical
importance in the longer term, as non-oil alternatives enter the mainstream.
Historically, and even up to 2008, OPEC cartel power, oil supply disruptions
and fears of ‘peak oil supply’ were a strong justification for countermeasures by
the developed countries: the International Energy Agency, founded in 1974 (IEA
6Reviewed in https://www.jstor.org/stable/25054077?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
7With regards to transitions to democracy, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2104708.
8See, for instance, Lapidus (2018), A History of Islamic Societies, Cambridge University Press.
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2019), and its coordination of strategic stocks; programmes of alternative energy
(nuclear, coal, biofuels and the beginnings of modern wind and solar); high fuel
taxes; efficiency standards and conservation; and incentives for new oil development
(Alaska and the North Sea in the 1970s and 1980s) and unconventional fossil fuels.
With lower world oil prices post-2014, and a much more relaxed attitude to future
supply, environmental drivers have supplanted security concerns as the main impetus
for support for electric vehicles and other non-oil technologies.
4 Economic Restructuring and Resilience
For all the talk of renewables in the energy transition, the most intense effect on
MENA oil and gas has so far come from competition from another hydrocarbon
producer—the US. The rise of shale and tight oil and gas output has led the US
from being the world’s biggest oil importer as recently as 2013, to being the world’s
largest producer, ahead of Saudi Arabia and Russia, and at times a net oil exporter
during 2019. Simultaneously, in seeking to export its surplus of cheap gas, the US
also challenges Qatar and Australia as the largest LNG exporter over the next few
years, with Russia coming up in fourth place. Finally, abundant low-cost feedstock
has also caused a renaissance in US petrochemical production, a further challenge
to Gulf industry.
In late 2014, oil prices fell from $100 per barrel to as low as $26 in January
2016, and have only partially recovered since to around $60 per barrel as of October
2019, despite the virtual elimination of Iranian and Venezuelan exports. After a
surge in LNG prices in 2018 (Singapore LNG Index reached $11.66 per million
British thermal units (MMBtu) in August 20189), primarily due to China’s coal-to-
gas switching, spot prices fell back in mid-2019 to around $4 per MMBtu, though
long-term contract prices remained higher.
This has put profound pressure on fiscal and current account balances for the
MENA hydrocarbon exporters (Fig. 3). Investment budgets and subsidies have been
cut, while non-oil revenues have been raised by introducing various fees and taxes,
such as value-added tax (VAT) in some of the GCC countries. Budget gaps have
been plugged by debt issuance, both at the sovereign level and by state firms, often
the national oil company, with Saudi Aramco, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company
(ADNOC) and Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) all floating sizeable bonds.
However, there has been relatively little progress in reducing the large public-
sector wage bill, or on privatisation. Indeed, protests in countries such as Oman in
the wake of the Arab revolutions in 2011, and in Iraq in 2019, have been met with
promises of even more fiscally unsustainable state handouts. The much-heralded
proposed initial public offering (IPO) of Saudi Aramco might realised $29.4 billion
for a 1.7% stake, and the sale of 10% of ADNOC Distribution (the company’s fuel
retail arm) on the local market raised $851 million in 2017 (Gulf Business 2017),
9Energy Market Company Pte Ltd (EMCSG).
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Fig. 3 Budgetary and current account balances,MENAoil exporters, 2019 estimate. SourceArabia
Monitor; IMF
but these amounts are not particularly material in the big picture, and the companies
involved are already well-run. Their importance is more for injecting a commercial
mindset and stimulating progress in privatising other less effective entities.
Attempts at diversification from oil date back to the 1970s; in the case of Iran,
to the 1960s. Diversification has passed through a number of eras (Hvidt 2013). In
the 1970s, the fear was that resources would deplete in the relatively near future.
The high oil prices of the time gave an abundant source of funds for investing in
new industries, which of course were also tempting to bureaucrats and rent-seeking
businesspeople. In the 1980s and 1990s, low oil prices created awareness of the need
to find other sources of income.
In the 2000s, a renewed influx of petroleum revenues allowed investment in infras-
tructure, real estate and energy-intensive industries such as aluminium, steel, cement
and petrochemicals, usually supported by cheap, subsidised energy. Saudi Arabia, in
particular, developed more advanced petrochemical activities via firms such as Saudi
Arabia Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC). Iran, under the pressure of sanctions,
also built up industry to serve domestic needs and create export products that were
less vulnerable than crude oil to interruption. Although not exactly a diversification
away from energy, these industries do offer more technological sophistication and a
reduced correlation with world oil prices.
Surplus revenues were used to build up large sovereign wealth funds, particularly
in the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar. These have a mix of objectives: avoiding upwards
pressure on the pegged currencies; saving to reduce macroeconomic and budget
volatility driven by oil price changes; saving for a future of diminished oil revenues;
and investing strategically in the domestic and international economy. At the same
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time, some states, notably the UAE, Oman and Bahrain, diversified into tourism,
aviation, logistics, financial services and other non-oil activities, even if these did
not contribute much to budgetary revenues10 and remained largely dependent on the
wider regional economy.
In the latest era of diversification,widespread regional political unrest (since 2011)
and lower oil prices (since 2014) have again concentrated attention on the develop-
ment of the non-oil economy. Another imperative has been added: the prospect of
peak oil demand. Althoughmost Gulf policymakers still do not expect this to be soon,
a slowing of demand and falling prices within the next 20 years or so still represents
an enormous challenge. In 2015, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince Mohammed bin Zayed
stated in a speech that, “In 50 years, when we might have the last barrel of oil, the
question is: when it is shipped abroad, will we be sad? If we are investing today in
the right sectors, I can tell you we will celebrate at that moment” (TheNational.ae
2015). In April 2016, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) reflected
on a much shorter timeline: “I think by 2020, if oil stops we can survive. We need
it, we need it, but I think in 2020 we can live without oil” (QUARTZ 2016).
Most of theMENAcountries have an ‘economic vision’ for some future date, 2030
or another. Saudi Arabia’s ‘Vision 2030’,11 launched under MBS, is one of the most
recent and influential. Yet its attention to the energy sector is surprisingly limited,
with more focus on technology, tourism and social transformation. The major energy
goals outlined in the Vision 2030 are to maintain oil production capacity at 12.5
million bbl/day by 2020, increase raw gas production capacity from 12 billion cubic
feet per day (Bcf/d) to 17.8 Bcf/d in 2020 (with a further target of 23 Bcf/d by 2027),
increase domestic refining capacity from2.9million bbl/day to 3.3million bbl/day by
2020, and phase out energy subsidies by 2025 (were previously planned to be phased
out by 2020). This reflects a tension between the oil and non-oil sectors. Should
hydrocarbon rents simply be a cash cow, funding investment into diversification? Or
should the existing strengths of the oil sector be the foundation for amore value-added
and environmentally sustainable energy industry, at home and abroad? In September
2019, this question seemed to be answered, at least for now, when experienced
technocrat Khalid Al Falih was replaced as energy minister by MBS’s half-brother,
Prince Abdelaziz bin Salman, and as Aramco chairman byYasir Al Rumayyan,MBS
confidant and head of the key Public Investment Fund (PIF), with holdings in Tesla,
Uber and other future-oriented companies.
The challenges of rapidly retooling entire economies remain enormous. In a recent
paper, Steffen Hertog concludes that, “Even under ideal conditions, it will be impos-
sible to become ‘post-rentier’ by 2030 and hard to imagine even by 2050. The maths
are quite similar for other high-rent countries, including those of theGCC” (POMEPS
2019). While the Gulf countries have at least articulated a vision of diversification
and taken some significant steps towards it, other MENA hydrocarbon-exporting
10Dubai being an exception.
11https://vision2030.gov.sa/en.
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countries have struggled. Iran has already a fairly diversified economy, with sanc-
tions pushing it towards further self-sufficiency and lower dependence on oil rev-
enues, but at the cost of a severe recession. Iraq’s cumbersome bureaucratic and
sectarian system is straining to deliver results in the oil, gas and electricity sectors,
but progress beyond these is very limited. The constant state of crisis management
militates against longer term planning, despite the schemes laid out in studies by
the World Bank (World Bank 2012) and International Energy Agency (IEA 2012).
Algeria too struggles to sustain its petroleum exports, let alone diversify, with an
excessively bureaucratic system and hostility to foreign investment. And the interna-
tionalised civil wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen of course make long-term economic
progress impossible.
A further question is whether the expected fall in hydrocarbon revenues, at least
relative to the rest of the economy, will reverse the ‘resource curse’ and rentierism
described above.12 More likely, this will not be automatic, and true diversification
will rest on building up strong and capable institutions. Ultimately, less dependence
on resource rents may diminish military competition and within-state conflict. But in
the medium term, economic stress and a struggle over the remaining rents may lead
to more violent confrontations, as with Saddam Hussein’s decision in 1990 to invade
Kuwait to try to solve his regime’s financial problems (Karsh and Rautsi 2008).
5 Future-Proofing the Hydrocarbon Industry
5.1 Current and Future Challenges
The future of the MENA hydrocarbon industry reflects a delicate balance between
meeting current challenges and ensuring its future resilience. The nature of this task,
and the methods used, vary according to the exigency of each country’s situation.
5.1.1 Climate
The primary challenge of the large GCC oil producers—Saudi Arabia, the UAE and
Kuwait—is how to maximise the value of their resources in a climate-constrained
world, where they face significant non-OPEC competition. The other big oil resource
holders—Iraq, Iran and Libya—ought to be thinking similarly, but are battling polit-
ical and security problems that prevent their planning effectively for the long term, as
are Syria and Yemen. The lesser producers, such as Algeria, Egypt, Oman, Bahrain
12Addressed in, for instance, https://bruegel.org/2017/08/towards-eu-mena-shared-prosperity/.
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and Tunisia, have in a way the more straightforward challenge of maximising out-
put (or at least slowing declines), rationalising domestic consumption and control-
ling costs in the medium term, including new exploration, enhanced recovery and
unconventional resources.
The major gas resource holders—Qatar and Iran—have a somewhat rosier sit-
uation, given the fuel’s much lower carbon content and relatively clean environ-
mental performance. Yet, in the long term, they too face the challenge of assuring
demand: ensuring gas remains cost-competitive against renewables, while reducing
or eliminating its carbon footprint.
Israel and, possibly, Lebanon, have to manage the transition to being gas pro-
ducers and exporters, in a market constrained by limited local demand and tricky
borders. Should debt-ridden Lebanon find significant amounts of gas, its corrupt and
dysfunctional political system will be strained to use it effectively.
Finally, the non-producers, Morocco and Jordan, deal with issues more analogous
to other energy importers, with their outlook improved by the growing availability
of reasonably priced gas, and competitive renewables.
The region’s energy-intensive industrial sector is also challenged by climate mea-
sures taken in major markets, particularly Europe. This could include border carbon
taxes on imports from countries without an equivalent carbon price (Lowe 2019), or
even outright bans on imports of oil, gas or other products with a carbon footprint in
production that exceeds some specified limit.
Some regional countries have taken a relatively proactive approach to the climate
challenge. Morocco has been a leader in deploying renewable energy and pioneer-
ing concentrated solar power. Abu Dhabi launched the Masdar clean energy initia-
tive in 2006, which featured an intended ‘zero-carbon’ (now carbon-neutral) city,
and domestic and international renewables investments. It competed hard to win
the headquarters of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in 2009
(TheNational.ae 2009a). TheUAEmade climate change an important part of its inter-
national diplomacy and backed the inclusion of carbon capture and storage (CCS),
suited to its oil industry, in the Clean Development Mechanism, a move criticised by
IRENA’s first director-general Hélène Pelosse (TheNational.ae 2009b), in a reminder
of some of the complexities in hosting international organisations. Dubai, through
its ‘Sustainable City’,13 electric vehicle and hydrogen pilots, and most practically by
its world-record solar power prices, has also made the environment a key part of its
brand and future orientation, despite the continuing high-carbon footprint and other
negative environmental features of the Gulf model of urbanisation.
In contrast, Saudi Arabia has long had a rather negative and obstructionist
approach to climate change negotiations (Depledge 2008), and at COP24 in Poland
in December 2018, in alliance with Kuwait, Russia and the US, refused officially
to “welcome” the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s report on limiting
warming to below 1.5 °C (Bradshaw et al. 2019). Saudi Arabia’s position has been
that it should be compensated for losses arising from restrictions on fossil fuels
(TheNational.ae 2009c), and that climate policies should not ‘unfairly’ target oil.
13https://www.thesustainablecity.ae/.
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Yet, as noted below, Saudi Aramco has implemented a number of policies to reduce
its emissions and prove its business against climate policies.
EveryMENA country except Libya and Yemen (for understandable reasons), Iraq
and Iran has submitted a document on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)
towards meeting its Paris goals (Yemen, Iran and Iraq have submitted Intended
NDCs). These generally include improvements in energy efficiency both in gen-
eration and use; gains in renewable and sometimes nuclear energy; fuel substitution;
boosting public transport; reducing gas flaring and leakage; changing land use; and
an overall reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below business as usual (BAU).
For example, Iraq will cut 90 million tonnes from 2020 to 2035, 14% below BAU
(UNFCCC2015a); Iranwill cut 4%belowBAUunilaterally and up to 12%with inter-
national aid (UNFCCC 2015b) and Morocco will cut 42% below BAU (UNFCCC
2015c). Carbon capture and storage is mentioned by the UAE, along with carbon
sequestration in marine and coastal environments (UNFCCC 2015d). Saudi Arabia
also mentions CCS (UNFCCC 2015e).
Within the MENA region, Climate Action Tracker assesses only three countries
against their Paris goals: Saudi Arabia (rated Critically Insufficient), the UAE (rated
Highly Insufficient) and Morocco (rated 1.5 °C Paris Agreement Compatible).14 In
fact, Morocco is one of only two countries in the world rated so highly. Most MENA
countries have major technical and economic potential for greenhouse gas cuts at
relatively low (or even negative) cost, but sustained political will and commitment
is lacking, though the region is far from unique in this regard.
MENA countries are themselves severely threatened by the effects of climate
change, particularly given that most are already water-stressed and experience high
temperatures. Urban development and important agricultural areas in coastal areas
are threatened by sea-level rise and saline water infiltration. Weak regional states,
and countries neighbouring MENA such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Sahel,
may come under further stress as results of drought, desertification, groundwater
depletion, upstream dams (notably on the Nile, Tigris and Euphrates), intensified
summer heatwaves, interruptions and price spikes in world food trade, migration
and other climatic impacts. These stresses may exacerbate the economic impact of
falling resource rents (discussed below).
5.1.2 Peak Oil Demand
Recent years have seen growing attention to the concept of ‘peak oil demand’, that
in the relatively near term, global oil demand will begin to decline, because of the
expansion of electric vehicles, improvements in efficiency, environmental pressure
on plastics and greenhouse gas emissions limits. Estimates for when this might occur
range from the mid-2020s to the 2040s or even beyond (Fig. 4).
Yet, even the 2040s are not that far away,when it comes to the question of retooling
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Fig. 4 Estimates for peak oil demand. Source International Energy AgencyWorld Energy Outlook
2016; http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/energy/energy-outlook/download-outlook-for-energy-
reports; BP Energy Outlook 2018; energy [r]evolution, Greenpeace https://www.greenpeace.org/
archive-international/Global/international/publications/climate/2015/Energy-Revolution-2015-
Full.pdf; Statoil; RethinX; Energy Information Administration; OPEC. RethinX does not give
exact figures so they have been approximated from its graphs. Not all forecasts give figures for
every year, so a smooth polynomial has been used to interpolate
national oil companies (NOCs) are aware of the peak oil demand question, but
have generally not subscribed to the idea of an early peak, nor fully internalised
its implications. The immediate pressure has been to survive the post-2014 period of
‘low’ prices, without the consideration that this might be a permanent state of affairs,
or indeed that prices may be in a secular downtrend.
During 2015, Saudi Arabia and other producers substantially ramped up output to
fight a ‘pricewar’ and gainmarket share, hoping to deter competitors. But non-OPEC
production, particularly US shale, proved more resilient than expected. In 2016, they
changed tack.
The ‘DeclarationofCooperation’ (OPEC2016) inDecember 2016betweenOPEC
countries (in MENA: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait, Iran, Libya and Algeria;
Qatar withdrew from OPEC in December 2018 (CNBC 2018)) and a group of non-
OPECproducers, led byRussia and includingOman,Kazakhstan,Mexico and others,
called for oil production cuts of about 3.5% by each OPEC country and lower cuts
by the non-OPEC adherents to the ‘OPEC+’ or ‘Vienna Group’ pact. In the event,
Saudi Arabia has substantially over-complied, Russia has under-complied, but the
agreement has helped to raise prices and reduce excess inventories for now.
Even if US shale output slows into the 2020s, the question remains about the sus-
tainability of this arrangement. Some other non-OPEC producers, such as Brazil and
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new entrant Guyana, are expanding, while promising shale resources in Argentina,
Australia, Russia and elsewhere are attracting interest. Given decline rates from exist-
ing fields, a substantial amount of new oil will be required even in a world of peak
demand. Prices could be volatile on the way down, and there will still probably be
price spikes triggered by phases of underinvestment or security problems.
The low production costs of most MENA countries mean they will still be able
to generate rents, though at overall reduced levels. Long-term production restraint
risks ‘stranding’ large quantities of viable resources, while keeping prices elevated
makes both competing production and non-oil technologies more viable. But Fattouh
and Dale argue that OPEC countries’ short-term budgetary needs mean they will be
unable to pursue a high-volume/low-price strategy to maximise output and squeeze
out competitors in the run-up to ‘peak demand’ (Dale and Fattouh 2018). Indeed,
OPEC’s own 2019World Oil Outlook (OPEC 2019) expects its production of oil and
other petroleum liquids to fall from 35 million barrels per day (bbl/day) in 2019, to
32.8 million bbl/day by 2024. The economic impact on oil exporters is determined
less by the exact date of the peak, which will anyway be visible only in hindsight,
and more by the pace of demand growth prior to the peak, the absolute volume at
peak and the subsequent rate of decline.
5.2 Value Generation, Internalisation and Demand Defence
In response to these pressures, the main MENA oil producers are following essen-
tially two linked strategies. The first is to generate more value from their existing
production. The second is to create new markets, or at least defend existing ones.
Investment in the oil upstream has become a lesser priority. In some countries, this
is because of domestic political or security problems. In Saudi Arabia, it reflects a
lack of space in the market for major production gains, particularly while the OPEC
+ quotas remain. ADNOC has plans for a substantial rise in capacity; Kuwait’s
ambitious expansion plans have made little progress over the last couple of decades;
while Iraq’s production capacity continues to grow despite bottlenecks. Iran is capa-
ble of maintaining production around current levels, diminished by sanctions, but
significant growth would require international investment in a post-sanctions situ-
ation. Libya, too, would require several years of improved security and investment
to regain its pre-Revolution level of 1.6 million bbl/day, or the aspirational 2 mil-
lion bbl/day. Oil output in Algeria, Bahrain, Oman, Egypt and Qatar is in slow
long-term decline unless there are major new discoveries, or investment in EOR or
unconventional resources.
TheMiddle EasternNOCs have invested relatively little in international upstream,
because of their vast and low-cost domestic resources and, in some cases, lack of
adequate technical and managerial skills. Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration
Company has been the most notable exception, building up a sizeable if scattered
global portfolio. Mubadala, a sovereign wealth-type vehicle of the Abu Dhabi gov-
ernment, has made a smaller but more concentrated number of upstream investments
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in Qatar, Oman, south-east Asia, Russia and Egypt. Recently, Qatar Petroleum has
enjoyed overseas exploration success, in partnership with IOC supermajors, in South
Africa, Cyprus and Guyana. But these projects remain small compared to domestic
production.
So value generation has primarily come outside upstream oil. Value generation is
not a new strategy—it dates back at least to the 1960 s in Iran, the 1970 s in Iraq and the
early 1980 s in SaudiArabia—but has been pursuedmore vigorously and consistently
in recent years. Saudi Arabia, mainly under Aramco and Saudi Arabia Basic Indus-
tries Corporation (SABIC), has been the leader, with ADNOC catching up under the
leadership of Sultan Al Jaber (appointed CEO in 2016), along with sovereign wealth
vehicle Mubadala (which took over the International Petroleum Investment Corpo-
ration (IPIC), another state fund, in 201715). Qatar Petroleum, under CEO Saad Al
Kaabi, also named energyminister inNovember 2018, has adopted amore aggressive
domestic and international growth strategy, including taking over the stakes of IOCs
in expiring Qatari fields. Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC), Oman Oil Company
and Sonatrach (Algeria) have been active, but to a lesser degree.
Part of enhanced value generation includes ‘in-country value creation’, trying
to improve the capacity of local firms or joint ventures to supply the domestic oil
industry with equipment. Eventually, this might produce internationally competitive
oil services and engineering firms, as Norway has done. However, it runs the risk of
protectionism and raising local production costs, and the skills developed have to be
transferable to new sectors. Localisation—boosting the skills development and hiring
of citizens instead of expatriates—has also been pursued. It can provide high-skilled,
high-paid work but, given the low and falling labour intensity of the oil industry, will
not make a dent in unemployment except in the smaller GCC countries.
The other part of value creation includes a move ‘downstream’—to refining,
petrochemicals, tankers, storage, trading and fuel retail. This is taking place both at
home and abroad. Aramco launched trading in 2012 (Saudi Aramco 2017), while
ADNOC Trading was set up in 2018 (Arab News 2018), and the company has been
promoting its Murban crude grade as a regional price benchmark (TheNational.ae
2019).With the launch of China’s International Energy Exchange’s crude oil contract
inMarch 2018, there is also somepressure on theGulf producers to ensure that control
of their commodity’s pricing does not move to their main customer (WSJ 2019).
Petrochemicals are seen as one of the most promising areas for future oil demand,
since demand typically grows faster than GDP in emerging economies, and alter-
natives such as biomaterials remain more costly and limited in supply. Producing
petrochemicals releases some greenhouse gases, but the products themselves do
not until and unless they decompose or are burnt. The Gulf has developed a large
basic chemical industry, based mostly on previously flared gas, and using methane
and ethane as feedstocks to yield fertilisers, methanol, polyethylene and polypropy-
lene. Now, new petrochemical strategies focus on mega-scale integrated refining and
petrochemical complexes, culminating in Aramco/SABIC’s proposed direct crude-
to-chemicals conversion plant at Yanbu’ on the Red Sea coast. These offer improved
15https://www.mubadala.com/en/mubadala-investment-company-old.
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margins andmarket adaptability but aremuchmore complex to construct and operate.
Speciality chemicals move up the value chain and can support local industries such
as automobile components but do not have the previous feedstock cost advantage.
The second part of the strategy, demand defence and creation, overlaps with
downstream development. Internationally, the particular focus has been Asia—the
traditional markets of Japan and South Korea, now with China, India and others such
as Pakistan, Vietnam and Indonesia. So far, there has been little attention to Africa,
though this could change with growth in countries such as Ethiopia. Saudi Aramco
has joint-venture refineries in China, Japan and South Korea, and it and ADNOC are
exploring a giant greenfield refinery in western India with a consortium of Indian
state firms.
Creation of gas demand has received less attention but is perhaps more powerful,
given the competition between gas and coal in Asia, and the need for substantial
infrastructure for importation and use. Qatar Petroleum has extended its LNG port-
folio into the US. Qatar Petroleum is a majority owner (70%) of the Golden Pass
LNG terminal in Texas, with ExxonMobil (17.6%) and ConocoPhillips (12.4%) and
is planning to invest $20 billion in US conventional and unconventional oil and gas
assets (Reuters 2018a). Algeria, by contrast, once a gas superpower, is struggling:
its core European market is seeing low prices amid Russian and American competi-
tion, while exports are dropping because of underinvestment in new fields and rising
domestic consumption.
Aramco andADNOC,whose gas businesses today essentially serve only domestic
demand (ADNOC has a relatively small LNG export unit), have targeted gas as a key
growth area, as has Mubadala which was already a significant gas player via its 51%
holding in the Dolphin pipeline. But this is more challenging for them than Qatar, as
they have to enter a crowded international space rather than relying on a domestic
surplus. Aramco has taken a stake in Sempra Energy’s US Gulf Coast export facility
(25% of Port Arthur LNG) (Saudi Aramco 2019) and has had discussions to enter
Russia’s Arctic-2 LNG project.
The northern tier of the Middle East may see the most development in gas, with
a complex mix of commercial and political factors. Iran began exporting gas to Iraq
in June 2017 (EIA 2019), although Baghdad has come under US pressure to find
alternatives. The Kurdistan region of Iraq has large gas resources which could serve
the crowded Turkish market, or the rest of Iraq. Iraq is gradually making headway
on reducing gas flaring and boosting power generation; it could eventually link up
to the GCC and become the gas and power conduit between Iran and the Gulf to the
east, Turkey to the north and the eastern Mediterranean to the west.
But oil and even gas still have to contend with the climate imperative. Aramco
is the most advanced of the region’s NOCs in thinking about demand defence in
terms of climate compatibility. It has invested substantial research and development
funding to improve engine efficiency, includingdeveloping some radical newdesigns,
which could keep oil-driven transport competitive with electric vehicles for longer,
while reducing emissions. Its gasoline compression ignition technology has been
accepted by Japanese carmaker Mazda Motor, and it is working with Achates Power
on opposed-piston engines (PR News Wire 2018). These are said to be 30-50%
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more efficient than conventional diesel and gasoline engines, have lower soot and
NOx emissions than diesel and can run on low-octane gasoline (Green Car Congress
2018). It is also researching octane-on-demand to lower consumption and emissions
of high-octane fuel used mostly during acceleration (SCMP 2019). Aramco has also
worked on mobile carbon capture and storage for vehicles, though the economic
viability of this seems doubtful. It has sought to develop non-metallic products from
petrochemicals, such as oil-field pipes.
It touts the low-carbon footprint of its production (a result of low flaring, reducing
methane leakage, improving energy efficiency of operations, and inherent advantages
such as prolific reservoirs and limited water cut). This could become important as
low-carbon fuel benchmarks are adopted by consuming countries and push out high-
carbon crudes such as Canada’s oil sands.
Aramco, ADNOC and QP have all launched large carbon capture and storage
facilities, which inject carbon dioxide from gas processing or industrial facilities into
underground reservoirs for safe disposal or enhanced oil recovery (EOR). Aramco is
a member, and ADNOC considering becoming a member (Reuters 2017), of the Oil
and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI), along with leading international oil companies
such as Shell and Occidental, with CCUS as a key focus.
In the longer term, two other technologies offer promise for sustainable hydrocar-
bon use. Direct air capture (DAC) extracts carbon dioxide from ambient air. It can
then be used for improving plant growth in greenhouses, creating products such as
low-emission cement, plastics or synthetic fuels, or injecting underground for EOR.
As all realistic emissions paths compatible with limiting global warming to 1.5 °C or
2 °C involve substantial amounts of ‘negative emissions’, DAC could have a growing
role, and MENA countries offer ideal geological, economic and social conditions.
Hydrogen has also attracted growing recent interest as a clean fuel. Its prospects
for light vehicles appear doubtful, because of themajor improvements of battery cars.
However, hydrogen could be viable in long-distance trucking, ships and air travel. It
is likely to be even more important for seasonal energy storage, balancing variable
renewables, and for decarbonising heavy industry by providing high-temperature
heat, and as a reducing agent such as in steelmaking.
‘Blue hydrogen’,made from fossil fuelswith carbon capture and storage, or ‘green
hydrogen’, produced by electrolysing water with low-carbon electricity, both have
promise inMENA. Japan has expressed particular interest in developing a ‘hydrogen
economy’ that could include imports fromMENA and other suitable producers such
as Australia. Dubai has set up a pilot hydrogen electrolysis facility at its Expo site.
6 Retooling the Domestic Energy System
Most MENA countries are engaged, at varying paces, in restructuring their domestic
energy—primarily electricity—sectors. This has primarily been driven by economic
and security-of-supply, not environmental, imperatives.
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Many regional countries struggled with limited gas availability during the 2000s,
as the economic boom outpaced production or insecurity cut off imports. In Egypt,
Iraq, Iran and Sharjah, this manifested itself in power cuts and interruptions of gas to
industry. Exports from Algeria and Oman were limited by feedstock. Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE burnt large quantities of expensive liquid fuels to meet
power demand.
Sector reform has manifested itself around three pillars: reductions in subsidies,
increased private involvement and greater use of non-hydrocarbon energy.
Exposure to world LNG market prices, whether as an importer or exporter, has
helped set an upper benchmark for local gas prices and encourage reduction in
subsidies. Dubai, in 2008 (Boersma and Griffiths 2016), and Iran, in 2010 (IMF
2011), were two of the first to begin significant reforms of electricity, gas, water and
petrol/diesel prices, and most regional countries have since followed suit. This has
restrained demand growth, though it is difficult to isolate the exact impact because
of the concurrent economic slowdown from 2014 onwards.
The breadth and social acceptance of the reforms differs from one country to
another in the MENA region; nevertheless, energy prices are generally still below
international or fully cost-reflective levels and in some cases reform has been post-
poned or cancelled due to lack of parliamentary support (seen in Iran, Bahrain and
Kuwait). In some cases in the GCC, particularly Saudi Arabia, and in Iran, rises in
energy prices for the consumer were followed by a cash transfer programme or other
type of in-kind assistance by the government, to help protect lower income citizens
and to minimise any risk of civil discontent.
Independent power producers (IPPs) have been introduced from the early 2000 s
onwards in most regional countries, breaking the model of the vertically integrated,
state-owned monopoly utility. However, privatisation of distribution has remained
very limited, and true electricity markets do not exist, with the ‘single buyer’ model
persisting and a statemonopoly remaining in charge of transmission. Oman hasmade
some steps towards a more liberalised power market especially once it has opened
private sector participation in electricity and water production. The GCC country
also plans to privatise its transmission and distribution companies by selling up to
70% of its stakes in Muscat Electricity Distribution, and 49% of its stake in the
Oman Electricity Transmission Company by 2020. Plans will likely be delayed due
to their complexity (Reuters 2019a). Improvements in dispatch, and the replacement
of outdated plants, have gradually improved average fleet thermal efficiencies. But
identifying the true cost of electricity, and the true value of different sources of
generation, remains difficult.
6.1 Alternative Energy Sources
The emergence of alternative electricity generation is the most striking and, in the
long term, consequential of these changes. Over the next one to two decades, the use
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of oil in the MENA power system is likely to be largely phased out, while growth in
gas use in power slows sharply.
These alternatives to hydrocarbons include coal, nuclear and renewables.
6.1.1 Coal
The turn to coal clearly illustrates the prioritisation of security-of-supply and eco-
nomic motivations over environmental ones, even if some of the coal plants are
promoted as ‘carbon capture-ready’. It, and nuclear, indicates the preference for
large, centralised facilities under the firm control of the national utility. There is no
coal mining in MENA (outside a small amount in Iran16), so the use of domestic
resources, or the preservation of domestic employment, is not a factor as it is in
parts of Europe, the US, India, China or South Africa. But coal is cheap and readily
available from a range of suppliers (US, Australia, South Africa and Indonesia) who
do not bring the same security-of-supply concerns as some oil and gas exporters.
This explains the interest in coal fromDubai, Egypt andMorocco, and its historical
use in Israel. Cement plants in Egypt and the UAE have turned to coal to replace
expensive or unavailable gas or fuel oil. Dubai is constructing a large (2.4 GW) ultra-
supercritical coal-fired power plant at Hassyan in the south of the emirate (Arabian
Industry 2018). Egypt’s plans for a sizeable clean coal power plant (2640 MW) with
Chinese and Emirati backing were apparently called off by the Egyptian Ministry of
Electricity in 2019 (IEA Clean Coal Centre 2019). Conversely, coal use in Israel is
being replaced for environmental reasons by its new offshore gas, and renewables in
Morocco will erode the share of its coal plants.
6.1.2 Nuclear
Nuclear power is more complicated, and the timelines and motivations of each coun-
try vary. Nuclear power globally has been struggling to maintain its share of the
energy mix, due to the shutdown of old plants, nuclear reductions or phaseouts in
countries such as Germany over safety concerns following the 2011 Fukushima acci-
dent in Japan, and the high cost and long timelines for new builds. TheMENA region,
though, had no operating nuclear power plants (there were some small research
reactors) until recently but has now emerged as a relative bright spot for the industry.
Iran has one operational plant, 1 GW at Bushehr, on the Gulf, which came into
service in 2011 (The Japan Times 2019a) after originally starting construction in
1975. Nuclear power has been seen as a source of national pride and technological
advancement (Vaez andSadjapdour 2013). In the 1970 s, therewas a fear that Iran’s oil
resources would be exhausted relatively quickly; in the 2000 s, the concern was over
the lagging pace of gas field development compared to fast-rising consumption. Now,
16Turkey, not included here in MENA, has substantial lignite mining and has made it a core part of
electricity diversification.
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an increase in gas output makes this less of an immediate worry, but the programme
has amomentum of its own. In November 2019, Iran began construction on another 1
GWreactor at Bushehr (DW2019),withAliAkbar Salehi, head of theAtomicEnergy
Organisation of Iran, commenting that each reactor would save 11 million barrels of
oil annually (a reasonable figure assuming that nuclear power solely displaces oil).
The link to the country’s uranium enrichment programme is not straightforward,
since Russia is supplying the fuel for Bushehr, though Iran does have ambitions to
construct additional, domestically designed reactors. The US-led sanctions under
the Obama administration were specifically predicated on limiting the country’s
enrichment, given that this could eventually produce weapons-grade uranium, not
on the civil nuclear power programme per se. The full scale of Iran’s nuclear plans
might reach 10 GW by 2035,17 out of a total installed capacity of some 137 GW,
generating some 20% of the country’s power. However, likely nuclear capacity will
be much less than this, and the high cost and long construction times contrast with
the relative ease and cheapness for Iran of turning to modern solar and wind.
In December 2006, the GCC states announced they had commissioned a study
on civil nuclear power. Of these, Kuwait explicitly ruled out nuclear in July 2011
following Fukushima in March 2011, but Abu Dhabi had already begun a nuclear
power programme in 2009 with the award of the construction bid to a consortium
led by Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO) and involving Samsung, Hyundai,
Doosan andWestinghouse. France’s Areva, with Suez and Total, competed intensely
with the Korean consortium for the contract, given the importance of their plans to
develop export-oriented nuclear power industries.Originally, thefirst of four reactors,
totalling 5.6 gigawatts (GW), was intended to start in 2017, but construction and
training delays have pushed full commercial operation back probably to 2021.
Its use of nuclear powerwas predicatedon the country’s rapidly growing electricity
consumption, the struggles of gas production to keep up with demand, the lack of
progress on expanding the Dolphin gas import contract with Qatar and the relatively
high cost of alternatives, including renewables. Subsequently, demand growth has
slowed, domestic gas output is set to rise, and solar power in the UAE has achieved
dramatic gains in size and cost-competitiveness. Therefore, theUAEEnergy Strategy
2050 counts nuclear as part of its ‘clean’ energy (i.e. zero-carbon) target but does
not foresee that any more reactors will be constructed by 2050. Greenhouse gas
emissions were not an important part of the initial motivation for the programme but
have been claimed retrospectively.
Saudi Arabia has had a number of abortive plans for nuclear power, with a pro-
gramme announced in August 2009. In April 2010, the King Abdullah Centre for
Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA.CARE) was established, and during 2011-2016
it produced various targets, for between 16 and 17 GW of reactors, and signed study
agreements with GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, Toshiba/Westinghouse, Exelon, the
Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute, China Nuclear Engineering Corporation
and Rosatom. Plans included full-scale reactors as well as small modular reactors
17Author’s estimates.
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integrated with desalination. Saudi Arabia has also sought to mine its domestic
uranium resources.
As with renewable energy, KA.CARE’s intentions were stymied by turf wars with
the energyministry, and its own lack of ability to finance plants. However, from 2017,
nuclear plans appear to have revived under the Ministry’s banner, with a framework
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Authority, selection of two reactor
sites and the start of construction on a 30 kW research reactor at Riyadh.
Jordan has long investigated nuclear power because of its lack of domestic oil and
gas resources, and its uranium resources (in phosphate deposits which are difficult
to extract (World Nuclear Association 2019)). It has set up a Committee for Nuclear
Strategy in 2007, and it set out a programme for nuclear power to provide 30% of
electricity by 2030. The shut-off of Egyptian gas supplies due to sabotage and falling
production after 2011 gave further impetus to its search for energy security. But its
small electricity market would find it hard to accommodate a large reactor, and the
relatively poor kingdom would struggle to finance it. With a short coastline, cooling
water is not readily available (the inland Al Amra site chosen in 2010 was to be
cooledwithwater from theKhirbet Samrawastewater treatment plant (WorldNuclear
Association 2019)). With the new availability of regional gas, the development of
its indigenous oil shale, and the expansion of Jordan’s successful solar and wind
programmes, nuclear power is unlikely to proceed.
Egypt is a more promising case given the large and fast-growing domestic elec-
tricity market. Again, nuclear power plans have been floated for many years, with
a 150 MW nuclear plant being proposed as early as 1964, but have been repeatedly
stalled. In 2004 and 2008, Egypt signed new nuclear cooperation agreements with
Russia’s Rosatom for a 1 GW nuclear reactor, but lack of action forced a renewal
of the cooperation agreement in 2013. In 2015, a new agreement was signed with
Rosatom to finance and build four 1.2 GW reactors at El-Dabaa on theMediterranean
coast (World Nuclear Association 2020).
The high cost and technical sophistication of nuclear power programmes raises
the question of the motivations for pursuing them, beyond simple economic and
environmental goals.
The UAE signed a ‘123’ agreement with the US, giving it access to American
nuclear suppliers, which committed to a ‘gold standard’ on regulation and trans-
parency, including a commitment not to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel.
This was an important part of assuaging concerns that a civil nuclear power pro-
gramme could be a cover for aweapons programme, given theUSobjective to prevent
further proliferation, and in particular any threat to Israel’s regional monopoly on
nuclear weapons. The UAE’s agreement, though, does give it the right to match the
conditions offered by the US to any other regional state in subsequent agreements.
Although there is no sign that the UAE’s power programme is intended to be part
of ‘nuclear hedging’, it could develop skills that might eventually be used for that
purpose. Perhaps, more significantly, it creates a large and high-profile asset, and
long-term agreements with a variety of influential countries, which would encourage
them to come to the UAE’s aid in the event of a threat.
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Saudi Arabia has not signed a ‘123’ agreement, partly because of its desire to
retain the option for domestic enrichment of its uranium resources. It has, however,
been lobbying for US support of its programme. Its leadership has given ambiguous
signals on proliferation (though it is party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)), with crown prince Mohammed bin
Salman noting that Saudi Arabia would seek to acquire nuclear weapons if arch-rival
Iran did so (Reuters 2018b).
6.1.3 Renewables
In contrast to the decentralised renewables models pioneered in Europe, and being
promoted for African countries, MENA countries have preferred to introduce large-
scale centralised renewable projects. These have typically been awarded by tender
by the state-owned utility, ministry or energy regulator, with an offtake guarantee.
Land is usually free and grid connections often provided. Commercial banks have
proved willing to finance these projects up to 84-90% of project value at low rates,
enabling world-record levelized cost of energy (LCOEs) to be bid. Dubai, AbuDhabi
and Saudi Arabia have set records in solar photovoltaic (PV), Dubai in concentrated
solar thermal power (CSP) and Saudi Arabia in onshore wind. Oman, meanwhile,
has inaugurated a giant solar thermal project to provide steam for enhanced recovery
of heavy oil.
The less creditworthy countries, notably Jordan, Egypt and Morocco, have not
achieved such low bid prices, but nevertheless they have made impressive progress,
at costs well below that of burning oil or imported LNG. Morocco, in particular, has
been a regional leader in CSP through its renewable agency MASEN.
Acwa Power, a private Saudi company held 45% by the Public Investment Fund
(PIF) (Al-Monitor 2019; Reuters 2019b), and Masdar, the clean energy subsidiary
of Mubadala, have emerged as regional leaders. Chinese, Japanese and European
companies (such as Jinko Solar, Marubeni Corporation, French energy giant EDF)
have also beenwell-represented amongwinning consortia. For instance, AbuDhabi’s
1.17 GW Noor Abu Dhabi Solar Plant is a joint venture between the Abu Dhabi
Government and a consortium of Marubeni Corporation and Jinko Solar Holding.
Progress is patchy across the region, though some of the laggard countries are
now catching up. Saudi Arabia struggled from turf wars between the King Abdullah
Centre for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA.CARE), and the Ministry of Energy;
and more recently between the ministry’s Renewable Energy Project Delivery Office
(REPDO) and the PIF (Power Technology 2019; Bloomberg Environment 2019).
Iran has some domestic capability but struggles to attract international investment
under the burden of sanctions and its own opaque domestic environment. It has,
though, carried out a large programme of hydroelectric dam construction, problem-
atic under drought conditions and part of a wider struggle to meet local water needs
for agriculture and ecology. Iraq struggles to offer acceptable payment guarantees
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and to overcome its internal bureaucracy, but a recent offer of 755 MW solar PV18 is
encouraging. Qatar, with its abundant low-cost gas, has not prioritised renewables but
has tendered for a 700 MW solar PV project, which could be expanded to 800 MW,
to be operational by the fourth quarter of 2021 (PV Magazine 2019a).
Perhaps more surprising is the slow progress made in Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait,
Lebanon and Algeria to date. These countries have struggled with combinations of
domestic gas shortfalls, reliance of the power sector on high-cost oil or importedLNG
and reductions in gas exports because of lack of feedstock. Idiosyncratic factors are
at play, though with some common elements.
Oman, for instance, struggled with a lack of institutional capability, though it
is now picking up on a series of renewable projects and recently commissioned
its first wind farm. Lebanon’s power sector has been hampered by politicisation,
corruption and heavy losses from selling subsidised power, though there are tentative
signs of recent progress. Poor public services, including lack of electricity, was a
major factor behind the October–November 2019 protests (Reuters 2019c). Kuwait’s
energy projects in general have been badly delayed by continual gridlock between
the government and parliament, with MPs wielding allegations of corruption.
Some countries, notably Saudi Arabia and Morocco (Oxford Business Group
2018), have sought to drive local economic development through renewables by spec-
ifying local content requirements. The UAE, by contrast, has focussed on achieving
the lowest possible costs.
Alongside the large utility-scale projects, ‘rooftop’ and distributed renewables
have made progress in some cases where the regulatory framework has been sup-
portive. In particular, net metering programmes in Israel (PV Magazine 2018a),
Jordan (PV Magazine 2018b), Abu Dhabi, ‘Shams Dubai’ (with 106 MW installed
as of September 2019) (PV Magazine 2019b) and the Sahim scheme in Oman19
have provided relatively attractive economics for larger scale (industrial and large
commercial) installations. Despite subsidy reform, residential power prices in the
region are still usually too low to encourage householders to install rooftop panels.
However, solar water heaters have been mandated in Dubai and are popular in Jordan
and Israel (Green Tech Media 2018).
Renewable power also raises the need and potential for electricity trading within
MENA countries, such as the GCC, which has a pre-existing interconnection grid.
Large-scale wind, solar PV and CSP projects would support expansion of the grid’s
current capacity (2.4 GW) and potential extensions to neighbouring countries. For
instance, Iraq’s Ministry of Electricity recently signed an electricity purchase agree-
ment of up to 2GWwith theGCCIA, the leading advocate for regional power trading.
Iraq shall receive power supplied by GCC countries (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the
UAE) from transmission lines from Kuwait. Saudi Arabia was in talks with Iraq last
year for providing electricity from a 3 GW solar plant at a steep discount compared
to what it imports from Iran ($21/MWh against $84/MWh from Iran), while Egypt
18https://moelc.gov.iq/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=4558.
19https://www.aer.om/en/sahim.
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has shown interest in a linking its national grid with Saudi Arabia’s to meet peak
demand with imports (up to 3 GW) (APICORP 2018).
Countries that have successfully developed large amounts of variable renewables
may seek to export surpluses at certain times to their neighbours. They may also rely
on dispatchable capacity in other countries to reduce their need for balancing variable
renewables. And time differences across the region can be exploited; for instance,
solar power in Jordan or Egypt can cover for demand in eastern Saudi Arabia during
the early evening there. However, large-scale electricity exports from the region to
Europe are unlikely in the medium term. From the Middle East, they would have to
cross unstable areas in Syria or Lebanon. From North Africa, the distance is shorter
and easier but the investment climate in Algeria and Libya has been unfriendly, and
all the North African countries have been prioritising meeting their own demand.
Europe would also, for reasons of local employment and security of supply, not wish
to depend too heavily on its Mediterranean neighbours. Electricity exports from the
GCC to South Asia via undersea cables could be a possibility. But the EU preference
is likely to be more for imports of decarbonised industrial materials, such as steel,
aluminium, fertilisers, cement and hydrogen, made in MENA with renewables, and
fossil fuels with CCS (van Wijk and Wouters 2019).
Renewables are unlikely to perpetuate the ‘rentier’ model or contribute to the
‘resource curse’. An attractive investment model is required to make MENA renew-
ables competitive against neighbours, given the intense competition to lower financ-
ing costs. AlthoughMENAhas some of theworld’s best solar conditions, they are not
superior enough to generate large rents, when including long-distance transmission.
7 Shifting Strategies in the Geoeconomic Transition
The US has since the 1970 s been by far the dominant outside power in the Middle
East (if not so much in North Africa), replacing or expelling the Soviet Union as
the sponsor of several client regimes. The Carter Doctrine, promulgated in 1980,
declared that theUSwould use anymeans, includingmilitary force, to prevent outside
domination of the Persian Gulf,20 a warning squarely directed at the USSR following
its intervention in Afghanistan. Though the Carter Doctrine was not directed at
regional states, the US has also sought to prevent the rise of a regional monopolist
which might dominate Middle Eastern oil supplies, leading the coalition to expel
Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991.
Though direct US imports of Middle Eastern oil have been relatively modest
(Venezuela, Mexico and Canada being more important suppliers), this role has been
played in recognition of the centrality of secure and reasonably priced energy to US
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objective, usually implicit, has become the most salient in recent years: the ability
to deny oil in the event of conflict to US rivals, specifically China.
However, over the past two decades, even though USmilitary forces in theMiddle
East remain strong, that role has gradually eroded. As the US has moved towards
being a net exporter of oil, its imports from MENA have plunged (Fig. 5). The long
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the chaotic aftermath of the intervention in Libya,
have drained domestic appetite for continuing involvement. The recent blundering
withdrawal from parts of north-eastern Syria is symptomatic of this desire, and of
the lack of a clear articulation of the continuing and compelling strategic rationale
for remaining. Meanwhile, the US’s main regional partners have been alarmed by its
unpredictability, and have begun to take some steps to diversify their dependence on
its security and diplomatic cover.
The key rising players have been China and Russia, China more in the economic
sphere, Russia in the military and diplomatic.Russia has extended cooperation with
variousMiddle Eastern countries, often across contradictory geopolitical alignments.
Though it has given Iran diplomatic support in the sanctions standoff with Washing-
ton, it has not been able—or has not tried particularly hard—to shield Iran, an oil
market competitor, from the consequences.
The OPEC + agreement has deepened the relationship with Saudi Arabia, mak-
ing Moscow an oil market player that cannot be ignored. For the first time, Russia
has delivered on production curbs—though it has not committed to cut as much as
the OPEC countries, nor has it fully implemented those cuts. Russia’s influence was
also been important in convincing Iran to join the accord in December 2016 (Reuters
2016), though Iran now chafes at Saudi-Russia domination of OPEC policy. As a
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relatively high-cost producer, with more limited reserves than the main Gulf coun-
tries, and whose production was rising only slowly, Russia benefits more from the
limitations. Its relative gains will be even more significant should oil demand growth
slow or reverse in the near future.
Russian companies’ investments in the region remain relatively limited, but
Lukoil, Rosneft and Gazprom Neft have important assets in Iraq, Gazprom has long
been involved in Libya, and Lukoil recently entered Abu Dhabi’s offshore sour gas
project. Rosneft entered the Kurdistan region of Iraq in September 2017, just ahead
of the ill-fated referendum on independence which led to the loss of Kurdish control
of the Kirkuk region and its important oil production. Rosneft signed for various
oil-field developments, bought a stake in the main oil export pipeline through Turkey
and agreed to construct a large gas pipeline to Turkey. However, its strategy in the
area, whether as a competitor or a complement to compatriot Gazprom, is unclear.
Rosneft also bought a stake from ENI in the giant offshore Zohr gas field, while
LNG player Novatek is involved in exploration in Lebanon. Russian companies, such
as Kremlin-linked Stroytransgaz, hope to benefit from resources in Syria as a reward
for supporting the Assad regime (Financial Times 2019). Though Gazprom Neft,
Lukoil and Zarubezhneft have studied fields in Iran, none has been willing to invest
under the penalty of American sanctions.
Nuclear power, via Rosatom, is another important area of cooperation. As dis-
cussed, Russia competed the long-moribund Bushehr reactor in Iran, has agreed to
construct the Dabaa plant in northern Egypt (ROSATOM 2019), has been involved
in Jordan’s plans (now unlikely to progress) (Reuters 2018c) and discussed partic-
ipation in Saudi Arabia’s nuclear power programme (S&P Global Platts 2019). It
is also constructing the Akkuyu plant in Turkey. Rosatom’s integration across the
nuclear value chain, its worldwide experience and its lack of political limitations give
it advantages over its American, French, Chinese and South Korean competitors.
Overall in the region, Russian firms bring some reasonable technical skills and
are desired for the diplomatic diversification. But they are not rich in capital, nor do
they come with the vital domestic energy markets of the main Asian players. This
will continue to limit them to a secondary role in the region’s petroleum industry.
Some energy investments have gone the other way. These are not very large as
yet, but Moscow does have an objective to replace the Western capital deterred by
sanctions imposed over its annexation of Crimea in 2014, and not to become too
dependent on Chinese funds. In 2018, Mubadala purchased a 44% stake in a unit of
Gazprom Neft’s operating fields in the Omsk and Tomsk districts of West Siberia
(MUBADALA 2018). Saudi Aramco has explored the purchase of a 30% stake in
Arctic-2 LNG from Novatek (Reuters 2019d). But the limited technical synergies
and the barriers of political risk and lack of transparency that have held back foreign
investment in general will probably limit the scope for Middle Eastern investment in
Russian petroleum.
China has been a more important economic player. After playing second fiddle
to Russia since 2017, Saudi Arabia has regained its slot as the country’s largest crude
oil supplier; Iraq is third, Oman sixth, while Iran was seventh in 2018 but has fallen to
low levels (though China is now essentially its only paying customer). The MENA
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role in gas is less dominant, with China relying on pipelines from Central Asia,
Russia and Burma, but Qatar was its second-largest supplier of LNG with 13.1% of
themarket in the first ninemonths of 2019; Oman and Egypt supplied small amounts.
Its large state oil firms have gained in prominence over the past decade, particularly
in their leading role in Iraq, acquiring assets in Egypt (Egypt Today 2017), and more
recently by acquiring stakes in Abu Dhabi’s renewed concessions.
In return, China has become the largest exporter of manufactured goods to most
of the Middle East. It has been the leading representative of Iran’s few remaining
trading partners and investors, and has defended the JCPOA. But it has not been
willing to oppose US sanctions too vigorously, given the practical difficulties, and
the fact this is just one issue in a wider confrontation with America over trade and
other contentious topics.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) relates to the Middle East, particularly the
maritime route through the Indian Ocean to the Arabian Sea, Red Sea and Suez Canal
(Gurol and Shahmohammadi 2019). The Caspian route through Iran, the Caucasus
and Turkey to Europe is also important, while the Gulf has played relatively less
of a role (Mills et al. 2017). The BRI’s primarily economic goals still bring with it
diplomatic, strategic and perhaps military obligations and opportunities.
China’s diplomacy has been relatively low-key and it has not established a signifi-
cant regionalmilitary presence,wishing to avoid anydirect appearance of challenging
the US (Lons et al. 2019). However, it has a base in Djibouti, close to the Bab El
Mandeb exit from the Red Sea (The Diplomat 2018), and Chinese military analysts
have argued for extending this network of bases to the UAE and Pakistan (Duchâtel
2019). The Chinese-developed Gwadar port in Pakistan is close to the egress from
the Gulf (and to the Indian-backed port at Chabahar in the strategic southern Mokran
region of Iran). Beijing has sought to remain neutral in the region’s conflicts, main-
taining good relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel (Efron et al. 2019) as
well as Iran. At some point, though, as its regional interests deepen, it may find itself
in a situation where this neutrality cannot be maintained.
India too has traditionally beenmore of an economicplayer, but the recent flurry of
deals signedwithADNOCandSaudiAramcohavemoved it up the league table of key
Middle East partners. Less geopolitically intimidating than the Chinese but less risk-
averse than the Japanese andKoreans, it has also seemed amore promising long-term
market as Chinese growth has slowed. Early in 2019, ADNOC signed an oil storage
agreementwith the IndianStrategicPetroleumReserves (ISPRL) to store 5.86million
barrels of Abu Dhabi oil, which was followed by ONGC Videsh, Bharat Petroleum
and Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) being awarded stakes in Abu Dhabi’s production
licenses. Aramco has planned a $60 B refinery and petrochemicals complex in India.
India has not yet played the diplomatic and security role in the Middle East its
proximity, contribution of migrant labour, and elements of shared culture, history
and religion might suggest. In September 2019, it deployed warships to protect its
tankers in the Gulf area following a spate of attacks on tankers blamed on Iran
(The Economic Times 2019). The US has at some times attempted to cultivate India
as a counterweight to China (Janardhan 2019), which could eventually include a
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heightened military role in the Gulf, as it did in the time of the British Raj (Gupta
2019).
Japan and South Korea are long-time economic partners of theMiddle East, and
particularly the Gulf, as importers of hydrocarbons and providers of manufactured
goods and engineering services. They have increased their upstream investments in
the region recently, particularly in Abu Dhabi and Iraq. Japan considered in Septem-
ber sending military forces to the Gulf to safeguard shipping, but this was opposed
because of fears it would violate restrictions on the overseas deployment of the Self-
Defence Forces (SDF) (The Japan Times 2019b). Ultimately, both will probably be
too concerned about their immediate neighbourhood and the threat from China to
commit large forces to the Middle East.
Europe’s economic and diplomatic relationship with North Africa is more signif-
icant than with most of the Middle East, with France and Italy, and to a lesser extent
Spain, especially involved as investors and customers. France and Italy have at times
been at cross purposes in the civil war in Libya. The UK and France, in particular,
have deepened their military and economic engagement with some members of the
GCC, which has been welcomed as a counterbalance to worries over declining US
attention. On the other hand, the ‘E3’ (UK, France and Germany) have been the lead-
ers of the attempt to preserve the JCPOA with Iran in the face of the US violation of
it, despite the GCC’s dislike of the agreement.
The prospect of a transition to lower oil demand raises the question of whether the
MENA region’s geopolitical importance will decline. It will still, of course, have a
central geographic position. Its gas exports, mostly from Qatar but possibly in future
also from Iran, are expected to remain important for a longer period than for oil.
Declining exports from Algeria and political instability in Libya have reduced their
role as suppliers of gas to Europe, thus increasing the relative share of Russian gas,
long an issue of concern for EU policymakers, though somewhat ameliorated by
the rise of renewables and the increasing availability of LNG from diverse sources.
However, in the short and medium term, the economic damage and instability from
declining hydrocarbon rents could lead to a greater prominence for Middle Eastern
political events. A secular decline in prices could be periodically interrupted by
supply disruptions and temporary price spikes, which would themselves hasten the
move towards alternatives. However, if the MENA region can avoid severe political
upsets, it could even gain in geoeconomic importance for a while, as high-cost oil
and gas producers are squeezed out of the market, andMENA exceeds the 42% share
of world oil production it held in the early 1970 s, before the first oil shock.
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8 Conclusions
The global energy transition centres on the shift from carbon-based energy sources
and carriers to low/zero-carbon or decarbonised forms. Initially driven by envi-
ronmental goals, this transition is now strongly encouraged by the growing cost-
competitiveness and technical performance of many new energy technologies, par-
ticularly solar, wind, batteries and electric vehicles. However, hydrocarbons have
also improved in cost, abundance and environmental performance in recent years,
notably in the expansion of US shale oil and gas production, and the growth of the
global LNG business.
From the MENA point of view, this energy transition coincides and partly over-
laps with a geopolitical and geoeconomic transition. This involves severe political
instability in many regional states; a diminished and less predictable role for the US
and a rising position for Russia, China and some other states, which does not yet
compensate for the American regress; and an ongoing shift of key markets away
from the US and Europe towards emerging Asia.
The major MENA hydrocarbon exporters have, on the whole, coped with the fall
in oil and gas prices since 2014, though with some economic difficulty and painful
restructuring. So far, OPEC, with the new cooperation with Russia, has not just
survived, but gained in coherence, given the stronger position of Saudi Arabia and
its allies. But if oil demand growth continues to be weak or reverses, and/or non-
OPEC competition remains strong, the loss of market share (or at least, failure to
gain market share) will increase tensions between the OPEC + group’s members.
Several leading MENA countries have found reasonable success in strengthening
their hydrocarbon sectors to cope with new challenges, making their national oil
companies more commercially minded and competitive, developing value-added
trading, petrochemical and refining industries, and in particular in reorienting their
markets towards Asia. Qatar has played its role in reshaping the world LNG business,
and in adapting to the changes spurred by the appearance of US LNG exports. Some
elements of a future climate-compatible industry are emerging—including a greater
focus on petrochemicals and non-metallic materials, CCS, direct air capture and
hydrogen—but remain quite nascent. The GCC countries in particular need to be
bolder in investing in commercial-scale decarbonised projects.
Although their carbon footprints and levels of energy intensity remain very high by
world standards, some regional states have also made increasingly swift and impres-
sive progress towards integrating new energy into their domestic supply. Morocco,
Jordan and the UAE stand out particularly. The dramatic new cost-competitiveness
of solar PV, and improvements in wind and solar CSP, should see them rapidly
gain a significant position in the energy sector of most MENA countries. Policy and
government will and capability is catching up but still lags behind.
Some of the GCC states have made progress towards diversification and articu-
lating ‘post-oil’ economic visions. So far, these do not involve a radical rethink of
political and social systems. Iran, under the pressure of sanctions, has been forced
towards diversification, though its economy has other severe structural flaws. Other
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major hydrocarbon producers, such as Algeria, Libya and Iraq, have been unable
even to begin on serious economic reform. The challenge of moving to an economy
not heavily dependent on oil and gas revenues within one to two decades remains
enormous. Though states such as Dubai, Malaysia and Norway offer some lessons,
there are almost no regional or even global success stories that MENA countries
could emulate, meaning they will largely have to find their own path.
Success in these three endeavours—retooling domestic hydrocarbons, boosting
thenewenergy economyanddiversifying economically—will be essential forMENA
states to cope with the wider geoeconomic transition. So far somewhat passive con-
sumers of the transition, they need to take a more active role in developing and
deploying the key technologies and business models, and translating these into an
effective, proactive and positive role in climate diplomacy. The institutions built up
during the resource-rich era have strengths, but also serious rigidities that will hinder
reform towards the post-oil era. Some have made significant progress in strengthen-
ing and widening their diplomatic relationships, remaining close partners of the US
while dealing successfully with Russia, China, European and other Asian countries.
Others have already been torn apart when their domestic political fractures have
been exploited by outside powers. The future for resource-rich MENA economies,
and their energy-poor neighbours and co-dependents, in an era of energy transfor-
mation is not as uniformly gloomy as the early scholarship has painted it. But it will
certainly not be easy, and not all states will achieve the transition successfully, or
even survive.
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Addressing Africa’s Energy Dilemma
Lapo Pistelli
1 Introduction
The transition to cleaner forms of energy production is happening in sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA) with distinct characteristics compared to other world regions. African
countries are gifted with a huge—and still largely untapped—energy potential but
energy access is among the lowest in the world, mainly due to structural constraints
(such as the poor efficiency of the power sector and the non-capillary diffusion
of grids) as well as lack of significant investment in energy infrastructure, human
resources and technology.
Considering that energy is the main enabler of economic development and an
essential component of several Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), if universal
energy access in sub-Saharan Africa continues to be a distant objective, a large part
of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development will remain out of reach, depriving
the region of the possibility to build a prosperous future. Thus, guaranteeing energy
access is the priority of sub-Saharan countries, while the transition from fossil fuels
to cleaner forms of energy is a complementary priority that manifests itself very
differently across countries in terms of timing, modality and impact.
This chapter discusses how the ongoing low-carbon energy transformation could
reshape geopolitics within Africa and between the continent and the rest of the world.
The chapter first attempts to define what ‘transition’ means in African contexts and
if the concept applies at all to African dynamics. It then delves into the drivers
and modalities of Africa’s alleged shift to finally explore geopolitical dynamics,
questioningwhether Africa is still the locus for the global supply of natural resources,
introducing patterns of engagement betweenAfrica and international/regional actors,
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The analysis pivots betweendiscussions of contemporary developments and future
trends. The former accounts inevitably differ from those that elaborate on the ‘likely’
implications of renewables on geopolitics in the coming decades. While the study of
current settings is based on historical and factual accounts, investigations of ‘likely’
futures are based on assumptions and scenarios.
We conclude that while the venues and sources of geopolitical interest might
change in the new geopolitical order that the transition to renewable energy implies,
the content and modalities of interaction may see a continuity with the past, namely,
dependence on external financing and technology. With yet at least one novelty:
increased relevance of regional interdependencies.
These latter may signal a counter-tendency at a time when increased tariffs and
sanctions are everyday practice at the global level. The recent signing of the landmark
African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement in July 2019 emphasises
Africa’s willingness to reduce reliance over external partners and products while
increasing regional integration. It is, however, a trend that has yet tomaterialise while
it already presents pitfalls. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), increased intra-African trade will depend, among others,
on how ‘rules of origin’1 will be negotiated and implemented. Unless such rules are
well thought through, future regional value chains on the continent will continue
receiving little input from Africa, and a lot from abroad.
Importantly, at the time of revision of this book chapter, the world is experienc-
ing an unprecedented pandemic, unforeseeable at the time of writing. The global
economy is headed for recession and the impact on the African continent is very
likely to be severe with potential social, economic and political disruptions. How-
ever, although investments and new electricity connections will slow down as a result
of the crisis, our analysis and conclusions have so far remained solid: the pandemic
will not reduce the urgency for universal energy access whose achievement under-
pins the success of the Sustainable Development Agenda; global lockdowns have
highlighted the critical value of power infrastructure and this applies also to Africa,
especially when it comes to the development of regional energy markets; the role
of clean energy sources will continue to be strategic thanks to the crescent compet-
itiveness of renewables and the complementary role of natural gas; furthermore, if
there is one thing that the coronavirus pandemic has once again confirmed is the
reliance of Africa on external actors, and yet its increasing willingness and capacity
to coordinate at the continental and sub-continental levels.
1By defining the nationality of a product, rules of origin dictate the conditions for the application
of tariff concessions, delimiting the range of products eligible for preferential treatment (UNCTAD
2019, pp. 3-4).
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2 Understanding the Energy Transition in Sub-Saharan
Africa
When we talk about the energy transition in sub-Saharan Africa, we cannot avoid
problematising the concept of ‘transition’, which generally implies moving from a
socio-economic and technological arrangement to another. The assumption behind
the concept is that an arrangement does indeed exist. In sub-Saharan Africa, how-
ever, 600 million people (IEA 2018), over a total 1 billion (World Bank 2018a),2
lack energy access. The ‘transition’ to cleaner forms of energy is thus only a comple-
mentary concern, second to that of providing access to energy. In other words, if the
majority of the population does not have access to energy, it does not have anything
to transit away from.
Nonetheless, as governments conceive national development plans, the idea of
leapfrogging the conventional path to energy development and shift directly to
renewables is starting to be contemplated. The ‘National Determined Contributions’
(NDCs)3 to the Paris Agreement and the energy plans of many sub-Saharan countries
indicate an initial move towards the energy transition. Differences are, however, great
across the continent. Countries like Kenya and South Africa have commissioned a
significant number of renewable energy projects in the last years (African Energy
Live Data 2019),4 though the inefficiencies of the power sector and the inadequacy of
the energy infrastructure (common structural constraints in the sub-Saharan context)
currently make the substantial penetration of additional capacity a tough challenge.
However, the vast majority of sub-Saharan countries are still very far from expanding
the share of renewables in the power mix.
Biomass and waste5 cover about 60% of sub-Saharan Africa’s energy mix, fol-
lowed by oil and coal (16% each), gas (4%), nuclear and hydro (1% each), while
renewables combined represent a mere 1% (Enerdata 2019). With a 51% share in
the electricity mix,6 coal is the dominant fuel in electricity production.7 Gas holds
11% of the share, oil 7%, hydro 24% and solar, wind and geothermal combined
3% of electricity generation (Enerdata 2019). On average then, renewable energy in
sub-Saharan Africa represents a mere 1% reality—yet with revolutionary potential.
2The IEA 2018 Outlook uses the estimate of 600 million people without access referring to the year
2017, in which the overall population in Sub-Saharan Africa was 1.05 bn.
3National Determined Contributions (NDCs) identify the post-2020 climate targets, including
mitigation and adaptation, which countries committed to ratifying the Paris Agreement.
4According to African Energy Live Data, as of August 2019, installed electricity capacity from
wind and solar totals 411 MW in Kenya and 1565 MW in South Africa.
5Primarily used in the residential and commercials sector where more than 70% of total biomass
consumption is concentrated.
6Energy mix and electricity mix data are referred to 2017.
7Excluding from the analysis SouthAfrica, Botswana and Zimbabwe, three countriesmostly depen-
dent on coal the power generation mix becomes hydro 51%, natural gas 26%, oil 18%, coal 1% and
renewables 4%.
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2.1 Energy Access Is the Priority of the Region
Africa’s energy landscape is extremely diverse across the continent. It presents dif-
ferent energy structures (based on reliance on various natural resources), different
levels of infrastructure development and consequential varied vested interests in spe-
cific sources, such as oil in Nigeria and Angola, coal in southern Africa. Nonetheless,
a distinctive feature shared by all sub-Saharan countries is the world’s lowest rate of
energy access.
Although the overall electrification rate in sub-SaharanAfrica has ‘almost doubled
since 2000, rising by 20% points to 43%’ (IEA 2018, p. 78), today six people out of
ten remain without electricity and have no promising prospects for improving their
conditions any time soon. The sub-continent is still home to 20 countries with the
world’s lowest electrification rates and almost nine people out of ten (890 million
over a billion) have no clean cooking access while the number of people relying on
biomass, coal and kerosene for their main household cooking needs has increased by
270million since 2000 (IEA2018).Moreover, progress on energy access, uneven as it
has been across the continent, concentrated in just four countries—Kenya, Ethiopia,
Tanzania and Nigeria—which make up more than half of those gaining access since
2011.
This is particularly problematic not just for the achievement of Sustainable Devel-
opment Goal #7, but also for the achievement of several other development goals,
given that energy is the main enabler of economic development. It is estimated that
if universal energy access in sub-Saharan Africa continues to be a distant objective,
most of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development will remain out of reach
(IEA, IRENA, United Nations Statistics Division, World Bank, World Health Orga-
nization [WHO] 2018), subsequently depriving the region of the possibility to build
a prosperous future.
To revert the trend and ensure universal energy access, the International Energy
Agency foresees that growing electricity needs in sub-Saharan Africa will have to be
met by using a combination of domestic gas and renewable energy sources, reducing
as much as possible the use of oil and coal in power generation. Also, the use of
biomass will have to be substituted with improved biomass cookstoves and Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG) as clean cooking options.
Considering that clean cooking represents only a minor part of the incremental
investment required to ensure universal energy access in Africa, this article will
mainly focus on the power sector, looking at the substitution of coal and oil with
natural gas and renewables. These latter two resources are widely available in Africa,
and the economy of the region would very much benefit from their increased use for
power generation.
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2.2 Structural Constraints to Gas and Renewable Energy
Penetration in the Power Mix
Increasing the use of natural gas and renewables for power generation is not, unfor-
tunately, easily achievable, though desirable, in sub-Saharan Africa. Highly efficient
and economically sustainable power systems, together with costly infrastructure
investments, are required to ensure the substantial penetration of those resources
in the electricity mix. The absence of these two conditions across the continent con-
stitutes the main reason why sub-Saharan power markets are underdeveloped, and
gas-to-power and renewable energy projects are still relatively limited in the region.
In many cases, this is also a problem for the oil and gas sector, where the develop-
ment of gas projects are, in many cases, conditioned to the availability of liquefaction
facilities for the sale of gas in the international gas markets.8
There is, however, one more underlying reason as to why the power sector
faces challenges across the continent: the lack of industrial capacity, which leads
to relatively limited energy demand, and hence the uselessness of increased power
generation.
2.2.1 Efficiency and Economic Sustainability
Concerning efficiency and economic sustainability, a study of the World Bank
(Kojima and Trimble 2016) analysed the relationship between costs and revenues
of electric utilities in 39 sub-Saharan countries highlighting that only Uganda and
Seychelles fully recover their operational and capital costs with the cash collected
from customers. Such large deficits9—averaging 1.5% of gross domestic product
(GDP)—‘prevent power sectors from delivering reliable electricity to existing cus-
tomers, let alone expanding supply to new consumers at an optimal pace’ (Kojima
and Trimble 2016, p. vii). The commercial losses faced by utilities raise the issue
of ‘creditworthiness’: the deficit puts national utilities under financial stress—also
affecting public finances since power utilities are usually state-owned entities—and
exacerbates the off-take risk.10 This sub-optimal situation hinders private investments
in power generation even where the power grid would allow additional generation
capacity to reach the final customer.
8According to Enerdata, total gas production in sub-Saharan countries was 67.5 bcm in 2017
and local markets consumed only 32.8 bcm. Thus, more than half (51.4%) of the production was
exported. In the last two decades, gas production in sub-Saharan Africa has constantly been above
gas consumption and the level of net export in the coming years is expected to be growing due to
new Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) developments (e.g. Mozambique).
9The revenue–expenditure gap of a public utility company is referred to as a ‘quasi-fiscal deficit’
because utility companies are usually state-owned and commercial losses often represent a
government-sponsored collective subsidy.
10Under a power purchase agreement between a power generation project and the national utility,
the non-payment risk incurred by an independent power producer.
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2.2.2 Infrastructure Investment
However, power generation is only one part of the electricity sector value chain, and
one of the most critical elements of sub-Saharan Africa’s energy sector is indeed
related to the development of the power grid. The inadequacy of the transmission
and distribution network prevents the energy supply from reaching final demand
representing one of the main causes of the low levels of energy access in the region.
While in the oil and gas industry the possibility to export and sell the resource
on international markets constitutes a sufficient incentive for the private sector to
invest, investments in electricity generation can only be paid back by the local (or
regional) market. Hence, a well-functioning power grid is essential to attract private
investments.
The ‘natural monopoly’ characteristics of transmission and distribution make the
intervention of the public sector necessary, but the budget constraints suffered by the
vast majority of sub-Saharan countries limit the scale of their intervention. For gas-
to-power projects, the challenge is even tougher than renewables since the former
requires infrastructure investments also in the midstream sector for the provision of
gas-to-power power plants.11
2.2.3 Lack of Industrial Capacity
Though access to energy is certainly a necessary condition for economic devel-
opment, economic development is, in turn, necessary to increase energy demand.
A country that has limited industrial capacity is likely to need a relatively limited
quantity of electricity.
Ghana, for example, has a rather strong economy if compared to the sub-Saharan
region, and has made considerable gains in the expansion of energy access in recent
years—providing79%of the populationwith electricity in 2017 (WorldBank2018b).
After suffering power shortages in 2014 and 2015, the government reactivated fast-
trackingprivate power plants.However, today the country faces the opposite problem:
excess electricity.12 In other words, demand is lower than supply, posing severe finan-
cial risks to Ghana’s economy. One might well ask why the power supply does not
automatically generate its owndemand among the 79%of the population already con-
nected to electricity—especially considering the lowGDP13 per capita of the country
(World Bank 2019a)—but energy supply will never ensure industrial development if
adequate policy measures are not adopted by the government. In other words, energy
access is a necessary—but not sufficient—condition to industrial development. The
11It can either be a gas pipeline or a regasification facility.
12The six million people (21% of the population) still lacking energy access would need additional
investment in the power grid or off-grid connection.
13According to World Bank Data, in 2018, the GDP per capita level in Ghana was still less than
20% of global GDP per capita.
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case of Ghana well represents a situation in which limited growth in energy demand
does not depend on limited supply but on macro-economic constraints.
Asof now, there are only a fewcountries in the sub-Saharan regionwhere industrial
development could drive energy demand growth. South Africa, Kenya and Ethiopia
represent different examples of this. South Africa is the most advanced economy in
the continent, but its industrial production growth is hindered by frequent electric-
ity shortages. In Kenya, with the blueprint development programme ‘Kenya Vision
2030’, the government aims to achieve middle-income status by 2030, continuing an
extraordinary two-decade-long development trajectory. Ethiopia is one of the fastest
growing economies in the world and is embarking on its next phase of economic
and social development supported by economic reforms and a bold programme of
infrastructure investments.
2.3 The Ongoing Transition
As a consequence of these limitations and due to rapid population growth14 (United
Nations 2019) and uneven progress across the region, the number of energy-poor
people is expected to remain unchanged in 2030 (IEA 2018) even in the best-case
scenario where all current and announced government policies are implemented. In
this context of under-achievement, although a shift to cleaner energy sources is partly
taking place, talking of ‘transition’ may be an overstatement.
Some elements indicate nevertheless that many countries in sub-Saharan Africa
are starting to move in the direction prospected by the International Energy Agency,
that is, towards a power sectormostly fueled by renewable energy sources and natural
gas.
In recent years, manyAfrican governments have designed energy strategies aimed
at pursuing full energy access with the contribution of regionally abundant renewable
energy sources. The number and size of wind and solar photovoltaic (PV) projects
grew significantly, reaching a total installed capacity of 6,520 MW at the end of
2018, up from 535 MW in 2013 (Enerdata 2019). Such growth is the result of joint
efforts between national governments, development finance institutions and private
companies. Even when it comes to gas-to-power projects, many sub-Saharan coun-
tries are actively pursuing programmes to grow their gas economies, with gas-fired
generation capacity doubled in the past few years, from 10.4 GW in 2010 to 20
GW in 2017 (Enerdata 2019). What Are then the Main Drivers Behind the Move of
Sub-Saharan Governments Towards Cleaner Energy Sources?
14According to the United Nations, sub-Saharan Africa population will be 1.4 bn people in 2030
and will double in the next 30 years, reaching 2.1 bn people in 2050.
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2.3.1 Aligning to International Norms to Leverage International
Support
One of the drivers of Africa’s move towards the energy transition is to abide by the
Paris Agreement to which African countries are signatories. Despite sub-Saharan
Africa’s negligible levels of CO2 emissions15 (World Bank 2018a), climate change
will impact the continent more than many other geographic areas. This looming
scenario makes the region a good candidate to receive ‘adaptation support’ pro-
vided by developed to developing countries in the framework of international climate
negotiations.
Prior to the Paris Conference, African countries submitted NDCs outlining how
they intended to address climate change andwhat theywould do if adequate financing
were available. They perceivedCOP21 as an opportunity to leverage support from the
international community to achieve sustainable development (Africa Union 2015).
Adding renewables to their power mix was indeed considered a way to obtain techni-
cal and financial support from development finance institutions mandated to support
infrastructure enhancement in developing countries and, at the same time, attract
investments and capacity building from international energy companies interested in
gaining/increasing their foothold in African markets.
2.3.2 Reducing Costs for Energy Access
The second driver behind the move towards cleaner forms of energy is the reduction
of costs to access energy. The fact that electricity tariffs often do not cover gener-
ation costs, hence putting utilities under financial stress, burdens state budgets and
drives African governments to favour the use of cheaper generation sources. At the
time of writing, the Levelized Cost Of Electricity (LCOE) of solar PV and wind
technology has, in many cases, reached the fossil fuel range (IRENA 2019a, b, c).16
Furthermore, renewables have enabled the development of off-grid solutions that
are increasingly attracting the interest of the most important international energy
companies for their ability to provide energy access quickly and cheaply. According
to Bilotta and Colantoni, ‘off-grid generation has a series of advantages for a large
part of the African population, particularly the rural one, as it solves the issue of
the dispersion of the population, requires smaller investments and is now affordable
even for many of the most fragile consumers’. (2018, p. 4). However, while off-grid
generation is, in many cases, the cheapest solution to ensure ‘basic’ energy access,
15According to the World Bank, CO2 emissions in sub-Saharan Africa account for 2.3% of global
CO2 emissions.
16Irena reports that the decline between 2010 and 2018 in the global weighted average LCOE is
77% for solar PV and 35% for onshore wind. The global weighted average LCOE of solar PV was
USD 0.056/kWh in 2018; the global weighted average LCOE of onshore wind was 0.085/kWh
in 2018; the fossil-fuel-fired power generation cost range by country and fuel is estimated to be
between USD 0.049 and USD 0.174/kWh.
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it is instead largely insufficient to guarantee ‘industrial’ access, necessary to sustain
the pace and size of economic development that the region needs.
2.3.3 Energy Security
Finally, the third driver of the low-carbon transition in Africa is energy security.
Reliable supply of energy is one of the most important requirements for significant
growth. African governments have started to identify the wind and the sun—abun-
dant and widespread across the continent—as crucial sources of energy and means
to increase energy security, through fuel diversification and greater energy indepen-
dence (IRENA 2019a, b, c). Energy self-sufficiency reduces countries’ exposure to
the price and supply volatility of importing energy.
2.4 Case Studies
The cases ofKenya,Nigeria andSouthAfrica represent different cases on hownatural
gas and renewable energy were introduced in the energy system to meet growing
electricity demand.Different economic and political contexts in these countries shape
the pursuit of the goal.
2.4.1 Kenya
Kenya is one of the most successful cases of renewable energy development in sub-
Saharan Africa. Kenya’s electricity access rate increased massively from 15% in
2000 to 63% in 2017 (World Bank 2018b) and at the end of 2018 Africa’s largest
windpower project—LakeTurkanaWindPower project (310MW)—was completed.
However, a slower-than-forecast economic growth led energy demand in the country
to be incompatible with the numerous Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) to which
the government had previously committed. As a consequence, despite an incredible
rise of renewable energy generation in the country, Kenya is currently facing diffi-
culties in the reduction of electricity cost, hence halting the development of further
renewable energy projects.
With a third of the population still lacking access to electricity, a major cause
of missing demand is also linked to the current state of the power grid that does
not allow power supply to reach final demand. Moreover, the high cost of power
generation based on heavy fuel oil drove the government, in the past few years, to
attempt shifting to natural gas (i.e. LNG). The shift, however, encountered resistance
and did not gather sufficient political consensus. The introduction of natural gas
interfered with plans to develop a 1050 MW coal power project.17
17Currently suspended by the National Environment Tribunal.
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2.4.2 Nigeria
Nigeria is instead a prime example of infrastructure inadequacy and power system
economic unsustainability. Despite having a total installed capacity of 12.5 GW and
an energy access rate of 54.4% (World Bank 2018a), the country can deliver only
about 5.2 GW of power to its citizens. The grid’s inefficiency and non-capillarity and
the inability of the national utility to collect cash from its customers are the main
causes of under-performance. This leads the government to use pollutants and costly
diesel-fuelled generators as backup solutions to face frequent power shortages.
Also, political tensions add up as energy subsidies are the subject of an ongoing
challenging negotiation between the government of Nigeria and the World Bank
Group for a large financial package in support of the Power SectorRecovery Program.
2.4.3 South Africa
South Africa is a different case, and a peculiar one in the sub-Saharan context,
both from an economic development perspective and an energy standpoint. The
country’s GDP per capita (USD 6,339 in 2018) (World Bank 2019b) is far above the
sub-Saharan average (USD 1,573); half of the electricity generated in sub-Saharan
Africa is consumed in South Africa; 90% of generation comes from coal. However,
the country suffers from power shortages, and its coal fleet is ageing.
The authorities planned a gas-to-power programme aimed at building and providing 3GWof
gas-fired plants.Gaswill be both imported anddomestically sourced. Though the government
invited expressions of interest for the construction of a 600 MW gas power plant at either
the port at Saldanha or at Richards Bay, at the end of 2017, the project was delayed. Later
on, in September 2018, the government disclosed the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) in
which it outlined that gas-fired power was going to become more important in the power
mix with LNG imports expected to drive the shift initially. However, according to Fulwood,
political difficulties associated with the social implications of replacing coal with gas make
the project unlikely to be developed before 2025 (2019, p. 16).
In termsof renewables, even thoughSouthAfrica has beenoneof thefirst countries
in Africa to develop solar and wind projects with the Renewable Energy Independent
Power Procurement Programme (REIPPP), an ongoing political debate on the cost
of energy is currently hindering the implementation of several renewable energy
projects.
3 Geopolitical Dynamics
Before deep diving into the geopolitical dimensions, it is worth reminding that the
literature has so far ‘only barely scratched the surface with regard to exploring
the potential geopolitical effects of the transition towards more renewable energy
sources’ (Criekemans 2011, p. 4). Even less with regard to Africa.
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In fact, though the energy transition has become a sensational topic of debate,
much remains unclear about its geopolitical implications in Africa and globally. Pre-
dicting winners and losers in this transition then becomes for some highly uncertain
(Hache 2016; Paltsev 2016), due to the increased complexity of energy geopolitics,
consequential to a more heterogeneous set of technologies and actors involved. For
others (Stang 2016; Huebner), it is more straightforward: winners are those coun-
tries with high energy consumption and few own resources like India, China,Mexico,
Brazil and Europe. Losers are instead leading oil and gas exporters whose leverage
decreases as energy types and suppliers diversify, and the need for long-distance
transport of fuels diminishes due to decentral generation and smart grids.
In such blurred situation, a few analytical considerations are due. The first is
that the arrival of renewable sources of energy is triggering a ‘transposition of the
geopolitical logic of oil and gas onto renewables, despite the considerable differ-
ences between the energy types and their associated technologies and infrastructure’
(Overland 2019, p. 36). This chapter argues that while some dynamics inevitably
remain unvaried, namely, dependence on external financing and technology, hence
justifying the ‘transposition of the geopolitical logic’, the peculiar characteristics of
renewables18 will add new dynamics to the geopolitical conundrum. In Africa, this
mainly translates in a ‘regionalisation of energy relations’ (Scholten, p. 23).
Secondly, energy-related issues will partly be ‘less about locations and resources,
and thus less geopolitical in nature’ (Overland 2019, p. 38). Rather, international
energy competition ‘may shift from control over physical resources and their loca-
tions and transportation routes to technology and intellectual property rights’ (Over-
land 2019, p. 38). In other words, we may talk more about tech-politics than geo-
politics. A caveat, however, is that natural resources still need to be extracted to
produce technology, and Africa currently supplies some critical items. Access to
natural ‘critical materials’ will hence be crucial and is likely to replicate the type of
rent-seeking dependent relation with international actors typical of oil and gas.
These initial considerations need to be, however, contextualised in a world where
the replacement of fossil fuels cannot realistically happen any time soon. Seemingly
then, according to Scholten, ‘the fact that both fossil fuels and renewable energy
will coexist in the energy mix for the foreseeable future implies that any (practically
relevant) understanding of the geopolitics of renewables is in essence about how the
energy transition affects fossil fuel dominated interstate energy relations’ (Scholten
2018, pp. 10–11).
18That is, being abundant and intermittent, relying on decentralised generation and usage of rare
earth materials in clean tech equipment, mostly electric distribution, requirement of stringent
managerial conditions and long-distance losses.
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3.1 International Dependence and Regionalised Energy
Systems
Even if Africa is becoming the locus for the extraction of ‘new’ resources needed to
manufacture renewable energy technologies, as well as home to a variety of projects
aimed at harnessing renewable energy, oil and gas are expected to be around for quite
some time still.
On the one hand, there will be (there already are) endogenous drives to diversify
economies and reduce reliance on hydrocarbons. On the other hand, global aspi-
rations to increasingly use cleaner energy sources may translate into a decreased
relevance of Africa’s role in global hydrocarbon fluxes, altering trade relationships
and geopolitical connections. According to the IEANewPolicies Scenario, global oil
demand is expected to peak only in 2040 to then downturn. However, should the pace
of the global energy transition unexpectedly accelerate,19 Sub-Saharan economies—
in particular, those heavily reliant on oil revenues20—may be profoundly destabilised
if diversification strategies are not timely implemented (IRENA, A New World The
Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation 2019).
In this context, competition changes. While affordable access to oil, coal and gas
is the main ground of competition in the fossil fuels world, in a low-carbon world, the
struggle will still partly revolve around access to materials, required to manufacture
technology, while also partly around how to finance infrastructure and control the
technology needed to harnesswind, solar and other renewable power sources. African
countries will likely continue relying on external finance and technology to advance.
Nonetheless, these dynamics of dependence are increasingly complemented by
dynamics of inter-dependency. While dependence characterises relations between
Africa and international actors, interdependence is part of regional integration phe-
nomena, in which the energy sector could act as a catalyst for development (see
power pools).
3.1.1 Infrastructure Financing
According to Bilotta and Colantoni, ‘the SSA energy sector has suffered from the
same chronic difficulty as African infrastructural projects in finding adequate invest-
ments, due to the lack of domestic funds as well as to a higher perceived regional risk’
(Bilotta and Colantoni 2018, p. 5). Domestic factors of instability, such as political
struggles, GDP fluctuations, corruption and lack of transparency, currency risk, led
19According to the Sustainable Development Scenario of the International Energy Agency, global
oil demand falls to 93.9 mb/d in 2025 and 69.9 mb/d in 2040. The Sustainable Development
Scenario provides ‘an integrated strategy to achieve energy access, air quality and climate goals,
with all sectors and low-carbon technologies—including carbon capture, utilisation and storage—
contributing to a broad transformation of global energy’.
20For instance, according to the World Bank Data, fossil fuel rents amount to over 15% of GDP in
Chad, South Sudan, Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of the Congo.
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African countries to mostly depend upon external actors to finance the development
of energy projects. With renewables, the dynamic seems to be replicated.
Young African entrepreneurs in the energy space face challenges related to access
to finance (in addition to lack of technical knowledge). Even though locally bred
pay-as-you-go companies, such as M-KOPA and BBOXX, are rising, they face the
challenge of having to raise sufficient capital to finance the upfront cost of solar panels
due to reluctance from local financial institutions to provide financing. Hence, the
need to rely on international investors, meaning that the inherent transaction costs,
currency risks and profit expectationswill be translated into higher solar home system
prices, preventing greater uptake of decentralised off-grid solutions and limiting
employment opportunities (IRENA, Renewable Energy and Jobs 2018, p. 23).
As for international investors, the incentives to invest in oil and gas infrastructure
differ from those in renewables, including electrification. If in the oil and gas world,
incentives are relatively high and resources can be sold on international markets,
in the renewables-electric world, the non-exportability of resources and the need to
use them in underdeveloped domestic markets make the incentive for the creation
of power infrastructure lower. For this reason, domestic and international political
support is crucial to guarantee the viability and long-term security of the projects.
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs)21 are increasingly playing an important
role in supporting the energy transition in developing countries.22 In sub-Saharan
Africa, DFIs are involved in infrastructure projects along the entire energy sector
value chain. They make use of a varied range of instruments. In the last few years,
the most important multilateral DFIs have been enhancing their support to renewable
energy projects. Two of the most notable programmes supporting private renewable
energy projects in sub-Saharan Africa are the World Bank’s Scaling Solar and the
European Union’s External Investment Plan23—the former was launched in 2015,
while the latter is more recent.
These two programmes provide technical and financial support to both govern-
ments and project developers for the development of power generation projects and
mitigation of the off-taker risk through credit enhancement mechanisms (such as
partial risk guarantee, which is a core instrument to make power generation projects
bankable). However, while these programmes are effective in mobilising private
investments in power generation, they are unable to address the deep causes of inef-
ficiency and unsustainability of the sector. They need to be complemented by other
initiatives along the electricity value chain for the power system to benefit effectively.
Integrated approaches are hence preferred in this context.
The Temane Regional Electricity Project (TREP) in Southern Mozambique well
exemplifies how an integrated approach looks like. In 2019, the Board of Directors
21Development finance institutions are legally independent and government-supported financial
institutions with explicit official missions to promote public policy objectives.
22According to the OECD, multilateral climate finance from developed countries to developing
countries almost doubled in recent years, from USD 15.5 billion in 2013 to USD 27.5 billion in
2017.
23The External Investment Plan has identified five priority areas, but we refer to the ‘Sustainable
Energy and Sustainable Connectivity’ investment window.
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of the World Bank approved a total USD 420 million of International Development
Association (IDA) grants and guarantees to strengthen Mozambique’s transmission
capacity for domestic and regional markets and increase electricity generation capac-
ity. Developed as an integrated operation including both public and private invest-
ments, the TREP entails the construction of a 563-km high-voltage transmission line
between Maputo and Temane and a private sector financing of a 400 MW CCGT
generation plant in Temane. A USD 300 million grant will be provided for the con-
struction of the transmission line and two IDA payment guarantees to de-risk the sale
of electricity and the purchase of gas by the power plant. This approach requires a
much more challenging and costly effort by all involved stakeholders. But the joint
approach proves very effective as it simultaneously improves supply and demand.
In addition to centralised power generation, the World Bank has started also
focusing on energy access programmes through mini-grid and off-grid projects so
as to reach sections of the population that are not served by the national grid. This
Africa-specific approach is crucial not only to bypass infrastructural deficiencies but
also to ‘deliver energy in a way that African consumers will be able to afford—even
the poorest strata of the population, and rural consumers in particular’. (Bilotta and
Colantoni 2018, p. 6).
3.1.2 Control of Technology
The energy transition is above all about technology and innovation.African countries’
role in this realm does not differ, so far, from the role played in the oil and gas world.
They are suppliers of critical materials needed to manufacture renewable energy
technologies but do not hold the leadership in terms of technological innovation or
control of technologies’ manufacturing. Hence, the relationship of dependence upon
external actors is seemingly reproduced.
Suppliers of critical materials
The nascent energy transition and ever-evolving technological advancement have
expanded the number of resources considered strategic. Africa is home to some
so-defined critical materials, that is, materials ‘which most consumer countries are
dependent on importing, and whose supply is dominated by one or a few producers’
(Overland, 2019, p. 37).
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), for instance, accounts for most of
cobalt24 world production (more than 60%). Exports are mainly China-bound with
the far eastern country being the world’s leading consumer in 2018. China primarily
uses cobalt in the rechargeable battery industry. Securing access to the resource
translated in the acquisition by Chinese companies of eight of the 14 largest cobalt
mines in the DRC, accounting for almost half of the country’s output. South Africa is
24Cobalt is a crucial component for the manufacture of lithium-ion batteries.
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instead the world’s leading producer of manganese25 (30.6%) followed by Australia
(17.2%), Gabon (12.8%), China (10%) and Brazil (6.7%).
Another strategic mineral present in Africa is Nickel. About 23.5% of reserves of
this mineral are located in Madagascar and 4% in South Africa (USGS 2019). Other
strategic materials such as lithium are overwhelmingly located in South America and
are comparatively scarce in Africa in terms of reserves, resources and production.
It is important to stress that, while cobalt, nickel and other minor minerals are
extracted from the African soil, their refining and manufacturing take place primar-
ily abroad. In this process, China plays a fundamental role by virtue of its com-
parative advantage and remarkable refining capacity. In general, the extraction of
these minerals presents a series of problems of environmental nature (particularly
water-intensive and polluting). On top of that, the issues linked to the highly extrac-
tive mining industry (illegal mining activities, conflict subsidisation, low worker
protection) have historically been taking a toll on local communities in Africa.
Nonetheless, though these materials are currently crucial, given the fast-pace
of technological innovations in the field, it is not improbable that currently used
materialsmay soonbedisplacedbyothers. In otherwords, their geopolitical relevance
is vulnerable not because of their geological abundance/scarcity, but because of the
rapidity of technological innovation.
Leadership in technological innovation
Advancements in renewable energy technology guarantee the centrality of a country
in awider geopolitical perspective as ‘innovationwill be a key determinant of the pace
of change’ (IRENA 2019, p. 27). Though it is clear that leadership in technological
innovation mostly does not originate in Africa, Scholten notes that it is, however,
unclear ‘how developments like great power rivalry between the US and China or
the EU and Russia and technical innovations in batteries or ICT will influence the
speed and direction of the energy transition and nature of energy systems’. (p. 4).
One way to evaluate countries’ approach to technological innovation is to look at
how they fare in terms of patents. The foremost leader in terms of renewable energy
innovation is by far China, with more than 150.000 patents as of 2016 (IRENA
2019). It is followed by the United States with a little more than 100.000 patents.
Japan occupies the third place, soon tailed by the EU, where Germany is in a leading
position with 30.000 patents.
As for Africa, the main owner of renewable energy patents is South Africa, with
63%of total African patents, followed by Egypt with 8% (UNEP, EPO 2013). Specif-
ically, South Africa is the leader in the field of mitigation26 technologies, with 553
patents, accounting for 84.2% of the African total. Northern Africa—represented by
25Manganese is another important material for batteries and, as of now, it has no satisfactory substi-
tute in its major applications (U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries, February
2019).
26‘Climate Change Mitigation refers to efforts to reduce or prevent emission of greenhouse gases.
Mitigation canmean using new technologies and renewable energies, making older equipment more
energy efficient, or changing management practices or consumer behaviour. It can be as complex
as a plan for a new city or as a simple as improvements to a cook stove design. Efforts underway
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Egypt (18 patents), Algeria (12) and Morocco (11)—follows suit, but lags signifi-
cantly behind South Africa. Other realities, such as Ghana, Burundi, Mali, Senegal
and Zimbabwe, have less than 1% of total African mitigation patents, with only
Kenya reaching 1.2%. The rest of Africa possesses 3.9% of patents (25 over 657 in
the entire African continent).
The number of African inventions related to renewable energy, as of 2016, was
significantly lower than that found in other countries or regions, translating into
higher exposure for African states to the shocks brought by the transition. Apart
from the economic consequences of these shocks suffered especially by countries
highly reliant on fossil fuels, lagging behind in terms of innovation corresponds to
decreased political importance.
Nonetheless, African countries still possess a comparative advantage for other
types of energy-transition-related technologies. These are Made-in-Africa technolo-
gies that facilitate access to energy. Examples are ‘smart payment’ or ‘pay-as-you-
go’ systems. These smartphone-friendly apps are intended to facilitate payments in
particularly remote rural areas where banks are not readily available.
3.1.3 Regionalised Energy Systems/Power Pools
The likely geopolitical implications of increased usage of renewables are first ‘a
regionalisation of energy relations’ (Scholten, p. 23). Renewables intrinsically need
to use electricity as a carrier and electricity is currently a regionally traded commod-
ity—rather than internationally traded like oil and gas—due to long-distance losses
(IRENA, A New World, p. 47). Second, they imply a ‘strategic emphasis on conti-
nuity of service supply instead of commodity supply due to renewables’ abundance
and stringent managerial conditions’ (Scholten, p. 4). As a consequence, a shift to
the green economy could increase intra-continental trade while creating important
interdependencies.
This adds up to the existing geopolitical conundrums for two reasons. The first
refers back to the first two points made about finance and technology. In order to
trade electricity regionally, grids need to be improved, and this strongly depends
on external finances and technology, which are not always readily available hence
making electricity trade less quick or smooth than wished. Secondly, though grids’
development is needed in Africa, off-grid systems may develop more quickly and
in a more widespread fashion, leading certain areas of the continent to leapfrog the
grid system entirely.
Geopolitically, greater cross-border trade in electricity could create geopoliti-
cal vulnerabilities for electricity importers, but greater electric interconnection will
also increase interdependence among nations, reducing risks of conflict. In fact,
Overland challenges the fact that electricity disruptions can be used as a geopolit-
ical weapon inasmuch as ‘much of the future international solar and wind power
around the world range from high-tech subway systems to bicycling paths and walkways’. (UNEP,
Mitigation).
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trade will likely involve more symmetrical relationships between different prosumer
(producer-consumer) countries than does the unidirectional gas trade (and much past
electricity trade)’ (2019, p. 38).
In aworld inwhich energy canbeproduced invarious locations, then it is less likely
that few actors dominate the scene by controlling routes and chokepoints. However,
control over grid infrastructure may become vital. While some argue that countries
that dominate electricity grids may exercise undue control over their neighbours
and that interstate electricity cut-offs will become an important foreign policy tool,
applied strategically in the same way as oil and gas sanctions (O’Sullivan et al. 2017,
as cited in IRENA), others note that ‘electricity trading tends to be more reciprocal
than trade in oil and gas […]A country that generates solar power may import energy
from a neighbouring country when it rains, but export to that neighbour when the sun
shines’ (2018, 51).As a consequence, ‘renewable energy exporterswill always be part
of a complex web of interdependencies between importers and exporters that would
tend to curtail the potential to use renewable electricity as a geopolitical weapon’
(IRENA 2018, p. 52). In Africa, however, this may be problematic given the levels
of energy infrastructure development across the continent vary widely, potentially
either making a country’s excess exports virtually impossible (for lack of electricity
network or lack of payment capacity), or enhancing the asymmetry between energy
exporters (countries with financial capacity to develop the production sector) and
importers (countries unable to produce).
In sub-Saharan Africa, there are four power pools that have been ‘established
to improve generation capacity and transmission infrastructure for greater cross-
border trade and ultimately address a cost-effectivewayof evacuating excess capacity
between countries to offset peak demands’ (Medinilla et al. 2019).
The Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) was the first electricity regional mar-
ket created in sub-Saharan countries and it comprises 12 countries—nine of them
are already interconnected; the East Africa Power Pool (EAPP) is composed of 11
countries but it is at a very early stage of development since it was established only
in 2015; the West African Power Pool (WAPP), created in 1999 by the regional eco-
nomic union ECOWAS, has ambitious development objectives with a USD 60 bn
plan for transmission and distribution investments by 2030; the Central Africa Power
Pool (CAPP), established in 2003 and comprising 10 member countries, is the least
developed power pool in Africa and the one that would need the major infrastructure
investments.
The vast disparities across countries in terms of political economies, governance
and infrastructure could hinder efforts to create or further develop ‘grid communities’
or regional pools. Hence, strategic imperatives for success and growth of power
pools in Africa require countries to focus on diversifying power generation sources
by taking advantage of the renewable energy potential, which will help mitigate
the respective power pools’ vulnerability and their impact on regional dynamics.
Moreover, power pools will not reach their objectives if member state power utilities
do not invest in transmission capacities and maintenance.
Moreover, the challenges to achieving functioning power pools are technical,
but also political. Power pooling requires trust and a strong alignment of interests
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between the region’s member states, between the regions (and/or member states)
and the national private sector, and between external partners’ and member states.
Indeed, vulnerabilities (of domestic/regional systems) that hinder the development
of regional energy integration could be mitigated if international actors contributed,
pragmatically, to fostering ‘positive interdependence’ through support in developing
priority transnational infrastructure.
In this context, it is worth noting that ‘increasing electrification of the energy
system […] implies the reliance on a single transport modality’ (Scholten 2018, 23),
hence replicating the same risky dynamic of lack of diversification. At the same time,
this would certainly give to landlocked countries (generally disadvantaged in the oil
& gas world) better chances of being connected and further their development goals.
3.2 Socio-Economic Implications and Security Risks
Understanding the overall political and economic landscape, in other words, the
particular context in which a transition is unfolding is crucial. Most accounts on the
shift to renewables tend to see the energy transition as a mere shift in the energy
mix from a source to another without accounting for the ‘disruptive potential of
renewables to redefine energy systems and markets’ (Scholten 2018, p. 9) or for the
fact that historic contingencies play a crucial role in technological change (Baker et al.
2014, p. 798). At the same time, it is equally important to identify the international
macro-economic forces and political actors, institutions and processes that have
an impact on how domestic policy choices and debates are shaped, enabled and
constrained (Baker et al. 2014, p. 795).
3.2.1 Socio-Economic Growth and Disruptions
The transition to cleaner sources of energy can prove particularly disruptive in coun-
tries where fossil fuels provide crucial revenues to the state. While current importers
of fossil fuels (or countries where production is for domestic use) are starting to
replace fossil fuels for domestic use, many others in Africa are still heavily reliant
on these sources. For oil, gas and coal producers, like Nigeria, Angola or South
Africa, the decline in revenue generated from fossil fuel energy exports can provide
an impetus for political reform and economic diversification. However, a decline in
hydrocarbons revenue could also lead to political instability, especially in the short
to medium term. These countries, unless they have ambitious strategies of economic
diversification, could face some severe challenges in the near future. Indeed, coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa rank low on the Energy Transition Index designed by the
World Economic Forum, signalling their lack of readiness for the energy transition.
However, renewables in Africa could also have a positive impact on economic
growth. For instance, off-grid access to electricity can contribute to achieving better
levels of ‘basic’ access across the continent—though ‘industrial’ access to energy
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will still be reliant on fossil fuels, hence constrained by the sector’s limits. Increased
basic access, especially in rural areas, could slowdownurbanisation processes,which
in turn have a high impact on grid/electricity demand and on air quality (which has
worsened significantly across the continent in the past 30 years27). Indeed, if citizens
were guaranteed a decent and sustainable livelihood in rural areas, the impetus to
move to the city might decrease. At the same time, according to IRENA the majority
of countries in sub-Saharan Africa ‘will benefit from reducing fossil fuel imports and
generating renewable energy domestically, because this will boost job creation and
economic growth’ (IRENA 2019, p. 30), with the exception of Nigeria and Angola,
whose dependence on fossil fuels rents will place them at risk.
Competing narratives and vested interests
The potential shift (even before becoming actual) translates into (often competing)
narratives being played out, like the ‘energy security’ and ‘sustainability’ ones (Jacob
2017, pp. 348–349). Energy security narratives sustain that a country, to develop
and industrialise, must be energy-secure and less vulnerable to disruptions to its
energy supply. This approach justifies the use of whatever energy resource to support
development. The case of South Africa is emblematic: considered by IRENA the
leader in renewables development in Africa, the country is also Africa’s top coal
producer, with the Mpumalanga Province being the second worst sulphur dioxide28
emission hotspot in the world (Greenpeace 2019). In Tanzania instead, the Minister
of Energy and Minerals notes that ‘coal to electricity is necessary […] because its
cost will be cheaper for citizens and this electricity will boost industrial growth’ (All
Africa, 16 January 2016).
The counter-narrative implies instead a strict adherence to the global low-carbon
movement. This approach sees clean energy as crucial to reduce dependence on
fossil fuels and achieve sustainability and low carbon development. As Jacob notes in
relation to Tanzania, ‘this narrative is grounded in the claim that ongoing and planned
coal investments will create obstacles to Tanzania’s efforts to meet its obligations to
reduce carbon emissions and mitigate climate change’ (p. 350).
Behind these narratives,Okemnotes, there is a shift between ‘competing industrial
sectors and political constituencies’ (Asuelime 2018, p. 3). The implications of the
shift range from employment concerns, especially in those countries where fossil
fuels employ large numbers of the population, to concerns over maintaining loyalty
of voters and business circles for political survival (Whitfield et al. 2015). Indeed,
if the energy transformation begins to permeate into industrial sectors that have
traditionally been dominated by fossil fuel energy, there could potentially be severe
social disruption, and we are currently seeing the fear of this disruption playing out
in the coal industry.
27According to UNICEF, between 1990 and 2017 deaths from outdoor air pollution in Africa grew
by 60% (2019, p. 4). The figure is expected to grow even further as population growth, industrial
growth and consumption growth—all expected in sub-Saharan Africa in the next decades—increase
levels of pollution, especially in urban areas.
28Sulphur dioxide is a toxic pollutant that causes disastrous air pollution and premature deaths.
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Technological and political change is, however, also embedded and affected by
broader global processes. In a study on South Africa, Baker, Newell and Phillips
(p. 795) argue that global processes have the potential to alter the balance of power
within the country between ‘entrenched coal-based interests’ and ‘emerging niches
in renewable energy generation’ as both levels ‘interact with and are backed by’
international stakeholders. China, for example, has emerged as the ‘leading financier
of Africa’s coal boom’ (Jacob 2017, p. 345).
Employment
Most African countries are expected to benefit, in terms of job creation, from the
energy shift (IRENA 2019, p. 30). The sector’s workforce—in terms of direct, formal
jobs—is already comparable to traditional power grids and utilities in Nigeria and
Kenya where the job creation impact is expected to grow in the next few years—by
70% inKenya and over 100% inNigeria.However, these are exceptions. Employment
of renewable energy still remains limited in Africa as a whole, especially when
compared to the growth in Asia (60% growth in 2017 compared to 51% in 2013).
Most of Asia’s dynamism is based on growing domestic deployment and strong
manufacturing capabilities, supported by policies such as feed-in tariffs, auctions,
preferential credit and land policies, and local content rules.
In Africa, instead, compared to the oil and gas sector—which is capital intensive
but not labour intensive—or mining—which is very labour intensive but localised—
employment in the renewables sector is less labour intensive (than oil and gas) but not
comprehensively developed along the value chain. In fact, employment is generated
especially in the sales and distribution, installation, and operations and maintenance
of the supply chain—vis-à-vis manufacturing. As a consequence, as long as there is
only a limited domestic capacity to assemble equipment or manufacture products,
economic multipliers and the resulting employment and other benefits will accrue
elsewhere.
South Africa is the country that employs the largest contingent of workers in the
renewable energy sector, close to 35,000, distributed across solar PV, concentrated
solar power (CSP) and wind. Important developments are also taking place in the
off-grid sector. In Ghana, Africa’s largest solar PV project (Nzema plant, generating
155 MW) is likely to induce 2,100 local jobs through subcontracting and demand
for goods and services.
However, a global review29 of skills for green jobs including four countries in
Africa (Egypt, Mali, South Africa and Uganda) revealed the existence of a gap
between the goals and targets set in environmental policies and the human resources
available for their implementation. Skills gaps exist for technical and engineering
positions and could grow as the renewable energy sector continues to expand, leading
to project delays or cancellations, cost overruns and faulty installations. There are,
however, promising experiences. For example, Cape Verde launched a Renewable
29High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. ‘Interlinkages between energy and
jobs’. Policy Brief No. 13.
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Energy and Industrial Maintenance Center (Cermi), whose main activity is the train-
ing of professionals in the areas of design, assembly andmaintenance of photovoltaic
installations.
3.2.2 Security and Dominance/Cooperation and Conflict
Finally, renewables are likely to reduce conflicts as we know them, but other tensions
are likely to arise around cybersecurity and access to important minerals (IRENA,
‘A new world’, p. 55).
In terms of cybersecurity, the fact that renewables rely on the use of electric grids
as the carrier of energy, vis-à-vis pipelines, tankers, rail, road, the sea used to transport
coal, gas and oil may reduce risks linked to crucial infrastructure or chokepoints. At
the same time, however, gridsmay be subject to new vulnerabilities. Not because they
are inAfrica, nor because they aremore likely to be cyber-attacked compared to other
infrastructure (for instance, oil- and gas-related infrastructure). Rather because, as
noted above, ‘increasing electrification of the energy system […] implies the reliance
on a single transport modality’ (Scholten 2018, 23), hence replicating the same risky
dynamic of lack of diversification. On the other hand, however, the diffusion of off-
grid systems ‘may actually make the system more resilient, as many different units
will have to be hacked to destabilize the system as a whole’ (Overland 2019, p. 38).
In terms of minerals instead, while cartels could develop around materials criti-
cal to renewable energy technologies, as noted above the fast-pace of technological
innovations makes it likely for many of these materials to be displaced by others
rather quickly, hence decreasing the chances of cartels—hard to form and sustain—to
emerge (IRENA 2019, p. 54). In other words, their geopolitical relevance is vulner-
able not because of their geological abundance/scarcity, but because of the rapidity
of technological innovation.
4 Conclusions
Any attempts to generalise sub-Saharan African dynamics, in the energy sector as
much as in any other area, risk being over-simplistic given the diversity of structures,
ideas, leaderships and international positioning across the sub-continent. While this
chapter tried to present specific examples, it also made the effort to identify common
traits so to provide a manageable framework to understand the energy transition in
sub-Saharan Africa and its geopolitical implications.
Problematising the concept of ‘transition’ in African contexts, instead of taking
for granted that a transition is well received and occurring, served the purpose of
placing proper emphasis on Africa’s problem number one: access to energy, both
‘basic’ and ‘industrial’ access, that is, for households and the industry, respectively.
Six out of ten people still lack basic access, and the remaining share is unable to
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consume as it would like due to non-reliable power networks or inadequate financial
means. We then argue that most of Africa has very little to transit away from.
Nonetheless, for many governments, the idea of leapfrogging the conventional
path to energy development and shift directly to clean energy is starting to become
attractive. This is not only to win the hearts of the electorate—increasingly aware,
if not victim, of climate change effects—but also to leverage the ad hoc financial
support that international institutions are making available to help Africa achieve
sustainable universal energy access.
Despite efforts, however, renewable energy—estimated by the IEA to be a cru-
cial component, together with gas, of Africa’s low-carbon energy mix in the next
decades—in sub-SaharanAfrica represents today amere 1% reality. This is due to the
fact that although Africa remains an important supplier of natural resources (namely,
oil and gas but also minerals to manufacture renewables technologies, as well as
renewables), it continues to rely on external financial and technological support to
develop energy systems. Nonetheless, the intrinsic features of gas and renewables
are shaping the creation of regional energy markets. These will inevitably imply
increased cooperation and coordination between neighbours across the region.
As a fact, looking at the energy transition in Africa will not merely imply moni-
toring the evolution of Africa’s dependence upon external actors, but will require a
more alert acknowledgement that regional interdepencies are ever growing.
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1 Introduction
The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2018 Report stated,
“Limiting global warming to 1.5 °C would require rapid, far-reaching and unprece-
dented changes in all aspects of society.” In recent years, it has become clear that
that scenario would require not only a transformation of our energy system in order
to meet our global emissions targets, but also a rethinking of the way we control the
temperature of our homes, travel around our planet, and manufacture our goods.
In order to meet this transformation by mid-century, scientists, engineers, and
technical experts are needed in the crucial role of designing pathways for the decar-
bonization process of specific, energy-intensive sectors, notably power, industry,
transport, and buildings. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and the Sustainable
Development Solutions Network (SDSN) invited more than 60 technical experts
from around the world to gather in Milan in April 2019 to discuss the state of decar-
bonization technologies that can accelerate the global shift toward decarbonization.
The outcome of that workshop, followed by an extensive external consultation and
review process by a large number of scholars and stakeholders (from international
agencies, academia, research centers, think tanks, non-governmental organizations,
public institutions, and the private sector), was the basis of the “Roadmap to 2050:
A Manual for Nations to Decarbonization by Mid-Century” (Carnevale and Sachs
2019). Some of the contents of this chapter are partially based on the work of this
Roadmap to 2050.
In order to decarbonize the global economy, energy demand growth needs to be
uncoupled from economic growth, and then the remaining energy demand needs
to be decarbonized. This chapter provides an overview of the latest decarboniza-
tion technologies available for national governments to develop their low-emission
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development strategies as outlined in the Paris Agreement. Following the Paris Cli-
mate Agreement’s aim to strengthen the global response to the climate crisis “in
the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty,” the chapter
is conceived on a “systems approach,” aspiring to simultaneously address multiple
objectives and promote policy instruments and technological solutions that can be
used across sectors. Themultiple objectives span decarbonization and environmental
sustainability, economic prosperity (including poverty reduction), and social inclu-
sion that leave no one behind. Needed policy instruments include public investments,
phase out of subsidies to fossil fuels, market mechanisms, regulatory framework, and
regulations on land use, while technological solutions address awide range of current
and emerging solutions, from smart power grids to synthetic fuels.
According to IEA(2019a), globalCO2 emissions causedby fossil-fuel combustion
for energy production totaled 32.3 Gt in 2016. The first responsible has been the heat
and electricity generation, with 13.4 Gt (41%), followed by transport (7.9 Gt, 24%),
industry (6.1 Gt, 19%), and buildings (2.7 Gt, 8%). However, if electricity and heat
generation are allocated to the relevant final sectors, industry takes the lead with
11.8 Gt (36%), while buildings and transport are comparable, with 8.6 and 8.1 Gt,
respectively (i.e., 27%and 25%). The remaining emissions are related to other sectors
(including agriculture/forestry, fishing, and other non-specified).
The chapter discusses the main technology options for decarbonization both of
the power sector and of the three final sectors: industry, transport, and buildings.
At the end of the chapter, we provide strategy and policy recommendations from a
technology point of view on how to decarbonize these sectors by mid-century and
of the necessity to take a systems approach.
2 The Power Sector
Electricity is the fastest growing energy vector, its demand has increased by a 3%
annual growth rate since 2000 (IEA 2018), around two-thirds faster than the total
final energy consumption at global scale. Worldwide electricity demand in 2017
reached 22,200 TWh according to the latest IEA’s World Energy Outlook, and the
future demand is expected to increase in all the different scenarios. The main reasons
are an increasing access to electricity in developing countries and an increasing
consumption of current users due to increased well-being. Although 840 million
people still lack access to electricity as of 2017 (World Bank Group 2019), this
number decreased from 1.2 billion in 2010 and is expected to further decrease.
Moreover, electrification is seen as a strong tool for decarbonization: the lower the
emissions target, the higher the electricity consumption that is required. However,
electrification itself is not sufficient to push toward decarbonization, since the devel-
opment of low-carbon generation sources need to keep the pace with the increase
of demand, which is a rather challenging task, especially in developing countries.
While wind and solar have significantly ramped up, they are still representing only
6% of the total electricity generationworldwide, which remains largely dependent on
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fossil fuels that provide around two-thirds of the total generation, with coal holding
the lion’s share with 40% of the total generation. As a result, in 2017, each kWh of
electricity consumed in the world resulted in 480 g of CO2 emissions (IEA 2018).
The decarbonization of the power sector is generally associated with increasing
penetration of renewable energy sources. However, especially for non-dispatchable
renewables such as solar and wind, they need to be associated with other flexibility
options, such as dispatchable power plants, electricity storage, grid interconnections,
demand-side management, and sector coupling. Moreover, other low-carbon sources
may be needed, including nuclear and fossil fuels coupled with carbon capture,
utilization, and storage. The generation mix is strongly country-specific, and this
will be reflected in the technological choices that will be performed to address the
decarbonization targets.
2.1 Renewable Energy Sources
Themain strength of renewables is to provide a solution to generate electricitywith an
alternative to the traditional combustion of fossil fuels, which causes significant CO2
emissions. Different sources are available, including hydro, solar, wind, bioenergy,
geothermal, tidal, and waves. The technologies used for electricity generation are at
different levels of maturity, but many are showing interesting potential.
Hydropower is currently the most important renewable source for electricity gen-
eration, with more than 1 TW installed worldwide in 2016 and roughly 70% of the
electricity generation from renewables (World Energy Council 2019). Hydropower
includes a number of applications, ranging from base load to peak power matched
with reservoir or pumped storage plants. There is still significant potential for
hydro generation worldwide, although concentrated in a relatively limited number
of countries with favorable morphological conditions.
This limitation is not applied to wind, which is virtually available everywhere,
although with strong variations in wind consistency and strength. Wind power has
shown a remarkable growth in last decades, reaching 4% of the world power genera-
tion in 2017 (IEA 2018). While the current wind farms are mostly onshore, offshore
facilities are spreading, supported by the lower environmental impacts related to
noise and visual impacts, together with higher capacity factors and the possibility
of exploiting larger areas. A potential breakthrough technology is floating offshore
wind, which is currently limited to some pilot plants in different countries but holds
the potential of unlocking even larger areas.
The other source that showed a large increase in the last decade is solar energy,
mainly from PV technology. The strong decrease of installation costs, driven by
subsidies and manufacturing upscaling, has allowed the spread of plants both at
utility scale and for final users, unlocking the paradigm of distributed generation. As
of 2017, PV generated 435 TWh, with a 2% share worldwide (IEA 2018). Further
cost decreases are expected (especially for inverters and balance of system, rather
than PV panels themselves). A marginal share is represented by concentrating solar
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power (CSP), which may increase its potential thanks to higher capacity factors and
the possibility of exploiting a larger flexibility in comparison with PV systems.
The main limitation of wind and solar plants is their variability, resulting in the
impossibility of dispatching them when needed. In contrast, this is one of the advan-
tages of bioenergy, which is used in thermoelectric power plants just like fossil fuels,
but with a closed CO2 cycle, meaning that the combustion emissions are absorbed by
the biomass during its life. Bioenergy has traditionally been considered as carbon-
neutral, but some studies are highlighting that this is not always the case, since
attention must be paid on land use issues, as well as on the effect of a slow capture
compared with an instantaneous emission (Hausfather 2018). Although biomass is
not primarily used for power generation, it totaled 623 TWh in 2017, including solid,
liquid, and gaseous bioenergy. Future developments may be focused on crops that
can be cultivated in marginal areas with a specific attention on the sustainability of
the entire supply chain, as well as from emerging technology like microalgae.
OtherRES that have currently amarginal role in power generation include geother-
mal, waves, and tides.While the former has a long history and shows a narrow poten-
tial due to the limited sites available worldwide, marine energy may play a role in
the decarbonization of the power sector thanks to its large potential, although the
technology is currently at early stage of development.
2.2 Energy Storage and Other Flexibility Solutions
The higher the penetration of renewables, especially non-dispatchable such as solar
and wind, the higher the need of technology solutions supporting the flexibility of
the power system. A number of options are available, including batteries, sector
coupling, networks interconnections, demand response, and traditional dispatchable
power plants.
The power network balance has traditionally been obtained by dispatchable power
plants,mainly based on fossil fuels.Gas-powered units have generally a higher degree
of flexibility, providing higher speed and ramps. Another common option is hydro,
both dam and pumped hydro, although the deployment of this option is heavily
limited by the geographical and morphological conditions. The predominant role of
dispatchable power plants is expected to make way for other solutions.
Among those, electricity storage through batteries is gaining momentum, both
with utility-scale and behind-the-meter installations. The current upscale of lithium
batteries for electric vehicles is leading to a strong cost decrease, resulting in competi-
tive solutions inmultiple countries. Electric batteries provide solutions for short-term
electricity storage, i.e., up to some days, while for applications on wider time frames
other solutions are required (such as the production of synthetic fuels).
An additional flexibility option that is already in operation in different countries
is demand response, both in industry and buildings, which can be fostered by time of
use electricity tariffs or coordinated by virtual aggregators that have the control over
a large number of users. In this perspective, demand response is tightly related with
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a growing digitalization of the power networks, which involve the implementation
of smart grids, where the increasing role of distributed generation leads to the shift
from consumers to prosumers.
Sector coupling, also referred to as P2X (power-to-everything), represents the idea
of coupling the electricity system with other sectors (heating and cooling, mobility,
desalination) or to generate other energy carriers (gases and liquids). This option is
increasingly seen as an opportunity to accommodate the excess of power genera-
tion from RES, especially in countries with high penetrations of wind generation. In
some cases, sector coupling can also be operated as electricity storage, if the tech-
nology allows a bi-directional operation, such as power-to-gas coupled to fuel cells
or vehicles-to-grid.
Finally, network interconnections should not be overlooked, since they are an
important flexibility solution, both at local and international levels. The connection
of a larger pool of both users and generation units can support a better matching of
demand and supply, by decreasing the limitations and the bottlenecks that may be
related to the transmission and distribution infrastructure.
2.3 Other Generation Sources
While much attention is put on renewables, which are necessary to reach a fully
sustainable power generation in the long term, other options may be needed in the
short term to reach a faster decarbonization of the sector. In particular, natural gas
is seen as a promising solution to facilitate the phase out of coal power plants,
especially in developing countries. However, some experts fear a potential lock-
in of fossil-fuel technologies. Another source that is not yet object of consensus
is nuclear, which allows generating low-carbon electricity but with other potential
environmental impacts.
Natural gas is seen bymany as a potential bridge fuel by temporarily offsetting the
decline in coal use. Others have contended that such option is incompatible with the
current climate targets and that methane leakage from natural gas systems (especially
upstream) may eliminate any advantage that natural gas has over coal (Levi 2013).
A transition from coal to natural gas power generation has already happened in the
US, mainly due to the rise of shale gas production, but with the effect of lowering the
international price of coal and shifting its use to other countries. China has partially
seen a similar shift, mainly caused by the need to limit the local pollution in large
cities. However, natural gas will need to face a strong economic competition with
both coal and renewables, and the investment in plants and networks that will operate
for a limited time lead to the fear of stranded assets for investors.
Nuclear power has not seen significant improvements in the last two decades,
resulting in a decrease of its share in power generation from 17% in 2000 to 10% in
2017 (IEA 2018), also due to the worldwide economic recession and to the concerns
raisedby theFukushimaDaiichi nuclear disaster that had consequences on thenuclear
policies of several countries (including Japan, Germany, and Italy). However, most
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countries with nuclear power or with plans to add nuclear power to their energy mix
have maintained an interest in developing the technology. In several cases, visible
delays in nuclear implementation have resulted from safety reviews and resultant
required actions (Nuclear Energy Agency 2017).
In addition to current nuclear fission technology, potential developments are
expected from small nuclear power reactors, driven by the desire of reducing invest-
ment costs as well as decreasing the importance of centralized power generation at
large sites. There seems to be a renewed interest in nuclear fusion, which is attract-
ing private investors through different technological options (The Economist 2019).
However, all of these options are still at very early stages, since no solution has yet
reached a net energy gain (i.e., they have to producemore energy than they consume),
and therefore any possible success will have consequences on a long-term horizon.
2.4 Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage
Another technological solution that may play a significant role in the decarbonization
of the power sector is the carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS), aiming at
complementing power plants based on combustion, both for fossil fuels and eventu-
ally for bioenergy (BECCUS), to reachnet negative emissions.Different technologies
and concepts are available.
The first projects related to CCS were aimed at exploiting the carbon dioxide
to enhance oil recovery in depleted reservoirs. Since the first large-scale facility,
which dates back to 1972, almost one hundred CCS facilities and nine test centers
worldwide have started up or begun construction (Global CCS Institute 2018). These
projects generally involve the post-combustion separation of the CO2, with removal
efficiencies around 90%, and require additional power consumption and a dedicated
infrastructure for the transport of the gas to the storage site. Transport and storage
risks are among the causes leading to a low public acceptance of these projects, which
appears to be higher when carbon dioxide is reused instead of sequestrated (Arning
et al. 2019).
Many alternative solutions are being proposed for CO2 utilization. Sometimes
referred to as carbon-to-value, CCU includes the multiple technologies that allow
to recycle the carbon dioxide stream obtained by flue gases or air to manufacture a
range of products, including cement, carbonates, chemicals, plastics, and synthetic
fuels. The aim of these processes is to find an alternative to CCS, by overcoming
the concept of burying carbon emissions underground and providing effective value
by creating market products that would have consumed other resources for their
production. In some cases, e.g., when producing fuels, the carbon dioxide is released
again into the atmosphere, but the entire cycle is (almost) carbon-neutral. There is a
growing interest in CCU applications worldwide, and some companies are already
providing commercially competitive solutions, although often at limited scale.
While the previous concepts are generally coupled to the combustion flue gases
of thermoelectric power plants, another technology still in early maturity is gaining
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interest in the scientific community: direct air capture (DAC). The idea of DAC is
to use specific solutions, including membranes, to capture the CO2 directly from
the concentration in the air. This would allow a broader flexibility in locating the
facility. One of its main challenges is related to its significant energy consumption,
although experts are confident it can become cost-competitivewith otherCO2 capture
technologies if massively deployed (Fasihi et al. 2019). Another limitation appears
to be the rate at which this technology can be scaled up (Realmonte et al. 2019).
3 The Industry Sector
The industrial sector is composed of a large variety of activities, which have different
purposes and characteristics, and for which specific decarbonization solutions and
technologies are required. If heat and electricity emissions are allocated to the relevant
final sectors, industry is the single final sector with higher CO2 emissions, with
36% of the 32.3 Gt of emissions estimated for 2016 (IEA 2019a). The emissions in
industrial applications include both the direct emissions during the processes, and
the indirect emissions caused by the fuel combustion to provide the energy required
by the processes.
Decarbonization strategies in industries include three main areas: actions on the
demand/reuse of products andmaterials, energy efficiency in the industrial processes,
and different sources in the energy supply. The first area includes both actions devoted
to decrease products demand and increase recycling both for industrial stakehold-
ers and for final consumers. The energy efficiency measures in industrial processes
involve a number of technologies that are already available, but that are not economi-
cally viable due to the absence of specific incentives to support low-carbon solutions
(e.g., carbon tax). Finally, the use of different sources for energy supply in industry
may include electricity and hydrogen produced from RES, sustainable biomass, or
fuel combustion coupled with carbon capture systems.
A general concept for different industrial sectors is that there are currently no
purely technological limitations blocking major decarbonization routes. The barriers
are economic and not technological: for themost part,we have the technologies today,
but they are expensive. Future technological advancements might very well reduce
those economic barriers (Carnevale and Sachs 2019). An additional aspect related
to economics is represented by the high cost of production plants, resulting in long
average lifetimes (in some cases up to 50 years). Therefore, since the turnover is
limited, the implementation of new systems would require some time in existing
plants and would need to be economically competitive for new plants. Moreover,
large industrial facilities are heavily integrated, and therefore a retrofit of a part may
require the adaptation of the other units, resulting in the need of a systemic approach.
This section will mainly be devoted to three main industrial applications, due to
their major contribution for carbon emissions: cement, steel, and chemicals. Some
of the solutions that will be presented can also be applied to other industries. A final
paragraph will be devoted to the technologies related to Internet services: although
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they are not usually considered as an industrial sector, their dramatic growing in the
last decades calls for attention on the increasing energy consumption they require.
3.1 Cement
The share of global CO2 emissions deriving from the cement industry is about 5%.
More than 50% of these are process-related and cannot be avoided (Markewitz et al.
2019). These emissions are caused by the manufacturing of cement from limestone,
since the heating of limestone (CaCO3) releases carbon dioxide to produce CaO, the
primary component of Portland cement. These emissions are currently dispersed into
the atmosphere, since there is no incentive or regulation to support alternative solu-
tions. Since the process emissions represent the most significant share in the cement
industry, substitution of clinker with other materials for cement production (blended
cement) reduces carbon dioxide emission significantly (Nidheesh and Kumar 2019).
Another option, without modifying the chemical process, would be to install carbon
capture systems to avoid those emissions, although some technical challenges are
related to the very high temperatures at which those processes occur.
Other actions that can support a reduction of the CO2 emissions include the use
of dry kiln instead of wet kiln, efficient kiln drives, low-pressure drop cyclones for
suspension preheaters, heat recovery for power generation, kiln shell heat loss reduc-
tion, kiln combustion system improvements, seal replacement, oxygen enrichment,
conversion to reciprocating grate cooler for clinker making in rotary kilns, adjustable
speed drive for kiln fan for clinker making in all kilns, indirect firing for clinker mak-
ing in rotary kilns, modern power management systems, and use of modern clinker
coolers (Fellaou and Bounahmidi 2017). Moreover, indirect emissions are caused
by fossil-fuel combustion for heating purposes, which can be substituted by other
low-carbon sources, mainly biomass.
3.2 Steel
The production of iron and steel is not only associated with fossil-fuel combustion
CO2 emissions, but it includes also process emissions. Iron and steel products are
basic materials at the core of modern industrial systems, additionally being essential
also for other decarbonization options like hydro andwind power (Mayer et al. 2019).
Iron and steel production is estimated to cause 25% of the global CO2 emissions from
the industrial sector (Serrenho et al. 2016). While continuous process improvements
and retrofitting measures have led to a relative decoupling of emissions from fuel
combustion in last decades, especially in Europe, process emissions are essentially
unavoidable under current conventional best-available technologies (Mayer et al.
2019).
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To reach long-term decarbonization targets, multiple studies have concluded that
a strong decline in CO2 emissions is achievable only by a combination of BATs
and CCS, or with a major decline of the sector’s output. This latter solution appears
unlikely in the medium term, unless alternative materials become viable, such as
polymers for the automotive applications or wood for construction. Another pos-
sibility would be the scale-up of steel scrap recycling, although it is not expected
before some decades and the quality of the final product may not reach the required
standards.
The current most diffused iron and steel production routes are the blast-furnace
basic-oxygen-furnace route and the route of carbon-based direct reduced iron (which
is fed into an electric arc furnace), representing 71.6% and 28.0% of global steel
production, respectively, in 2017 (World Steel Association 2018). Two promis-
ing emissions-free breakthrough alternatives are the route of hydrogen-based direct
reduced iron (fed into an EAF) and the plasma-direct steel production route. How-
ever, since they both rely on electricity consumption, a low-carbon power generation
mix is essential to limit the indirect emissions.
3.3 Chemicals
Within the industrial sector, the chemical industry is one of the largest energy users,
accounting for 12% of global industrial energy use (Sendich 2019). The chemical
industry is usually divided into basic chemicals that are the basis for other products,
and specialized chemicals, including medicine, soap, and paints. Basic chemicals,
or commodity chemicals, generally require significant energy for their production,
but due to their large-scale production they are sold at low prices. They include raw
material gases, pigments, fertilizers, plastics, and rubber. Fossil products (mainly
natural gas and oil) are used to produce chemicals both as fuels and feedstocks. The
energy production is mainly necessary for process steam and for equipment (e.g.,
pumping), and the largest feedstock use is required by the petrochemical industries.
The top five commodity chemicals with both the largest production volume and
energy consumption worldwide are ammonia, ethylene, propylene, methanol, and
benzene/toluene/xylene (BTX). All of these chemicals require energy for their syn-
thesis, and in some cases also hydrogen is involved as a feedstock. While current
hydrogen production is mostly performed through natural gas steam reforming,
mainly for economic reasons, water electrolysis is a mature technology, and may
be adopted if supported by carbon pricing policies. Some of these chemicals, partic-
ularly methanol and ammonia, may be used as synthetic fuels in a low-carbon energy
system if produced by renewable electricity, leading to a closed carbon cycle.
Some technological solutions related to the chemical processes include the pos-
sibility of exploring electrochemistry, since there are many possible routes for elec-
tricity to drive a chemical reaction (Schiffer and Manthiram 2017). Electrification
may allow chemical reactions at lower temperatures, supporting the development
of smaller units distributed in locations with high availability of renewables for
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power generation. An additional advantage would be the decreasing distribution
costs. Finally, electrochemical reactions facilitate the products separation, which
can be an energy-intensive step in the current technological processes.
Electrification of the chemical industry may be integrated into broader trends in
modular and local manufacturing that have been enabled by robotic automation and
additive manufacturing methods to support a new paradigm of a fully integrated,
decarbonized, local manufacturing that starts with renewable resources and ends
with desired commercial products (Schiffer and Manthiram 2017).
3.4 Information and Communication Technologies
Although not traditionally included into the industry sector, the potential growing
rates of the power consumption of the information and communication technologies
(ICT) sector may reach important shares, and therefore it should be considered into
the analysis of future energy systems. The energy consumption of the sector is limited
to electricity, thus more easily manageable in the hypothesis of a low-carbon power
mix, but dramatic rises of power demand with respect to the forecasted scenarios
may have an impact on the deployment of RES power plants.
Andrae and Edler (2015) calculate that the ICT sector will represent 21% of
global electricity consumption by 2030, reaching 8,000 TWh from a base of around
2,000 TWh in 2010. Two additional scenarios are presented by the authors, with
relative power consumption ranging from 8 to 50% of global electricity use by 2030.
The International Energy Agency (IEA 2017), provides some figures for the power
consumption of communication networks (185 TWh in 2015) and data centers (at
194 TWh in 2014), which together represent around 2% of the global electricity
consumption. A moderate growth in the energy consumption of data centers of 3%
by 2020 is expected, but there is a greater uncertainty for the estimation of future
consumption for networks, with scenarios varying between growth of 70% and a
decline of 15% by 2021 depending on trends in energy efficiency.
In general, it is not clear if the current positive trends in energy efficiency, par-
ticularly for data centers, will be able to compensate the dramatic increase of data
demand for the users (Morley et al. 2018), in particular, if future technologies will
be massively adopted, including smart devices and automated vehicles. The growth
of Internet traffic is the combined results of multiple phenomena: the increase of
Internet users, the rise of the average devices per user (there will be 3.6 networked
devices per capita by 2022, up from 2.4 networked devices per capita in 2017, Cisco
2019), as well as the constantly increasing speed and contents that are available for
the users. These aspects result in an exponential growth of Internet traffic, with global
traffic flows rising from 100GB per second in 2002 to 26,600GB per second in 2016,
and the volume of traffic is expected to nearly triple within the next 5 years (Cisco
2019).
Finally, an aspect that deserves attention is the daily pattern of ICT consumption,
since the trends suggest that the increase of Internet use during peak hours is rising
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even faster, driven by the video streaming (Morley et al. 2018). For this reason,
particular attention should be paid to the management of peak electricity demand,
whichmaybecomemost critical than in current electricity networks.Decarbonization
strategies should deal with Internet-related energy demand as it develops, rather than
allowing it to become a “problem” that will be harder to tackle once data-intensive
services aremore thoroughly embedded in normal, everyday life and thereby “locked
in” (Morley et al. 2018).
4 The Transport Sector
The total final energy consumption of the transport sector reached 2.8 Gtoe in 2017
(IEA2018), almost 29%of the total, and 92% is represented by oil products, although
they account for less than 50% of the growth in demand over the previous year.
Mobility demand is showing a constant increase at global level, which is expected to
continue for the next three decades. Both passenger and freight transport is expected
to increase nearly threefold between 2015 and 2050 (ITF 2019), based on the current
path. The reduction of CO2 emissions in transport needs a combined approach,
tackling both a limitation of the demand and the deployment of low-carbon alternative
technologies as well as compensation measures.
This section will present the main technological options that are available in the
four main segments of passenger and freight transport, i.e., road, rail, aviation, and
shipping. Currently, three-quarters of the final energy consumption in transport is
due to the road segment, with roughly 10% each to aviation and shipping and just
2% to rail, also thanks to its higher energy efficiency compared to other modes
(International Energy Agency 2016). These shares have remained rather unchanged
in the last three decades, although the total transport energy demand is more than
doubled.
4.1 Road Transport
Road transport is probably the most various segments of the transport sector, ranging
from passenger cars, buses, and two-wheelers to heavy trucks for freight. The current
situation is seeing a predominance of internal combustion engine (ICE) technology,
basedonoil products andon a limited share of alternative fuels, includingbiofuels and
natural gas. The two main potential alternative powertrains are based on electricity,
either by its direct use through its storage supported by on-board batteries, or through
its conversion fromhydrogen thanks to a fuel cell. The opportunities and challenges of
these technologies are related to a number of aspects, including cost, range, flexibility,
reliability, performance, and charging time.
There is an increasing interest in electric vehicles (EVs) worldwide, especially for
passenger light-duty vehicles (LDVs). EVs generally include multiple technologies,
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from hybrid EVs (HEVs), which have both a traditional ICE powertrain and an
electric engine (but usually no possibility of directly charging from the external grid),
to battery EVs, which are fully electric. An intermediate technology is the plug-in
hybrid (PHEV), which is a hybrid vehicle with a larger battery and the possibility
of connecting to an external power source. Finally, fuel-cell-powered EVs (FCEVs)
are often grouped in the category of EVs, although they are basically running on
hydrogen to supply the electricity needed by the vehicle.
The penetration of EVs in the global market currently remains marginal, although
significant improvements are being made in the last years. The global EVs car fleet
reached 5.1 million in 2018, almost doubling the number of new EVs sales (IEA
2019b), but compared to a total car fleet around 1 billion. The world largest market
remains China, followed by the US and Europe, and the largest share of EVs market
share is in Norway, where in 2018 EVs reached 46% of the new vehicles sales. How-
ever, electricity penetration in passenger transport is going beyond cars, especially
in China. The country hosts the vast majority of the estimated 300 million of electric
two-wheelers in the world (IEA 2019b), while electric buses reached a world fleet
of around 460,000 vehicles, with 100,000 new sales in 2018.
The deployment of EVs requires a parallel development of a proper charging
infrastructure, whose capillarity is essential to support the use of EVs. In particular,
a total of 5.2 million charging points for LDVs are estimated worldwide, mostly slow
chargers installed at private houses and workplaces, including an estimated 540,000
public chargers, of which 150,000 fast chargers (78% in China).
The limitations of EVs deployment are mainly related to the limited available
range due to the low energy density of batteries, together with the high duration of
charging and the current limited availability of charging points. The investment costs
are currently higher than for ICE cars, but a massive upscaling of EVsmanufacturing
may lead its future cost to be in line with traditional vehicles. Moreover, expected
improvements in batteries technology may also increase the performance of EVs.
The chicken-and-egg problem of vehicles and charging infrastructure deployment
may be currently slowing down the adoption of EVs, especially in Europe.
The limitations related to BEVs are among the reasons that may lead to the
adoption of hydrogen-powered vehicles, which promise longest ranges and shorter
charging times. However, the generation, compression, and use of hydrogen lead to
an increased energy chain leading to a lower system efficiency when compared to
batteries. This aspect may not be too critical in terms of emissions as long as the
electricity is produced by RES, but the need of additional power generation should be
carefully taken into account. Other issues related to hydrogen are the transportation
and the installation of a proper refueling infrastructure.
An alternative pathway for road transport decarbonization is related to biofuels
(e.g., biodiesel, biomethane) or to synthetic fuels (e.g., methanol) supported by elec-
tricity generation from RES. These solutions have the advantage of exploiting the
existing powertrains as well as distribution infrastructures, although their limited
availability would suggest that their use may be prioritized to transport segments
that are harder to electrify (i.e., aviation and shipping).
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Finally, heavy trucks for freight transport have different requirements than LDVs,
since their higher size and required ranges may deter the use of electric batteries,
although some companies are currently evaluating their technical feasibility. The
most probable alternatives include hydrogen-powered trucks or electric road systems,
in which the vehicles are constantly supplied with the required electricity during the
travel on highways. These systems may be integrated with different powertrains
(e.g., batteries, hybrid, or hydrogen) to enhance their flexibility and limit the need of
a capillary power infrastructure outside of the main roads.
4.2 Rail Transport
Rail networks carry around 8% of the world’s motorized passenger movements and
7% of freight transport, but account for only 2% of energy use in the transport sector,
thanks to their high efficiency (IEA 2019c). Rail transport includes conventional rail-
ways around and between cities, high-speed railways and urban networks (including
subways and tram). The majority of passenger transport on conventional railways is
located in Asia, with India accounting for 39% of the total, followed by China with
27%, and Japan with 11%. Today China accounts for about two-thirds of high-speed
rail activity, having overtaken both Japan (17%) and the European Union (12%). The
regional distribution of urban rail activity is more even; China, European Union, and
Japan each have around one-fifth of urban passenger rail activity.
Rail transport is currently themost electrified transportmodeworldwide, although
with different levels depending on the area. Considering conventional railways, three-
quarters of passenger rail transport and almost half of all freight rail are electric (IEA
2019c), the remainder being powered by diesel trains. High-speed rail and urban rail
are completely powered by electricity.
As a result, the challenges for rail transport decarbonization appear lower than
for other modes, as the options are clear and already available. Efforts are needed to
further improve the power infrastructure in some railways that are not yet electrified,
together with the extra-sector improvement of the share of power generation from
renewables. However, the electrification of railway lines with low utilization factors
is often not economically affordable, and therefore other technologies may play a
role, including battery-electric trains and hydrogen fuel cell trains.
Potential alternatives to high-speed railways include maglev (magnetic levita-
tions) andHyperloop concepts.Maglev trains are already in operation in six locations
in Asia, but the only train that is operating at a speed higher than the normal high-
speed trains is the one connecting Shanghai City center with the airport, reaching a
top speed of 430 km/h over the 30 km of its length. Another project currently under
construction in Japan plans to connect Tokyo and Nagoya, but the benefits provided
by increased speed come at the cost of a four to five times higher energy consump-
tion in comparison with the current high-speed train connecting those cities. Another
alternative technology, the Hyperloop, is based on a low-pressure tube in which a
passenger or cargo pod is operated through an electromagnetic propulsion system.
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According to some feasibility studies, this technology could be more efficient than
the current high-speed trains, but there are not yet any real figures from services in
commercial operation.
Further actions are possible in the optimization of the demand and logistics,
especially in freight, and the improvement of the performance and energy efficiency
of railways. These solutions may include the implementation of on-board energy
recovery devices (including regenerative braking and energy storage), as well as the
use of lighter materials and a decreased use of energy-intensive power electronics.
4.3 Aviation
Aviation is among the most critical transport segments, due to its constantly increas-
ing passenger demand, especially for long-haul flights, and the high energy density
that is required. Demand for domestic and international air transport combined will
rise from 7 trillion passenger-kilometers in 2015 to 22 trillion in 2050, according to
(ITF 2019). Moreover, since air travel is a highly regulated environment, the access
to innovative technologies is strongly related to the policies implementation.
The most promising pathway for air transport decarbonization is the development
of advanced sustainable jet fuels, either by incorporating biofuels, or by the use of
synthetic fuels based on power generation from RES. The blending of biofuels with
the current fossil-based products may provide the possibility of gradually integrating
low-carbon solution in the existing system, without the need of major changes in the
current fleet, which usually has a renewal rate around 30 years. However, tomatch the
requirements of existing certifications, the fuels need to provide high energy density
and low freezing temperatures, which is rarely the case for available biofuels. Thus,
a blending with fossil fuels is currently required to meet those strict standards.
The electrification of short- and medium-haul flights is being evaluated by differ-
ent manufacturers, but major hurdles remain related to the energy density provided
by the current batteries. Moreover, the largest part of air travel demand worldwide is
related to long-haul flights, since travels shorter than 600 nautical miles (that would
be the target of potential electric aircrafts) currently represent half of the departures
but only 15% of the total fuel use (Schäfer et al. 2019). Hybrid technology may enter
the market soon if it proves to bring economic advantages, and the combination with
biofuels may help in reaching the decarbonization goals.
Lastly, energy efficiency measures are necessary to compensate the expected
increase in demand. These solutions include the use of innovative materials such
as advanced composites and airframe metal alloys, with lower weight and improved
performance, and the development of new plane designs. As in any sector, energy
efficiency is usually themost effectivemeasure to support decarbonization, and avail-
able solutions should be always prioritized before thinking of a sustainable energy
supply.
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4.4 Shipping
The other transport segment that shows severe challenges for decarbonization is mar-
itime shipping, especially for long-haul freight transport. Solutions and opportunities
differ depending on the range and the purpose of the trip.
Short-haul naval shipping for freight and passenger transport, especially in inland
waterways, is already seeing an evolution toward electrification in some countries.
The ships operation on fixed routes allows a better planning of the battery size as
well as the management of charging during the load and unload of the ship. Electric
ferries are already in operation in Denmark and Norway, and different technologies
are under evaluation, including hydrogen fuel cells (Norled 2019) and flow batteries
(Valentine 2018).
For long-haul freight maritime transport, which represents the largest share of
fuel consumption in the sector and totally relies on oil-based bunker fuel and diesel,
some potential alternative fuels are under evaluation. The current regulations lim-
iting pollutant emissions in some areas are pushing toward cleaner fuels, including
liquified natural gas (LNG). Other low-carbon options, although not yet commer-
cially available, are hydrogen or ammonia produced through electricity from RES.
Ammonia has higher volumetric energy density than hydrogen and more practical
storage temperatures and pressures, and its production requires less energy than other
synthetic fuels like methanol or ethanol (Laursen 2018). However, for the develop-
ment of all these alternative fuels, a dedicated infrastructure is required, both for
their production and distribution and for their supply in the ports worldwide, since a
diffused availability of fuel supply is at the basis of its use for long-haul freight.
Besides the supply technologies, energy efficiency measures can be implemented
to decrease the energy demand of shipping. These include the use of lightermaterials,
the slender design, the decrease of friction (air lubrication, hull chemical coating),
on-board waste heat recovery, wind assist, or exploitation of renewables sources with
on-board devices such as kites (Traut et al. 2014). Moreover, a better electrification
of ports and the availability of power supply for boats would allow the combustion
of fuels for on-board power demand during the loading/unloading operations.
5 The Buildings Sector
Buildings floor area in the world is currently estimated at around 223 billion m2,
and it is expected to grow to 415 billion m2 by 2050 (Dean et al. 2016). The largest
increase is expected from Africa, in line with the expected increase of population
which may reach a total of 2.5 billion people in the continent by 2050 (United
Nations 2019). Buildings are the final sector with highest final energy consumption
at global scale, with 3.05 Gtoe as of 2017, although energy efficiency measures have
limited its energy demand growth in last decades (IEA2018).Moreover, an additional
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impact is related to the embodied energy, i.e., the energy required for materials and
construction, although these impacts are generally included into the industry sector.
The strong push from growing population and increasing income levels in emerg-
ing economies and developing countries represent the main drivers for building stock
rise, leading to a potential increase of energy consumption in the sector reaching 50%
by 2050 if no action is taken (Dean et al. 2016). In the 2010–2017 period, energy
consumption increase (+5%) has been lower than the increase of floor area (+17%),
thanks to the improved energy efficiency in new buildings and in renovations. Elec-
tricity (+15%) and renewable energy sources (+14%) contributed more than natural
gas (+5%) to the substitution in final energy use of less-efficient coal-based tech-
nologies (−8%), while other fuels (oil and biomass) remained almost stable. Natural
gas and electricity constitute the main energy source in OECD countries, while non-
OECDcountries stillmainly rely on biomass and coal,with slow shifting to electricity
and gas (Carnevale and Sachs 2019).
Energy consumption in buildings is related to multiple aspects and services,
including heating and cooling, lighting and appliances. Moreover, although the
majority of buildings are related to housing purposes, other applications with spe-
cific energy demand needs and patterns include shops, offices, schools, hospitals,
etc. The amount and type of energy demand is related to the specific activity and the
occupancy schedule and density for each building. Some services are also strongly
dependent on external weather conditions, both for temperature and solar radiation,
and strong variations occur on a geographical and chronological basis.
This section will present the main decarbonization options for buildings, by con-
sidering heating, cooling, and electricity demand. In comparison with other sectors,
energy efficiency measures are of utmost importance, and although many actions
have already been undertaken, especially in developed countries, there is still a huge
potential for energy savings and rational energy use in the building sector.
5.1 Space and Water Heating
Space heating is particularly significant in temperate and cold climate regions, with a
strong seasonality imbalance between winter and summer. Also domestic hot water
production is generally higher in those regions, although it shows a more evenly dis-
tribution both across the world regions and the months of the year. Fuel consumption
represents roughly two-thirds of the total final consumption in buildings as of 2017
(IEA 2018), of which less than half is from renewables (mainly traditional biomass
used for heating and cooking), and therefore significant measures are required to
address this aspect.
The most impactful actions for space heating decarbonization are related to build-
ings insulation, both for building envelope and for windows. An increasing num-
ber of countries worldwide is adopting buildings energy performance regulations,
with stringent limits for both new buildings and renovations. However, it has to be
reminded that the current renovation rate of buildings worldwide is around 1%, but to
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reach a total decarbonization by 2050 an increase up to a 3% rate would be necessary
(Dean et al. 2016).
Considering energy supply, the most promising solution to substitute fossil fuels
is the switch toward heat pumps (HPs), which are a mature and efficient technology
for space heating, especially coupled with low-temperature heating systems (such as
radiant floors or low-temperature radiators). Heat pumps are based on the principle
absorbing heat to a low-temperature heat source (which is usually the outdoor air or
the ground) and supplying heat at a higher temperature, thanks to an additional energy
input, usually electricity (although gas- or heat-powered HPs are available). The
coefficient of performance (COP) of the current heat pumps, i.e., the ratio between
the useful heat supply and the electricity consumption, is generally between 3 and
5, depending on the working conditions. Ground-source heat pumps have generally
a better performance thanks to the higher temperatures of the ground compared to
outdoor air, especially in winter.
While heat pumps are an interesting and promising solution, it has to be observed
that the electrification of space heating should be deployed in parallel with the decar-
bonization of the power sector. The strong seasonality of heat demand may become
an issue if the future power mix would be strongly based on solar energy, since the
generation pattern would not be well-matched with the heat demand profile (Jarre
et al. 2018). Therefore, proper storage strategieswould be needed, both on a day/night
basis and on a weekly or seasonal basis to compensate the weather fluctuations (both
programmed and unexpected).
An alternative solution for the heating sector decarbonization is district heating
(DH), which is a mature technology for the energy supply to buildings in dense areas.
DH systems are based on a centralized heat generation facility, from which heat is
supplied to the users through a network of insulated pipes. While traditional DH
systems are based on fossil-fired cogeneration units, the potential upgrading toward
low-temperature RES-based DH systems can be obtained through the integration
of solar energy, heat pumps, waste heat, and biomass. Some technical challenges
remain, but DH can play a significant role in densely populated areas, also inte-
grating distributed heat sources, developing smart thermal networks. Moreover, DH
systems can be integrated with power networks through sector coupling, to exploit
the availability of excess electricity fromRES to generate heat to be stored or directly
supplied to final users.
Finally, a limited role may be played by other renewable sources, mostly local
wood biomass and solar thermal. Rural areaswith a lowpopulation density and severe
climate conditionsmaybenefit from the use of localwoodbiomass,which can be used
for high-temperature heat generation. Wood biomass is already used in many world
regions, although in developing countries it is often used for cooking in low-quality
appliances, leading to severe problems for safety and pollutants emissions. On the
other hand, the use of local biomass in modern stoves is already a sustainable and
low-carbon solution to substitute the use of fossil fuels in many rural areas. Space
heating can also be integrated with solar collectors, especially in middle seasons
and in climates that are not showing extreme conditions. However, solar thermal is
usually mostly used to provide domestic hot water, especially in summer. Among
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its main advantages, there are the low cost, the simple system configuration, and the
relatively high efficiency (up to 70–75% of the solar radiation can be converted into
useful heat).
5.2 Space Cooling
While space heating has traditionally been a significant cause of energy consumption
in buildings, the role of cooling is progressively increasing worldwide. This grow-
ing trend is expected to continue, sustained by the climate change and the growing
per-capita income in developing countries. Current cooling technologies are rela-
tively limited, and the large majority of cooling worldwide is supplied by distributed
electricity-powered chillers, with some few exceptions including district cooling
networks or solar cooling units.
Themost impactful actions to limit energy consumptionwould be the limitation of
the rising cooling demand. This could be obtained through building design strategies
aimed at minimizing the cooling needs (cool roofs, shading systems, night ventila-
tion), integrated with solutions for the free cooling when the outdoor conditions are
favorable. These solutions would be even more impactful in hot climate countries,
where cooling demand is particularly high. Non-residential buildings show a signif-
icant potential for energy savings through a proper energy management, since they
often operate cooling equipment with very low set point temperatures and without a
proper attention to limit the flow of cooled air to the outside.
Considering cooling supply, the installation of high-efficiency chillers and their
proper operation could lead to significant energy savings. Attention must be paid
on maintenance operations, especially for air filters, to avoid unnecessary additional
energy consumption. In specific contexts, the use of high-efficiency district cooling
networks or solar cooling units may provide performance improvements with respect
to common solutions.
5.3 Lighting, Appliances, and Cooking
Besides heating and cooling, there is an increasing energydemand in buildings related
to power supply for lighting and appliances, mainly driven by the diffusion of tech-
nologies providing multiple services to the users. As long as electricity consumption
is concerned, there is a huge difference across developed and developing countries.
In the former, the increased integration of houses with digital technologies and the
Internet of Things (IoT) may lead to an optimized supply and use of services, but
dramatically increasing the power demand of households. At the same time, develop-
ing countries are still facing severe problems of energy access, especially in Africa,
where many buildings are able to power any appliance or electric lighting system.
Universal energy access will increase the living conditions of million of people, and
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at the same time boost the installation of appliances that will lead to higher power
consumption also in existing buildings. For this reason, it is important to ensure
regulations that require high standards in energy efficiency both for lights and other
appliances.
Another cause of energy consumption in residential buildings is cooking. While
in developed countries most houses have access to gas- or electricity-fired cooking
systems, the majority of the world is still relying on biomass or coal. While burning
local biomass has a limited impact on CO2 emissions, thanks to the closed CO2 cycle,
it has severe consequences for the indoor air quality and for safety. For this reason, it
is important to support the deployment of clean and efficient cooking technologies.
Induction cooking is providing higher efficiencies than traditional electric and gas
cooking, and its deployment may play an important role toward decarbonization.
6 Conclusions: Strategies and Policy Recommendations
Following the Paris Climate Agreement’s aim to strengthen the global response to
the climate crisis “in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradi-
cate poverty,” it is necessary to use a “systems approach,” aspiring to simultane-
ously address multiple objectives and promote policy instruments and technological
solutions that can be used across sectors.
In this section, we synthesize some of the most important strategies and pol-
icy recommendations distilled from the earlier sections of this chapter and from
the “Roadmap to 2050: A Manual for Nations to Decarbonize by Mid-Century”
(Carnevale and Sachs 2019) to which the authors of this chapter have actively
contributed.1
There is a broad consensus on technology pathways to decarbonization which
points to six main technological pillars: (1) Zero-carbon electricity: a shift toward
zero-carbon electricity mix; (2) Electrification of end uses: the penetration of elec-
tricity, built on existing technologies, can enable a green conversion for the sectors
currently using fossil-fuel energy; (3) Green synthetic fuels: deployment of a wide
range of potential synthetic fuels, including hydrogen, synthetic methane, synthetic
methanol, and synthetic liquid hydrocarbons applicable for harder to abate sectors;
(4) Smart power grids: systems able to shift among multiple sources of power
generation and various end uses to provide efficient, reliable, and low-cost systems
operations, despite the variability of renewable energy; (5) Materials efficiency:
improved material choices and material flows, such as reduce, reuse, and recycle to
significantly improve materials efficiency; (6) Sustainable land use: mainly involv-
ing the agriculture sector, as it contributes up to a quarter of all greenhouse gas
1Other authors who contributed to this “Strategies and Policy Recomendations” section are Niccolò
Aste, Marco Bocciolone Dimitri Bogdanov, Ed Brost, Christian Breyer, Victoria Burrows, Carlos
Calvo Ambel, Emanuela Colombo, Claudio del Pero, Thomas Earl, Fabrizio Leonforte, Maurizio
Masi, Renato Mazzoncini, and Alessandro Miglioli.
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emissions from deforestation, industrial fertilizers, livestock, and direct and indirect
fossil-fuel uses.
The present chapter has discussed the main technological decarbonization strate-
gies available to decarbonize our energy systems for the power sector as well as
the three final energy consumption sectors: industry, transport, and buildings. Here
below, we present the main strategies and policy recommendations for each sector.
6.1 Strategies to Decarbonize the Power Sector
The power sector is already undergoing a decarbonization process in multiple coun-
tries around theworld. The traditional centralized organization of the power system is
now facing a paradigm shift to distributed and renewable generation. This newmodel
is closely related tot he implementation of smart grids, where the end users act as
prosumers. Digital technologies will be at the center of this revolution, unlocking
the potential of different business models like virtual aggregators and peer-to-peer
energy trading.
The current technologies supporting this transition can be classified into four
main groups: (i) low-carbon energy sources (on- and offshore wind, solar PV and
concentrated solar power, hydropower, biomass, nuclear, and geothermal); (ii) short-
term and long-term electricity storage solutions; (iii) other flexible options such
as network interconnections, sector coupling, supply response (hydro reservoirs,
bioenergy) and demand-side management (DSM); (iv) carbon capture, utilization,
and storage (CCUS), and variants including bioenergy CCUS and direct air capture.
While many of these technologies are already cost-competitive and may offer even
lower costs in the future, others (e.g., electricity storage and carbon capture) require
future technological developments and/or increased economies of scale to support
their effective deployment at the levels needed to reach a full decarbonization of the
power sector.
The total decarbonization target will require a combination of multiple technolo-
gies. Depending on local conditions, the mix of available power options will vary
from one country to another, and thus there will be no one-size-fits-all solution.
The implementation of transition technologies may also be required. Coal should be
phased out earliest given its high carbon content and its contributions to air pollution.
While natural gas may play a crucial role during a transition period, it will also need
to be either decarbonized or progressively phased out. To allow for unanticipated
technological breakthroughs and cost reductions, energy policies need to be flexible,
to be regularly assessed, and be adaptive to ongoing technology advances in order to
allow each potential low-carbon solution to be supported and deployed.
While many national and international policies are heavily oriented toward the
electrification of energy systems, electrificationmust proceed alongside decarboniza-
tion and uncoupling of energy demand fromeconomic growth in order to fight climate
change. Also, the energy efficiency potential along the whole electricity chain should
not be underestimated. Moreover, a strongly integrated approach across sectors and
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energy pathways is essential for addressing climate change issues. Finally, secondary
effects and a holistic perspective on the entire lifecycle of technological solutions
should be considered to avoid potential rebound effects from specific technology
choices.
6.2 Strategies to Decarbonize the Industry Sector
Heavy industry emits a large share of global greenhouse gas emissions, because
industrial processes employ high temperatures and depend on high energy densities
to enable the chemical processes involved. The industrial sector of the worldwide
economy consumed more than half (55%) of all delivered energy in 2018.Within the
industrial sector, the chemicals industry is one of the largest energy users, accounting
for 12% of global industrial energy use.
Three energy-intensive sectors have been considered: cement, iron and steel,
and petrochemicals (plastics, solvents, industrial chemicals). Fully decarbonizing
such complicated and integrated industrial environments requires a multidimen-
sional approach. Strategies include (i) reducingdemand for carbon-intensive products
and services; (ii) improving energy efficiency in current production processes; (iii)
deploying decarbonization technologies across all industries, which in turn can be
split between four supply-side decarbonization routes: electrification, use of biomass,
use of hydrogen and synthetic fuels, and use of carbon capture technology.
Some material efficiency options for the three industry sectors analyzed include
(i) for cement: building design optimization, concrete reuse, materials substitution;
(ii) for iron and steel: optimization of scrap recycling, product design for efficiency,
more intensive use of products; (iii) for petrochemicals: chemical and mechanical
recycling, plastic demand behavior change, use of renewable feedstocks, and product
eco-design to better enable recycling. For these industries, improvements in energy
efficiency should run in parallel with material efficiency and demand reduction.
Appropriate technology for energy efficiency exists today and it can be applied in
any country. Some of the key solutions for energy efficiency improvement include
(i) for cement: switch to dry kilns, multistage cyclone heaters; (ii) for iron and steel:
reuse of high-pressure gas for power, coke dry quenching; (iii) for petrochemicals:
energy efficiency in monomer production and naphtha catalytic cracking.
There are currently no pure technological limitations blocking major decar-
bonization routes across any industrial sector. The barriers are economic and not
technological; we have the technologies today but they are expensive.
Of course, also geographical contexts will impact technology decision-making.
Countries investing in new plants should go for zero-carbon technology rather than
investing in energy efficiency improvements in plants at the end of their life. In
contrast, countrieswhere legacy plants and facilitieswill continue to operate for years
to come should invest in energy conservation and energy efficiency improvements for
existing processes. Additionally, the possibility of combiningmore of these solutions
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in a given country or facility will vary and depend on the geographical distribution
of resources and social acceptability of specific technologies.
6.3 Strategies to Decarbonize the Transport Sector
The transport sector requires deploying a diverse mix of decarbonization solutions
to meet the challenges within each of its four main segments: roadways, railways,
aviation, and navigation. Effective decarbonization pathways in transport relymostly
on technological solutions, new sustainable fuel development and fuel shifts, and are
complemented by demand reduction and modal shift strategies.
Direct electricity usage (through either batteries or electrified railways and electric
road systems), hydrogen, synthetic fuels, and sustainable biofuels (properly allocated
to hard-to-decarbonized modes) will all be important for transport decarbonization.
Strategies include (i) in the road segment, CO2 emissions are easier to abate due
to electric vehicles and fuel-cell electric vehicles for short-to-medium haul (freight,
passenger, light-duty, or heavy-duty categories); (ii) the pathways for railway decar-
bonization are mostly based on fuel shifts from diesel to electricity or hydrogen; (iii)
in aviation, advanced jet fuels (such as synthetic fuels) are the only way to decar-
bonize the current fleet and the relevant one in the near future. Modal shift from air to
land could be enhanced with innovative alternatives such as ultra-high-speed trains
with the right policies in place; (iv) long-haul navigation is hard to abate while short-
haul navigation can be supplied by electricity or hydrogen technologies. Ammonia
and hydrogen are currently being investigated in long-haul navigation.
The use of biofuels and the sustainability of biomass for biofuels need to be
carefully assessed so as to avoid: competition with food production, deforestation or
loss of biodiversity in natural regions, and competition with industries that currently
use the biomass for higher value products or uses. As sustainable biofuels will only
be available in limited volumes, its use should be prioritized in hard-to-abate modes
like aviation.
Regulatory frameworks need to be technology agnostic to create a fertile environ-
ment for innovation, unleashing the potential of the research while fostering virtuous
behaviors of citizens in all transport modes.
6.4 Strategies to Decarbonize the Buildings Sector
Buildings represent an estimated 36%of global final energy consumption and 39%of
the global energy-related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The goal of total decar-
bonization in the buildings sector includes the construction of new buildings and
districts with zero or almost zero energy consumption from fossil fuels and the total
renovation of existing buildings with the same net zero-carbon standards. Current
renovation rates account for about 1% of existing building stock each year, while to
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achieve 100% zero-carbon goal by 2050 it is necessary to ensure a renovation rate
higher than 3%. It should be noted that the CO2 emissions resulting from material
use in buildings represent almost one-third of building-related emissions: the con-
struction industry must radically change its manufacturing structure in order to abate
this increasing embodied energy.
In general, using a combination of readily available technologies and approaches,
and performance-based design metrics, net zero-carbon buildings and districts can
be achieved today by (i) maximizing the buildings energy efficiency mainly through
passive and low embodied carbon solutions; (ii) adopting high-efficiency technical
systems and advanced control/management strategies: phasing out inefficient solu-
tions, encouraging of low-carbon systems such as heat pumps and district heating
and the adoption of advanced control/management strategies; (iii) maximizing on-
site or nearby renewable energy production and self-consumption while electrifying
the buildings sector, to completely cover or exceed the total energy demand of each
buildingwith theminimumexchange of energywith the grid (thus stimulating energy
management, storage, and exchange at district level).
In order to achieve the overall decarbonization of the buildings sector, energy
consumption related to building codes be addressed. The strategies include (i) estab-
lishing advanced building energy codes with mandatory performance standards and
settingminimum energy performance levels for existing buildings. Also, policies and
subsidies to favor the retrofit of existing buildings rather than new constructions are
absolutely necessary; (ii) achieving high-efficiency building envelopes at negative
life cycle cost, mandating energy performance standards for envelope components
and work with industry to deliver non-invasive and whole-building retrofit packages.
Policy-makers should develop strategic frameworks to create the adequate market
conditions for low-carbon technologies, guiding building owners and designers in
making the correct choices; (iii) mandating minimum energy performance standards
for stand-alone heating equipment, prevent expansion of fossil-fuel heating, and
pursue strategy to shift demand to high-efficiency and integrated energy solutions
with net zero emissions; (iv) pursuing low-cost solar cooling technologies such as
high-efficiency and renewable district cooling where appropriate. Mandating the
use of waste heat from large-scale cooling for heating and hot water use on-site or
via district systems, local governments are uniquely positioned to advance district
energy systems in their various capacities; (v) implementing regulations and mea-
sures obstructing energy self-consumption such as specific additional taxes or levies
should be lifted and administrative procedures to allow self-consumption should be
user-friendly; (vi) achieving affordable thermal storage and low-cost solar thermal
systems (for low-income countries only); (vii) implementing training and capacity
building activities for the construction sector must be adequately promoted, while
also pushing the development of specific DSS (decision support system) or design-
aid tools to strongly increase the application of climate-responsive and integrated
building design.
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6.5 An Integrated Systems Perspective Needed
Due to the complexity of the decarbonization process across the whole energy sys-
tem, it is important to adopt an integrated system approach. A systems perspective
recognizes the interconnectivity of actions toward any one or more of these objec-
tives, using any one or more of the mentioned policy instruments or technological
solutions. An action in one can be detrimental to another, while some combined
efforts could amplify their cumulative effects and achieve multiple objectives. For
example, the power grid itself represents a complex system that must continue to
operate reliably and efficiently even as it undertakes the deepest transformation in its
history. No single policy or technology can achieve decarbonization by itself or be
implemented without due consideration to its ripple effects, or to the delicate state
of the current, broader system.
In taking a systems approach, many complementarities need to be considered
for managing the complexity of the energy system: (i) complementarities of vari-
able renewable energy sources. Wind, solar, and hydropower vary by the minute,
day, season, and year. Digital systems will play a large role in coordinating the aug-
mented grid complexity and the required flexibility; (ii) complementarities among
zero-carbon technologies. As one obvious example, zero-emission vehicles depend
on complementary zero-carbon energy sources and the infrastructure to fuel them;
(iii) complementarities of public and private investments. Parts of the energy system
are in private, for-profit hands, and parts are publicly owned. It will take significant
effort and analysis to harmonize public and private investments, to recognize the
diverse role they can play, and the synergies their joint action can create; (iv) com-
plementarities of natural and engineered systems. Achieving net negative emissions
would require biological storage of carbon dioxide (CO2) in vegetation and soils via
preservation of existing forests, restoration of degraded habitats, and reforestation
to increase natural carbon sinks. Energy strategies that amplify land use degradation
must be ruled out; (v) complementarities of mitigation and adaptation. Adaptation
measures can also contribute to mitigation strategies. Forest restoration and protec-
tion of coastalwetlandswould help resist storm surges from rising sea levels, promote
resilient food production, and secure carbon, thereby serving both adaptation andmit-
igation purposes; (vi) complementarities of centralized and decentralized solutions.
Renewable energy resources are by nature different from one place to another and
restriction on land availability and use may require different power configurations;
(vii) complementarities of actions and strategies in different geographies. Efforts
to address decarbonization might be similar for big cities in North America and in
Europe, but they would not apply to sub-Saharan Africa. Urban areas are also differ-
ent from rural areas where the fight to bring access to energy and other services to all
is still a challenge. Trying to impose the same pathway in different contexts can lead
to failure and to the continuation of business-as-usual scenarios; (viii) complemen-
tarities of R&D activities supported by research institutions and academia, funded
by public and private sectors. These activities should aim at promoting breakthrough
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innovation to feed continuously the process of decarbonization and keep under con-
trol any risk of lock-into solutions that may fail to contribute to total decarbonization
in the long run.
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Policy and Regulation of Energy
Transition
Karolina Daszkiewicz
1 Overview and Background
The world is at a turning point for what concerns energy trends. At a first glance, one
can say that almost nothing happened over the last two decades: the share of fossil
fuels in the overall global energy mix remained constant, at around 80%. However,
this global number hides many different important energy trends: the rise of China,
to become the largest energy consumer of the world, mainly fuelled by coal and oil
growth; shale oil and gas reshaping not only the consumption in theUnited States, but
also shifting historical importers/exporter balance; the start of the next new energy
giants: India, South East Asia and Africa.
On the other side, we have been seeing clear signals of the will of many govern-
ments to steer away from fossil fuels and to move towards a clean energy future. The
implementation of vehicles standards for cars, energy efficiency labelling for appli-
ances and support for renewables technologies are strong examples of pivotal policies
that have been implemented over the recent decades with climate and sustainability
angles, changing the way that we consume and produce energy. This resulted in the
stall of the growth of energy-related CO2 emissions for several years.
But despite these encouraging signals, the CO2 emissions grew again in 2018,
and we are far from achieving, and even being on the right track with the goals
that most governments of the world agreed upon at the UNFCCC’s conference of
parties 21 (COP21), held in Paris in 2015. COP21 was a turning point, but countries’
actions need to be stepped-up. As shown in the International Energy Agency’sWorld
Energy Outlook 2019, the gap between the efforts currently envisaged and the Paris
Agreement pledges is huge. This can—and must—be filled by a series of actions
that requires a series of actions and policies to be put in place.
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Many technologies and decarbonisation options are available, and it is up to each
country to choose the best combination for them. Nevertheless, many areas still
lag behind: removing the barriers that prevent the realisation of the huge energy
efficiency potential, continuing the increasing deployment of renewable technologies
in all sectors, supporting carbon, capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) and place
of nuclear technologies in the mix, creating the right conditions for these investments
to be forthcoming are among some of the key policies that will need to be stepped-up
in ambition over the next years.
This chapter is to outline the evolution of policies and regulations driving
the energy transition with a focus on renewable energy technologies and energy
efficiency.
2 Policy Classification
Countries have a range of policies and measures at their disposal to influence the
deployment of renewables and energy efficiency improvements. These policies are
multiple, ranging from tax benefits or waivers to capital grants, measures rewarding
heat or power generation, self-consumption, or energy efficiency codes andmandates
and many other tools.
Various energy strategies, targets and the majority of the policies aiming at
decreasing investment costs can be used to trigger the deployment of renewables
in all sectors—electricity, transport or heating and cooling. However, these policy
tools can be adjusted and applied to incentivise improvements in the energy effi-
ciency area. Price-finding mechanisms (e.g. auctions or administratively set tariffs)
are mostly applicable to power generating renewables.
The below Table 1 attempts to group these policy tools and measures into over-
arching policy categories, enlists policy types, and track, if adjusted accordingly,
the applicability of these tools across renewable sectors and the energy efficiency,
provided necessary adjustments were implemented. Due to the breadth and depth of
policy forms available, the below classification is not exhaustive.
Other approaches to classification of the policy types can be applied by sorting
them from the angle of project size or purpose (electricity sector). Categorising
policies per their exposure to market forces could be another approach (IRENA, IEA
and REN21 2018).
In this chapter, only a few of the above-enlisted policy types will be explained
in detail, in particular the ones that are responsible for bringing online the most
significant shares of new capacities or particular relevance for either renewables or
energy efficiency.
Policy and Regulation of Energy Transition 205
Table 1 Policy classification and applicability to renewables and energy efficiency areas
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3 Renewable Energy
3.1 Renewable Energy Policy Evolution and Geographical
Spread
The deployment of wind and solar photovoltaics (PV) technologies progressed at a
rapid pace over the past two decades growing from a nascent level and from few loca-
tions.While renewables in power sector made an impressive progression, renewables
in transport and heating sectors developed at a slower pace lagging behind which is
closely related to the level and effectiveness of corresponding policy adoption.
In 2000, only few countries had in place policies directly targeting renewable
power technologies, with various rates of success. In 2010, already 45 countries had
a renewable target in place and around 60 countries had some form of a measure
remunerating directly renewable power generation gaining experience with feed-in
tariffs. By 2017, the number of countries that adopted renewables target had grown to
almost 180, of which two-thirds had in place policies incentivising renewable power
generation. Robust policy adoption corresponded directly with increasing annual net
additions commissioned in countries across all regions.
Countries aiming to support renewables in transport sector mainly use various
forms of biofuel blending mandates. In 2010, only approximately 30 countries had
mandates in place. By 2017, this number tripled. However, majority of the mandates
require relatively low biofuel blending shares and countries’ limited efforts to enforce
them on the part of governments result in slower progression of renewables in the
transport energy consumption.
At the same time, opportunities for the deployment of renewables in heating and
cooling sector are vast as this is the largest end-use sector, accounting for more than
half of total worldwide final energy consumption. However, renewable energy policy
adoption visibly lags behind fort this sector. In 2010, only 13 countries had in place a
renewable heat mandate with the majority located in Europe. By 2017, the number of
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countrieswith some formof a renewable heatmandate increased only to 22. European
countries continued to lead policy adoption in this sector driven by obligations under
the EU Renewable Energy Directive with mandatory 2020 renewable targets (IEA
2018).
Over time, renewable energy policies evolved, morphed and diversified in their
structure, in particular policies targeting renewable electricity.
3.1.1 Targets
Target setting (in absolute or share levels) is often country’s first step in strategy and
policymaking for renewables deployment. Targets provide a clear objective where a
country, region or city aims to get in terms of renewables deployment and may or
may not consider how renewables will interplay with other energy technologies in
the future energy mix and over a clearly defined period. They are often accompanied
by a roadmap or an action plan in which the country enlists the measures it intends
to use in order to achieve set objectives, translating targets into concrete steps and
actions. This step is usually followed up by a secondary legislation, which adopts
rules and renewable energy measures such as fiscal or financial policies, measures
setting tariffs for renewable power generation, premiums or programmes supporting
self-consumption.
In order to set ambitious yet achievable targets, target adoption is usually pre-
empted by a series of studies and consultations such as resource availability study,
technical potential and cost competitiveness assessments, grid integration and evo-
lution of energy demand. These give a clear set of information on which targets can
be set in an informed way by a country (IRENA 2015).
Renewable energy targets have four major characteristics:
1. strength and obligation status;
2. structure and scope;
3. time scale;
4. context.
The first element defines whether a target is of voluntary or of a binding nature.
For the target to be legally binding it must be adopted into the national law. The
target can be embodied in the overall energy act or adopted by a specific renewable
energy legislation. Targets can also be set in the form of renewable obligation (RO),
Fuel Mandate or renewable portfolio standard (RPS) that are adopted as secondary
level laws and are renewable energy mechanisms per se.
Example of a legally binding target is the EuropeanUnion’s 2020 renewable target
adopted in 2009 by Renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/EC. This target is binding
for the overall of the European Union but it is also accompanied by legally binding
country-level targets, which are expressed in a share of renewable energy consumed
in country’s total energy consumption in 2020. These targets are further split into
sector-level objectives that are non-binding but are of an indicative nature on how
countries intend to achieve their overall targets. Nonfulfillment of the overall targets
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is to be penalised with financial fines placed on member countries by the European
Union.
Voluntary targets are not incorporated into national body of law but noted in
various policies and strategies, and they do not entail financial burdens or fines.
Renewable energy targets can take a wide range of forms and structures. The
first tier target is an overall target, applicable to country’s entire energy mix (as
before mentioned EU target). The second tier targets refer to a specific sector such
as electricity, transport or heating and cooling sectors. The third granularity level of
the target specifies if the target is technology-neutral or split into specific technol-
ogy targets (separate target for solar PV capacity to be reached, wind, etc.). While a
technology-neutral target allows markets to decide on the most cost-effective renew-
able technology option to be used in order to meet the target, it can also lead to
overrepresentation of one technology on the market with the most mature technol-
ogy dominating the deployment and preventing other technologies from maturing.
There is a benefit in assuring deployment of a variety of technologies. Technology
specific targets guarantee that technologies that are not yet fully mature will have
their opportunity to develop within the country market.
While setting the target, a country should decide the metrics in which the target
is expressed in and therefore chooses how the progression towards the target is to be
measured and calculated. One of the most commonly used metrics by countries are
either total primary energy supply (TPES) or total final energy consumption (TFEC).
Targets can be also expressed as a share of energy demand or a specific amount of
energy, power, heat or fuel delivered or consumed measured in a corresponding
metric unit.
The third target element is its time scope. Typically targets are set for 10
or 15 years periods, however, many countries choose shorter horizons for their
objectives. For example, China operates on the basis of carefully designed 5-Year
Plans. Targets with horizons of 20 years and over are also practiced and are often
accompanied by supporting mid-term targets.
Often, countries set renewable energy targets in a larger context of their over-
all energy and climate strategies. The EU 2020 and 2030 renewable targets are
accompanied by the CO2 reduction and energy efficiency targets. Countries often
embed renewable targets in their overall energy mix objectives that are increasingly
supplemented by climate targets.
Target setting is an important process that should be done carefully and supported
with various studies. Regardless of what approach is chosen for a target setting,
tracking progression towards the set objectives is a fundamentally important part of
the process. This requires for the policymakers and regulators to develop a clear and
coherent monitoring process.
However, the stand-alone target is an orphaned ambition if not supplemented with
an appropriate blend of policies and measures triggering renewables deployment and
putting countries on the path to meet the set targets.
The above-explained target setting process refers mostly to setting tangible objec-
tives in the renewables sector. However, it can be replicated and adjusted accordingly
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to setting objectives in the area of energy efficiency or any other part of the energy
system.
3.1.2 Fiscal and Financial Policies
Most low-carbon technologies face high capital costs, and therefore the conditions
for finding such capital and the financing conditions can play an essential role in
the deployment of these technologies. Fiscal and financial policies generally aim at
reducing upfront capital costs and providing cheaper and more affordable financing
conditions to investors. These can take awide rangeof forms such as capital grants and
rebates, soft loans, tax discounts, tax waivers or other tax benefits. These measures
are easy to adopt and are often the first type of renewable support in place. They can
also be complemented by other policies and measures directly supporting renewable
production. These measures are rarely stand-alone policies available in a country,
although stand-alone tax benefits and waivers are adopted in developing countries
where no other measures are yet implemented.
Fiscal and financial measures are easy to manage from an administrative side
as they can be amended, adjusted or removed within regular budgetary work of the
government. Thesemeasures can address anyparticular renewable energy technology
and are applicable to any sector.Measures supporting renewables are often embedded
into energy efficiency policies and support systems. These types of policies can be
used in renewables as well as in the energy efficiency efforts across all sectors and
users. Their characteristics and principles remain similar but the beneficiary changes
accordingly to an envisaged effect the measure supposed to achieve.
3.2 Renewable Electricity Policies
Much of the renewables policies over the last two decades have been aiming at
increasing installed capacity in the electricity sector. Renewable capacity more than
tripled from 850 GW in 2000 to 2 500 GW by the end of 2018, with more than
90% of this growth coming from hydro, wind and solar PV in almost equal shares.
Hydropower was—and still is—the largest renewable power technology, both in
terms of capacity and of electricity generation. For long, it has also been leading
the annual additions of installed capacity. Nearly twenty years ago, total installed
onshore wind capacity was less than 20 GW, offshore wind was an experimental
technology with only demonstration projects in waters, and solar PV total capacity
was standing at less than 1 GW.
Over the last two decades, wind and solar PV technologies experienced efficiency
gains and large cost cuts. By 2018, solar PV additions grew to some 100 GW level
reaching total installed capacity of around 500 GW and wind annual additions grew
by 50 GW reaching 565 GW installed capacity. Hydropower was no longer a leading
technology in terms of capacity additions, expanding by 20GW in 2018; half of these
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new projects came online in China, as majority of viable sites for large hydropower
projects in the OECD countries have been already used (IEA 2019e).
In 2000, half of the global annual renewable capacity additions were commis-
sioned in Europe. In 2018, renewables growth was spread across all regions with
China accounting for 43% of the global growth and Europe delivering third-highest
level of new projects after APAC region. Renewables for power generation are turn-
ing from an expensive possibility for few to a mainstream across the globe (IEA
2019e).
There is a strong link between pace of additions and renewable energy policy
adoption. Knowing the evolution of policy types and history of policy adoption
across regions and sectors is important to understand the success and failures that
have been a part of renewables take off and allow to draw lessons for the future (IEA
2018).
3.2.1 Evolution of Feed-in Tariffs and Feed-in Premiums
Feed-in tariffs (FITs) are administratively set price tariffs for electricity generated
by renewable energy technologies. Countries started using FITs in the late 1970s as
an incentive tool, gaining policy expertise over time (NREL 2010). With that and
growing maturity of renewable technologies paired with dropping costs, the FIT sys-
tems started being more complicated with tariffs tailored to technology, installation
size, mounting system type and often location of the installation. Remuneration lev-
els are set by countries’ regulatory office, separated from the market forces. Tariffs
are assigned in long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) signed between the
generator and the responsible energy regulatory body or the electricity offtaker.
FIT contracts durations are usually of 12–20 years, reaching up to a maximum of
30 years in rare cases. Initially, the duration of FITs was of the same length for all
technologies and project sizes. However, similar to remuneration levels, countries
started gradually to adjust contracts’ lengths to technology life cycles and how fast
developers would get the return on their investments. Ultimately, on average, FIT
contracts’ durations become shorter and shorter oscillating currently around 10–
15 years.
Initially used to support the deployment of all types and size renewable power
stations, developed economies started limiting the use of FITs for renewables deploy-
ment in favour of other price-finding mechanisms. Conversely, in several developing
countries FITs continue to be used, mostly for support of small installations for res-
idential and commercial usage. They also continue to be an important mechanism
for the deployments of all types and size of renewable installations in these coun-
tries, where access to financing instruments is more limited and investment is overall
riskier.
One of the main limitations of FITs is the difficulty to accurately identify the
correct level of remuneration for the amount of power generated, and to adjust it
rapidly and in sync with the decrease of the technology costs. If the FIT is not
sufficiently high, it will not trigger investors’ interest, while if it is too high it will
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provide an excessive return on the investment, increasing the burden to electricity
consumers or taxpayers. This second case can be exacerbated by the fact that, unless
complemented with additional policies, there is no control on the volume of new
capacity.
Feed-in premiums (FIP) are also set administratively, similar to feed-in-tariffs,
but hold a greater exposure to electricity markets, as they are paid on top of the
electricity price set by the market and collected by the generator. The overall remu-
neration of the project is therefore the sum of the electricity price received from the
market and the FIP. The advantage of this mechanism is that generators are encour-
aged to react to the variation of electricity prices, while on the other side it increases
their market exposure and therefore the risks associated to the project. FIPs can be
set to remain constant over time regardless of the variation of the electricity price
or sliding, with adjustments and eventual minimum and maximum levels. Similar to
the FITs case, FIPs are contracted for long periods under PPAs.
Feed-in policies played a pivotal role in renewables deployment that was success-
fully adopted in Germany and later duplicated by many countries. In 2010, just over
50 countries had either a feed-in tariff or premium tariff systems in place, of which
nearly half were European countries, followed by adoption inAPAC region. By 2017,
FITs or FIPs were in place in over 80 countries with Europe continuing to lead the
adoption followed by APAC, Eurasia and other regions. The International Energy
Agency reports that feed-in tariff and premium policies were the main policy bring-
ing online around 80% of all commissioned utility-scale renewable projects over
2012–2017 period (IEA 2018). However, the policy paradigm shifted as renewables
became more mature, and costs have experienced large cuts with countries turning
towards auctions for price-finding mechanism for large-scale projects. Going for-
ward, with China limiting its feed-in tariff policy, the IEA estimates that the feed-in
mechanisms will drive around 40% of the global large-scale deployment over the
next five years (2019–24) (IEA 2019e).
Administratively set tariffs are set to continue to play an important role for
hydropower, concentrated solar panels (CSP), marine and geothermal technologies.
Renewable auctions can drive the deployment, serving as a new go-to policy mecha-
nism for large renewables, in particular for solar PV and wind projects. Nevertheless,
countries start to increasingly use auction systems for awarding contracts tomid-size,
or commercial size projects.
3.2.2 Renewable Auctions
Renewable energy auction is a selection process designed to procure new renewable
electricity capacity (or generation volumes) competitively, in which a long-term PPA
is granted to a qualified bidder based on a submitted financial offer, and in certain
cases, additional criteria (e.g. the bidder’s financial health, bank guarantees received,
and previous experience in developing and operating renewable energy plants).
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Auctions are, in fact, a price-discovery tool that takes advantage of competitive
forces, shifting the burden away from the administrator who is responsible for setting
the suitable framework within which private sector bids for a price and project.
Auctions are an excellent mechanism for a renewable capacity volume-control;
however, their designmust be carefully tailored to each country’s context, as any other
policy mechanism, in order to be effective. Auction mechanism must be designed
so to attract sufficiently large pool of competition, which ultimately leads to low
price discovery. Additionally, auctions must be accompanied by rules preventing
unsuitable developers from participating or winning the auction and failing to deliver
the allotted production capacity.
Auctions can be either open to all renewable technologies, wherein all projects
compete with one another, or limited to one specific technology, for example to solar
PV. PPAs can then be structured to incentivise production in desired locations more
than in others, or at certain times that are more valuable to the system.
In auctions, bidders are invited to compete for a portion of the capacity up for
auction (the minimum capacity size is usually specified in the auction rules), while
in tender processes bidders must bid on the entirety of the sought-after capacity.
Winning developers are granted long-term PPAs, usually of up to 20 or 25 years
depending on the country, project and technology. In effect, auctions are a price-
finding mechanism for granting contracts similar to the way FITs and FIPs do.
Renewable energy auctions are most suitable for procuring utility-scale projects.
Large companies are most likely prone to participate, be eligible for participation
and win the PPA contracts.
Set up of the auction system is difficult to cope with successfully by smaller
companies to participate in, so there is a risk that competition will, in effect, be
limited to several large players that will dominate the results and cut the smaller
entities out of the market.
Selected project developer turn to financial institutions to secure loans. Once
conditions of the loan are secured, the developer return to the relevant institution or
the offtaker to sign the PPA. Time limits and penalties for late delivery of contracted
projects are embedded in the PPA conditions.
In 2010, less than 20 countries had a renewable auction mechanism in place with
Europe leading the adoption (seven countries), followed shortly by five countries
from Latin America region. By 2017, number of countries with auctions increased to
88 and overtook number of countries with feed-in mechanisms in place. Europe is no
longer a region dominating auctions activity as countries of Latin America, Eurasia,
Africa and APAC are very active in adoption and running consecutive auction rounds
as well. Within the next five years, auctions are to drive the large-scale renewable
deployment bringing around two-thirds of global capacity growth. Nearly all large-
scale renewable capacity to come online in Latin America is to come online winning
bids in national auctions. In Europe, MENA and North America regions auctions
are to drive around 70% of all renewable additions while in China and other Asia
regions auctions are to drive just over half of the new deployment (IEA 2018).
Less developed regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa and Eurasia are to sup-
port the large renewables through a blend of feed-in tariffs and auctions policies
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as hydropower continue to be an important technology for new projects that are usu-
ally signed under administratively set tariffs, and non-hydropower renewables are
still in early deployment levels and require strong policy framework (IEA 2019e).
Subsequently, annually awarded capacity volumes were increasing on an annual
basis. In 2010, just under 3 GW of capacity was awarded, with majority of contracts
going to onshore wind projects in Brazil. By 2017, auctions around the world allotted
contracts to projects corresponding to 28 GW capacity to be commissioned across
Latin America, APAC, Europe and North America regions. Nearly half of winning
bids came from solar PV projects, followed by wind. In the first three quarters of
2019, a record of 40 GW renewable capacity was awarded through auctions tipped
by China running renewable capacity auctions for utility and commercial size solar
PV projects and completing country’s first offshore wind auction round.
All together, as of the third quarter of 2019, auctions globally allocated long-term
PPAs to around 175 GW of renewable capacity with the most recent wins to be
commissioned by 2022.
Introducing factor of a strong competition pushed developers to drive cost cuts
along the supply chain, in particular for solar PV and onshore wind technologies
as they represent over 95% of the awarded capacity, with hydropower, bioenergy,
geothermal and CSP accounting for the remaining portion (IEA 2019f). Capacity-
weighted average auction prices for utility-scale solar PV projects declined from
almost USD 160/MWh for those projects commissioned in 2014 to around USD
70/MWh for projects commissioned in 2018. Prices for projects selected in the
2019 auctions noted further decline with contracts awarded at USD 40/MWh. These
projects are estimated to come online in 2022 given the usual project lead times for
this technology and clauses written in the auction guidelines (IEA 2019e).
Average auction prices dropped for onshore wind fell from USD 65/MWh for
projects commissioned in 2014 to around USD 56/MWh for projects coming online
in 2018. Given the 2019 auction results, some projects to come online in 2022 will
sell their generated electricity just below USD 40/MWh (IEA 2019e).
Going forward, auctions are expected to increasingly drive larger shares of annual
additions as a tool that is able to secure attractive prices for new capacities, drive
innovation and more policy know-how from various country setups are emerging.
Increasingly, developing countries in Eurasia and sub-SaharanAfrica are introducing
auctions, often with a support from international financial agencies such as theWorld
Bank, EBRD and other regionally relevant institutions that are able to assist with
policymaking and often provide funds for soft financing for the initial auction rounds.
However, in countries where renewable energy policies will be increasingly
phased out leaving renewables to play on the market independently, over the counter,
or corporate PPAs can be an attractive tool for securing necessary financing outside
of renewable energy auction schemes for the developers and for private companies
as a way for decarbonising their energy needs.
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3.2.3 Corporate Power Purchase Agreements (Corporate PPAs)
Corporate PPA is one of the tools increasingly used by private companies to decar-
bonise their energy demand, meet sustainability objectives while satisfying investors
and the general public’s pressure. As of mid-2019, three of the most significant plat-
forms gathering private corporations that announced their sustainable commitments
(TCFD, the RE100 and the science-based targets platform) reached 1400 members,
of which majority joined post-2016. This level of engagement demonstrates a keen
interest in the private sector in decarbonisation efforts and options to do so. In 2018,
estimated 14 GW of renewable capacity was signed by the private sector under cor-
porate PPAs, bringing the global total to 33 GW. The first three quarters of 2019
resulted in deals equivalent to 9 GW renewable capacity (BNEF 2019a).
A power purchase agreement is essentially a contract between two parties where
one party sells both electricity and renewable energy certificates that might be a
secondary product to the electricity generated to another party. In a corporate PPA,
the seller is most often a renewable energy project developer or project owner. The
buyer, or the offtaker, is a corporate or industrial entity with significant energy needs.
The corporate PPAs can take two forms: physical or financial, often referred to as
‘virtual’.
In a physical corporate PPA, the seller develops, owns and operates the renewable
energy project and is responsible for delivering contracted power to the seller up
to the delivery point. The offtaker buys the electricity directly from the seller. The
offtaker takes ownership of the electricity from the delivery point as well as any
corresponding renewable energy certificates and is responsible for moving bought
electricity from the generator to its load.
The virtual corporate PPA (VPPA) is a financial contract rather than a contract
for power purchase. In this type of contract, the offtaker buys the project’s output
and associated renewable energy certificates at a fixed price. The generator sells
electricity on the market and passes the revenue collected to the offtaker. On the
other hand, the offtaker agrees to pay the seller a fixed price, agreed upon in the
signed PPA, for the renewable generation that developer sold to the grid. The fixed
rate signed in the contract is the guaranteed price that the developer is to receive for
generated power, irrespective of the ever-changing market price. When the market
price exceeds the fixed contracted price, the developer passes the positive difference
to the offtaker.When the market price is below the contracted price, the offtaker must
pay the developer the difference (RE-Source 2019). This type of contract is often
referred to as a contract for difference (CfD). The VPPA guarantees the seller a fixed
price for generated and sold electricity, helping them inobtaining affordablefinancing
to cover the initial investment costs. As a result, the VPPA can help commissioning of
new renewable projects that would otherwise not be constructed. TheVPPA resulting
in a new capacity built can be particularly attractive to commercial offtakers that aim
to decarbonise their demand and have electricity supply widely dispersed (Penndorf
2018).
The corporate PPAs are complex contracts bearing advantages and risks to both
parties. Advantages to the seller are numerous, starting from guaranteed offtaker
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for electricity generated at a fixed price agreed for a long time durations. Increased
creditworthiness can help to secure affordable financing, making the project econom-
ically viable resulting in new business for the developer. Benefits for the offtaker are
long-term price stability, the company’s budget stability, decarbonisation of energy
demand and possible influence over renewable energy project specs and site.
Several risks are common for both the developer and the offtakes. Corporate
PPAs have higher administrative costs. Possible regulatory changes rendering further
contract execution impossible or at an increased cost are an essential risk factor to be
accounted for by both parties and accommodated for upfront. In addition, in the case
of long-term market distortion, the agreement has to be flexible enough to permit
post-signature adjustments.
Corporate PPAs require the existence of certain regulatory and market conditions.
These types of contracts are possible in countrieswith organised liberalised electricity
markets where independent developers are allowed to build, own, operate and sell
electricity to the grid or another party at its liberty with either regional transmission
operator or an independent system operator in place. Additionally, signing corporate
PPAs makes the most sense in countries where renewable energy policy support is
minimal, evolves towards full market integration, or is to be increasingly phased out.
In these conditions, developers are required to seek other streams of revenues and
financing outside of administratively set prices or auction systems. For the offtakers,
signing corporate PPAs requires a profound understanding of the electricity market,
market trends and understanding of price evolutions over a short to mid-term (BNEF
2019b).
Thus far, the corporate PPAs predominantly developed in the United States of
America, where the developers could rely mostly only on renewable support in the
form of a tax exemption (the Production Tax Credit). However, as renewable energy
measures in Europe are becoming limited or being phased out, corporate PPAs are
becoming an increasingly attractive option for both developers and corporate entities.
Corporate PPAs inEurope aremore common inNordic countrieswith several projects
also signed in the United Kingdom, France and Denmark. Recently, developers and
investors started to show interest in opportunities in Poland with two contracts signed
so far by Mercedes-Benz and Grupa Azoty, amounting to 50 MW of renewable
capacity together (Grupa Azoty 2019; WindEurope 2018). However, it is anticipated
that going forward, more corporate PPAs will be signed in Poland as prices for
baseload electricity are increasing rapidly and with estimations of further growth
over the short-term period. This growth is mostly driven by increasing prices of the
EU emissions trading system (ETS) auctions to which Poland is very susceptible as
country’s power generation is based on lignite coal (BNEF 2019c).
3.2.4 Policies for Self-consumption and Distributed Generation
The story of renewables for power generation is not only a story of large-scale instal-
lation previously driven by fixed feed-in tariffs and nowadays by auction systems or
corporate PPAs going forward. In 2018, around 42% (or 210GW)of the total installed
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solar PV capacity was coming from smaller (less than 1 MW capacity size) projects
for commercial, residential and off-grid installations. For a long time, distributed PV
projects were not cost-competitive with large-utility scale power plants. However,
with the costs of PV dropping significantly over the last decade and expanding policy
support in Europe and increasingly so in other regions across the globe, jump-started
an important growth of distributed solar PV to the status we observe today. Currently,
majority of the distributed solar PV capacity is located in Europe. Government poli-
cies, incentives and regulations have been central to this deployment in Europe and
globally.
As indicated above, large portion of countries have renewable energy targets,
which often include solar PV capacity objectives. However, several important mar-
kets have a specific distributed solar PV targets such as China (60 GW by 2020)
or India (40 GW of rooftop PV by 2022). Targets alone often do not determine the
deployment. The policies adopted along the target, at least until today, determined
the deployment speed and capacity growth volume.
Similarly as in case of large-scale projects, distributed PV installations can benefit
from policies decreasing investment costs. To repeat, these are grants, rates, various
tax benefits and tax exemptions. According to the IEA classification, there are three
main policymodels targeting consumption and sale of electricity from the distributed
solar PV. These are:
1. buy-all, sell-all model;
2. net metreing system and
3. real-time self-consumption models.
In the first model, all solar PV generation is contracted to be sold directly to
the utility. Usually, the electricity is sold at a fixed tariff rate for the duration of the
contract similar as FIT system. However, in some countries, auctions are used as a
price-finding and contract awarding mechanism for commercial installations (e.g.:
France). Often, a feed-in tariff mechanism is used as well.
In this model, the installation owners still source all their electricity from the grid.
Their activity as generator is separated from their needs as customers. In order for this
model to be functional, the private entity is obligated to have twometres installed.One
to measure electricity generated and send to the grid, and one to measure electricity
sourced from the network.
In the net metreing model, the PV owners are enabled to consume electricity
generated by their installation reducing consumption from the network. The excess
of the electricity is sent to the grid in return for an energy credit. Accumulated credit
can be used to decrease future electricity bill accrued by electricity consumption at
another time from the network. The duration of the validity of the credit is determined
by the scheme in which the prosumer is participating. Usually, the validity period
ranges from 6 months to one year. However, it is possible for this period to be longer.
Recently, in Poland, the validity of the credit was extended from one to two years.
The duration of the validity period strongly influences the economic attractiveness
of the net metreing scheme for the PV investor as the output of the installation varies
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largely through a day and seasons. Installation of one bidirectional metre is required
for this model to be possible on the owner side.
In the real-time self-consumption model, the PV owner is allowed to generate,
self-consume and sell excess of the electricity produced to the network. The differ-
ence from the net metreing system is that the accounting of electricity procurement
from the network and sending off the excess happens within short time intervals
(hourly or less than hourly time spans). Each unity of the electricity sent to the net-
work is paid for with a price level determined by the utility with which the contract
is signed. Often, the price is based on the wholesale or retail electricity price. Simi-
larly as in case of the net metreing model, installation of one bidirectional model is
required.
Self-consumption policies continue to evolve and countries are working on tai-
loring them to their needs and particular conditions. In order to cap costs of the self-
consumption policies, often additional limits and eligibility conditions are added.
These can be put on a size of the installation eligible to participate in the scheme or
on the amount of electricity sent to the network.
Other, less common self-consumption and electricity sell models exist where
countries try to put a value of PV generation based on avoided large-scale generation
capacity expansions, fuel expenditures or on benefits brought to the system or a
society such as grid integration costs, CO2 reduction or job creation.
The economic attractiveness of the participation in the abovemodels is determined
by several main factors. In the all abovementioned options, duration of the contract
signed with the utility is pivotal. Additionally, in the buy-all, sell-all model, the
LCOE is impacted by the contracted tariff level. In the remaining models length of
the energy accounting period, remuneration type and price of excess generation and
evolution of electricity retail tariff determine the attractiveness of the distributed PV
project.
3.3 Renewable Heat and Transport Policies
The heating and cooling sector is complex and fragmented, and generally less well
understood than the electricity sector. Its complexity makes effective policymaking
challenging. Different thermal demand patterns in buildings (depending on climate,
buildings efficiency, technology, occupancy purpose and others), and a multitude of
technologies and fuel options availability on the supply side for water and space
heating contribute to the complexity of the sector. Manufacturers range from large,
multi-national corporations to small, local installers using different solutions. Addi-
tionally, different solutions are implemented across countries but also on regional
and city-levels, which means that different institutions are responsible for policies
and regulations-making. Due to this complexity, renewable energy policy adoption
is more difficult and visibly lags behind in comparison to policy saturation in the
renewable electricity sector.
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In 2010, 13 countries, mostly in Europe and Latin America, had renewable heat
mandates in place. By 2017 mandates spread to 22 countries across all regions, with
Europe still leading, driven by the EU 2020 targets. Outside of mandates, almost 35
countries had some form of a capital grant in place facilitating purchase of the renew-
able heating equipment (IEA 2018). While the number of countries with availability
of soft loans and tax incentive are difficult to track, these policies remain pivotal for
the sector’s decarbonisation due to their direct impact on the investment costs.
Many policy tools used for support of renewables in electricity sector are
adjustable and applicable to support renewables in the heating and cooling sector.
These are in particular different forms of targets and obligations as well as a range
of measures affecting upfront investments costs. Heating and cooling sector is an
area where policies for renewable energy and energy efficiency converge as many
financial and fiscal forms of support for renewable heat technologies are embedded
in the energy efficiency policies, programmes and standards.
Policies to support the use of renewables in heat can take a variety of forms, from
mandates to heat generation incentives, from additional taxation to the ban of use of
certain forms of energy. Mandates are the most commonly used type of policy, often
requiring targeted types of buildings to satisfy a part of the heat demandneeds through
renewable energy (such as bioenergy or solar water heaters). The rate of implemen-
tation remains, though, more effective for newbuilds than for refurbishments, given
the slow pace of the latter, due to the long lifetime of buildings.
District heating producers can benefit from incentives based on the amount of
heat generated. This type of policy is very similar to feed-in-tariffs used in the power
sector, providing a certainty of cashflowover a predetermined span of time. This form
of policy support is still not widely spread; an example of a successful renewable
heat generation-based policy is the Renewable Heat Incentive available in the UK
since 2011 and currently scheduled for closure in the early 2021.
Countries can also adopt indirect forms of support for renewable heat. These are
in particular carbon or additional tax obligations put on owners that generate heat
using fossil fuels (wood and various coal products). These indirect measures provide
important price signals, however design and implementation challenges remain, espe-
cially in contextswhere energy-intensive industries are subject to strong international
competition and may ask for exemptions.
Countries also have in their disposal introduction of bans on fossil fuel heating
options. Bans can be very effective provided other suitable heat alternatives exist
and are accessible to investors of various heat demand patterns and quotas. The
effectiveness of bans heavily relies onmonitoring and enforcement of suchmeasures.
Renewables in transport take a form of biofuels, primarily used in road transport
but increasingly applied in rail, shipping and aviation. The most common form of
the support for biofuels in transportation is well spread biofuel blending mandates,
often accompanied by fiscal incentives (IEA 2011). In 2018, around 80 countries had
some form of a blendingmandate. However, majority of thesemandates required low
blending levels (less than 10%) (IEA 2018) with few exceptions of Brazil (ethanol
18% blending mandate in 2019 cut from 27%), Paraguay (ethanol 25% mandate)
Policy and Regulation of Energy Transition 219
and Indonesia (biodiesel 15%.mandate) (BiofuelsDigest 2019). Countries often pro-
vide tax waivers or tax cuts on biofuels production, distribution and consumption.
Governments start to adopt sustainability mandates instead of blending mandates.
The sustainability criteria are set based on avoided greenhouse gas emissions in
comparison to conventional fuels.
4 Energy Efficiency
4.1 Energy Efficiency Policy Classification
Improvements in the energy efficiency can be the most cost-effective strategy to
reduce emissions associated with energy consumptions in all sectors globally. How-
ever, various barriers such as financial, institutional, technical or lack of awareness
often slow down the energy efficiency uptake. The energy efficiency policies and
measures aim to overcome these barriers and as in the case of renewables support,
blend of policies can be used in parallel in order to achieve energy efficiency gains in
various sectors. Policies and tools can be implemented on regional, national, state or
city-levels targeting appliances, equipment, improvements in buildings and vehicles
in the end-use sector.
The IEA in its recent Energy Efficiency Market Report (IEA 2019a) groups the
energy efficiency policies in three large categories:
(1) mandatory policies
(2) energy efficiency,obligations and
(3) fiscal or financial policies.
Outside of this main categorisation governments adopt other types of policies
and programmes such as information provision, installers training and capacity
programmes. Increasingly, private sector and various corporations adopt voluntary
objectives and programmes to decrease the energy demand and improve efficiency.
4.1.1 Mandatory Energy Efficiency Policies Setting Performance
Requirements and Standards
The first policy category, the mandatory policies and regulations set minimum
energy efficiency performance requirements. Forms of such requirements are used
extensively since the 1970s.
This category includes mandatory minimum energy performance standards
(MEPS) for appliances and equipment, mandatory building codes, fuel economy
standards and targets for industry. The MEPS for appliances is widely adopted and
is considered an effective tool to improve the energy efficiency improvements in the
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end-use sector and reduce CO2 emissions by banning the worst-performing appli-
ances from the market, forcing manufacturers to innovate and improve their product.
At the same time, they force customers to purchase more efficient appliances. The
energy-efficient labels help the customers to make an informed choice but also pro-
vide educational value (Sonnenschein and van Buskirk 2019). In 2004, around 50
countries had these types of standards in place. By 2013, just over 80 countries used
MEPS for energy efficiency improvements (IEA 2015).
The voluntary or mandatory building energy efficiency codes (BEECs) pertain
specifically to the buildings sector and can be put on existing or newly build structures
in the form of a standard. As buildings account for around 36% of global final energy
use and nearly 40% of energy-related CO2 emissions in 2017, the energy-saving
opportunities, cuts in the CO2 emissions and in costs are substantial. Number of
building codes implemented grown from 54 countries in 2010 to nearly 70 countries
in 2018 (IEA and UNEP 2018). Energy gains in the buildings sector can be achieved
through reducing energy wastage, usage of energy-efficient appliances, lightening,
space heating and cooling as well as through using materials and designing buildings
to minimise the energy use.
The BEECs are often categorised as either prescriptive or performance based
depending on the choice of an approach chosen for a compliance with the standard.
The prescriptive compliance approach is a regulation requiring usage of specific
materials in the construction of the building. These standards require minimum ther-
mal performance level of each building envelope component such as walls, roofs,
windows and doors as well as minimum energy efficiency requirements for heat-
ing, ventilation, water heating and lighting systems. The insulation of the build-
ing envelope or the insulation of pipes and ducts are also specified in the code.
The performance-based approach sets annual levels of building energy consumption
covering space cooling and heating, lightening as well as water heating.
The BEECs can be adopted on the voluntary or mandatory basis. However, even if
the standard is adopted in the form of a mandatory measure compliance and enforce-
ment of the codes is a key challenge. Achieving full compliance with set codes ab
extend in time. Building strong compliance infrastructure around construction and
building sector facilitates enforcement of the adopted codes and standards. Compli-
ance with adopted codes should be measured during four stages of building project.
That is to check compliance at the design stage before issuing the permit, during
the construction phase, before issuing occupancy permit and once the building is
occupied to measure actual energy performance. These checks help fixing potential
issues and deviations from standards while it is still possible to do so (IEA 2013).
Energy efficiency standards also exist for transport sector. These are transport
fuel economy standards and can be applied to passenger as well as to light, large
trucks or to heavy duty vehicles. In these standards the governments or responsible
relevant country regulatory body sets aminimum fuel standard for each given vehicle
model produced or soldwithin its jurisdiction thatmust be respected. These standards
pertain to fuel consumed by a vehicle in respect to travelled distance. Often expressed
in miles per USgallon (mpg). Goal of such standards is to push manufacturers to
produce more fuel-efficient machines while continuously reducing CO2 emissions
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generated per usages of the vehicle. Standards also help to push out less efficient and
more polluting cars or other types of automobiles from the market (US DOE 2019).
4.1.2 Energy Efficiency Obligation Policies
The secondpolicy category, the energy efficiency obligation programmes are strongly
established in the United States of America where are mostly known as the energy
efficiency resource standards (EERS). These types of standards establish specific,
long-term targets for energy savings to be met through energy efficiency measures.
These standards play a role of a target, with a clear specification by whom the
target is to be met. Obligation on meeting the standards are put on utility or non-
utility administrators that are subsequently met through customer energy efficiency
programmes. The standards can apply to electric or natural gas utilities adopted via
legislation or secondary regulation (ACEEE 2019).
The standards do not indicate how the efficiency improvements are to be gained
but indicate a minimum amount of savings to be reached. The obliged party has a
flexibility of choosing how the requirement will be met giving the utility freedom of
choice of the programme that would be the most effective for them. The objectives
can be expressed in various units ranging from a percentage form (on electricity
delivered) or in megawatt, gigawatt, or kilowatt-hours (ACEEE 2019). The EER
standards are similar in their set up to the renewable energy portfolio standard (RPS).
Often the EERS are of mandatory nature, they can be also established as a voluntary
mechanism (C2ES 2019).
4.1.3 Fiscal and Financial Policies Targeting Energy Efficiency
Financial incentives. These include policies put in place to encourage the take-up
of energy-efficient technologies and behaviour through financial or fiscal rewards,
including grants and subsidies, tax relief, equity finance, loans and debt finance,
guarantees, on-bill finance and other incentives (IEA 2019a). All this incentive types
mirror fiscal and financial support mechanisms used for renewable energy solutions.
Their main goal is to decrease level of capital investment bore by the investor.
5 Nuclear Energy
The deployment of nuclear energy power plants saw its peak during the 1970s and
the first half of the 1980s, on the back of national programmes, in particular in the
United States, in Canada, in several European countries, in Russia and Japan.
In the period 1965–1990, global nuclear-installed capacity increased 64-fold and,
by1990,more than90%of the global capacitywas installed in thesefive regions.Over
the following years the growth reduced drastically, with global capacity increasing
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by some 15% in 20 years (IAEA 2019), as a result of several factors, including the
fears that followed the Chernobyl disaster, the saturation in some markets and the
significant investment costs needs.
The most recent years, in particular following the Fukushima accident, saw the
emergenceof threemajor trends.Onone side, somecountries (e.g.Germany,Belgium
and Switzerland) decided the gradual phase-out of nuclear energy from the power
mix. On the other side, several emerging economies have decided to continue to
pursue the deployment of nuclear power; China has been leading this trend over the
last decade (and is expected to continue over the coming years), but several other
countries have plans to expand or start new nuclear energy programmes. Thirdly,
several countries with existing and ageing nuclear power fleet are facing the question
mark if closing, extending the lifetime or replacing the existing assets (IEA 2019c).
Nuclear policies are therefore very varied according to the intentions and the
direction decided in each country. Some countries see nuclear power as an important
component for the decarbonisation of their power mix—and of the energy transition
at large—while others see it as a no-way forward. In several cases, major decisions
on the timing of phasing out, on the allowed maximum lifetime of the existing power
plants and on the eventuality and the extent of new builds are spurring important
national debates and have not yet been set.
Significant differences emerge across countries depending on if liberalised or
regulated electricity power markets are in place, but it has become increasingly clear
that the construction of new nuclear power plants based solely onmarket forces is not
a viable option, in particular due to financial and regulatory risks. Several countries
have therefore decided to put in place support mechanisms (such as the Contract
for Difference in the United Kingdom, or the inclusion of nuclear within the Zero
Emission Credit in some States of the USA), while many others support directly the
construction of new nuclear power plants.
The investment costs can be very different across countries, with the highest
costs seen in first-of-a-kind plants in mature economies (e.g. Europe and the United
States) and the lowest costs in China, thanks in particular to a continuous stream of
new builds and low construction, labour andmaterial costs. Despite these differences,
one element is common to almost all new nuclear power plants: the very high upfront
investment cost. This is due to the high unit investment costs (usually in the order of
2500–6500USD/kW) and the very large capacities of themain reactors built (usually
in the order of 1000–1600 MW).
Policies aimed at reducing the related financing costs can therefore play a key role
for the deployment of new plants, as well as policies that can optimise and reduce
the building process and therefore reduce the long construction times (another key
element for new nuclear plants). To solve or reduce some of these financing aspects,
but also to open newmarket opportunities for smaller andmore flexible use of nuclear
power, several constructors are now exploring the possibility of building so-called
small modular reactors (SMRs). These plants, usually of the size of 30–300MW, are
now in the demonstration phase and are attracting significant attention and support
from several governments.
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6 Carbon Capture, Utilisation and Storage (CCUS)
Carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) is a technology that can provide a sig-
nificant contribution to achieve a low-carbon—and in the long-run a zero-carbon—
energy world. This technology has been applied in some industrial sectors for over
two decades, and currently has almost 20 large-scale projects and several dozens of
small-scale ones in operation. Looking ahead, it can play a significant role in the
decarbonisation strategies of several sectors, ranging from enhanced oil recovery
(EOR) to fossil-fuelled power generation (mainly coal, but also gas), from the pro-
duction processes in heavy industry to the creation of so-called carbon sinks (e.g.
bioenergy CCS or BECCS).
The importance of CCUS technology in the industry sector stems from the fact
that the CO2 emissions in this sector, and in particular in the cement, iron and steel,
and chemical subsectors, are among the most challenging to abate, as a significant
portion of these emissions result from chemical or physical reactions and there is
a limit scope for fuel switching away from fossil fuels in processes that require
high-temperature heat. The scope for policy action is therefore relevant, requiring
concerted actions between governments, industrial and financial actors (IEA 2019g).
The power sector has a more varied availability of low-carbon generation tech-
nologies, ranging from dispatchable renewables (such as hydropower and bioenergy)
to non-dispatchable renewables (mainly wind and solar PV) and nuclear power.
Nonetheless, two-thirds of current global electricity generation is fossil fuel based.
Given the long lifetime of power assets, and the very young age of the coal fleet
(in particular in China); it faces the mutual challenge of ‘emissions lock-in’ and of
possible stranded assets. Retrofitting with CCUS technology represents therefore a
very important option, in particular for some countries, to avoid stranded assets and
to keep flexible capacity in the power systems (IEA 2019h).
While the CCUS technology is already a competitive decarbonisation option in
some process (such as the production of ammonia), it still needs to achieve cost
reductions and the scale needed in the long-term decarbonisation scenarios. As it
is the case for most other low-carbon technologies, CCUS is characterised by high
upfront investment costs. The technology had significant momentum globally in
the second half of the first decade of 2000s, but then lost some grounds and slowed
down in terms of demonstration projects in subsequent years, as actual public funding
support did not match previous announcements (IEA 2016).
Adequate funding and support measures for R&D and for demonstration projects
are therefore key for a quick upscale of the technology. For the early phases, the policy
options range from regulatory to financial, including grants, tax credits or low-carbon
product incentives. In the longer run, CO2 pricing can provide an important long-term
investment signal. Particular attention should be provided to the industrial sectors that
face global competition, while for other sectors such as cement or power generation,
a fair level playing field should be established at national or regional scale.
Additional areas for policy intervention are also represented by the development of
CO2 transport and storage networks, the removal of regulatory and social barriers and
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obstacles to the deployment of the technology and removing uncertainties regarding
the availability of storage. Increasing attention is also being given to the development
of CCUS hubs, that can support new investment opportunities through economies of
scale, and can be developed together with storage considerations (UK Government
2018).
7 Conclusions
Energy policies have been and continue to have a pivotal role in the energy transition
triggering and fast-tracking renewables deployment, incentivising uptake of energy
efficiency, supporting changes in the energy system and paving the role of CCUS
and nuclear power in the energy mix of tomorrow.
Policies targeting renewables expanded fast over the last two decades, initially
adopted by a small pool of countries with well-developed economies. Currently,
nearly all countries across the globe have some form of a renewable energy policy in
place effectively triggering high deployment levels and making solar PV and wind
front-running green power technologies as cost continue to decrease and various
market-entry barriers are tackled.
Over time, policies evolved growing in their complexity. Through increasing pol-
icymaking know-how, governments gained experience and skill in tailoring mecha-
nisms to their needs and energy system specifications at decreasing costs. Policies
with administratively set prices for renewable power generation triggered the renew-
ables deployment. However, nowadays countries move away from these types of
mechanisms moving towards policy frameworks that allow price setting through
market competition.
Going forward, overall system integration in which all generators are able to
secure sufficient level of revenues is to be in focus. Private sector is expected to
play an important role in furthering decarbonisation of the energy system through
greening their energy demand with help of corporate power purchase agreements
becoming an active player in the energy domain.
Policies for energy transition go beyond renewables for power generation but sup-
port mechanisms are adaptable and can be applied to heating, cooling and transport
sectors aswell as in efforts aiming to decrease energy consumption through efficiency
measures. Energy efficiency is a pivotal domain in the successful energy transition
and often strongly interlinked with renewables and requires strong governments
attention.
Role of nuclear energy in the energy transition depends on countries’ energy
strategies as we currently observe examples of states that decide to reduce (France)
or eliminate (Germany) this source of energy, while others take their initial steps
towards first reactors. According to World Nuclear Association, as of 2020 around
30 countries are either considering, planning or launching their nuclear power pro-
grammes. UAE, Belarus, Bangladesh and Turkey are currently working on the con-
struction of their reactors (World Nuclear Association 2020). The CCUS provides
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important opportunities in achieving deep decarbonisation level with several proven
projects in operation. However, in case of both technologies, strategy making, target
setting and policymaking are indispensable to tackle high upfront costs.
Going forward, energy policies will continue to be at the heart of energy transition
continuously evolving and adapting to countries needs and changingmarket realities.
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The Role of Policy Design and Market
Forces to Achieve an Effective Energy
Transition: A Comparative Analysis
Between the UK and Chinese Models
Marco Dell’Aquila, Daniel Atzori, and Ofelia Raluca Stroe
The interplay between policy design and market forces has been crucial in driving
the global energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. However,
models adopted by countries are based on different historical approaches and have
therefore evolved differently over time, while also influencing each other.
In this chapter, the UK and China have been chosen as two countries which
have achieved successes in decarbonising their respective economies through the
deployment of significant levels of renewable energy resources; however, each has
adopted a differing energy transition strategy.
The UK electricity market was one of the first globally to be privatised and dereg-
ulated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, following similar earlier initiatives in the
natural resources and telecommunications sector. This experience and the subsequent
market adjustments which were undertaken by the UKGovernment and the regulator
laid the groundwork for similar processeswhich have takenplacewithin theEuropean
Union and further afield. The entry of new market players initially in conventional
gas-fired power generation during the 1990s and subsequently in renewables starting
in the 1990s—but more substantially over the past 20 years—have brought non-
utility private sector expertise into the deployment of new technologies. It was this
track record which enabled the UK to design incentives for renewable energy—start-
ing with tariffs and moving to auctions—with a strong likelihood that they would
bring about successes in terms of deployment of new renewable capacity. It is for this
reason that the UK has been selected to represent a noteworthy example of how regu-
lation can harness market forces to play a decisive role in the shift towards renewable
energy.
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China, on the other hand, began its journey towards decarbonisation later, its moti-
vation was driven partly by the availability of natural renewable resources—such as
wind and sun—which in turn would reduce the country’s need to import primary
energy and secondly, abate emissions which were becoming particularly significant
in urban areas risking a public backlash. China epitomises a very large and topo-
graphically diverse country in which the role of the state has been instrumental not
only in policymaking aspects of the energy transition, but crucially also in funding,
building, owning and operating renewable energy power plants.
1 The UK: A Case Study of Market-Led Energy Transition
As an island endowed with some of the best renewable resources in Europe, in
particular wind, tidal and wave power resources, the UK has been chosen as a case
study to show how a major economy is capable of achieving ambitious renewable
energy targets whilst ensuring economic growth. However, Britain’s transition away
from coal, like many of its European neighbours, has been neither a smooth nor a
linear process.
Importantly, in June 2019, the UK became the first G7 economy to commit to
reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) to net-zero by 2050, as compared to the
previous less ambitious target of an 80% decrease from 1990s levels.
The UK is also one of a handful of markets around the world which is currently
transitioning from traditional direct government support of renewable energy sources,
using feed-in-tariffs for utility-scale renewable energy plants, to the private sector
support of renewables. This is predominantly through the use of Power Purchase
Agreements (‘PPA’), entered into directly with corporations keen to purchase some
or all of their power requirements from renewable energy sources.
This section argues that one of the key reasons for Britain’s success in promoting
a renewable agenda and transitioning away from direct government support has been
policy flexibility combined with a commitment to allowing the market to play a
crucial role in the energy transition. In this respect, the British model differs from
those of other European countries, which were more heavily reliant on direct state
support.
The UK has been a pioneer not only in the incentivisation of renewables through
the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) subsidies introduced in 1990s, but also the
liberalisation of its electricity market, thanks to wide-ranging reforms implemented
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The role of successive UK Governments since
the 1990s has been decisive in paving the way for the energy transition, latterly as
capital costs have declined sufficiently enabling the private sector to take a leading
role, thanks to the development of ‘more competitive forms of price discovery such
as auctions or tenders’ (DECC 2011).
While these policies can be deemed to have been successful, they mainly sup-
ported commercially viable technologies, such as wind and solar, at the expense of
promoting commercialisation of technologies such as tidal. Beyond that, they failed
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Table 1 UK energy sector, key milestones
1983 The Energy Act encourages the private generation and supply of electricity
1986 Privatisation of British Gas
1988 ‘Privatising electricity’ White Paper
1989 The Electricity Act calls for the privatisation of the UK electricity supply industry
1990 Privatisation of the Regional Electricity Companies (distribution and supply) and
two generators National Power and PowerGen
1990 Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO)
1990–1998 Liberalisation of electricity supply
1993 ‘The prospects of coal’ White Paper
1997 British Gas splits into Centrica (gas trading and retail) and Transco (pipelines)
2000 The Utilities Act introduces the Renewables Obligation (RO)
2001 Climate Change Levy
2008 Climate Change Act
2013 Energy Act—Electricity Market Reform
2018 Launch of ‘The Road to Zero’ Strategy
2019 UK commits to net-zero emissions by 2050
2020 COP 26 to be hosted by the UK, jointly with Italy
to provide any incentive for research and development into earlier stage technologies
such as wave, notwithstanding the higher priced banding available in recent Renew-
ables Obligation (RO) tenders. Indeed, the government resorted to entering into a
long-term PPA to support the construction of the £20 billion Hinkley Point C 3.2GW
nuclear power plant at a price of £92.50/kWh but was unwilling to undertake the
same for the smaller £1.3 billion 320 MW Swansea Bay Tidal Lagoon Project at a
price of £89.90/kWh (UK Government 2011) (Table 1).
2 Early Processes of Decarbonisation
Decarbonisation of the UK energy industry started in the 1970s, well before any
global initiative to halt climate change. The primary motivation was economic rather
than environmental, and more specifically linked to the depletion of the UK’s North
Sea oil and gas reserves. A series of policies were launched to reduce the UK’s
reliance on fossil fuels in the electricity sector, including stronger support for new
nuclear power plants as well as other clean-energy sources, the result of which was
a 29% decrease in petroleum consumption between 1970 and 2012 (UK Parliament
2018).
As a result, the interplay between a set of economic and policy factors has signifi-
cantly contributed to accelerating the energy transition. Hence, in order to understand
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the roots of Britain’s decarbonisation processes, it is necessary to briefly analyse the
historical context from which this transition emerged.
Despite having its own domestic sources of coal, the need for the UK to become
less dependent on fossil fuels first became apparent as a consequence of the 1973
and 1979 oil shocks. Following the first oil shock, the UK Government formed a
Department for Energy in January 1974 (Pearson and Watson 2012). The economic
consequences of the two oil shocks were far reaching in the UK and translated into
spiralling inflation rates which reached 24% in 1974 (The Guardian 2011). Wage
demand began to rise as earnings were eroded and the Trades Unions representing
some 280,000 miners played a pivotal role in wage negotiations with the government
led by the Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath (Gouiffes 2009). The UK
economy was forced into a three-day working week as miners went on strike which
led to frequent blackouts, as coal-fired power plants were shut down due to a lack
of coal. Public opinion and the resulting public policy began to favour the search
for alternative sources of energy such as renewables. However, these oil shocks also
drove heavy investment into the UK North Sea to reduce the need for oil imports
and this translated into the UK having access to large amounts of natural gas, which
fuelled the boom in gas-fired power plants in the 1990s. At the same time the UK
continued to build newnuclear power plants, an industrywhich had thrived in theUK,
having been home to the world’s first civil nuclear power station built at Calder Hall,
in Cumbria, in 1953, which only closed in 2003. Both nuclear and gas increasingly
drove down the overall share of coal, dampening the drive for non-fossil sources of
energy. It would be another decade until this trend was to re-emerge (Fig. 1).
As in other countries, a sudden increase in global hydrocarbon prices led policy-
makers to rethink the need for an energy policy focusing on the country’s security
of supply. As Elliott (2019) convincingly argues, the development of UK policies in
this regard was also strongly influenced by a set of utopian ideas developed mainly
in the USA and the UK by the Alternative Technology movement of the late 1960s
and early 1970s (Elliott 2019). However, although the 1973 oil crisis introduced
renewables into the policy debate, capital costs were still too high and the immediate
consequence was to strengthen the UK’s development of nuclear and gas-fired power
generation sources.
As will later be demonstrated, the debate between nuclear and renewable energy
as the most effective way to decarbonise the economy has raged in the UK over the
last three decades and is yet to reach a conclusion. The UK has undoubted achieved
remarkable successes in its building of nuclear capacity, but the rapid reduction in
new nuclear builds over the past 20 years, as well as the well-publicised delays and
cost overruns in the construction of new plants, has shifted the policy onus in favour
of renewables (EDF Group 2019). In Britain, investment in nuclear has historically
been framed primarily as necessary to ensure national energy security, and onlymore
recently has the rationale been extended to cover the industry’s contribution to the
decarbonisation of the economy. However, Fig. 2 shows that nuclear as a share of
the UK electricity sector actually grew from the 1970s and peaked at almost 30% in
the late 1990s, before declining to below 20% today. This share is likely to decline
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Fig. 1 Electricity supplied in the UK between 1970 and 2018, by source type (GWh). Source UK
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Fig. 2 Share of conventional, nuclear, CCGT and renewables in total electricity supplied between
1970 and 2018 in the UK (%). Source Dukes energy statistics, 2019
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further despite the construction of the 3.2 GW Hinkley C plant, as many of the older
plants are retired and not replaced.
In 1979, David Howell, Secretary of State for Energy in the government led by
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, spearheaded a new nuclear programme, aimed at
increasing the country’s nuclear capacity in the face of growing geopolitical uncer-
tainty that threatened energy imports (Pearson and Watson 2012). However, the
government’s overall support for nuclear in the context of energy security, even
in the face of growing public hostility following the 1979 Three Mile Island and
1986 Chernobyl accidents, was not the only factor in promoting the first phase of
decarbonisation of Britain’s economy.
A key element of this early decarbonisation was the shift from public to private
ownership of the energy sector, which took place throughout the 1980s and into the
1990s, starting with the privatisation of British Gas in 1986, followed by the break-
up of the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) and the sale of the Regional
Electricity Companies (RECs) in 1990. Nuclear was retained in public hands until
it was partly privatised through a flotation of 28% of the shares in 2006 (Horrocks
and Lean 2011). It was subsequently fully privatised when it was purchased in its
entirety by EDF 2 years later (World Nuclear Association 2019), although it could
be argued that with EDF being fully owned by the French Government at that stage,
it was not a pure privatisation. Throughout the 1990s, electricity companies, which
had recently been privatised, undertook a shift in the building of new power plants
from coal-fired to natural gas generation, as a result of the increased availability and
competitive price of North Sea gas.
The so-called ‘dash for gas’ led to a replacement of old coal plants, which had effi-
ciencies of between 20% and 30%, with newer and more efficient Combined Cycle
Gas Turbines (CCGT), with efficiencies of between 40% and 60%, and which ulti-
mately led to the closure of a significant number of deep mines owned by British
Coal.1 Overall between 2005 and 2016, the average UK power fleet improved effi-
ciencies by 5.9% (European Environment Agency 2018). From 1913 when there
were 3,024 deep coal mines in the UK employing 1,107,000 people, the numbers
had plummeted to 20 mines employing some 12,000 people in 1999 and ultimately
down to 5 mines employing 1,000 people in 2019 (UK Government 2019).
In the landmark 1993 white paper ‘The prospects for coal—Conclusions of the
government’s Coal Review’, the UK Government endorsed the principle that:
Competitive markets provide the best means of ensuring that the nation has access to secure,
diverse and sustainable supplies of energy in the forms that people and business want, and
at competitive prices (Department of Trade and Industry 1993).
This argument, inspired byThatcherism,would also influence later energy policies
of the Conservative government of John Major (1990–1997) and also New Labour
under Tony Blair. Indeed, the 1993 White Paper also stated:
The coal industry must take its place within a competitive energy market. It must compete
with other fuels and other suppliers to meet the needs of its customers at commercial prices.
Its dominant market is in electricity generation (UNFCCC 2019).
1See: https://netl.doe.gov/sites/default/files/gas-turbine-handbook/1-1.pdf.
The Role of Policy Design and Market Forces to Achieve … 233
Another interrelated factor that contributed to the decreasing importance of coal
in Britain’s energy mix was the bitter confrontation between the government of
Margaret Thatcher and Arthur Scargill, the then President of the National Union
of Mineworkers (NUM), which culminated in the 1984 and 1985 miners’ strike,
ultimately leading to the shutdown of many mines in the UK.
The share of coal in the energy mix declined throughout the 1980s and the 1990s,
as a consequence of the decline of the country’s domestic production along with
growing imports of natural gas making CCGTsmore economically viable. This trend
was also one of themain factors in the decentralisation of the electricity system,made
possible by the emergence of Independent Power Producers (IPPs) in the aftermath
of the privatisation and deregulation of the electricity industry.
While the need to transition to a low-carbon economy was increasingly reiterated
at international summits throughout the 1990s, the country had already achieved
significantly reduced levels of coal in the energy mix thanks to an increasing reliance
on nuclear and gas. Overall, during this period, a substantial decarbonisation of
Britain’s economy was mainly driven by a need to ensure energy security through
the support for nuclear, and by economic factors that made gas-fired generation
increasingly cost-competitive with coal.
3 Reducing Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions
As mentioned, in this first phase of decarbonisation of the UK energy mix, the
main driver was not so much represented by environmental concerns, although this
certainly played a part, but by geopolitical andmarket factors. However, in the 1990s,
the need to reduce Greenhouse Gas emissions (GHG) was perceived as increasingly
important in global public opinion and by governments.
Such a growing awareness was reflected in Britain’s policymaking. The UKGov-
ernment’s white paper on the environment, entitled ‘This common inheritance’, was
published in 1990, setting out a strategy to stabilise CO2 emissions. Although the
document was criticised by environmentalists for not going far enough, it was never-
theless hailed as a landmark, especially for stating the principle that polluters should
pay.
Meanwhile, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held
in Rio in 1992 to prevent human interference with the climate, increased the pressure
on governments to stabilise greenhouse gas emissions.
1988 Establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
1992 Earth Summit takes place in Rio de Janeiro
1995 COP1 takes place in Berlin
1997 Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol
(continued)
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(continued)
2001 COP7, Marrakesh Accords
2005 EU Emission Trading
2005 Entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol
2015 COP21, Paris Agreement
Source United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
The origins of theUKpromotion of renewable energy can be found in the Electric-
ity Act of 1989. In it, the government established a mechanismwhereby producers of
non-fossil fuel based energywould participate in tenders submitting aminimumprice
for a 15-year contract which would underwrite their project. The scheme, known as
the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO)—together with Northern Ireland NI NFFO
and Scottish Renewable Obligation (SRO)—paid the generator the then wholesale
electricity or pool price plus a technology premium linked to the specific technology
being utilised (International Energy Agency 2013).
Buyers of the renewable electricity were the recently privatised Regional Electric-
ity Companies (RECs) who were obliged to source a fixed percentage of their power
from non-fossil sources. The RECs contracted collectively through the Non-Fossil
Purchasing Agency Ltd (NFPA) with renewables generators, while the above mar-
ket costs were reimbursed by a levy passed onto consumers (Department of Trade
and Industry 1999).
Generators had up to 5 years to commission their plants, but no penalties were
imposed for either delays or failure to build a power plant. The scheme was rolled
out in five orders, in 1990, 1991, 1994, 1997, with a total of 3,639 MW contracted,
but only 1,198 MW of capacity was actually built (The National Archives 2006).
The NFFO mechanism supported nuclear, as well as renewables.
4 A Market-Led Decarbonisation
Britain pioneered the privatisation of energy assets and has led the way in developing
market-based tools for the promotion of renewable energy. The advent in 1997 of the
New Labour Government led by Tony Blair ensured a continuity with the market-
oriented approach to the energy transition implemented by the previous Conservative
governments. By the 2000s, the UK’s decarbonisation was no longer only driven by
economic factors, aswas the case of the previous decadewith the ‘dash for gas’, but by
environmental concerns crystallised in international commitments, as demonstrated
by the initiatives implemented by the governments of Tony Blair, who was in power
from 1997 to 2007.
In 2000, the Utilities Act replaced NFFO with Renewables Obligation (‘RO’), a
market-based incentive based on green certificates to promote the development of
large-scale renewable generation in the UK. Arguably, RO encapsulated Britain’s
attempt to promote the development of renewable energy through market-based
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mechanism, rather than more top-down approaches predominant in other European
countries, and even more so later in China.
TheRO,which came into effect inEngland andWales, andScotland, in 2002 and in
Northern Ireland in 2005, required UK electricity suppliers to purchase an increasing
share of their electricity in the form of Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs)
either from their own renewable sources, or by purchasing from qualifying power
producers. The ROwas paid for over a 20-year period andwas banded by technology,
with landfill gas generators earning the lowest band of 0.25 of a ROC, increasing to
double the price of a ROCs for wave, tidal, dedicated biomass and Combined Heat
and Power producers. Overall renewable power producers would benefit from three
key income streams. This consisted of the wholesale electricity price and the ROC
payment, divided into the fixed buyout element as described above and a variable
element paid by non-compliant suppliers and shared amongst renewable generators.
Finally there was a levy exemption certificate paid by all industrial and commercial
consumers to renewable producers (Climate Change Levy).
In 2017, the RO closed to new generation capacity. Overall, the market-based
mechanism of RO ended up favouring specific technologies, such as wind and
biomass, developed by large groups through utility-scale projects. Innovative tech-
nologies that were less market ready were discarded, such as the proposed tidal
project over Severn Barrage in 2010. Other measures implemented in this period
include, in 2001, the Climate Change Levy and the establishment of the Carbon
Trust. A landmark step was represented by the 2003 White Paper, which set the
future government priorities:
In reducing carbon dioxide emissions, our priority is to strengthen the contribution of energy
efficiency and renewables. They will have to achieve far more in the next 20 years than
previously.Webelieve such ambitious progress is achievable, but uncertain (UNFCCC2019).
While endorsing renewables, the government’s support for nuclear had waned, as
the issue of nuclear waste disposal began to be addressed:
There are also important issues of nuclear waste to be resolved, including legacy waste and
continued waste arising from other sources. We do not make specific proposals for building
new nuclear power stations.17
Hence, in 2003 the UK seemed to be on the verge of a major shift to a whole
new energy policy, focusing virtually exclusively on the development of renew-
able energy, even at the expense of nuclear, which had represented the backbone
of the country’s energy security in the previous decades. However, such an atti-
tude was short-lived. At the beginning of his third term, Prime Minister Tony Blair
again backed nuclear power, to ensure the attainment of Britain’s decarbonisation
goals whilst at the same time contributing substantially to its energy security. The
renewed support for nuclear was contained in the 2007 White Paper, which set the
new energy priorities of the government. It expressed concerns about the country
being too dependent on a limited number of technologies and positioned nuclear as
an important element in the diversification of energy sources, with the additional
benefit of reducing carbon emissions (UK Government 2007).
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This position was reiterated by Tony Blair’s successor Gordon Brown in his fore-
word in ‘Meeting the energy challenge. A white paper on nuclear power’, published
by the then Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) in
January 2008, stating:
Nuclear power is a tried and tested technology. It has provided the UK with secure supplies
of safe, low-carbon electricity for half a century. New nuclear power stations will be better
designed and more efficient than those they will replace. More than ever before, nuclear
power has a key role to play as part of the UK’s energy mix. I am confident that nuclear
power can and will make a real contribution to meeting our commitments to limit damaging
climate change (UK Government 2008).
As Pearson andWatson (2012) point out, one of the main reasons behind the shift
may have been the fact that, by 2004, the UK had again become a net energy importer
as a result of dwindling cheaply recoverable gas supplies from the North Sea, after
having been a net exporter for several years previously.
The new commitment to nuclear was part of a broader political will to address the
decarbonisation of the economy. In this respect, in 2008, the government of Gordon
Brown launched the Climate Change Act, which set forth legally binding targets to
reduce GHG emissions by 80% from 1990 levels by 2050.
However, during the coalition government formed by the Conservative and the
Liberal Democrat Parties and led by David Cameron between 2010 and 2015,
Britain’s path towards decarbonisation suffered some setbacks. In the Conservative
Party Manifesto 2015, it was stated:
Onshore wind now makes a meaningful contribution to our energy mix and has been part
of the necessary increase in renewable capacity. Onshore windfarms often fail to win public
support, however, and are unable by themselves to provide the firm capacity that a stable
energy system requires. As a result, we will end any new public subsidy for them and change
the law so that local people have the final say on windfarm applications (The Conservatives
2015).
This halted new onshore wind projects despite an abundance of wind resources.
Concurrently, the cancellation of incentives for utility-scale solar saw activity
plummet in that sector too.
In 2013 the UK Government passed the Energy Act, with the aim of reforming
the energy sector to enable it to attract £100 billion of infrastructure required to bring
it up to date (OFGEM 2019). These Electricity Market Reforms, which importantly
introduced a Capacity Market to ensure long-term security of supply, also impacted
renewables by phasing out the RO support and replacing it with a Contract for
Difference (CfD):
A Contract for Difference (CFD) is a private law contract between a low carbon electricity
generator and the LowCarbon Contracts Company (LCCC), a government-owned company.
A generator party to a CFD is paid the difference between the ‘strike price’ – a price for
electricity reflecting the cost of investing in a particular low carbon technology – and the
‘reference price’– a measure of the average market price for electricity in the GB market.
It gives greater certainty and stability of revenues to electricity generators by reducing their
exposure to volatile wholesale prices, whilst protecting consumers from paying for higher
support costs when electricity prices are high (UK Government 2015).
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A key element of these reforms was that the government was able to decide
on when and the level of capacity it would make available for each CfD auction,
which in turn is divided into two pots, one for established and one for emerging
technologies. To date, three auctions have taken place with a total of almost 10GW
allocated; the first round (AR1) ran from October 2014 to March 2015, the second
(AR2) fromMarch to September 2017 and the third was launched in May 2019. The
only sector to have seen significant growth has been offshore wind, which reached
a total of 19GW. AR1 awarded 1.2GW, comprising two offshore wind farms (the
714 MW EA1 and the 448 MW Neart na Gaoithe) (BEIS 2019), 11 projects were
awarded in AR2 totalling 3.3GW, while in the third six projects totalling 5.5GW of
installed capacity received CfDs. In fact, prices in the third-round saw offshore wind
achieve £39.65/kWh, as opposed to £92.50/kWh which the government negotiated
bilaterally with EDF for the construction of the new Hinkley C nuclear reactor (The
National Audit Office 2017).
5 Towards Net-Zero
In June 2019, Theresa May, the then UK Prime Minister, passed legislation to cut
emissions to zero by 2050. The announcement took place almost a month before the
formal dissolution of her cabinet, on 24 July 2019, and it was likely made in order
for her to secure a legacy beyond Brexit.
It is highly significant that her successor, Boris Johnson, setting out the priorities
of his new government in his first speech at the House of Commons on 25 July 2019,
supported this policy stating:
Our kingdom in 2050—thanks, by the way, to the initiative of the previous PrimeMinister—
will no longer make any contribution whatsoever to the destruction of our precious planet,
brought about by carbon emissions, because we will have led the world in delivering that
net-zero target. We will be the home of electric vehicles—cars and even planes—powered
by British-made battery technology, which is being developed right here, right now (House
of Commons 2019).
Despite the optimistic tone, however, the UK’s path towards decarbonisation is
set to face a number of challenges. Currently, besides repowering existing wind
farms, it is extremely difficult to develop onshore wind projects. Yet according to
a report prepared by Vivid Economics for RenewableUK (2019) (Vivid Economics
2019), the deployment of 35GW of onshore wind—the UK’s cheapest renewable
technology—by 2035, could lead to a 7% decrease in electricity costs, together with
a set of wide-ranging set of socioeconomic benefits.
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6 Subsidy-Free Shift
Whilst auctions can be seen as a backward step in the UK’s history of allowing the
private sector to drive decarbonisation, in that it places a greater onus on government
to decide when to allocate new capacity and how much, the primary drivers of new
projects that will contribute towards the Net-Zero by 2050 target are likely to come
from the private sector. Indeed, the UK is a pioneer in the development of projects
that do not rely on government subsidies, or subsidy-free projects. The 10 MW
Clayhill solar project with 6MWof co-located storage situated inMilton Keynes and
inaugurated in September 2017, exemplifies this new trend as it required no subsidy
and instead signed a long-term Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with EDF.
Such subsidy-free projects rely on a burgeoning market for corporates for whom
the need to become greener and more sustainable is leading them to enter into PPAs
directly with developers of renewable energy projects, effectively cutting out the
middleman—i.e. the UK Government. As most projects must compete with low
power prices, they attract a mix of predominantly debt to make them competitive,
and lenders to these projects require the terms of the power purchase to be as robust
as those previously in place when the projects were effectively underwritten by the
government. As a result, corporate PPAs tend to favour large companies with deep
balance sheets, capable of entering into long-term contracts, enabling the power
developers to seek long-term debt funding. However, the financial and corporate
sectors are leading the way in creating ‘synthetic’ PPAs, in which the obligation to
purchase electricity is shared between several buyers at differing conditions and is
wrapped or underwritten by utilities, banks and increasingly oil companies who are
keen to enter into the renewable energy market. Whether all this potential results in
many new projects coming online is still open to debate, as the whole corporate PPA
sector is still in its infancy, with 7 projects totalling 804 MW having been built and
operating as at Q4 2019.2
7 Electrification of Transport
Although the UK had been able to achieve significant success in the decarbonisation
of its electricity production, it is increasingly being acknowledged that the main
challenge is the need to achieve higher rates of decarbonisation of heat and transport,
where progress had been much slower. For the electrification of transport, the launch
in July 2018 of ‘The Road to Zero’ represented a major turning point. The document
set the objective of ‘all new cars and vans to be effectively zero emission by 2040’
and of ‘almost every car and van to be zero emission’ by 2050 (UK Government
2018).
Consistent with the market-driven approach that, as we have seen, is a key feature
of the UK model to energy transition, the document also clearly states that ‘[w]e
2www.inspiratiacom, dataLive database, 2019.
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expect this transition to be industry and consumer led, supported in the coming years
by the measures set out in this strategy’ (UK Government 2018).
‘The Road to Zero’ was presented by the UK Government as part of its industrial
strategy. Hence, its goal was not only to reduce pollution and decarbonise the econ-
omy, but also to ensure that the UK was going to be a leading manufacturer of zero
emission vehicles. The importance of this document cannot be overstated, given the
sheer scale of its ambition. However, the strategy presented several shortcomings.
According to a letter from Lord Deben, Chairman of the Committee on Climate
Change (CCC) published on 11October 2018, ‘existing and newly agreed policies for
road transport […] are insufficient to ensure the reductions in emissions necessary to
meet the 5th Carbon Budget in the most cost-effective way’ (UKGovernment 2018).
A report published by the House of Commons on 16 October 2018 conducted a
much more abrasive critique of the ‘Road to Zero’, accusing the government of a
‘lack of clarity on the meaning of the 2040 targets’ which was ‘unacceptable’ (House
of Commons 2018). The Parliament’s report criticised the fact that the ‘Road to Zero’
did not clearly define the ‘conventional’ petrol and diesel cars to be phased out, as it
did not specifywhether conventional hybridswill be bannedor not.With conventional
hybrids potentially still available on sale after 2040, the goal of achieving a zero-
emissions fleet target by then seemed impossible to reach. Such an ambiguity was
seen as a major constraint for both car manufacturers and charging infrastructure
providers. Hence, theHouse of Commons’ report was asking formore clearly defined
and more stringent targets, to allow the industry to make the appropriate investment
decisions.
Despite its shortcomings, Britain was, however, effective in establishing a part-
nership between the public and private sector to develop charging infrastructure for
Electric Vehicles (EVs). As announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the
2017 Budget, a fund was later established to increase the roll-out of charging infras-
tructure in Britain. The Charging Infrastructure Investment Fund (CIIF) was a £400
million investment fund to be set up with £200 million raised by the private sec-
tor, matched by £200 million from the government. In February 2019, the private
equity firm Zouk Capital was named CIIF’s preferred bidder, entering in exclusive
negotiations with the government to act as the manager of the fund.
8 China: A Case Study of Government-Led Energy
Transition
A world leader in installed capacity of hydropower, solar PV and wind, China has
been selected as a case study, as it represents one of the most iconic examples of a
successful government-led energy transition. Moreover, the country’s policy shifts
have a considerable impact on the global energy environment, due to the size and
growth of its economy and its high levels of electricity production and consumption.
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This can be coupled with China’s ambitious cross-border investments in energy,
including those within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
This section outlines the reasons behind China’s success in promoting an ambi-
tious renewable energy agenda. Four different drivers will be assessed, including
the status of energy dependency, decarbonisation policies and initiatives, the swiftly
developing manufacturing sector and the shift to subsidy-free renewables.
Firstly, energy dependency in China underwent significant changes in the 1990s,
throughout the Gulf War and beyond. While annual oil imports accounted for less
than 5% of total imports at the time of the Gulf War, the country gradually became
a major global importer of oil by the 2000s reaching a level of 10.35 million b/d
in December 2018 (Dannreuther Roland 2003; Li 2015; S&P Global 2019). This
increasing dependency is one of the drivers behind the country’s relatively swift
transition to renewables, as China aims for energy self-sufficiency. According to
a document published by China’s National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC)—mentioning the targets set by NDRC—the country’s self-sufficiency rate
should be above 80% by 2020. In parallel, by 2030, clean energy is set to meet most
of the demand, forecasted at 5.6 Btce (3.91 Btoe) between 2035 and 2040, with
non-fossil fuel sources accounting for over 50% of the power production (IEA 2018;
NDRC 2016).
Secondly, as a consequence of its economic growth, carbon emissions per capita
have almost quadrupled inChina since 1990 (Wang et al. 2015).As an emerging econ-
omy, the country strives to enhance quality of life and to achieve progress through
further industrialisation and urbanisation, necessitating that sustainable development
be at the forefront of its political agenda. Economic growth has driven up energy con-
sumption significantly and thus, with demand on the increase, the Chinese Govern-
ment has kick-started a series of decarbonisation initiatives, focusing on electricity
generation using clean sources, and more specifically renewables.
Thirdly, the swiftly growing renewable energy manufacturing sector emphasises
China’s interest in boosting economic growthwhilst creating new jobs and increasing
exports. Therefore, China considers the manufacturing of renewable energy equip-
ment a strategic industrial area, entitling it to preferential land policies, taxation and
loans. China began to promote the use of locally manufactured products for renew-
ables as early as 1999, when the ‘Notice on Relative Problems of Further Supporting
the Development of New and Renewable Energy’ stipulated that projects using such
equipment would be granted a preferential investment profit rate of 5% (Fan et al.
2018; NDRC 1999). The investment profit rate is the ratio of investment to rate of
returns on capital.
The manufacturing of wind turbines and photovoltaic cells has been designated
as a critical industrial sector in China, as a result of which the country has become a
global manufacturing leader in both sectors.
Lastly, renewable energy incentives through feed-in tariff policies have played an
important role in the rapid roll-out of such projects throughout China. Some of the
most noteworthy policies include the ‘Improving Policies on Feed-in Tariff of Wind
Power’ issued in 2009 by NDRC, which announced the launching of tariffs for wind
power and dividing the country into four regions with tariffs ranging from 0.51to
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0.61 RMB/kWh. Power costs above coal-fired generation were split between the
central government and the operators of the provincial grid (Grau et al. 2012; Zeng
et al. 2013; Lewis 2011). Another similar document was released in 2011, addressing
solar photovoltaic (PV) power projects and awarding a fixed feed-in tariff of RMB
1.15/kWh for projects reaching the completion stage by the end of 2011 and RMB
1.00/kWh for those approved by July 2011(Fan et al. 2018).
This section analyses China’s challenging transition process to subsidy-free
renewables. The country witnessed substantial decreases in project capital costs due
to technology-related manufacturing improvements and increasing competition in
the renewables market. Between 2000 and 2010, China’s total renewable energy
supply grew at an average annual rate of 12%, approaching mass production (Zeng
et al. 2013). On 31May 2018, NDRC, the National Energy Board and theMinistry of
Finance announced that all subsidies for utility-scale solar projects would be halted
in favour of competitive bidding (NDRC 2018).
Below are some of the key milestones the country achieved in the energy sector
since the 1950s, including the implementation of the country’s iconic five-year plan,
the adoption of the first minimum energy performance standards and the launch of
the Belt and Road Initiative (Table 2).
On 28 February 2005 the decarbonisation of the Chinese electricity generation
sector began, triggering debates amongst academics as to how realistic these targets
would be, with a considerable number deeming non-fossil fuel based electricity
targets of 20% by 2030 as feasible (Zhang et al. 2018).
An in-depth analysis of drivers of the government-led energy transition in China,
including additional impetus necessary to preserve success on the long term, is
detailed in the section below.
Table 2 China energy sector, key milestones
1953–1957 The first Chinese Five-Year Plan
1978 Deng Xiaoping commenced its ambitious programme of reforms, with an
emphasis on attracting foreign trade and investment
1981 The State Energy Commission was established
1982–1983 The Ministry of Petroleum was divided in China National Offshore Oil
Corporation, Sinopec Corporation and China National Petroleum Corporation
1984 China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
1988 Formation of the Ministry of Energy
1989 China adopted the first Minimum Energy Performance Standards (MEPS)
1997 Establishment of the State Power Corporation
1997 The Energy Conservation Law entered into force
2003 Abolishment of the State Power Corporation
2003 Launch of the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC)
(continued)
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Table 2 (continued)
2005 Adoption of the Renewable Energy Law of the PRC on 28 February
2007 The National Climate Change Program was issued in June 2007
2008 China launched US$850 billion economic stimulus package in November 2008,
with 35% allocated to low-carbon development
2008 Publication of the first white paper on energy, the country emphasising the
development of renewable energy as a top priority
2010 The revised Energy Conservation Law entered into effect on 1 April 2010
2011 China overtook US becoming the largest power system world-wide, with an
installed capacity of over 1TW
2013 The Belt and Road Initiative was launched by China’s president Xi Jinping
2015 After connecting roughly 3 million people in remote areas, China reached 100%
electrification rate
2018 China increased its renewables target in the electricity consumption mix from
20% to 35% by 2030
2021 No subsidies will be granted to offshore wind projects from 2021 onwards
9 Paving the Path to Energy Self-sufficiency
As an importer of oil since 1996, China’s energy self-sufficiency levels plummeted,
while electricity consumption was and continues to be on the rise52, as shown in the
figure below. To tackle this issue, the country’s government implemented a series of
strategies, meant to lower dependency on imported oil. Renewable energy sources
have become a significant part of the solution, providing new avenues through which
the country could develop its national power industry and build a reputation for the
use and deployment of sustainable alternatives (Fig. 3).
When assessing China’s success in paving a path to energy self-sufficiency, three
main factors should be taken into consideration. The first focuses on the ability of
renewable power to tackle substantial growth in energy demand, whilst diminishing
the need for fossil fuel imports. The second relates to the historical progressChina has
made with regard to achieving renewable energy technology (RET) self-sufficiency.
The third assesses policies and initiatives adopted by the government to enable energy
producers, developers, advisers and financiers to learn from the experience of more
mature markets in Europe.
China experienced rapid economic growth in a number of industries between
2005 and 2011, including thermal power generation, which grew by roughly 90%,
steel production grew by 135% and automotive vehicles by 223%, with proportions
of coal, gas and oil used in manufacturing overtaking the entire output from nuclear
and renewables (Liu et al. 2013).
Annual electricity generation and consumption in China continued to grow dra-
matically between 2000 and 2019 (WorldBank 2018; IMF2019;UNStatistics 2019).
This growth drove the Chinese Government to seek to accelerate the development
and deployment of renewable energy sources, as this was widely perceived as the































Fig. 3 China’s electricity consumption per capita in kWh, between 1990 and 2014. Source World
Bank (2014) Electric power consumption (kWh per capita). Available from: https://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/EG.USE.ELEC.KH.PC
engine to swift and secure economic development (Liao and Wang 2019). A num-
ber of initiatives were implemented to boost renewables production and decrease
dependency on oil, gas and coal imports.
Having identified several vulnerabilities within the energy supply sector, the June
2002 Law on Promoting Clean Production was enacted to increase security by
diversifying the energy mix (SCNPC 2002). This initiative was not the first to be
implemented, as the government had already offered a construction tax credit to the
renewables generation sector since 2001 (Zhang et al. 2016).
In September 2007, the Medium and Long-term Program for Renewable Energy
Development was published by the Chinese Government, announcing a target of
10% for energy consumption from renewables by 2010 and 15% by 2020 (Gao et al.
2011; NDRC 2007a).
In December 2007, the government’s white paper on China’s Energy Conditions
and Policies also emphasised the importance of energy diversification for the coun-
try’s security, which, according to the document, could only be achieved through
boosting electricity production from renewables. Chinese President Hu Jintao also
mentions this in the report of the 17th People’sCongress (UNStatistics 2019;Chinese
Government Official Platform 2007; IOSC-PRC 2007).
In an attempt to regulate energy consumption, China’s Ministry of Finance intro-
duced a tax targeting large vehicles with inefficient energy consumption in 2008
(MOF 2009). In 2010, the government amended the original Renewable Energy
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Law, published in February 2005, emphasizing the urgency to roll-out renewable
energy (Wang and Chang 2014; Chinese Government Official Platform 2009).
Between 2011 and 2015, throughout its 12th Five-Year Plan, China ramped up
installation of offshore wind plants, announcing it aims to achieve 5GW of capacity
by the end of 2015 (NEA 2019).
In the latest Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) the Chinese Government plans to
increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy demand from 14.3% in
2018 to approximately 20% by 2030 and, in addition, is also aiming to achieve 15%
share of clean-energy in total primary consumption by 2020 (Lee 2019; NEA 2016).
Commentators, including S&P Global, agree that a slowdown in the growth of
fossil fuels and more specifically oil in total consumption is likely to be achieved
over the next 5 to 8 years, as a result of increasingly favourable government support
for renewables and its rapid adoption, but also due to an increase in electric vehicles
in the country (S&P 2019).
These strategies appear to be ever more important, now that China and the United
States are in a mounting trade conflict, affecting energy commodities flow (Kempe
2019). This current political uncertainty is accelerating the deployment of renewable
energy projects.
China’s rapid deployment of renewables has seen installed capacity grow from
3 MW in 1994 to over 11GW of solar and 5GW of wind capacity in the first half of
201966. Most of the technology used in these projects was either produced locally or
nationally.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is one of China’s best recognised international
plans to increase its economic and political influence globally and, amongst other
projects, it involves a multi-billion dollar investment program in the energy sector.
While to date the main beneficiaries have been large-scale fossil fuels schemes,
according to Greenpeace (2019), Chinese equity backed over 12GW of wind and
solar projects under this initiative.
Initiatives such as the BRI are ushering a new era of Chinese investment globally,
including in Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America, potentially enabling it to learn
from the experiences of early renewables adopters—especially in Europe–further
driving its accelerated transition to renewables and thus reducing its dependence
on energy imports. China has already showed substantial interest in exchanging
knowledge on innovative solutions and legislative improvements in the clean-energy
sector. In July 2018, China signed an agreement with the EU to cooperate on meeting
power demand with alternative energy (EC 2018).
10 A Leader in RET Manufacturing
As a result of the significant scale that it has been able to achieve, China has evolved
its renewables manufacturing base from being a supplier of domestic projects to an
export-focused industry. The clean-energy sector expanded much faster than nuclear
power and fossil fuels between 2012 and 2017, as the use of renewables gradually
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became more efficient, affordable and accessible (Standaert 2019; Tan and Mathews
2014).
To better assess the country’s manufacturing sector, this section focuses on wind
power, solar PV and hydropower in China.
The country’s first grid-connected wind farmwas constructed as far back as 1986,
using equipment fromDenmark (Shi 1997).By the endof 2020,China is set to employ
800,000 people in the sector, according to the Chinese Wind Energy Association
(CWEA 2017).
Despite being a relative latecomer to wind generation, the Chinese Government
has enacted a number of policies to facilitate the expansion of wind power manu-
facturing. Primary amongst these were the 2008 InterimMeasure of Management of
Special Funds for Wind Power Industrialization, the 2009 Notification of Improving
Price Policy of Grid-connectedWind Electricity and theAccelerating SmoothDevel-
opment of the Wind Equipment Industry published in 2010 (Zhao et al. 2012; Dai
et al. 2014).
In addition, the Ministry of Science and Technology announced in 2011 that
wind turbines are amongst the national key technologies and proceeded to fund the
research and development (R&D) departments of both universities and emerging
manufacturers (MOST 2012).
The country has also built its wind expertise through mergers and acquisitions, as
well as international technology transfer (NDRC 1999; Standaert 2019). Some of the
more noteworthy Chinese purchases abroad were the 2016 acquisitions comprised
of Australia’s Pacific Hydro’s wind and hydropower assets by China State Power
Investment Corporation for roughly US$2.1billion and the UK’s Beatrice and Inch
Cape Offshore Wind farms by the State Development and Investment Corporation
for US$260 million (Nicholas 2018).
The size of Chinese manufactured turbines has grown from 600 kW in 1997
to Dongfang Electric’s 10 MW offshore model revealed in August 2019 (Shi
2007). Other manufacturers of wind turbines in China include Goldwind, Envision,
Mingyang, United Power, Shanghai Electric and CSIC Haizhuang.75
The solar PV manufacturing sector’s boom was been spurred by substantial sub-
sidies, tax rebates, research grants and cheap land, benefits similar to those offered
by the Chinese Government to both wind power and hydropower industries. Accord-
ing to multiple studies published in these sectors, the state played a central role in
encouraging provincial governments to support local industries by investing in their
renewables-associated products and technologies (Beeson 2009; Gang 2015a).
Between 1986 and 2005, advancement in solar PV was still relatively slow due
to insufficient expertise in the PV industry and a lack of raw materials and advanced
production equipment. However, China experienced a surge in productivity in this
sector between 2011 and 2012 (Dai et al. 2014; Gang 2015b; Yang and Pan 2010).
As highlighted in the 2007 Medium to Long-term Renewable Energy Develop-
ment Plan, industrial development of renewables including solar PV represented an
essential national strategy (NDRC 2007b). The document specifically mentioned the
need to promote the use of solar materials manufactured locally and to invest in
associated R&D activities.
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Whilst the country became one of the largest manufacturers and exporters of
solar PV technologies globally between 2004 and 2008, the dissemination process
within the country was slow (Zhang et al. 2015; Cao and Groba 2013). China’s
export-oriented strategy led to significant improvements in the quality of solar PV
products manufactured domestically and gradually sped up the process of domestic
renewables adoption.
Between September 2012 and August 2013, a series of policies, including a
resource-based Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) scheme was introduced by the Chinese Gov-
ernment, to provide stronger support to the industry (NDRC 2016; IEA 2013). In
2015, China became the world’s largest producer of solar panels, led by companies
such as Jinko Solar.
The development of China’s hydropower sector began in 1912, with a 0.48 MW
power station in Yunnan, in 1912 (Li 2012; Du et al. 2008). The hydropower industry
today–which has grown to a total capacity of approximately 352GWor over a quarter
of the global installed capacity–occupies a pivotal position in Chinesemanufacturing
and represents one of the country’s most valuable energy sources, as well as enabling
it to develop a competitive export offering. The country’s Medium and Long-term
plan for all renewable energy, adopted in 2007, has a goal to achieve 800GW of
installed capacity by 2020 (Beeson 2009), underlining the strong political support
for hydropower within all renewable energy sources.
11 A Government-Led Decarbonisation
The decarbonisation process in China has been driven by a mix of climate concerns
as well as the need to diversify away from fossil fuels, especially imports. Climate
concerns touch upon social issues and how rapid industrialisation which expanded
energy intensity has made pollution a major concern for the population (Zhang et al.
2010). In June 2007, China published its national climate change program aimed
at speeding up decarbonisation, with wind, solar, hydropower and biomass sources
acting as the key drivers to mitigate climate-related concerns (Beeson 2009).
Since 2006 the country’s government outlined the importance of sustainable devel-
opment, which was deemed to be an essential part of its national strategy. Amongst
the targets announced was achieving a balance between emission reduction and pre-
serving economic growth (Dai 2015). In 2009, the Chinese prime minister Wen
Jiabao reiterated his intentions when he announced the country’s aim to reduce CO2
emissions by between 40% and 45% by 2020, in comparison to 2005 levels (Watts
2009).
Moreover, since 2007, China has seen growing population unrest caused by health,
environmental and food safety concerns, including successful protests in Xiamen
opposing the manufacturing of paraxylene, 2007 Shanghai demonstrations opposing
the route of the Maglev rail project, 2008 and 2012 Sichuan protests and 2013 Kun-
ming and Maoming demonstrations, all significantly contributing to China’s shift
towards sustainable development (Geall et al. 2014).
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In 2018, the Key Work Plan for Industrial Energy Conservation Supervision
was published by the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.
It addressed multiple energy-intensive industries such as the chemical, petrochemi-
cal and paper sectors (Chen and Li 2019), and stressed the importance of optimising
transportation and improving sector efficiency across the country, while facilitating
a shift to EVs.
Innovation and technology have played a significant role in the country’s decar-
bonisation policies. In light of this, this section explores the electrification of transport
as an essential driver of decarbonisation, as well as providing a boost to the clean-
energy industry. EVs have become a key priority of China’s transition to low-carbon
mobility; the industry is dominated by major state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and,
as well as more recently, joint ventures between international car automakers and
SOEs.
In 2010, the Chinese Government announced an investment of RMB100 billion
(US$14bn) in the EV sector and declared EVs a ‘key strategic industry for the next
5 years’ (Tyfield et al. 2014). Other favourable policies for e-mobility included the
2004 automobile industry development policy (amended in 2009), the 2007 com-
prehensive programme of work in energy saving and emission reduction and the
2009 eV initiative joint action plan, amongst many others (Chinese Government
Official Platform 2013).
In 2010, the government released a notice on the expansion of energy saving
and new energy vehicle demonstration to public services, which was one of the
initiatives that has driven the emergence and growth of EV buses and taxi fleets
(MOF 2010). Public authorities continued to implement favourable policies and
initiatives to facilitate the roll-out of EVs nationally. This including the adoption of
EVs in 2013 and the 2014 guidance on accelerating the deployment of EVs, as well
as the implementation plan for government agencies and public institutions to buy
new EVs (Du et al. 2008; Zhang et al. 2010; MIIT 2014).
China has become a global player inEVs and associated charging infrastructure. In
the second half of 2018, the country had built 300,000 public EVchargers, accounting
formore than 50%of the global EVchargingmarket (Pyper 2019). In the sameperiod,
China announced the sale of approximately 1.3 million EVs, 62%more than in 2017,
with roughly 2.6 million vehicles on the street by the beginning of 2019 (Hove and
Sandalow 2019).
The surge in EV sales could be explained by the support schemes the government
put in place, including allowing local governments to offer additional subsidies of up
to 50% of the national subsidies already offered (MOF 2016; Manthly 2018). Non-
financial incentives such as exemption from license plate lotteries and restrictions
also had a major contribution to the swift increase in EVs popularity in the country.
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12 From Tariffs to Zero-Subsidies
The path from tariff-based to subsidy-free renewable energy projects in China has not
been a straight-forward transition, with the market sensitive to tariffs being phased
out. It has been argued that the reason behind an apparent loss of momentum in
China’s renewables deployment has been the uncertainty surrounding government
funding and regulatory support for green energy.
The feed-in tariff system in China has been based on competitive bidding, which
takes place prior to the tendering process (Han et al. 2009) and obliges bidders to
present the lowest possible prices. However, as many of the bids were unrealistically
low, projects were not built and the country moved towards a fixed FiT, especially
for technologies such as solar PV and wind (Martinot 2010; Chan 2009).
At present, China needs to tackle multiple issues, including low consumption
problems, the pressure on the government to continue providing substantial subsidies
and a very high percentage of fossil fuels in the overall energy mix.
To date, China has approved 224 subsidy-free wind and solar projects, which
are estimated to add 21GW of installed capacity (Yu 2019). A joint statement by
NDRC and NEA mentioned that roughly 60% of the capacity will be installed in six
provinces, namely, Heilongjiang, Guangdong, Shanxi, Guangxi, Henan and Hebei
(NDRC 2019).
The country’s renewables industry and more specifically its wind and solar PV
sectors are poised for long-term growth, with capital costs on a downward trajectory
and likely to fall to levels equal or less than those of coal power stations.
13 Conclusion
This chapter showcases two examples of jurisdictions which have adopted differing
strategies in achieving a decarbonisation of their respective economies.
The UK has been presented as a global leader in the deployment of renewable
energy capacity primarily through onshore and offshore wind, as well as through
solar.As one of the first countries in theworld to privatise and deregulate its electricity
sector, the UK has one of the longest track records in empowering the private sector
to deliver a market-based approach which extended to decarbonisation.
Whilst other countries such as Germany have been extremely successful in the
first phase of state-led deployment of renewables primarily through feed-in-tariffs,
it is the UK’s market-based approach which has stood the test of time. As tech-
nology costs continue to decline, governments are withdrawing direct support and
instead favouring the direct participation of private sector buyers who are interested
in purchasing renewable electricity through private PPAs. This recent development
is therefore renewing the UK’s position as a pioneer in the subsidy-free era.
The UKGovernments’ role in decarbonising the economy has by nomeans been a
smooth process. Yet its reliance onmarket-led policies has ensured the engagement of
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the private sector throughout the various phases of its evolution.However, insufficient
emphasis has been placed on newer technologies, which instead have been forced to
rely on other forms of investment. Historically, the UK Government has preferred
to remain technology agnostic. Whilst banding of ROCs and Pot 2 under the CfD
regime has allowed some higher cost projects such as offshore wind and waste to
energy projects to flourish, little of the UK’s vast, untapped wave and tidal resource
potential has been captured. In particular, for larger scale projects requiring longer
time horizons like the Swansea Bay tidal lagoon project, a lack of support such as
that provided to nuclear projects such as Hinkley Point C has effectively hampered
the project’s fruition, despite strong private sector interest.
One of the central hypotheses of China’s decarbonisation strategy has been the
rapid increase in energy dependency; decarbonisation can therefore be viewed partly
as one of a series of energy policies and initiatives aimed at achieving greater energy
self-sufficiency. The rapid deployment of renewables across the country has been at
the centre of China’s strategy, with the majority of involvement in these projects
coming from domestic companies and more specifically major SOEs, including
equipment manufacturers, investors, banks and utilities.
The expansion of China’s renewablesmanufacturing sector, optimization ofwork-
force and enhancement of equipment quality has led to the creation of an export-
focused industry worth trillions of dollars– with solar PV module exports alone
accounting for approximately £4 billion in Q1 2019 (CCCME 2019). Multinational
conglomerates such as Jinko Power and Dongfang deploy ‘made in China’ renew-
ables technologies, including solar panels and wind turbines globally. The growth in
the RETmanufacture sector is therefore an essential driver of the Chinese renewables
market.
Moreover, global climate concerns and the pressure to decarbonise the energy and
transport infrastructure sectors have contributed significantly to speeding up China’s
transition to renewables. The country boasts the world’s largest fleets of electric
vehicles and auxiliary charging infrastructure and it is on the right path to ensure an
efficient transition to clean energy.
Notwithstanding their significant differences, the examples of the decarbonisation
pathways undertaken by China and the UK analysed in this chapter, demonstrate how
direct government involvement through SOEs together with direct incentives are
equally effective as market-enabled policies with direct incentives. Both examples
present viable strategies that can be adopted by governments either wishing to adopt
top-down decarbonisation strategies, or those wanting to foster a greater role for the
private sector as developers and owners and operators of renewable energy and other
asset categories such as EV infrastructure.
Typically, emerging economies often need to attract foreign direct investment, as
part of their strategies to open up their markets. For these countries and amongst the
various policies that are in place, the government needs to foster a specific market-
friendly approach to attract foreign companies. Furthermore, these policies need to
remain in place for the duration of the specific renewable energy incentives. The
temptation to change such policies to suit a government’s budgetary constraints—as
has happened inmarkets such as Spain and Italy over the past decade—will only have
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Financing the Sustainable Energy
Transition
Alexander Van de Putte, Akshu Campbell-Holt, and George Littlejohn
1 Indroduction
In The Perfect Storm: Navigating the Sustainable Energy Transition, the authors
argue that for the energy transition to be sustainable, the five capital stocks—natural,
manufactured, human, social and financial—need to be grown (or maintained) and
balanced simultaneously (Van de Putte et al. 2017).
What is considered sustainable energy though is not necessarily well understood.
For the purpose of this chapter, we will argue that the end-game for the sustainable
energy future is a global renewable energy internet comprised of five integrated lay-
ers: (1) largely distributed renewable energy generation technologies, such as wind,
solar and hydro, (2) electricity transmission and distribution network infrastructure,
(3) energy storage solutions and smart energy routers, (4) active network manage-
ment software to manage and balance loads and (5) mobile and stationary sensors
and smart terminals (Van de Putte and Nematova 2017).
To make the transition to a global renewable energy internet a reality, it is also
necessary to make the current energy system more sustainable by employing Cir-
cular Economy (CE) ideas. According to the Ellen MacArthur Foundation (2013),
a circular economy ‘seeks to rebuild capital, whether this financial, manufactured,
human, social or natural’.1 The rebuilding of capital is achieved by reusing, reduc-
ing and recycling waste and the shift from a ‘cradle-to-grave’ to a ‘cradle-to-cradle’
1https://www.ellenmacarthurfoundation.org/circular-economy (accessed 4 July 2016).
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philosophy. The benefits of the circular economy cannot be ignored in the transition
towards a sustainable global energy environment. McKinsey estimates that between
2016 and 2030, apart from the environmental, social and human capital benefits,
the net economic benefits are estimated at e1.8 trillion,2 or in excess of e120 bil-
lion per year or 0.8% of global GDP. For developing countries, especially natural
resource-rich economies, this could be twice as much.
Most of the energy demand growth will come from developing countries. Devel-
oping countries are home to more than 6 billion people,3 and especially natural
resource-rich countries hold the key to sustainable development. This is because
these countries tend to be at the early stages of climbing the ‘energy ladder’. The
energy ladder, first described by Shell in the early 1980s, shows the relationship
between primary energy consumption per capita and Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
per capita and follows an S-curve (Van de Putte 2010).
As capital markets and venture capital financing is well developed in OECDmar-
kets, and given that energy demand growth will primarily come from developing
countries, this chapter largely focuses on financing the sustainable energy transi-
tion in the developing world. If financial resources would be properly channelled,
developing countries could leapfrog the sustainable energy transition.
2 The Tables Are Turning
The ratification of the Paris Agreement by nearly 94% of the world demonstrates
a strong global commitment from most countries to achieve the United Nation’s
Sustainable Development Goals (UNFCCC 2019). The challenge, however, is the
enormous investment requirement which is estimated between $5 trillion and $7
trillion per year (UNCTAD 2014) and channelling investments were required.
Additionally, a growing body of studies demonstrates that the new generation of
investors with changing mindsets provides increasing optimism for the inclusion of
sustainability in investment decisions. This, together with the superior returns poten-
tial from sustainable investments compared to traditional investments, emphasises
a strong match between requirements and investors—is it possible to leverage this
match and what challenges lie ahead?
2.1 Countries Have Made Global Commitments
United Nations-led initiatives including the Paris Agreement, the Kyoto Protocol
and the Sustainable Development Goals have seen widespread global commitment
2https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/europes-circular-
economy- opportunity (accessed 4 July 2016).
3https://population.un.org/wpp (United Nations 2019a).
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in recent years. While both the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol are targeted
towards addressing climate change, the Kyoto Protocol established emissions reduc-
tion commitments for developed nations while the Paris Agreement applied to all
countries—developing and developed. Out of 197 Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 185 have signed up to
the Paris Agreement and undertaken commitments and identified their Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) (UNFCCC n.d.).
There are several bodies that have recommended solutions to tackle the CO2
emissions and climate change but now is the time to take collective action. One
such solution is identified in the World Energy Outlook 2018 as the Sustainable
Development Scenario4 that presents an integrated approach to maintain CO2 levels
at the same level as in 2017 and achieve internationally agreed objectives on climate
change, air quality and universal access to modern energy. TheWEO 2018 highlights
that a sustainable development scenario which is aligned with the Paris Agreement
can be made possible but will be heavily determined by the actions undertaken by
governments. The prerequisites for this will not only include the joint political will
globally but also the mammoth funding required for the implementation of NDCs.
Some of the key considerations in this scenario include (International EnergyAgency
2018):
• renewable energy technologies to lead the way in providing universal access to
energy and thereby increasing the share of renewables in the power mix from
one-quarter in 2017 to two-thirds in 2040;
• implementation of economically viable options to improve efficiency in the energy
sector thereby maintaining overall demand in 2040 at the same level as at 2017
and
• for the first time in the WEO, clean water is examined as a dimension including
the energy required to provide universal access to clean water and sanitation.
2.2 Investors Are Changing, Mindsets Are Changing
A world that is faced with growing challenges is also in the midst of an intergenera-
tional wealth transfer estimated at $30 trillion from baby boomers to their children,
a majority being millennials, and is expected to take place over the next two or three
decades (MSCI 2017). The millennial generation is seeking far more than mere
financial factors—responsible investments and positive environmental, social and
governance impacts alongside financial returns as evidenced by some of the recent
revolutionary findings.
4According to the World Energy Outlook (WEO), the scenarios (Current Policies Scenario, New
Policies Scenario and Sustainable Development Scenario) do not aim to forecast the future but
provide a way of exploring different possible futures, the levers that could bring them about, and
the interactions that arise across a complex energy system. The base year for projections in all
scenarios is 2016.
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According to a Morgan Stanley study (MSCI 2017), the three common objectives
among sustainably-minded investors are
1. integration of environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors because they
believe that companies with strong ESG factors are better managed and that this
may improve their investment results;
2. reflection of personal values in relation to ethical, social, religious or political
beliefs and
3. selection of investments with a positive impact on environmental, social and
political challenges and thereafter the ability to monitor those investments
based on norms set through frameworks (e.g. Paris Agreement, UN Sustainable
Development Goals).
TheGlobal Sustainable Investment Review 2018 (GSIR 2018) (Global Sustainable
Investment Alliance 2017) highlights the widespread global interest and engagement
in sustainable investing which is an investment approach that considers environmen-
tal, social and governance (ESG) factors in making investment decisions.GSIR 2018
covers information for five markets (Europe, USA, Canada, Japan, and Australia and
NewZealand) collectively managing sustainable investing assets worth $30.7 trillion
as of early 2018. This is a 34% increase since 2016 with Japan and USA leading
the way. In Japan, sustainable assets grew at a staggering 308% since 2016 and the
corresponding growth rate in the USA was 38%, with other regions continuing to
rise but experiencing growth at a slower pace. On the other hand, at the start of 2018,
the proportion of sustainable assets in relation to total assets grew in almost every
region with Canada and Australia and New Zealand consisting of sustainable assets
as the majority of their overall assets. The only region that had a slight decline in
this proportion was Europe, however, with nearly half of the global sustainable and
responsible investing assets domiciled in Europe, it continues to manage the highest
proportion of sustainable assets (GSIA 2017).
GSIR 2018 also indicated that the top sustainable investment strategy globally
continues to be ‘negative or exclusionary screening’5 with $19.8 trillion assets
under management, followed by ‘ESG integration’6 and ‘corporate engagement and
shareholder action’7 with $17.5 trillion and $9.8 trillion assets under management,
respectively. Impressive growth rates in assets across almost all other strategies were
reported with the exception of ‘norms-based screening’8 which declined by 24%
5GSIA defines the ‘negative or exclusionary screening’ strategy as the ‘exclusion from a fund or
portfolio of certain sectors, companies or practices based on specific ESG criteria’.
6GSIA defines the ‘ESG integration’ strategy as ‘the systematic and explicit inclusion by investment
managers of environmental, social and governance factors into financial analysis’.
7GSIA defines the ‘corporate engagement and shareholder action’ strategy as ‘the use of share-
holder power to influence to influence corporate behaviour, including through direct corporate
engagement (i.e. communicating with senior management and/or boards of companies), filing or
co-filing shareholder proposals, and proxy voting that is guided by comprehensive ESG guidelines’.
8GSIA defines the ‘norms-based screening’ as the ‘screening of investments against minimum
standards of business practice based on international norms, such as those issued by the OECD,
ILO, UN and UNICEF’.
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from $6.2 trillion to $4.7 trillion in assets. These trends support a growing change in
mindsets among investors globally.
Despite the USA’s intent to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, there are strong
signs of increasing interest and awareness in sustainable investing among individual
investors in the USA. A survey conducted with 1,000 US individual investors by
Morgan Stanley’s Institute for Sustainable Investing (2017) provides for a positive
and pro-sustainable future as the results showed that
• awareness and interest in sustainable investing has grown steadily since 2015;
• among individual investors, 75% are interested in sustainable investing and the
level of interest among millennials is even higher at 86%;
• almost three-quarters (71%) of individual investors believe companies with robust
sustainability practices are better long-term investments and
• the USA saw a spike in sustainable, responsible and impact investing between
2014 and 2016 growing at a rate more than 33% amounting to $8.72 trillion.
These trends are on a rise and if applied across theworld and across all stakeholders
far beyond the investor community, it might rest with the voters’ ability to choose an
administrationwhich is pro-sustainable—an interesting area to lookout for especially
in the 2020 elections in the USA.
ESG investments, Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) and impact investing,
albeit differing from one another in their definitions and used interchangeably, are
all components of sustainable investing and are strong contenders to become the
new norm in making investment decisions. This also makes a strong argument for
the likelihood of a future by 2030, if not earlier, where companies that deviate from
ESG, SRI and impact investing principles would become the outliers and therefore
not favoured by stakeholders—not only by the investor community but across the
entire ecosystem including customers, suppliers, shareholders, consumers and the
wider community. Studies and surveys demonstrate that the interest in ESG, SRI and
impact investing ismore pronounced amongmillennials and as they increasingly take
up decision-making roles, positions of influence and control assets, they are bound
to become a strong driving force for sustainability. Do these trends bring about a
perfect match between investors and investment requirements for the sustainable
development of economies? This is a question to be addressed later in this chapter.
2.3 ESG, SRI and Impact Investments Outperform
Traditional Investments
As described above, the recent trends and developments in ESG, SRI and impact
investing demonstrate that sustainability is increasingly becoming mainstream.
While investors are being virtuous by increasingly seeking ESG, SRI and impact
investments, they are also making money by doing what they believe to be the right
thing. According to a growing number of studies, ESG, SRI and impact investing
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are providing better returns compared to traditional investments. ‘Traditional invest-
ments’ in this chapter indicate investments that do not consider pro-sustainable fac-
tors including, but not limited to, environmental, social, governance, ethical and
norms, alongside financial factors.
Europe’s largest asset manager by assets under management, Amundi, that has yet
again received the top rating (A+)3 in 2018 for its responsible investment approach,9
has championed responsible investing by including it at the core of its identity.
Between 2010 and 2017, Amundi conducted a study (Amundi 2018) which consid-
ered investment universes covered by MSCI indices (MSCI North America, MSCI
EMU, MSCI Europe ex EMU, MSCI Japan and MSCI World) and applied three dif-
ferent strategies—active management, passive management and factor investing—
andbased its analysis onESGcriteria. The analysis found thatwhile ESG investments
produced negative excess return compared to non-ESG investments during the period
from 2010 to 2013, 2014 was a turning point where ESG investments outperformed
non-ESG investments. The results of the analysis showed that, between 2014 and
2017, being a ‘responsible investor’ and managing portfolios based on the ESG cri-
teria would have resulted in annualised excess return of 3.3% in North America and
a remarkable 6.6% in Europe. While Amundi promotes ESG-induced portfolios,
it cautions while applying these factors to avoid reducing the investment universe
beyond the point that could negatively impact diversification and performance.
In another study (Giese et al. 2019), a research team at MSCI looked at the
attributes of ESG investments that led to positive financial effects and found that
companies with robust ESG practices demonstrated the following characteristics:
• Higher profitability: When compared with low ESG-rated companies, higher
ESG-rated companies had a competitive edge and generated better returns that
usually resulted in higher profitability and dividend payments.
• Lower risk: An observation of companies within theMSCIWorld Index over a 10-
year period demonstrated that high ESG-rated companies had a lower frequency
of severe incidents such as drawdowns more than 95% or bankruptcy.
• Lower volatility: Because of better risk controls associated with high ESG-rated
companies, they have fewer severe incidents of fraud, corruption, embezzlement
and litigation cases.
In addition to Amundi, other global asset managers including Blackrock, BNP
Paribas, Vanguard and Fidelity Investments have launched ESG funds. According to
data provided by Morningstar, mutual funds based on ESG criteria surpassed the $1
trillion mark in 2018 with assets under management rising by 60% since 2012 from
$655 billion to $1.05 trillion.
January 2019 witnessed another milestone for sustainable investment when S&P
Dow Jones Indices launched the S&P 500 ESG Index. In the first half of 2019 alone,
S&P Dow Jones Indices has launched six ESG indices (S&P 2019) with global
9https://www.amundi.com/int/ESG.
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coverage.10 Similar to the S&P 500 Index, in the S&P 500 ESG Index companies are
ranked by their ESG scores and excluded if they do not meet the criteria as defined
in the Index. Companies can be excluded from the S&P 500 ESG index for reasons
including:
• failure to meet the required ESG scores;
• disqualifying United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) scores or
• business activities listed in the exclusion list such as tobacco production/sales or
controversial weapons (e.g. cluster weapons, landmines and nuclear weapons),
or an ownership stake of 25% or more in another company involved in these
activities.
In April 2019, several notable companies were removed from the S&P 500 ESG
Index, including Facebook, Wells Fargo, Oracle and IBM—Facebook being the
largest with a weight of 2.5% in the index a day before it was excluded (Stead-
man 2019). As a result of the recent privacy protection concerns, such as a lack of
transparency on collecting and sharing private user information, Facebook did not
meet the requirement to remain in the S&P 500 ESG Index. Despite Facebook scor-
ing high on the environment score, its aggregate was brought down by the social and
governance factors which are weighted higher for tech companies.
In summary, a growing number of studies demonstrate that high ESG-rated com-
panies are associated with positive characteristics that all stakeholders look for in
any company or while making investment decisions. Together with the pronounced
interest from investors who are seeking to make a positive impact through their
investments, ESG, SRI and impact investing all have the likelihood of being the new
norm in making investment decisions and in voting practices. Additionally, with an
increasing adoption rate of ESG, SRI and impact investing among investors and lead-
ing global asset managers, sustainability will soon become the central topic among
institutional investors, policymakers, regulators, government agencies and corpora-
tions alike. Importantly, investors can now do the right thing—socially responsible
and sustainable investing—without settling for sub-optimal returns.
3 Channelling Investments to Meet Global Energy Demand
Sustainably Remains a Challenge
With the world population projected to reach 9.2 billion by 2040 (UN 2019a)—a
nearly 20% increase from the 2019 levels—an upsurge in the demand for energy
consumption is inevitable and the demand is estimated to increase by more than a
quarter by 2040 predominantly in developing countries led by India. Despite efforts
towards combating climate change, 2017 recorded a rise in carbon emissions from
10The six indices are S&P 500 ESG Index, S&P Global 1200 ESG Index, S&P Europe 350 ESG
Index, S&P Japan 500 ESG Index, S&P/ASX 200 ESG Index and S&P Developed Ex-North
America & Korea LargeMidCap ESG Index.
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the global energy industry at the fastest rate since 2011 and the upward trajectory
is continuing. Global CO2 emissions are forecast to rise by a near-record amount in
2019 (The Guardian 2019). These trends pose alarming global threats and they attest
that efforts thus far are inadequate to achieve global commitments and are a reminder
that it has never been more critical to transition to a cleaner and more efficient energy
industry in the context of meeting global sustainability targets.
3.1 Current Overreliance on Fossil Fuels
The global energy demand is still being served mostly by fossil fuels, such as oil
(30%), coal (27%) and gas (20%) (ENI 2018), which poses a growing concern in
relation to carbon emissions and, consequently, climate change.
The Paris Agreement becomes binding only through ratification. Despite being
signatories to the Paris Agreement, as of June 2019, 11 countries11 were yet to
formally ratify the Paris Agreement and these countries are collectively responsible
for more than a tenth of global emissions which presents added concern and raises
questions regarding their commitment to achieve global sustainable goals. Of the 11
countries, Russia, Turkey and Iran are notably some of the largest Global Greenhouse
Gas (GHG) emitters (Apparicio and Sauer 2018). Although the USA has notified its
intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, it can only officially withdraw after
3 years from the date of the Agreement which means that the USA must stay in the
deal until at least 2019. Nonetheless, this demonstrates a lack of commitment from
one of the world’s biggest offenders in terms of GHG emissions and, according to
the Climate Action Tracker, it is almost certain that the USAwill miss its NDC target
for 2025 due to the lack of implementation of new policies planned by the Obama
administration. However, there are studies and surveys that display positive signs
among individual investors with their keen interest in sustainable investments.
The Climate Action Tracker, which has beenmonitoring 32 countries that account
for 80% of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, has reported (Erickson 2018) some
alarming findingswhich establish that actions, thus far, are far from adequate inmeet-
ing the climate change goals. In fact, the world’s major polluters have made minimal
efforts, if any, to meet their commitments and that only seven countries (Morocco,
The Gambia, Bhutan, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, India and the Philippines) have made
efforts and commitments to class them under either of the two acceptable categories,
11As of 1 June 2019, the countries yet to formally ratify the agreement were Angola, Eritrea, Iran,
Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Russia, South Sudan, Turkey and Yemen.
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‘1.5 °C Paris Agreement Compatible’ and ‘2 °C Compatible’, with the other cat-
egories on the scale being ‘Insufficient’,12 ‘Highly Insufficient’13 and ‘Critically
Insufficient’.14
In its latest working paper on global fossil fuel subsidies, the International Mon-
etary Fund (Coady et al. 2019) estimates that the direct15 and indirect16 fossil fuel
subsidies in 2017 amounted to $5.2 trillion, or 6.5% of global GDP, and that espe-
cially the indirect subsidies are likely to increase unless drastic measures are taken
to move the world away from fossil fuels. But weaning economies from fossil fuels
also requires huge financial investments.
3.2 Capital Markets in Developing Countries Are
Underdeveloped
It is estimated (UNCTAD 2014, p ix) that the investment requirement to imple-
ment the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)17 in developing countries alone is
between $3.3 trillion and $4.5 trillion per year and faces an annual funding gap of
$2.5 trillion. In addition to climate change mitigation and adaptation, these costs also
account towards basic infrastructure, health, food security and education—elements
of sustainable economic development.
Governments and public funds simply cannot meet these astronomical investment
requirements making the role of the capital markets and private sector instrumen-
tal in bridging the gap. UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable
Development recognises stock exchanges and market infrastructure to be instrumen-
tal in meeting these investment needs. However, capital markets in most developing
countries still remain underdeveloped. For instance, more than half of the Asian
countries are not recognised in the MSCI indices (MSCI 2019a). The development
of stock markets will be crucial in mobilising investments since stock exchanges
12Countries classified under ‘Insufficient’ are Australia, Brazil, EU, Kazakhstan, Mexico, New
Zealand, Norway, Peru, Switzerland and UAE.
13Countries classified under ‘Highly Insufficient’ are Argentina, Canada, Chile, China, Indonesia,
Japan, Singapore, South Africa and South Korea.
14Countries classified under ‘Critically Insufficient’ are Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, USA and
Ukraine.
15Direct subsidies are defined as the cash transfer from governments to industry and amounted to
$296 billion in 2017 (IMF 2019). Direct subsidies are often referred to as pre-tax subsidies, because
they reflect the difference between what consumers pay for fuel and the cost to produce the fuel.
16Indirect subsidies or post-tax subsidies reflect the difference between what consumers pay for fuel
and the full environmental and societal costs of fossil fuels. Indirect subsidies may be perceived as
less tangible, but they are both real and increasing.
17The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a call for action by all countries
to promote prosperity while protecting the planet. ‘SDGs are the blueprint to achieve a better and
more sustainable future for all. They address the global challenges we face, including those related
to poverty, inequality, climate, environmental degradation, prosperity and peace and justice’ (United
Nations 2019b).
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are positioned in the intersection of key stakeholders including the government,
policymakers, investors and corporations.
3.3 Matching Financing with Projects Remains Problematic
In a recent working paper (Tyson 2018), the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
finds that the lack of bankable projects that meet investment criteria is a key barrier,
not the lack of financing. This is found even in countries where international finan-
cial institutions play a significant role in providing infrastructural support including
technical assistance in developing innovative and new policy approaches, providing
new project-preparation facilities, and financing and co-financing of funds and de-
risking for private investors. This is largely due to (1) the early stages of development
of projects, (2) lengthy planning and construction phases, (2) requirements of non-
standard financing and (3) the bespoke and complex nature of the projects making it
excessively difficult for investors to understand. These challenges are further com-
pounded especially in developing countries due to the lack of an adequate ecosystem
to foster the growth of micro, small and medium-sized businesses, in particular,
owing to limited early stage investors, such as venture capitalists, private equity and
angel investors, who not only provide financing but also the strategic direction and
platforms to grow.
4 Could There Be a Perfect Match?
The investment needed to finance aGlobal Renewable Energy Internet is estimated to
be in the range of $100 trillion globally until 2050 or close to $3 trillion per year (Van
de Putte and Nematova 2017; Liu 2015). This seems to be a very significant amount
but is relatively small compared to the annual direct18 and indirect19 subsidies that
are channelled into the fossil fuel industry globally.
There is also no shortage of capital or sources of capital to finance the sustainable
energy transition. According to the Boston Consulting Group (BCG 2019), global
wealth now exceeds $200 trillion and since the 2008 global financial and economic
crisis, this global wealth has struggled to find bankable projects anywhere in the
world. The Global Renewable Energy Internet could provide this opportunity for
global investors to make a game-changing contribution to sustainability, while at the
18Direct subsidies are defined as the cash transfer from governments to industry and amounted to
$296 billion in 2017 (IMF 2019). Direct subsidies are often referred to as pre-tax subsidies, because
they reflect the difference between what consumers pay for fuel and the cost to produce the fuel.
19Indirect subsidies or post-tax subsidies reflect the difference between what consumers pay for fuel
and the full environmental and societal costs of fossil fuels. Indirect subsidies may be perceived as
less tangible, but they are both real and increasing.
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Table 1 Financing landscape for sustainable projects
Commercial Development institutions Government
Banks
− Debt/equity, Guarantee on leans,
Funds,
Asset Managers
− Debt/equity, Funds, SPVs, Leases,
Private placements,
Private Equity, Venture Capital
− Equity, Funds, SPVs, Private
placements,
Institutional Investors












same time providing superior returns in line with the findings of the 2019 Amundi
study.
Sources of capital are diverse and growing and include banks, asset managers,
private equity, institutional investors, development institutions and government
financing (Table 1).
We argue that a perfect match exists between global capital and sustainable
projects to rapidly scale the sustainable energy transition if at least three things
come together: (1) capital market development in developing countries, (2) govern-
ment regulation to create a level playing field and (3) a venture capital approach to
stimulate sustainable investments and entrepreneurship (Fig. 1).
4.1 Developing Countries Need to Develop Capital Markets
to Enhance Liquidity and Increase Capital Flows20
The Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Markets Index is an
index used to measure equity market performance in global emerging markets and
is the de facto index used by investors to channel investments to growth markets.
The MSCI Emerging Markets Index grew from 10 countries in 1988 to 24 countries
today and represents 13% of world market capitalisation. Most developing countries
are currently not part of this index and need to explore ways how to upgrade from
Frontier to Emerging Market status. To upgrade from Frontier to Emerging Market
is relatively straightforward (Table 2), while the benefits are significant.
The benefits include as follows:
20This section is based on a presentation made by Prof. Alexander Van de Putte at the Belt,
Road & Bridge: Creating New China-Europe Connections conference on 1 May 2019 in London
and was published in the CISI Review, the journal of the Chartered Institute for Securities &
Investments, as ‘Growing the Digital Economy’, by Alexander Van de Putte and George Littlejohn.
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Fig. 1 Scaling the Sustainable Energy Transition
• Increased capital inflows: TheMSCI EmergingMarkets Index has over $2 trillion
of assets benchmarked against it. Inclusion in the Index would not only increase
the exposure of developing countries’ stocks to international investors, but also
lead to passive inflows from funds that follow the Index’s progress.
• Enhanced liquidity: Liquidity in developing countries’ stock markets is typically
very low. Capital inflows resulting from inclusion in the Index will substantially
boost liquidity in developing countries’ stock markets and economies.
• Reduced cost of capital resulting from increased trading volumes: Being part
of the Index should lead to a fall in the equity risk premium because of risk
diversification. This will help draw in new investors, such as endowment funds
and hedge funds. As stock prices swell as a result, even more investors are drawn
to developing countries, effectively creating a virtuous circle.
Apart from equity, capital markets have an important role to play in the develop-
ment of debt capital markets, in particular a green bondmarket. The issuance of green
bonds has been growing rapidly to reach $162 billion in 2017 globally (Chartered
Banker Institute 2019). Green bonds are issued to finance environmentally friendly
projects, such as renewable energy projects, sustainable buildings and circular econ-
omy projects. According to the Climate Bonds Initiative (2018), most of the green
bond proceeds were allocated to renewables energy projects (39%), followed by
buildings (25%) and transportation (15%).
To facilitate the growth of green bonds, many stock exchanges and/or regulators
around the world have released national green bond guidelines and listing rules
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Table 2 MSCI Market Classification Framework and Requirements




No requirement No requirement Country GNI per capita
25% above the World Bank
high income thresholda for
3 consecutive years
B. Economic Development
B.1 Number of companies
meeting the following
Standard Index criteria
• Company size (full
market cap)b

















C.1 Openness to foreign
ownership























Source MSCI, 2019 (https://www.msci.com/documents/1296102/1330218/MSCI_Global_
Market_Framework_2019.pdf/57f021bc-a41b-f6a6-c482-8d4881b759bf (accessed 17 July 2019))
aHigh income threshold for 2018: GNI per capita of $12,056 (World Bank, Atlas method)
bMinimum in use for the May 2019 Semi-Annual Index Review, updated on a semi-annual basis
(Sustainable Banking Network 2018). Other markets, such as the EU, are also in the
process of developing their green bond standards (EU 2019) or trying to encourage
greater uptake of their green bonds as in the case with Japan (EF 2019).
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) play a critical role in the economy.
They tend to be nimbler and more dynamic compared to larger companies and there-
fore drive innovation and more sustainable business growth. SMEs, however, need
access to growth financing to scale their business. In most developing countries, a
capital market for SMEs does not exist. There are, however, important benefits for
developing countries to develop an SME market:
• An SME market provides access to equity capital to scale the business beyond
what would be possible through Venture Capital (VC) funding;
• An SME market provides exit options for VC firms which are thus more likely to
provide risk capital at earlier stages of the SME development process;
• A listing often requires SMEs to bolster their corporate governance, including
the recruitment of independent non-executive directors. Thus, a well-composed
270 A. Van de Putte et al.
board will help SMEs identify viable strategic growth options beyond what the
founders are typically able to identify;
• Over time, a lower the cost of capital which in turn will help SMEs to grow more
sustainably and
• Increased visibility to a diverse group of stakeholders, which could result in
additional revenue growth.
In order though for developing countries to develop the capital markets that
enable their sustainable energy transition, government policies that help create a
level playing field must also be implemented.
4.2 Government Regulations to Create a Level Playing Field
Based on the latest US Energy Information Administration (2019) report on levelised
cost of new electricity generation technologies entering service in 2023, electric
renewables are and will increasingly be competitive against fossil fuel alternatives
from a plant investment perspective. The levelised ‘investment’ cost in $/MWh of
selected new generation resources entering service in 2023 is as follows: hydroelec-
tric (39.1), onshore wind (55.9), solar PV (60), conventional combined cycle (46.3),
coal with 30% carbon capture and storage (104.3) and advanced nuclear (77.5).21
When both the direct and indirect subsidies will be phased out, both wind and
solar integrated as part of smart grids and combined with advanced electric storage
solutions will be competitive in most geographic locations, even when the various
load factors are taken into account.
But more needs to be done by governments to stimulate the uptake of renewable
energy projects. Governments have a variety of policy tools available to de-risk
renewable energy projects. Now that the Paris Agreement and the UN Sustainable
Development Goals have been ratified by 185 states plus the EU22 and 193 countries,
respectively,23 governments around the world could provide an important stimulus
to sustainable economic development.
The first step is to gradually phase out the direct subsidies. The second step is to
internalise the externalities. Given that the externalities constitute by far the largest
share of the subsidies that benefit the fossil fuel industry, this would make the fossil
fuel industry instantly uncompetitive. A rapid internalisation of the externalities is
very unlikely though because many natural resource-rich countries depend on it for
their economic development and they need time to diversify their economies away
from fossil fuels. A gradual internalisation of the externalities combined with scaling
CE projects should attract most of the investment in the short to medium term. For
21Note that comparing different technologies using LCOE alone evaluates only the cost to build
and operate a plant and the value of the plant’s output to the electric grid. This because different
generation technology have different load factors.
22https://www.unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification (accessed 6 July 2019).
23https://www.sustainabledevelopment.un.org/memberstates.html(accessed 6 July 2019).
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natural resource-rich countries, a CE should be particularly appealing during the
transition period because it would allow for making existing assets more sustainable
and competitive. This, because there are many opportunities to reduce, reuse and
recycle waste in the extraction industries value chain by leveraging skills, enabling
infrastructure andSMEs.The circular economy innatural resource-rich countrieswill
create skills, jobs, maintain and improve (or at least help maintain) natural capital,
and create financial capital that is not dependent on the volatility of the demand for
natural resources.
4.3 A Venture Capital Approach to Sustainable Investment Is
Needed24
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into especially natural resource-rich countries still
tends to target the extraction industries. Of the $4.1 trillion of global FDI flows in
2017, $2.3 trillion (56.1%) went into the primary sector25 (UNCTAD 2018, p. 75).
These global FDI flows therefore do not help inmaking the energy transition a reality.
Instead, aVentureCapital (VC) approach could help accelerate the sustainable energy
transition, and stimulate innovation and entrepreneurship.
The life cycle of green finance projects can be broken down into three discrete
yet integrated stages: (1) Ideation and business case development, (2) Independent
verification and project financing and (3) Implementation and post-implementation
monitoring. Note that the green financing life cycle is a non-linear process withmany
feedback loops. The feedback loops exist to make the business case more robust or
allow the entrepreneur or investor to revisit or abandon the project at any stage of its
life cycle.
Stage 1: Ideation and business case development
During this stage (Fig. 2), entrepreneurs generate ideas for sustainable energy
projects. Sustainable energy projects typically fall into two categories: (1) new renew-
able energy generation, storage and transmission technologies and solutions and (2)
CE technologies to ensure that waste produced during one process is used as an input
into another process. This eliminates, or at least dramatically reduces, waste while
creating a financial return and higher skilled jobs.
For example, technology to convert the flue gases of coal-fired power plants into
cement could potentially be considered as ‘green financeable’, subject to results from
the independent review that shows that by doing so all the capital stocks are grown
and balanced simultaneously.
Most projects will not meet both the financial and ESG viability criteria (Phase 3).
A potential project may be a great idea from the perspective of the inventor, but not
24This section is derived from the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) Unified Strategy
developed in 2018.
25UNCTAD defines the primary sectors as the extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas and
the mining of metal ores.


























Fig. 2 Ideation and business case development stage. Source AIFC Unified Strategy, 2018
necessarily from the perspective of other stakeholders, including society at large and
investors. That is the nature of entrepreneurship—it carries important risks. Stage 1
is, however, a critical stage, because entrepreneurs do not shy away from challenges.
Instead, they learn from past experience andmake improvements along the way, even
starting afresh if need be.
Stage 2: Independent verification and project financing
After the project has demonstrated potential from a sustainability and financial return
perspective, the project moves into the independent verification and project financing
stage (Fig. 3). For green bonds, strict requirements need to be met to ensure that the
bonds meet the local and/or internal ESG standards. For this, an external review
and independent verification are required. The climate bonds initiative has issued
















Fig. 3 Independent verification and project financing stage. Source AIFC Unified Strategy, 2018
26https://www.climatebonds.net/certification/get-certified-1 (accessed 27 July 2019).














Fig. 4 Implementation and post-implementation monitoring stage. Source AIFC Unified Strategy,
2018
requirement before issuing a green bond in order to ensure that the investment meets
the stated sustainable benefits, and thus to avoid ‘greenwashing’.27
VC-backed green investments do not typically require an independent verification,
after all the fund, and not bond market investors, bare the risk of the investment
decision. However, VC funds have their own experts who conduct pre-investment
due diligence, including ESG compliance of projects.
Only after the pre-investment due diligence process will an appropriate VC fund28
consider investing in a green finance project. Usually, financing will come in stages
so that the VC fund can better manage the investment risk.
Stage 3: Implementation and post-implementation monitoring
After financing has been obtained the hard work starts and the focus now switches to
the implementation and post-implementation monitoring phase (Fig. 4). Monitoring
is important to ensure that both compliance and performance criteria are met. Com-
pliance criteria typically relate to ESG factors, while performance criteria typical
relate to financial return factors, such as Internal Rate of Return (IRR), cost overruns
and delays.
Note that apart from the aforementioned feedback loops, the flexibility in the life
cycle of sustainable energy finance projects remains to also abandon the project.
Abandonment may take many dimensions—from stopping a project to handing it
over to a different type of investor. VC funds typically bring more than just equity
finance to the sustainable energy project; they often lie in the trenches and assist in
strategic and operational matters.
27Greenwashing can be defined as ‘the practice of making an unsubstantiated or misleading
claim about the environmental benefits of a product, service, technology or company practice’.
https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/greenwashing (accessed 24 July 2019).
28Various types of VC funds exist. Some will invest in early stage ventures, some during the growth
stage and yet others help companies to prepare for a public offering.
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The life cycle of green finance projects is designed to simultaneously achieve sev-
eral objectives: (1) stimulate entrepreneurship; (2) obtain financing for ESG com-
pliant projects; (3) reduce risk through independent review and verification, thus
improving the bankability of green finance projects and (4) continuously moni-
tor progress made to allow for taking corrective action as needed and develop a
knowledge base for future green finance projects.
5 Conclusion
There is no shortage of capital, nor is there a shortage of bankable ideas to make
the sustainable energy transition a reality. The challenge is that systematic change
is needed for governments around the world to deliver on the commitments they
have made following the ratification of the SDGs and the Paris Agreement. It is also
important to create a level playing field and gradually eliminate the direct subsi-
dies and internalise the indirect subsidies benefitting the fossil fuel industry. Finally,
especially developing countries need to develop both capital markets and make ven-
ture capital financing available to entrepreneurs. Top-down forward-looking govern-
ment policy combined with bottom-up entrepreneurs would dramatically accelerate
the sustainable energy transition because capital would increasingly be channelled
towards bankable sustainable projects.
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1 Introduction
The transition to a low-carbon economy is accelerating, in part, due to two recent,
landmark international agreements. To date, 185 parties have ratified the Paris Agree-
ment since coming into force in November 2016, which aims to keep global temper-
ature increase below 2 °C this century (UNFCCC 2018). In addition, the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), adopted by the UNGeneral Assembly in 2015, lay out a
global agenda for eliminating poverty, protecting the environment and ensuring that
all people can enjoy equality, peace and prosperity. SDG 13, in particular, commits
UN member states to take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts,
while SDG 7 calls for affordable and clean energy for all (United Nations 2018).
With the transition underway, many actors have stepped up their efforts to con-
tribute to climate change mitigation through the adoption of green energy technolo-
gies. The Chinese government pledged to spend USD 360 billion on clean energy
projects by 2020, creating 13 million new jobs in the process (Forsythe 2017). From
2015 to 2019, more than 95% of Costa Rica’s electricity was generated from renew-
able energy sources (Rodriguez 2019). And it isn’t just states that are driving this
shift; consumer preferences and the private sector are also fuelling this change. Four
of Europe’s biggest primary insurers have restricted or limited insurance cover for
coal, for example, and the car manufacturer Volvo announced in 2018 that by 2019
all of its new vehicles would at least be partially electrified (Bosshard 2018; Watts
2017). The pace of change has been so significant that the Bloomberg New Energy
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Outlook predicts that wind and solar will make up 50% of the world’s electricity by
2050 (BloombergNEF 2019a, b).
The demand for green energy technologies—and corresponding demand for the
materials and minerals needed to build, transport and instal these technologies—is
predicted to grow dramatically in the years and decades ahead. In a recent report,
the World Bank estimated that demand for the minerals required for solar panels—
including copper, iron, lead, molybdenum, nickel and zinc—could increase by 300%
through 2050 should the international community stay on track to meet its 2 °C goal
(Arrobas et al. 2017). Similarly, demand for minerals like cobalt, lithium and rare
earths1 is expected to grow at unprecedented rates due to their strategic role in the
production of wind turbines, electric vehicles (EVs) and energy storage.
This increased demand should be an economic boon to those countries that are
home to the principal reserves of minerals like cobalt, lithium and bauxite; increased
investments in their extraction should, in a well-governed sector, result in growing
revenues to the state from taxes and royalties, improved infrastructure, more jobs
and increased spending on local businesses, health and education. Unfortunately, not
all strategic reserves of these minerals are found in countries applying international
best practice tomining sectormanagement. As such,while green energy technologies
may contribute to the achievement of SDGs 7 and 13, failure to engage in responsible
sourcing practices could increase conflict and fragility risks along the green energy
supply chains of these key minerals and metals, stalling or reversing local develop-
ment gains. This would jeopardize the achievement of another, foundational SDG:
specifically, SDG 16, which prioritizes promoting peaceful and inclusive societies,
providing justice for all, and building effective, accountable, inclusive institutions
(United Nations 2018).
In countries struggling with political instability, where governance for the mining
sector is weak, the extraction of these minerals can be linked to violence, conflict and
human rights abuses. The mining of cobalt in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
for example, has so often been connected to violence that the mineral has been
dubbed as the “blood diamonds of this decade” by various news outlets (Wilson
2017; Safehaven.com 2017). The extraction of nickel, a mineral critical for both solar
panels and energy storage, has been linked to murder, sexual violence and forced
displacement in Guatemala (Kassam 2017). And while supply chain governance for
certain minerals, including tin, tungsten, tantalum, gold and diamonds, is improving,
such initiatives have not yet been expanded to include most of the minerals and
metals central to green energy technologies.
The technologies require to facilitate the shift to a low-carbon economy, includ-
ing wind turbines, solar panels and EVs, which all require significant mineral and
metal inputs and, absent any dramatic technological advances, these inputs will come
from the mining sector. How they are sourced will determine whether this transition
1The term “rare earths” refers to 17 elements often found in the same ore deposits, including
cerium, dysprosium, erbium, europium, gadolinium, holmium, lanthanum, lutetium, neodymium,
praseodymium, promethium, samarium, scandium, terbium, thulium, ytterbium and yttrium.
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supports peaceful, sustainable development in countries where strategic reserves are
found or reinforce weak governance and exacerbate local tensions and grievances.
This chapter seeks to understand the extent to which increased demand for the
minerals critical to green energy technologies could affect fragility, conflict and
violence in producing states, and explores what would be required of the interna-
tional community to mitigate these local and national threats. It builds on extensive
desk-based research, as well as a mapping analysis, case studies and findings from
consultations with key stakeholders and experts.
2 Context and Background
2.1 Green Energy and the Demand for Minerals
The release and accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is severely
affecting the global climate. Higher temperatures, increasing variable rainfall, rising
sea levels, more droughts and floods, coral bleaching and crop failure are some of
the ways in which a changing climate will affect people and ecosystems. Scientists
predict that temperatures will continue to rise in the coming decades and that the
impacts will be felt across the globe, with varying severity and frequency depend-
ing on the region (NASA 2018). Current climate models project increases in mean
temperatures, hot extremes in most inhabited regions, heavy precipitation in several
regions and droughts and precipitation deficits (IPCC 2018).
In an effort to combat the impacts of climate change, 185 parties have ratified
the 2016 Paris Agreement, which aims to keep global temperature increase below
2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue initiatives that limit the temperature
increase even further to 1.5 °C or lower (UNFCCC 2018). The key to this agreement
will be a shift to a low-carbon economy, equipped with green energy technologies
to decarbonize existing industries.
Within the past few years, global investments in the green energy sector have
surged. Companies like Google and Amazon have made major commitments to
renewable technologies, purchasing enoughwind and solar power in 2017 to compen-
sate for their energy needs (Donnelly 2017). In 2016, the deployment of new energy
storage technologies—most notably batteries—grew by more than 50% (Interna-
tional Energy Agency 2017). And car companies—most prominently Tesla, Volvo
and BMW—have taken significant strides to electrify their fleets.
This chapter will analyze four green energy technologies: solar panels, wind
turbines, EVs and energy storage batteries. These technologies are already on the
market, have made the biggest gains in the past decade, and are projected to increase
in demand exponentially through 2050.
As the demand for these technologies grows, so too does the demand for a number
of minerals required to develop and facilitate them. Solar panels, for example, were
the fastest-growing source of renewable energy in 2016 (Levin Sources 2017a, b).
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According to the World Bank, solar technologies could represent somewhere from
2 to 25% of total global energy production in a low-carbon economy through 2050
(Arrobas et al. 2017).While theminerals required for solar technologies vary depend-
ing on the type and make of the panel, key minerals including gallium, germanium,
indium, iron, nickel, selenium, tellurium and tin.
Wind technologies are also becoming more widespread and price-competitive
with traditional fossil-fuel-based energy. In Europe, wind accounted for 44% of all
new power installations in 2018 (WindEurope 2019). The minerals required for wind
technologies also vary, depending on whether or not they located off or onshore and
whether they use geared or direct-drive technologies.2
EVs are expected to be as affordable as gas-powered cars by 2022, with the
greatest demand coming from China (NetworkNewsWire 2017). Bloomberg New
Energy Finance estimates that 57% of all passenger vehicle sales will be electric
by 2040 (BloombergNEF 2019a, b). Lithium-ion batteries dominate the market for
EV batteries, due to their excellent energy-to-weight ratio (Arrobas et al. 2017).
Due to the increasing demand for EVs and energy storage batteries, the demand for
and prices of minerals like lithium, cobalt and manganese—all used in lithium-ion
batteries—are already rising. The price of manganese, for example, nearly doubled
from 2015 to 2017 (USA News Group 2017). Other estimates suggest that, in order
to meet upcoming lithium demand, at least one new lithium mine will need to begin
operations each year through 2025 (Baystreet Staff 2017).
The predictedmineral requirements for each green energy technology are included
in Table 1. These minerals were determined based on data from the World Bank,
Levin Soures, the U.S. Geological Survey, Bloomberg New Energy Finance and
the American Exploration & Mining Association. Although other minerals may be
required, the minerals in the following graphic were verified and cross-referenced by
multiple sources and represent strategic components of the technologies in question.
Table 1 Minerals required for green energy technologies
Green energy technology Minerals required
Solar Bauxite & Alumina, Cadmium, Copper, Gallium,
Germanium, Indium, Iron, Lead, Nickel, Selenium,
Silicon, Silver, Tellurium, Tin, Zinc
Wind Bauxite & Alumina, Chromium, Cobalt, Copper, Iron,
Lead, Manganese, Molybdenum, Rare Earths, Zinc
Electric vehicles and energy storage Bauxite & Alumina, Cobalt, Copper, Graphite, Iron,
Lead, Lithium, Manganese, Nickel, Rare Earths, Silicon,
Titanium
Source Data primarily from the World Bank (2017), Levin Sources (2017a, b), USGS (2017),
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2018) and the American Exploration & Mining Association
(2013)
2Geared technologies, for example, do not require as much lead or rare earths as direct-drive, but
are generally less reliable and have a lower capacity to handle intense wind speeds (Arrobas et al.
2017).
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It is important to note that, due to the rapid rate of technological advances and possible
opportunities for metal substitutions, these minerals are subject to change and are
dependent on market fluctuations.3
The variety of minerals and metals required, and the quantities of each that will be
needed, place stakeholders from across themining life cycle—including exploration,
extraction and processing entities—in a strategic position to contribute to the shift to a
low-carbon economy. Exploration is expected to surge in order to meet the blooming
demand and projected mineral supply deficits. However, the rate of change in the
transition to a low-carbon economy has so far been too rapid for the exploration
industry to keeppace;while the price ofmetals can increase quickly, it takes anywhere
from 10 to 15 years from the discovery of a new deposit to the presence of fully
operating mines at the site (Allen 2017).
Mineral recycling could alleviate some of the pressure placed on extractive oper-
ations; however, to date most of the listed minerals have poor end-of-life collection
and recycling rates. Even in a scenario where recycling rates improve, studies have
shown that supplies of lithium and cobalt, in particular, will still deplete signifi-
cantly by 2060 (Manberger and Stenqvist 2018). As a result, the development of new
technologies and metal substitution pathways are likely to play a far greater role in
addressing potential supply deficits.
2.2 A Note on Mining and Conflict
Mineral resources—their extraction and the responsible investment of the revenues
generated—can be a key driver of sustainable development. Well-managed minerals
and metals can be a source of significant revenue for developing countries, revenue
that, when collected and distributed transparently, can support national investments
in health, education, infrastructure and other sectors crucial to a country’s growth and
prosperity. Large-scale mines (LSM) can be a significant source of foreign invest-
ments, jobs, shared infrastructure and procurement for local goods and services,
while artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) can provide viable livelihoods in
regions where opportunities may be limited. Ensuring that mining contributes to
sustainable development will depend on the presence of strong laws and policies for
the sector, as well as mechanisms and institutions in place for their implementation
and enforcement.
3For example, there has been some recent speculation that vanadium redox flow batteries could
become a substitute for stationary lithium-ion batteries, thereby placing a greater demand on
vanadium (Church 2019).
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The potential for conflict,4 however, always exists in themining sector—a function
of the impacts of mining activities have on communities, economies and the envi-
ronment (Andrews et al. 2017). These conflicts are rarely the result of a single actor,
but rather the result of interactions between multiple actors including companies,
governments (local, district, national), communities and civil society organizations
(Andrews et al. 2017).
Conflict minerals are defined by the European Union as those minerals that “fi-
nance armed groups, fuel forced labour and other human rights abuses, and sup-
port corruption and money laundering” (European Commission 2017). Diamonds in
Sierra Leone and Angola are a prominent example: gaining control of the country’s
rich alluvial diamond deposits was a key incentive for rebel groups to carry out vio-
lence during the country’s civil war, and the stones were used as a funding source for
their ongoing operations. Similarly, illegal tin, tungsten, tantalum and gold (3TG)
mining continues to fuel violence in the DRC. Beyond Africa, armed groups exert
control over 3TG operations in South American countries as well; notable examples
include the ELN in Colombia and drug smugglers and illegal groups in Venezuela
(Jamasmie 2017; Diaz-Struck and Poliszuk 2012). Prolonged resource conflicts con-
tribute to further human rights abuses and facilitate corruption, as well as undermine
state legitimacy and resource governance institutions.
Conflict minerals are, of course, not the sole source of tension in the sector. As
mining activities expanded from 2000 to 2012 due to high commodity prices, driven
by increasing global demand for raw materials, incidences of social conflicts around
mining increased in parallel, driven and experienced by a diverse range of state, non-
state and private actors (Dietz and Engels 2016). Between January 2006 and July
2013, 843 large-scale protest movements—relating to a range of societal issues—
took place in 87 countries (Andrews et al. 2017). These protests were and continue
to be most prevalent in Latin America, Africa and Asia, and have continued despite
downturns in both commodity prices and mining activities. In 2017, for example,
thousands of protesters in Jerada, Morocco, called for government intervention and
regulation in the country’s coal mining sector, known locally as the “mines of death,”
according to news reports (Leotaud 2017). In the same year in Boké, Guinea, one
person died and 20were injured by Guinean forces during protests against the impact
of local bauxite mining operations.
This chapter will analyze the fragility, conflict and violence implications of both
LSM and ASM operations. While the prevalence of conflict minerals is more com-
monly associatedwithASM sites, the high rates of protests, civil unrest, environmen-
tal degradation, corruption andother financial crimes associatedwithLSMoperations
necessitate that both be examined to fully understand the range of conflict implica-
tions associated with an increased demand for minerals required for green energy
technologies.
4It should be noted that conflict in and of itself is not necessarily a bad thing; disagreements among
stakeholders can lead to dialogue, debate and constructive change. Violent conflict, conversely, is
never an optimal solution to differing opinions and approaches.
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3 Identifying Mineral-Rich Fragile States Critical
to the Low-Carbon Transition
The minerals and metals identified as critical to the development and deployment
of four key green energy technologies—solar, wind, EVs and energy storage—are
presented in Table 1. These minerals include, but are not limited to aluminium,
cadmium, chromium, cobalt, copper, gallium, germanium, graphite, indium, iron,
lead, lithium, manganese, molybdenum, nickel, rare earths, selenium, silicon, silver,
tellurium, tin and zinc. Recycling minerals—or secondary minerals—are not yet in
sufficient supply to meet the predicted demand, and therefore the majority of these
minerals and metals will continue to be sourced from mining sites.
Given the historical links between conflict and mining, it is essential to determine
if increasing extraction of these minerals has the potential to aggravate grievances
and tensions at current and future sites of extraction. Regions that are vulnerable to
these dynamics were identified by overlaying fragility indicators with global reserves
of identified minerals. Fragility was determined by using both the Fund for Peace’s
Fragile States Index as well as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index. The Fragile States Index defines fragility using 12 indicators relating to inter-
nal cohesion, the economy, politics, cross-cutting factors including demographic
pressures, refugees and internally displaced persons, and external intervention (The
Fund for Peace 2018). Transparency International calculates perceptions of corrup-
tion in the public sector using 13 different data sources from 12 different institutions
(Transparency International 2017).
Fragility and corruption measures are presented in Fig. 1; the darker the shading,
the more fragile and corrupt the state is, according to 2017 and 2018 data sets. As
Fig. 1 Fragility and corruption indicators. Source Fund for Peace (2018), Transparency Interna-
tional (2017)
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can be seen, fragility and corruption are not endemic to any one particular region;
all countries struggle with these issues, to varying degrees. However, higher rates
of fragility and corruption are found in the Sahel and Central Africa, the Middle
East and North Africa, Southeastern Asia, Central America and some parts of South
America.
Fragility indicators can next be overlaid with established mineral reserves5—
defined as resources known to be economically feasible for extraction—to determine
if any of the strategic reserves are found in countries already plagued by instabil-
ity. The U.S. Geological Survey collects and disseminates data on global mineral
production and reserves every year in its Mineral Commodities Summaries. While
extensive, the report has notable data gaps resulting from reporting and collection
inefficiencies, particulary in developing countries. For this reason, it is important
to note that even if a country has been designated as having minimal to no mineral
reserves, this does not necessarily indicate the country lacks the mineral in question,
only that data is unavailable to determine if there are significant reserves.
Figure 2 overlays the location of reserves of 18minerals that are strategic for green
energy technologieswith indicators of fragility and corruption, highlighting areas that
may be vulnerable to conflict with the proliferation of green energy technologies. The
size of the circle corresponds to the relative global quantity of the country’s reserves
in metric tonnes. Mineral data was unavailable for cadmium, gallium, germanium,
Fig. 2 Global reserves of minerals required for green energy technologies overlaid with fragility
and corruption measures. Source Fund for Peace (2018), Transparency International (2017), U.S.
Geological Survey (2018)
5While data on existing mineral deposits is readily available and may indicate large quantities of
select minerals, these deposits have not yet been deemed economically viable and are therefore
excluded from analysis.
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indium and silicon. It is important to note as well that the circles signifying the
reserves are geotagged to the country only, and not to a particular region within
the country. Further, the colour of the circles has no significance, other than to
differentiate between the different minerals.
While the map does not reflect current levels of production, the presence of strate-
gic minerals in fragile states, coupled with the expected increase in demand for these
minerals in the decades to come, point to the emergence of a number of potential
hotspots for increased conflict or tension. Figure 2 demonstrates that there are signif-
icant reserves of strategic minerals in South America, sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast
Asia and Australia. These regions, with the exception of Australia, have middle
to high measures of fragility and corruption, highlighting areas that are potentially
vulnerable to conflict with the proliferation of green energy technologies.
Table 2 Mineral reserves in states with high fragility and high corruption
Mineral Global reserves located in a
fragile or very fragile statea
(%)
Global reserves located in states
perceived to be corrupt or very
corruptb (%)


















Source Fund for Peace (2018), Transparency International (2017), U.S. Geological Survey (2018)
aLabelled as “elevated warning,” “high warning,” “alert,” “high alert,” or “very high alert” on the
2018 Fragile States Index: receiving a score of 70.00 or higher (113.4 is the highest score, held by
South Sudan).
bReceiving a score of 43.00 or lower on the 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index. A score of 1
denotes a highly corrupt state; a score of 100 denotes a very clean state.
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Table 2 further illustrates the possibility of conflicts emerging around these min-
erals. The table lists the percentage of known global reserves located in either fragile
or corrupt states. Twenty-eight per cent of bauxite and alumina reserves, for exam-
ple, are found in a very fragile state: Guinea. Fifty-six per cent of cobalt reserves
are located in one very fragile and very corrupt state: the DRC. Notable, 100% of
chromium and graphite reserves are found in states perceived to be either corrupt or
very corrupt. In fact, substantial reserves of all 18 studiedminerals are found in states
perceived to be either corrupt or very corrupt in 2017 (Transparency International
2017).
In order to understand these conflict risks better, three case studieswill be explored
in further depth: cobalt in theDRC, rare earths inChina andnickel inGuatemala. Each
demonstrating a different geography, mineral and types of conflicts. These minerals
were selected based on their importance to the development and deployment of green
energy technologies and the rates of fragility and corruptionwheremajor reserves are
found. Each case study examines the mineral’s use in green energy technologies, as
well as the conflict, fragility andviolence implications of increasedmineral extraction
in one country, typically the country with the most reserves.
4 Case Studies
4.1 Cobalt in the DRC
Cobalt is used in the batteries of most modern electronics, including smartphones,
digital music players and laptops. Critical to the low-carbon economy, cobalt is
also instrumental for the development and facilitation of EVs and energy storage
technologies. For EVs in particular, cobalt is found in three out of the four major
lithium-ion batteries on the market: lithium cobalt oxides, nickel manganese cobalt
and nickel cobalt aluminium (Levin Sources 2017a, b). Lithium-ion batteries are also
used to store energy derived from solar, wind and other green technologies, thereby
making the batteries—and the minerals required to power them—an integral part in
the transition to a low-carbon economy.
Surging demand for cobalt has been a recurring theme in recent headlines. The
World Bank estimated that if the international community is able to keep global
temperature rise to 2 °C (instead of the project 6 °C) through the widespread adoption
of green energy, demand for cobalt could see an increase of an exponential magnitude
(Arrobas et al. 2017). Future demand and pricing are largely predicated on changes
in the automotive industry, namely, the shift toward lithium-ion batteries. Some
estimates suggest that the price of cobalt could increase to USD 100,000 per tonne
by 2030 (compared to USD 60,000 per tonne in 2017) as a result of the transition
to EVs and green energy storage technologies (NetworkNewsWire 2017). Much of
this demand comes from Chinese manufacturing and consumer markets.
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Global cobalt supply is subject to potential shortages. Some estimates suggest a
20% global cobalt supply gap by 2025, even with new mining operations in Canada
coming online in the interim (Safehaven.com 2017). The British Geological Survey’s
2015 Risk List gave cobalt a score of 8.1 out of 10, indicating a relatively high supply
risk (British Geological Survey 2015). In addition to unprecedented demand for the
mineral, this risk and supply gap is in part due to the way that cobalt is mined; cobalt
is mined as a by-product of either nickel or copper and therefore can be dependent on
price fluctuations and demand of the two. Cobalt can be mined through both ASM
and LSM operations.
Cobalt supply is also designated as high risk because fragile countries host a
large majority of the cobalt reserves and production. The DRC has the largest global
reserves of cobalt, as demonstrated in Fig. 3, with an estimated 3,500,000 metric
tonnes—50% of world reserves (U.S. Geological Survey 2018). Other, less signifi-
cant reserves are found in Australia, Cuba, the Philippines, Zambia, Russia, Canada,
Madagascar, PapuaNewGuinea, SouthAfrica and theUnitedStates (U.S.Geological
Survey 2018).
Despite a vast wealth of mineral resources and biodiversity, the DRC’s recent his-
tory has been defined by fragility, corruption and violence. The centre of what was
called Africa’s World War, or the Second Congo War, from 1998 to 2003, legacies
of human rights abuse, weak governance and exploitative practices still permeate the
lives of many Congolese citizens. The country still scores high on global indicators
of fragility and corruption, ranked the 5th most fragile country in the world and the
19th most corrupt (The Fund for Peace 2019; Transparency International 2019). And
Fig. 3 Global cobalt reserves overlaid with fragility and corruption measures. Source Fund for
Peace (2018), Transparency International (2017), U.S. Geological Survey (2018)
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although the Ibrahim Index ofAfricanGovernance demonstrates that, in recent years,
the DRC has shown increasing improvement in developing a sustainable economy,
it also highlights a continued deterioration of human development, political partic-
ipation and human rights (IIAG 2016). Its positive peace ranking is low, indicating
that despite marginal economic improvements, the state’s stability is still prone to
shocks (Institute for Economics & Peace 2017).
The DRC’s mining industry is its largest source of export income (BBC News
2018a, b). In addition to cobalt, the country is a major global producer of copper,
tantalum, tin and gold. Despite the potential the DRC’s mineral wealth holds for its
economy and development, the country’s history of war, weak governance and grand
corruption pose a risk to the responsible management of ongoing mining operations.
The DRC’s resource governance scores have either been poor or on the cusp
of failing for years, indicating that there are minimal established procedures and
practices to govern the country’s minerals (Natural Resources Governance Institute
2017). Throughout and after the Second Congo War, mineral resources, including
3TG, fuelled violence and human rights violations. Illegal armed groups fought for
control of themines, exploitedminers and used profits from theminerals to fund their
continued violence. These activities, in addition to other global examples, contributed
to the emergency of thinking on “conflict minerals,” referring to minerals that are
extracted from conflict zones and fund continued violence.
In addition to conflict and violence, mineral resources in the DRC can be subject
to corruption schemes and financial crimes. Corruption can erode the social contract
between the state and its citizens, diverting funding away from the core services that
need it most and impoverish communities, further exacerbating fragility.
The continued permeation of fragility, conflict and violence into the mining sec-
tor as well as ongoing records of corruption and weak governance pose considerable
risks for the responsible extraction of Congolese cobalt for green energy technolo-
gies. Already, cobalt has been tied to some of the same exploitative and violent
practices seen in the mining of 3TG; these mines have been connected to child
labour, dangerous working conditions, extortion and human rights abuses.
Approximately 10% of the global supply of cobalt, and 20% of the DRC’s total
exports, comes from ASM operations (Amnesty International 2017). ASM sites are
not inherently dangerous, but are prone to risk due to minimal oversight, regulation
and safety measures (Reuters 2018). ASM operations can be associated with high
rates of death and injuries, due to the lack of safety equipment and protective gear.
In 2016, Amnesty International visited ASM operations in the south of the DRC
and interviewedworkers at fivemining sites. Researchers interviewed 17 children, all
of whom were employed at the mining sites for less than USD 2 per day, and found
that several children had been beaten by the mining companies’ security guards
for trespassing on the companies’ concessions (Amnesty International & Afrewatch
2016). The researchers also found that workers did not have access to protective
equipment, were exposed to harmful chemicals and that state officials extorted illegal
payments from the artisanal miners (Amnesty International & Afrewatch 2016).
As a result of these risks, some companies have tried to avoid sourcing from the
DRC altogether, looking instead to Australia, Canada or the Philippines. Given the
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DRC’s rich reserves, however, leading producers of cobalt will most likely continue
to work in the African country. Efforts should be focused on mitigating conflict risks
by addressing its root causes and stopping human rights abuses around the DRC’s
mining sites, which will ultimately improve certainty in the supply chain.
Despite the relativelywidespread reporting of these ongoing conflict implications,
only marginal improvements have been made to secure the responsible sourcing of
cobalt. Cobalt is not officially classified as a conflict mineral in legislation like the
U.S. Dodd–Frank Act or the European Union’s Conflict Mineral regulation. Any
regulations aimed at curbing the illegal flow of conflict minerals, therefore, may not
explicitly apply to cobalt. Some groups—like the World Economic Forum’s Global
BatteryAlliance and theResponsibleCobalt Initiative—have started to takemeasures
to address these inefficiencies and gaps in international legislation and supply chain
governance. However, given the ongoing human rights abuses and surging demand
for cobalt, additional improvements in the responsible sourcing of cobalt are still
sorely needed.
4.2 Rare Earths in China
The term “rare earths” refers to 17 different elements, often found together in the
Earth’s crust. Of the 17, three are of particular importance to the development of green
energy technologies: dysprosium, neodymium and praseodymium. These minerals
are necessary for the production of specialized magnets used in both EVs and energy
storage technologies as well as wind turbines. The magnets are favoured for EVs
because they are generally lighter, stronger and more efficient than induction motors
that rely on copper coils (Desai 2018). Similarly, use of these magnets has significant
advantages in the production of wind turbines, cited for their efficiency, weight, size
and maintenance properties (Pavel et al. 2017). The World Bank notes that the use
of these magnets in wind turbines is preferred, particularly for offshore turbines, due
to their reliability and capacity to handle higher wind speeds (Arrobas et al. 2017).
Some substitutions are available for rare earths; however, most of these are still in
the research phase and in general have been found to be less effective.
The prices of wind turbines and EVs are increasingly competitive, making the
deployment of both a rapid reality. The demand for rare earths to meet this reality,
and for neodymium and praseodymium in particular, is expected to surge in the
coming years with this transition. The global demand for neodymium in 2017 was
approximately 31,700 tonnes, outstripping supply by 3,300 tonnes (Desai 2018).
And without viable substitutions, demand for neodymium will need to increase by
more than 250% through 2050 for the international community to meet its Paris
Agreement goals (Arrobas et al. 2017).
Both the demand for and supply for rare earths are concentrated in China. China
accounted for 80% of rare earth production in 2017 and is home to 36% of world
reserves, as shown in Fig. 4 (U.S. Geological Survey 2018). Reserves are also located
in Vietnam, Brazil, Russia, India, Australia, the United States, Canada, South Africa,
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Fig. 4 Rare earths reserves overlaid with fragility and corruption measures. Source Fund for Peace
(2018), Transparency International (2017), U.S. Geological Survey (2018)
Malawi and Malaysia, but these are yet to be developed to the same extent as the
Chinese reserves (Australia hosts the only other major rare earths operations in
the world). Increasing demand for and prices of rare earths are spurring the rapid
development of rare earths projects around the world; however, most of the projects
will not come online until the last 2020s. China’s monopoly of the rare earths market,
however, is set to continue for the coming decade at a minimum (Shaw 2017).
In addition to rare earths, China is rich in multiple mineral resources key to green
energy technologies. Most notably, China has some of the largest global reserves
of lead, selenium, tellurium, tin and zinc, which are critical to solar technology,
as well as graphite, lithium and titanium, which are critical for EVs and energy
storage technologies. The country also has reserves of bauxite and alumina, copper,
iron, manganese, nickel and silver. This vast mineral wealth places China in a unique
global position, in some cases allowing the state to exert a quasi-monopoly on several
critical minerals. A number of producers and refiners for minerals required for green
energy technologies, including cobalt, are also located in China. Virtually all lithium-
ion battery production is done in China: the country is the largest global importer of
cobalt, nickel and manganese, as well as lithium, despite having large reserves of its
own (RCS Global 2017). As such, most discussions of green energy supply chains
must include China.
China has mid-range scores of fragility and corruption (Fund for Peace 2019;
Transparency International 2019). It has high positive peace scores, indicating high
levels of resilience and the appropriate attitudes, institutions and structures needed
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to sustain a peaceful society (Institute for Economics & Peace 2017). However,
the Natural Resource Governance Institute labels China’s resource governance as
“weak,” indicating that the sector has a mix of strong and problematic areas of gov-
ernance; indicators like value realization, revenue management and establishing an
enabling environment for extraction have ample room to improve (Natural Resources
Governance Institute 2017).
Mining and industrial development more generally in China have often come at
the cost of the environment, growing alongside dangerous levels of air and water
pollution. Since the 1990s, environmental activism, driven by localized grievances
against pollution, has grown and manifested in the form of protests, petitions and, in
some cases, violence (Ho and Yang 2018). In 2011, communities from the Qinghai
province in China, for example, urged the government to take action against lead
mining in the Ganhetan Industrial District, which was known to cause high levels of
water pollution and endanger the lives of local residents (Environmental Justice Atlas
2018). Similar protests andpleas have also been recorded against controversial copper
mining in Tibet, gold mining along the Gu Chu River, cadmium extraction in the
GuangdongProvince and cement production in theMadangProvince (Environmental
Justice Atlas 2018).
Rare earth mining can be both destructive and toxic to surrounding environments.
Almost all rare earth ores contain the radioactive elements thorium and uranium
(Huang et al. 2016). As a result, the extraction and processing of rare earths can be
highly toxic and have a negative effect on soil, water and human health. In 1958, the
Baotou Iron and Steel Company began producing rare earths near the city of Baotou
in InnerMongolia; by 1980 crops in the nearby villages had already started to fail due
to pollution of soil and groundwater attributed to rare earth mining and processing
(Bontron 2012). Today, the lands surrounding Baotou are stripped of topsoil while
streambeds contain thousands of gallons of acid (Bradsher 2010a, b). Dalahai village,
located close to a Baotou rare earths tailing pond, has been named a “death village”
due to the high incidence of lung cancer, brain cancer, respiratory illnesses and
cardiovascular diseases suffered by local residents (Huang et al. 2016). Ganzhou,
the so-called “rare earths kingdom,” has been described as a “site of devastation”
by the ChinaDialogue, plagues as it is with crude open air mines, smelters, polluted
water supplies and reduced crop yields (Hongqiao 2016). Coupled with the growth of
environmental activism, rare earths mining in China could lead to increasing tensions
at the local level.
The nature of deposits located in the southern province of Ganzhou makes rare
earth extraction relatively easier than in Inner Mongolia. These deposits are also free
of radioactive thorium. However, as a result of the ease of extraction and raising
global prices for rare earths, a substantial number of illegal rare earth mines emerged
in the area. These mines are cited to sell to organized crime syndicates and exploit
workers, some of which are children (Bradsher 2010a, b; Schlanger 2017). Some
estimates suggest that tens of thousands of tonnes of rare earths are illegally mined
and sold on China’s black market every year (Hongqiao 2016). In response, both
the central and provincial governments have taken measures against illegal mining
operations, including instituting new regulations against illegal exploration as well
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as dispatching police to outlaw the illegal mines (Yan 2012). The traceability of rare
earths supply chains, however, is still relatively unexplored, and is not regulated to
the same extent as other conflict minerals.
In addition to the risks of exacerbating local and global grievances surrounding
pollution and public health, China’s majority share of rare earth production has been
used as political–economic leverage in past state-level disputes. In 2010, amid a terri-
torial disagreement over disputed islands with Japan, China suspended its shipments
of rare earths to its neighbour (Bradsher 2010a, b). Chinese officials later lifted the
embargo and denied that the ban was in response to the dispute with Japan, but that
they had instead reduced export quotas to mitigate pollution and environmental con-
cerns (Bradsher 2010a, b). Nevertheless, the period raised a number of concerns with
companies and countries around the world regarding the diminishing supply, rising
prices and implications of China’s dominant position in the rare earths market. More
recently, concerns have been raised that China could use this position for leverage in
the trade war between the U.S. and China (Reuters 2019).
4.3 Nickel in Guatemala
Cobalt, lithium and rare earths tend to dominate the discussions around the minerals
required for the green energy transition. This is in part due to the fact that base metals
like nickel are not exclusively produced for green energy technologies; nickel is used
in more than 300,000 products worldwide, including those with consumer, industrial
aerospace, marine and architectural applications (Nickel Institute n.d.). Of the 2.1
million metric tonnes of nickel content produced in 2017, approximately 65% was
used to manufacture stainless steel, while only 6% was devoted to the production of
coins, electronics and rechargeable batteries (U.S. Geological Survey 2018; Nickel
Institute n.d.). However, its use in the production of steel is also expected to benefit
from green energy technologies, and its use in rechargeable batteries is expected to
comprise a growing share of nickel production annually. Nickel can only be mined
through LSM operations.
Nickel is required for multiple green energy technologies. Currently, two types of
lithium-ion batteries make up the majority of the EV market due to their efficiency,
price and ease in manufacturing: nickel manganese cobalt and nickel cobalt alu-
minium batteries (Hunt 2018). A rate of 30 and 80% of nickel is required for nickel
manganese cobalt and nickel cobalt aluminiumbatteries, respectively.As such, nickel
will be crucially important to the green energy transition, regardless of which EV
battery leads production in the coming decade (Hunt 2018). Nickel is also instru-
mental in solar technologies; according to the World Bank, the transition to solar
could increase the demand for nickel by 300% through 2050 (Arrobas et al. 2017).
This number increases dramatically when EVs and energy storage technologies are
included, with a predicted increase in demand for nickel of up to 1,200% (Arrobas
et al. 2017).
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Fig. 5 Nickel reserves overlaid with fragility and corruption measures. Source Fund for Peace
(2018), Transparency International (2017), U.S. Geological Survey (2018)
Nickel ismined inmore than 40 countries, with significant quantities of reserves in
13, shown in Fig. 5 (U.S. Geological Survey 2018). However, of these reserves, 38%
are found in states given an “elevated warning” label or worse on the Fragile States
Index (Fund for Peace 2018), and 54% of reserves are located in states perceived to
be corrupt or very corrupt (Transparency International 2017). Guatemala is currently
ranked 10th in terms of world reserves, with an estimated 1,800,000 metric tonnes
of nickel content (U.S. Geological Survey 2018).
Guatemala is one of the most resource-rich and populated countries in Central
America. Despite this richness, the country ranks poorly on indicators of fragility,
corruption and violence (Fund for Peace 2019; Transparency International 2019).
Although the Indigenous Maya comprise almost 50% of the population, they are
disproportionately affected by development challenges and the negative impacts of
the country’s mining industry (BBC News 2018a, b).
Mining activity currently makes up approximately 3% of Guatemala’s overall
GDP (MICLA n.d.). Along with nickel, Guatemala possesses rich deposits of gold,
silver and copper, although not all have been economically viable to mine. On the
2017 Resource Governance Index, Guatemala’s mining sector was given a “poor”
ranking, having established minimal procedures and practices to govern resources
(Natural Resources Governance Institute 2017).
Nickel mining is relatively new to Guatemala, having emerged during the coun-
try’s armed internal conflict, which began in the early 1960s and lasted until 1996. At
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the height of this violence, the Canadian mining firm INCO (previously the Interna-
tional Nickel Company, now Vale) won a monopoly on nickel extraction in Central
America, and controlled nearly 54%of the nickelmarket inNorth and SouthAmerica
(Price 2015). New mines were primarily opened in Guatemala’s rural areas, where
the majority of Indigenous Maya people reside. Indigenous opposition to mining
during the civil war manifested as protests against illegal land use, environmen-
tal degradation, and connections to colonialism associated with LSM operations.
In response, armed groups and private security forces were sometimes deployed to
remove indigenous-led opposition to mining (Price 2015).
Throughout the armed internal conflict, more than 200,000 civilians were killed
and more than 1.5 million displaced (Agence France-Presse 2015; PBS News Hour
2011). Guatemala’sHistorical ClarificationCommission later found that themajority
of these abuses were perpetrated by the state military and that 83% of victims were
Indigenous Maya (Amnesty International 2014).
A recent report by Amnesty International found that mining companies in
Guatemala throughout the civil war neglected to address existing community ten-
sions and in many cases “failed to adhere to international standards on business and
human rights” in regards to consultation and security operations (Amnesty Interna-
tional 2014). Although the civil war ended in 1996, the legacy of violence continues
to affect Guatemalan society, oftentimes manifesting around the mining of nickel.
Fenix Mining project is one of the largest nickel mines in Central America (Hill
2014). Throughout the past decade, the project—located near the Lote Ocho Indige-
nous community in El Estor—has been linked to allegations of forced displacement,
murder and sexual violence. Due to poor access to dispute resolution mechanisms
and a weak judiciary, victims—the majority of which are Indigenous—have up to
date been unable to successfully bring criminal cases against their perpetrators within
Guatemala (Kassam 2017). Some victims, however, have been able to bring forward
civil lawsuits in the home jurisdictions of the foreign mining companies that own the
mine (and their subsidiaries) (Kassam 2017).
In the case of Caal v. HudBay, 11 Maya Q’eqchi’ women are suing the mining
company HudBay in its home jurisdiction of Ontario (Klippensteins et al. 2018).
The women allege that in January 2007, private security personnel from the Fenix
mining project forced villagers off their ancestral lands, burned their homes and
sexually assaulted the women (Klippensteins et al. 2018). In addition to this lawsuit,
community groups are suing HudBay and its subsidiaries for the 2009 murder of
the community leader Adolfo Ich Chamán and the shooting of German Chub Choc.
HudBay denies culpability, stating that the sexual assaults were carried before their
involvement in the mine and that mining personnel were not involved in the 2009
evictions; HudBay bought the mine from the Guatemalan Nickel Company in 2008
(Kassam 2017; Price 2015; Hudbay Minerals Inc. 2017).
While these cases represent a landmark move to bridge the disconnect between
foreign mining companies and the actions of its local subsidiaries, they also reflect
how increasedmineral demand in resource-rich states like Guatemala can result in an
exacerbation of land ownership disputes between private companies, governments
and community groups. A decade after the aforementioned incidents, nickel mining
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in Central America is still associated with the destruction of surface land resources,
a primary source of livelihoods for many Indigenous communities (Fox 2014).
If the demand for nickel increases at its predicted rates, it is essential to ensure
that mining companies and governments adhere to international human rights and
business law, as well as actively respect the human and land rights of Indigenous
persons. This consideration, as well as improved access to effective dispute reso-
lutions, will be necessary to mitigate ongoing community tensions and grievances
surrounding extraction, and to contribute to the responsible supply chain governance
of nickel and other base metals.
5 Supply Chain Governance
Some states, international agencies and private sector entities have introduced leg-
islation and guidance to curb the flow of conflict minerals and promote responsible
and transparent mineral supply chains. This includes the OECDDueDiligence Guid-
ance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-
Risk Areas. In line with the UN Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights,
the OECD guidance provides a framework for companies operating in contexts of
fragility to conduct due diligence on their supply chains by assessing potential risks,
preventing andmitigating these identified risks, and adopting a riskmanagement plan
(OECD 2016). The guidance applies to all minerals, but has specific supplements
for 3TG.
The European Union (EU) Conflict Minerals Regulation comes into force on
January 1, 2021 and is designed to ensure that all EU importers of 3TG meet the
OECD Guidance. The regulation directly applies to almost 1,000 EU importers and
indirectly applies to 500 smelters and refiners of 3TG, based both inside and outside
the EU (European Commission 2017). As the regulation only applies to 3TG, the
aforementioned minerals will not be directly affected. However, additional minerals
could be added to the regulation in 2024, when the EU executive is set to undergo a
review of the bill.
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce forMetals, Minerals &Chemicals Importers
& Exporters (2015) also introduced a framework to operationalize the OECD Guid-
ance. The framework provides guidelines and tools to those Chinese companies that
extract or use minerals in their products to help them identify, prevent and mitigate
risks of conflict, human rights abuses and misconduct throughout the entire mining
life cycle. The framework can be applied to all minerals, however, remains voluntary.
The U.S. Dodd-Frank Act is another prominent mechanism to promote respon-
sible mineral supply chains, though with more limited geographic scope. Passed in
2010, Section 1502 of the Act requires U.S. publicly traded companies to assess
and address any risks in the supply chains of 3TG that may originate from the DRC
or neighbouring countries. While the scope of this legislation neglects the potential
for other minerals and regions beyond sub-Saharan Africa to finance armed groups
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in mineral-rich fragile states, the legislation is a landmark example of public sector
action against corruption, human rights abuses and violence in the mining sector.
In addition to these public sector mechanisms, civil society groups and private
sector actors have also taken steps to ensure the responsible sourcing of minerals
and metals. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), for example,
promotes the open and accountable management of oil, gas and mineral resources
(EITI 2018). In addition, the London Metals Exchange (LME), the world’s biggest
market for industrial metals, has increased efforts to monitor and investigate cobalt
sources. In July 2018, LME announced that it would require all companies that
receive a minimum of 25% of their metal from ASM mines in the DRC to undergo
a professional audit (Desai and Daly 2018). These moves demonstrate the growing
awareness of the conflict-related risks associated with cobalt extraction in fragile
states.
Industry schemes like the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI) are also con-
tributing to the improved international governance of mineral supply chains. RMI is
a coalition of more than 360 member companies aiming to improve the human rights
conditions of mineral supply chains, by administering third-party audits of mineral
sourcing in conflict-affected and high-risk areas (Sustainable Brands 2018). In 2016,
the OECD began to assess five industry schemes, including RMI, regarding the
schemes’ alignment with the OECD Guidance and overall due diligence in sourcing
practices. Although the official policies of the industry schemes were increasingly
alignedwith the OECDGuidance, the assessment found in its 2018 report that imple-
mentation of the due diligence processes lagged behind alignment (OECD 2018).
Reporting and monitoring by civil society groups have pointed to sometimes shal-
low improvement in due diligence practices by mining companies and industries as
well. The Responsible Sourcing Network, for example, assess companies’ efforts to
provide strong supply chain due diligence in their use of conflict minerals (Deberdt
and Jurewicz 2017). The report found that, although more than 70% of assessed
companies followed the OECD guidelines, most did so only superficially and few
used the guidance in full (Deberdt and Jurewicz 2017).
The implementation gap is common across the various public sector, private sec-
tor and civil society actions to monitor and regulate the mineral supply chain, posing
a risk to the responsible sourcing of green energy technologies and the minerals
required to develop and deploy them. While legislation like Section 1502 of the
Dodd–Frank Act and the upcoming EU Conflict Minerals Regulation represent sig-
nificant milestones to responsible mineral governance, many are not yet applicable
to minerals beyond 3TG. In the past few years, the conflict risks of cobalt sourc-
ing have started to garner international attention. Subsequently, some civil society
groups and private sector actors have started to incorporate responsible cobalt sourc-
ing into their mandates. However, the supply chains and associated risks of other
green conflict minerals like bauxite and alumina, lithium, nickel and rare earths are
still largely unexplored and therefore largely absent from the current field of mineral
supply chain governance.
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6 Recommendations and Conclusions
Mining can be an inherently risky industry. Companies and small-scale miners alike
constantly struggle with accessing uncertain deposits, managing volatile commodity
prices, ensuring worker health and safety, and avoiding environmental catastrophe.
Conflict adds another, significant risk to mining: it can interrupt operations, under-
mine the social license to operate, damage reputations and, at its most extreme,
threaten the lives of those involved. Conflict and fragility are bad for business,
communities and governments, and reducing conflict risks is in the interests of all
stakeholders.
For minerals required to make the transition to a low-carbon economy, there are
real risks of grievances, tensions and conflicts emerging or continuing, as has been
made clear in the case studies and mapping exercise presented. For fragile states,
weak governance, corruption and the inadequate implementation and enforcement
of existing laws all work against ensuring that the benefits of mining accrue to the
population and the country’s sustainable development. Local voices are often left
out of important decision-making, and meaningful engagement with communities
does not always occur prior to the start of mining activities. Depending on the min-
eral, individuals can be subject to health and safety violations, human rights abuses,
environmental risks and child labour.
There remains a lack of transparency across a number of key supply chains, includ-
ing those for cobalt, lithium and bauxite. This opaqueness extends to the recycling
industry, which will be increasingly important part of mineral and material provision
in the future. Regulations and laws supporting increased transparency are not yet
widespread enough to capture all relevant minerals, though important lessons can be
drawn from international efforts to eliminate conflict from 3TG supply chains. The
complexity of these supply chains, which include miners, traders, smelters, refiners,
manufacturers, transporters and consumers, can be intimidating, but should not deter
the international community from the important work that needs to be done to ensure
they are conflict free.
Governments, the private sector and civil society should work together to ensure
that the transition to a low-carbon economy, and the subsequent sourcing from
mineral-rich fragile states, is conducted in a way which promotes peace, stability
and sustainability. While some of the foundations are in place to ensure that these
critical minerals do not emerge as conflict minerals in the coming decades, these
must be extended and strengthened. In particular, communities should be engaged
in a meaningful way across the mineral life cycle, transparency promoted, existing
supply chain regulations should be expanded to apply to more minerals, and the
implementation of these regulations improved.
To meet the aims of the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals,
it is imperative that we transition to a low-carbon economy. Green energy technolo-
gies like wind turbines, solar panels, EVs and improved energy storagewill aid in this
transition. However, the emergence or exacerbation of fragility, conflict and violence
along the supply chains of the minerals needed to produce these technologies could
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threaten the overall “green” nature of this transition. In order to meet global goals
around sustainable development and climate change mitigation, while contributing
to lasting peace, the supply chains of these strategic minerals must be governed in
a way that is responsible, accountable and transparent. Achieving this vision will
require concerted effort from civil society, the private sector and governments.
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The Impacts of the Energy Transition
on Growth and Income Distribution
Giacomo Luciani
1 The Impacts of the Energy Transition on Economic
Growth and Income Distribution
Two conflicting narratives are frequently heard in connection with the economic
impact of the energy transition. The first has it that the transition is a great opportunity
to revitalize economic growth and increase employment. The second, in contrast,
estimates that objectives like reaching carbon neutrality by 2050, as pledged by the
European Union, would be “too expensive.” Which is right?
The question is supremely relevant for the political viability of the transition and
the implementation of the Paris agreement. It is not by chance that environmentalists
have consistently asserted that decarbonization is not only good for the environ-
ment, but also for the economy. This assertion promises benefits to all, including
people living in regions that may not be greatly affected by global warming; and to
contemporaries versus future generation, thus fundamentally improving the political
appeal of the transition. If, instead, decarbonization entails an economic burden, and
even accepting that this burden is likely much smaller than that which would derive
from climate change, the question of the sharing of such burden, both internationally
and intergenerationally, inevitably arises. As we know, there has, unfortunately, been
substantial and persistent pushback from electorates in democratic countries towards
decarbonization policies; and governments are not implementing measures capable
of delivering the goals they are subscribing to. This must have something to do with
perceived costs and benefits!
In the following pages,we attempt at disentangling themultiple contrasting effects
that might be expected from the energy transition. It goes without saying that the net
effect, resulting from the balance of such multiple contrasting effects, is extremely
difficult or impossible to predict. It will surely very much depend on the specific
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characteristics of the economy facing energy transition, notably its current energy
system, rate of growth of energy demand, available energy resources, and opportu-
nities for decarbonization. All of these are extremely variable country by country. It
will also greatly depend on the specific transition path pursued, and especially the
intended speed of the transformation.
The question, it should be stressed, is not whether it is more appropriate to move
speedily with the transition; it is not whether mitigation is preferable to adaptation. It
is quite possible—indeed supported by majoritarian expert opinion—that adapting
to climate change might be much more expensive that avoiding or limiting the same.
Nevertheless, if mitigation has a net cost in terms of economic well-being, disposable
income, and income growth, the question of how the burden should be distributed
inevitably arises. Finding a consensus or compromise on burden sharing may be
very difficult indeed, and the path to mitigation may therefore result politically too
arduous.
The prominence of the issue of burden sharing is abundantly evidenced by the
acrimonious debates in successive COPs, and the difficulty that the European Com-
mission has experienced in pushing for the adoption of the goal of carbon neutrality
by 2050. Somemember countries of the EU havemuch “cleaner” electricity systems,
thanks to greater reliance on hydro and nuclear. Othermember countries significantly
rely on coal and consequently generate much larger emissions per kilowatt/hour. The
Commission has proposed the creation of a Just Transition Fund aimed at taking some
of the burden from the shoulders of the worst emitters and transferring it to countries
with cleaner electricity systems. But to what extent is it acceptable that countries that
have invested in cleaner sources early on should be called to contribute to the cost of
cleaning the systems of countries that have resisted doing so? (And, in some cases,
even opted to abandon nuclear, thus worsening the problem?)
2 Three Definitions of GDP
The discussion of the economic impact of the energy transition that is proposed in this
chapter is organized around the definition of gross domestic product (GDP). GDP
can be looked at in three different perspectives: from the point of view of production
generation, of production use, or finally of production (income) distribution.
• From the perspective of production generation, GDP is defined as the sum of all
value added generated in an economy in a given time:
GDP = value added + (taxes − subsidies) on products (1)
where value added is defined as the difference between all costs of production
(excluding the remuneration of factors of production, capital, and labor) and the
realized value of the final product (i.e., total sales revenue at producers’ prices).
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• Alternatively, GDP can be viewed from the point of view of the utilization of
production, and in this case it is equal to consumption plus investment (gross
capital formation or GCF), plus exports minus imports:
GDP = Consumption + Investment + Exports − Imports (2)
Gross capital formation (investment) in turn is composed of substitution of obso-
lete production tools tomaintain existing production capacity, plus addition of new
tools to expand production capacity (the latter constituting net capital formation
or NCF).
• Finally, GDP can be viewed from the point of view of the distribution of income,
in which case it is equal to total wages plus total profits and interests, plus net
government transfers (taxes minus income subsidies):
GDP = Wages + Profits + Taxes − Subsidies (3)
All of the above is very relevant for our discussion, because the energy transition
has implications for value added; for the allocation of income to investment rather
than consumption; to the distribution of income between wages and profits; for taxes
and subsidies; and finally for foreign trade. All of these implications must be spelled
out and considered to achieve a thorough understanding of the impact of the transition
on GDP and its growth.
GDP is a frequently criticized indicator. Indeed, some of the weaknesses of GDP
are well known: in particular, only products and services that are commercialized,
i.e., paid for, are included (except for government services, which are included at
cost). There are plenty of subjectively very valuable products and services that we
enjoy, and play a very important role in determining the well-being of each of us, and
at the same time are not necessarily paid for, hence not included in GDP. Also, lots
of public services that are provided for free are included at cost, independently of
the outcome. Hence, alternative measures have been proposed and sometimes used,
such as the HumanDevelopment Index (UNDP 2019) or either Gross or Net National
Income. Each alternative has merits and demerits, but in the end GDP remains the
most widely used and the best measure of “what money can buy.” It is quite possible
that a decline in GDP will allow you to conduct a happier life than before, but your
money will still buy less than it used to.
3 Pricing Emissions
It is a widely accepted starting point that the economic cause of global warming is
a market failure due to the fact that the cost of emitting CO2 and other greenhouse
gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere is not borne by the emitter (Nordhaus 2013). No
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one has to pay for using the atmosphere, and rules for preventing corporations and
individuals from emitting pollutants are mostly concerned with local or, at most,
national atmospheric conditions. Until very recently, the emission of GHGs has not
involved a cost for the emitter, thus creating a negative externality.
This interpretation assumes that in the absence of a cost for emissions, carbon-
intensive technologies will be more attractive than clean alternatives. According to a
point of viewwhich ismore andmore frequently expressed, someclean alternatives—
notably non-dispatchable renewables—are becoming cheaper and cheaper, and soon
will be, or are already absolutely preferable to carbon-intensive technologies even
in the absence of the imposition of a cost for emissions. Such statements frequently
ignore systemic costs arising from growing penetration of non-dispatchable renew-
ables beyond a certain threshold (variously estimated at 35–50%). But even ignoring
the issue of systemic costs, if it were true that clean sources may become cheaper
than fossil ones, the market would, we may say, be vindicated, and policies to pro-
mote clean technologies would not be needed, because the latter would prevail out of
their own greater competitiveness. At most, the energy transition might be a matter
of speeding up (at a cost) a process that is taking place anyhow. In the rest of the
chapter, I assume that fossil sources remain mostly cheaper than clean ones: there-
fore, if no cost is charged for emitting GHGs, the market will not by itself bring
about decarbonization and avoid climate change.
If the cause of excessive GHG emissions is a market failure due to negative
externality, the remedy must be sought in correcting the functioning of the market by
imposing the internalization of the cost of emittingGHGs.This is thewell-established
“polluter pays” principle, which translates into the need of imposing a cost on carbon
emissions.
By definition, the emergence of a new cost associated with the production of
goods reduces the value added which the economy generates. This is because, other
things being equal, the new cost increases the total cost of production. As energy
enters in the production of all goods, this means that all productive activities will be
faced with an increase in production costs.
Furthermore, also the cost of utilization of a given goodmay increase (if emissions
are linked to the utilization as well as production stage: e.g., producing an internal
combustion engine car will cost more, and using it will also cost more). In this case,
either the producer accepts a lower per unit sales price, which is unlikely, or demand
for the product may decrease because of the increased cost to the consumer: in both
cases the net result will be a reduction in total value added.
GDP is the sum total of all value addedgenerated in an economy, hence introducing
a cost for carbonmust reduce it. This effect may bemore or less important depending
on the level of the newly imposed cost and the extent to which the economy depends
on carbon-intensive production and/or consumption; but it will inevitably be there.
In fact, one may argue that the downsizing of GDP when the cost of carbon emis-
sions is made explicit is the consequence of the failure of acknowledging this cost
in earlier years, since the beginning of the industrial era. In this view, past estimates
of GDP, that do not include externalities, are exaggerated, and the introduction of
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an explicit cost for carbon emissions is just a remedy to past miscalculation. Fol-
lowing this line of thinking, the World Bank has proposed a concept of adjusted
national income, which estimates environmental depletion associated with value-
added generation, and not included as production cost; and corrects national income
accordingly (Lange 2018).
The matter is further complicated by the time lag between damage to the envi-
ronment and the emergence of the economic cost of such damage. We suffer today
from emissions released by past generations over longer than a century; and future
generations will suffer because of our emissions. The economic damage that emit-
ting a ton of CO2 today entails will only be visible in the future, and depends on
how much CO2 has been emitted in the past. Therefore, in fact we cannot internalize
the externality by imputing as cost the present value of the future economic damage
caused by an additional unit of emissions, because we have no precise idea of what
this cost might be. We are, rather, imposing a price on carbon emissions in order to
solicit a market response and achieve a reduction or elimination of emissions. This
price then represents the opportunity value to the potential emitter of emitting one
additional unit (ton of CO2): he will stop emitting only if the price is higher or equal
to the benefit that he may derive from emitting one additional GHG unit.
The explicit addition of a previously hidden cost is the reason that most govern-
ments are reluctant to introduce carbon pricing, whether under the form of a carbon
tax or of a price generated by an emission trading system. Governments frequently
prefer to resort to regulation and administrative measures, whose cost is non trans-
parent and not immediately predictable by those on whose shoulders it will fall. But
this cost exists: it may manifest itself as a shift from a preferred technology to a
less commercially attractive one, or accelerated obsolescence of the existing capital
stock, but in all cases it will lead to a decline in value added, hence of GDP.
4 Carbon Prices Are a Tax
But how is a price imposed on carbon? It is out of acts of government introducing an
emission trading system or a carbon tax (or a combination of the two). In one way
or another, the imposition of a price for carbon emissions translates into revenue for
the government, i.e., higher taxation. Although in theory the imposition of a price
on carbon emissions is justified by the additional cost that these emissions are likely
to impose on future generations, the proceeds do not accrue to some fund set aside
for future generations, but to the government of today. This is important, because
taxes on products appear with a positive sign in the GDP Eq. (1). If all that happens
is that a price on carbon translates into higher tax revenue, the impact on GDP will
be neutral: higher costs imposed on enterprises and/or consumers are compensated
by higher revenue for the government. If this higher revenue is used to subsidize
select productive activities (e.g., production of electricity out of renewable resources
by way of feed-in tariffs, or purchase of solar PV panels through reimbursement of
part of the cost) all that will happen is that the value added of producers paying the
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tax will be decreased to the benefit of producers receiving subsidies, and aggregate
value added may not change.
This would be our conclusion if the purpose of carbon pricing were to raise rev-
enue for the government. In fact, the purpose is to stimulate a change in the behavior
of producers and consumers, i.e., induce them to change their production meth-
ods or consumption baskets, reduce emission, and ideally decarbonize completely.
Thus, the real cost consists of the “distortionary” effect of the combination of taxes
(either explicit or through an ETS) and subsidies. In most cases taxes on products
are designed in such a way as to minimize distortionary effects on production: in our
case the distortion is the desired outcome. The “distortion” may be for the better,
but still entails deviating from maximization of producers’ profits or consumers’
satisfaction, hence a worsening of their condition.
5 Consumption or Investment?
Next, we need to discuss the impact of the transition on the allocation of income
to consumption vs. investment, as described by GDP Eq. (2). From this point of
view, the impact of the transition is a needed decline in consumption, and increase
in investment.
All consumption of goods and services entails some demand for energy. Energy
saving is unanimously identified as a key component of the necessary decarbonization
process: we need to drive less, fly less, heat or air condition less, and so on. We may
shift tomore efficientmachines (requiring additional investment) in order tomaintain
the same level of net service while reducing energy consumption (increasing energy
efficiency), but very likely reduced energy consumption is part of the deal.
Improvements in energy efficiency are unanimously considered an essential com-
ponent of the energy transition. The International Energy Agency estimates that 37%
of the difference between the Stated Policies and the Sustainable Development Sce-
nario must be contributed by improved energy efficiency (IEA 2019, p. 79). Whether
this is genuinely increased efficiency (i.e., less energy use for unchanged level of
service) or simply reduced energy consumption (i.e., acceptance of reduced level of
service) is not clear. Some transition optimists believe that humankind will be able
to achieve expanded level of service with reduced energy use through extraordinary
improvement in efficiency, but this cannot at all be taken for granted.
This points to the need for more investment. There is no progress possible toward
decarbonization that does not require some form of investment. True, the energy sec-
tor always stood out as relatively capital-intensive, meaning that investment would
in any case be necessary to satisfy growing demand or improve efficiency, even
if we were to continue with emitting GHGs into the atmosphere; however, the
decarbonization agenda entails even higher investment.
There are two main effects at work. The first is accelerated obsolescence of the
existing capital stock. Physical assets with decades or years of technical life left in
them will become stranded. This affects Net Fixed Capital Formation, which, as said
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earlier, is Gross Fixed Capital Formation (i.e., investment viewed as the sum total of
buildings and machinery added to the production process) minus the replacement of
worn-out capital from the existing stock. Accelerated obsolescence means that more
of the new fixed capital added in a year will simply compensate for the retirement of
existing capital, instead of contributing to the enlargement of productive capacity.
The second effect is an expected increase in the capital/output ratio, i.e., increased
capital intensity.Asmentioned, the energy sector has been relatively capital-intensive
even before the need to decarbonize became established, but in a decarbonizingworld
it will become even more so. Almost all renewable energy sources are characterized
by high initial investment costs and low subsequent operational costs. The latter are
mostly maintenance costs, not directly related to the volume of production, while
marginal costs may be nil or irrelevant.
In some cases, additional investment for decarbonization may even negatively
affect production capacity, rather than the opposite. Think for example of carbon
capture associated to a fossil fuel-based power plant: the process of capturing CO2
absorbs some of the electricity generated by the plant, so that by investing in carbon
capture we are actually decreasing the net output of electricity from the plant. Of
course, what is gained is the elimination or decrease of emissions, but the usefulness
of the plant with respect to its main product, which is electricity, is decreased. Or
consider the expected transformation of the car industry from internal combustion to
electric engines: this requires huge investment on the part of the automobile manu-
facturers for the introduction of new models, of distributors or municipalities for the
installation of recharging stations, of final consumers for buying new vehicles—and
the end result is a mobility service which is somewhat more limited (because of
range limitations or recharging times) or at most equivalent to what they enjoyed
previously.
The macroeconomic impact of additional investment requirements may be larger
or smaller depending on whether the country in question experiences stagnant or
increasing energy demand. Where energy demand is stable or declining (as in the
EU), the required investment ismore likely to be in substitution of existing production
capacity. In contrast, in an environment of rapidly growing energy demand relative
decarbonization may be achieved by focusing on clean solutions for incremental
energy production capacity, and the increase in investment requirements relative to a
scenario of business as usual might be much more limited. In fact, there may even be
situations in which investment in renewable energy sources may be easier, because
production units are smaller and economies of scale not as important as for traditional
technologies. Greater modularity may facilitate spreading investment over time and
reducing the financial burden.
The shift from consumption to investment may under certain conditions justify
the assertion that decarbonization will enhance growth rather than the opposite.
Whether this is the case depends on the initial condition of the economy. If the
economy is distant from an equilibrium of full employment of available resources,
and savings exceed investment for lack of opportunities or inefficient intermediation
of the financial sector, the emergence of new investment opportunities, especially if
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strongly supported by clear and consistent government policies, may facilitate a shift
toward greater utilization of resources. But how likely might such a scenario be?
It may be argued that the European economy has in fact been far from full employ-
ment equilibrium ever since the financial crisis of 2008. Expansionary monetary
policies have failed to stimulate either consumption or investment. In our capitalist
economies, investment is justified by the expectation of profit, which ultimately is
supported by consumer demand. In recent years, consumer demand in Europe has
remained subdued because of uncertainty, and savings have exceeded investment. In
the US, the situation is altogether different.
The transition requires increased investment even though consumption may not
increase, or evendecrease. If resources canbe channeled towards investment to imple-
ment the transition, in the context of departure from consumerism, it is indeed pos-
sible that the economy moves towards fuller employment of all resources, including
labor, thus resulting in an acceleration of growth. But is this a realistic expectation?
The answer largely depends on institutions and policies. The latter in partic-
ular need to be predictable and strong enough to solicit the desired response from
investors. The profitability of investment for the transitionmust be clearly established
and consistently supported for investors to take the plunge.
But even if the required new investment projects are demonstrably profitable, the
relevant investorsmight not be able to invest.Amain example is investment for energy
savings, which to a large extent depends on decisions to be taken by millions of final
consumers: the investors in this casemay face limitations in financing the investment,
or be put off by the generally long recovery periods, or simply not be aware of all
available opportunities. Even for corporate investors, their balance sheets may not
be solid enough to underpin large financial efforts. Certainly, venture capital may be
available, and shareholders are ready to pay high prices for the shares of companies
that promise a bright future, in contrast with the equity of old energy companies,
which commands low valuations notwithstanding the high dividends paid. But the
impression is that so far not enough of available savings have been channeled toward
investment for decarbonization. In fact, the opposite is likely true: the uncertainty
surroundingmany an economic activity in a decarbonizing future increases investors’
risk and discourages long-term investment.
This is all the more true if we move from the national to the global level. Globally,
many investment opportunities in cleaner energy sources are to be found in coun-
tries with dubious or precarious governance, presenting a risk profile, which few
investors are willing to undertake. Global decarbonization ideally entails a massive
shift of financial resources from the industrial to the emerging countries, because
there demand for energy is growing faster, and the deployment of renewable energy
sources would in many cases be easier.
But in fact, we see very little of this shift taking place: energy projects that reach
final investment decision are more easily geared to the development of hydrocarbon
resources than to investment in renewables. According to the IEA, in the period
2014–18 out of total global average annual energy investment of 2 trillion US dollars
(at 2018 prices), 1 trillion, or 50%, went to fossil fuels without carbon capture and
sequestration. Renewables for power generation and final uses attracted 435 billion
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dollars, and energy efficiency 238 billion (IEA 2019, p. 50). Implementation of the
Agency’s Sustainable Development scenario would require an increase of global
average annual energy investment to upwards of 3.5 trillion dollar (IEA 2019, p. 93),
with roughly halving of investment in fossil fuels and tripling of other investment
functional to the transition. Institutional barriers to such massive expansion and
redirection of investment should not be underestimated.
It is therefore not clear at all that the decarbonization drive may per se suffice
to overcome the low-employment equilibrium which is found e.g. in the European
Union or Japan. Considerably more muscular policies than those currently imple-
mented would be needed to convince private actors to substantially increase invest-
ment. Given the limited fiscal space that most governments enjoy, increased invest-
ment cannot be supported primarily by government expenditure. The imposition of a
high enough carbon tax, whose proceedings were channeled exclusively and rapidly
into support for energy transition-related investment, may become a driver for pri-
vate investment, but would entail depreciation of existing assets, and uncertainty
negatively impacting on corporate and household propensity to invest.
The task of achieving zero or negative CO2 emissions requires a massive shift
from consumption to investment, i.e., a further increase in the rate of savings over
GDP, rather than simply efficiently channeling existing savings towards investment.
We normally expect economies that devote more of their GDP to investment and less
to consumption to grow more rapidly, because investment adds to the capital stock
and expands the production possibility frontier. But the energy transition entails
investment that is predominantly in substitution of existing productive capacity, and
might even decrease rather than expand existing capacity. Thus, the pro-growth effect
of a shift of resources from consumption to investment might be undermined by the
acceleration in the obsolescence of the existing capital stock and the increase in the
capital/output ratio that the energy transition requires.
The speed of the transition plays an important role in determining whether growth
will be supported or undermined. Fast transition requires a larger shift from consump-
tion to investment, and faster obsolescence of the existing capital stock; it is therefore
less likely to be conducive to faster GDP growth. In all advanced economies, growth
is driven by consumption: to compress consumption and shift to a model of growth
led by investment independently of an expected increase in aggregate demand is a
huge political–institutional task. This is implicitly recognized by proponents of very
ambitious policies arguing in favor of something close to wartime mobilization, but
then the required societal acceptance is far from being guaranteed.
6 Exports and Imports
Equation (2) describing the destination of GDP also includes external trade: exports
are a possible destination together with domestic consumption and investment;
and imports are a possible alternative way to satisfy domestic consumption and
investment and must therefore be subtracted from GDP.
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Advocates of pioneering the energy transition frequently insist on the fact that
early movers may acquire comparative advantage, which will support their exports
in the future. Furthermore, all countries that are net importers of fossil fuels would
see their imports relatively reduced. The energy transition is therefore depicted as
potentially improving the trade position of a country, and in this way contributing to
its economic prosperity.
This is a simplistic approach for more reasons than one. Firstly, it should be
underlined that export are a destination ofGDPalternative to consumption and invest-
ment, so increasing exports must bematched by decreasing consumption or domestic
investment, something which may be difficult to achieve in a context in which con-
sumption already must be compressed to make room for a significant increase in
investment. Exports are useful as driver of economic growth when domestic aggre-
gate demand is not sufficient to justify the existing pace of investment—as was the
case in the early years of most economic booms, including China’s. But the energy
transition cannot be led by export demand—at most the cost of somemachines might
be reduced if economies of scale are available, and export demand on top of domestic
demand facilitates the attainment of large enough production runs. Thus, wemay say
that the energy transition is facilitated in China (and in the rest of the world) thanks
to the collapse in the cost of PV panels that Chinese producers have been able to
achieve; but surely this has been due to massive domestic demand in conjunction to
export opportunities. It is the low cost of production rather than being pioneers that
facilitates exports.
As for decreased import demand for fossil fuels, this can indeed benefit growth
(especially in energy import-dependent emerging countries), inasmuch as it frees
resources which otherwise might need to be devoted to exports, and improves the
solvability of the country. It may therefore facilitate attracting foreign investment,
which is a crucial consideration for supporting the energy transition in emerging
countries. However, it is not always the case that decarbonization will allow decreas-
ing imports: in coal-producing countries such as China or India a needed shift from
coal to natural gas may lead to increased rather than reduced demand for imports.
7 Income Distribution
So far, we have discussed the impact of decarbonization on the formation and use
of GDP: we must now discuss income distribution, i.e., how decarbonization may
affect the share of income accruing respectively to labor (wages) and capital (profit).
The distribution of income between labor and capital is determined by the capi-
tal/output ratio. As discussed earlier, the energy transition entails an increase in the
capital/output ratio, because of a shift to more capital-intensive technologies and
little net benefit of the required additional investment (i.e., more capital needed for
the same output).
An increasing capital/output ratio automatically results in an increasing share
of income accruing to capital, unless fully offset by falling returns on industrial
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investment or interest rates on borrowed capital. We do live in a world of historically
low interest rates, but there is no evidence that corporations are ready to accept lower
returns. In fact, the opposite is true, as the perception of risk has widely increased,
and in the energy industry the perspective of decarbonization further increases risk.
Thus, the increase in the capital/output ratio associated with the energy transition
inevitably also determines a shift of income from labor to capital—i.e., a widening
of inequality in income and wealth distribution.
It should be stressed that the energy transition in this case simply reinforces a
trend that has been underway ever since the end of the Second World War, as argued
by Piketty (2013). Thus, while we certainly cannot attribute exclusive responsibility
for growing inequality to the energy transition, the fact that it adds to an unwelcome
existing trend further hinders public acceptance.
This effect on income distribution must be compounded with the effect of the
increasing cost of energy on different income groups. It is generally accepted that
an increasing cost of energy has a regressive impact on income distribution because
energy expenditure is a larger share of the budget of poorer households. In addition,
households are expected to invest to minimize the added cost, e.g., in insulation of
their homes or buying new electric vehicles, but the vast majority of households has
no net savings and no borrowing power either. Thus, richer households can contain
the added cost by engaging in investment, but poorer citizens simply must bear the
brunt of the decarbonization agenda.
The above is true at the level of individual countries, but evenmore so at the global
level. Although emerging countries may offer better opportunities for decarboniza-
tion—because it is easier to decarbonize where energy consumption is growing than
where it is stagnant—and because of more favorable climate and environmental cir-
cumstances in some cases; nevertheless, the burden of a higher capital/output ratio
will be felt universally. The poor in emerging countries are even less able to bear the
burden of added energy costs—although at the extremely low level of consumption
that they currently enjoy the differencemay not be felt (if you rely on collectingwood
for cooking and on a small generator for lighting). And the availability of investment
finance is certainly critical for all emerging economies and chronically insufficient
to meet all investment needs.
It is indeed difficult to see how global decarbonization may take place unless
policies and institutions are put in place to facilitate the emerging countries’ access
to investment finance, which, however, also implies an added financial burden on the
industrial countries and a further reason why income inequality in the latter may be
expected to widen.
It is therefore not surprising that the energy transition agenda has been accompa-
nied by demands for financial transfers from rich to poor countries; and proposals
for the introduction of a carbon tax in industrial countries are accompanied by the
suggestion that the proceedings should be entirely redistributed to citizens on an
equal basis, so that poorer citizens may actually end up being better off.
There are, however, at least two major problems with coupling environmental and
redistributive measures. The first is that the energy transition contributes to, but is
not the only cause of growing income inequality. Why should the introduction of a
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citizens’ income be funded in particular by the carbon tax? These two measures are
logically separate and the only reason for coupling them is to facilitate the swallowing
of the bitter pill—the carbon tax—with sugar coating—citizens’ income. The second
problem is that devoting the revenue from a carbon tax to redistribution, rather than
in particular supporting investment functional to the transition, would reduce the
effectiveness of the policywith respect to its environmental goal. It should be recalled
that the carbon tax has the ambition of eventually disappearingwhen decarbonization
will have succeeded—the sooner the better; it is therefore not an appropriatefiscal tool
for addressing a problem that will remain long after decarbonization has succeeded.
8 Employment
It is normally asserted that the energy transition will generate millions of new jobs
globally, and in this way benefit the countries engaging in it. The evidence proposed
consists of an estimate of all jobs created directly or indirectly by transition-related
projects.
It is certainly to be expected that the investment surge linked to the transition will
generate jobs. At the same time, jobs will also be destroyed in some industries—this
being a major deterrent from reducing reliance on domestically produced coal or dis-
couraging the sale of IC vehicles. But we need to approach the issue at a macro rather
than micro level, and ask whether a shift in the composition of aggregate demand
from consumption to investment is likely to increase employment. The answer is not
straightforward.
Consumption demand has been progressively shifting from goods to services.
Some categories of services are indeed labor-intensive, and normally associated
with the growing number of poor-quality low-paying jobs; at the same time, other
services have witnessed a huge improvement in productivity thanks to the introduc-
tion of information technology, and the threat to employment arising from artificial
intelligence is a major preoccupation. Jobs created by investment expenditure are
on balance likely to require higher skills and be better paid than jobs in services,
although generalizations are questionable in this case.
It should be underlined that, although employment creation is a constant preoc-
cupation for politicians and governments, labor is a cost, which should in principle
be minimized. There is constant tension between increasing productivity and full
employment: the former should be maximized, preferably with no detriment for the
latter, which is only possible if total production is growing in line with productivity.
We have noted that the transition must be expected to lead to an increase in the cap-
ital/output ratio, which also means a decrease in the productivity of capital (output
per unit of capital is the inverse of capital/output). Assuming that, other things being
equal, employment will also grow for a given output is tantamount to saying that
the productivity of labor (which is the ratio of output to employment, or output per
worker) will also decrease. In other words, we are envisaging a decline in both the
productivity of capital and of labor, i.e., a poorer world.
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Of course, productivity of capital and labor may increase in other industries
and compensate for the loss of productivity in energy, but it is important to recall
that increased employment in the energy industry, especially in countries where
production is stagnant, is not per se a positive outcome.
The jobs created argument in support of the energy transition may very well turn
out to be correct, but it is not clear that, other things being equal, it should be viewed
as a net benefit. It does inevitably hide a decrease of productivity, which negatively
affects total GDP and GDP per capita.
9 Concluding Remarks
If, as some claim, the energy transition were a win–win development, why should
it be so difficult to implement? We need an energy transition and the cost of failing
to make rapid progress in this respect may well be much higher than the cost of the
energy transition itself, but there is a net cost to the energy transition both in terms
of total available GDP and of its division among rich and poor.
If we want to make progress with the energy transition, it is necessary to acknowl-
edge its cost and seek agreements on the division of the burden. Agreements are
needed at the international level, between rich and poor countries, as well as domes-
tically (within each country or the EU) between rich and poor citizens. For much too
long proponents of the environmental agenda have bypassed this need and relied on
the slogan that the transition is not only better for the environment, it is also better
for the economy: unfortunately this may be true in the long term, but it is mostly not
true in the short and medium term.
Governments have been searching for paths of lesser resistance, measures with
limited costs, or non-transparent costs whose burden on each individual could not
easily be predicted. This approach has largely failed: the share of fossil fuels on
total global energy consumption has not decreased at all since the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change entered into force in 1994.
Imposing a sufficiently high price on carbon emissions is the only approach that is
widely based enough to solicit the needed global response, but no government is ready
to bite the bullet. The reason is clear: it is the one approach that most clearly would
bring to the fore the cost of the transition (and hence create the greatest incentive
to engage in it earlier rather than later). Governments keep on preferring ad hoc
measures that provide only partial benefits and stimulate the search for loopholes.
The bipartisan US initiative to impose a significant carbon tax and redistribute
the income of the same (CLC 2019) may be slowly gaining traction also in Europe,
where a European Citizens’ Initiative was launched in 2019 (EC 2019). However,
the resistance of vested interests is strong and unlikely to fade away.
As is evident from our argument, the cost of the transition depends on the speed of
it. Slowing down the energy transition will relatively minimize the losses connected
to premature obsolescence of existing capital stock, facilitate the transfer of resources
from consumption to investment, and allow technological progress to come up with
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better, more efficient solutions. It may also give time to our political systems to adopt
policies for the redistribution of income and wealth—independently of the energy
transition—which in recent decades have been largely undone in most democratic
societies. Today we face underlying conflicts because of inequality and lack of social
mobility; these are not caused primarily by the energy transition, but the latter ends up
being the lightning rod that precipitates open conflict, so that the transition becomes
politically unviable.
The reversal of the globalization process may lessen the pressure of international
competition and its drag to the bottom, allowing governments greater latitude to
engage in voluntaristic policies, including tackling inequality and climate change.
But it could also lead to a loss of credibility for multilateral institutions, and lack
of interest for a global coordinated approach, which is indispensible for avoiding
catastrophic global warming. Global growth is likely to slow down anyhow, and
with it the growth in energy demand. Possibly, this may give us more time to pursue
the transition at a slower, less conflictual pace.
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The Global Energy Transition
and the Global South
Andreas Goldthau, Laima Eicke, and Silvia Weko
1 Introduction
The global energy transition, that is the full decarbonization of the world energy
system until 2050, is attracting growing attention in global policy debates. While
the geopolitics of the renewable transformation have attracted much recent attention
(Goldthau 2017; IRENA 2019; O’Sullivan et al. 2017; Scholten 2018), the scholarly
community has been surprisingly silent on what the low-carbon shift means for the
Global South.
To be sure, there exists a host of writings on the development implications of
renewables. A key theme here is improving energy access by decentralized elec-
tricity supply, notably in rural Africa or developing Asia (Alstone et al. 2015; Dag-
nachew et al. 2017). Other works center on the opportunity for developing countries
to leapfrog centralized energy systems and instead make off-grid solutions the back-
bone of an economic development model (Kuzemko et al. 2016; Levin and Thomas
2016). Important reference points in this debate are the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs), notably SDGs 3 (health and well-being) and 7 (centering on afford-
able and modern energy), which may be helped by a surge in renewable energy,
prompting scholars to point to the co-benefits of the energy transition (Edenhofer
et al. 2014; Helgenberger et al. 2017). Some works also zoom in on individual states
(Baker et al. 2014; Power et al. 2016), highlighting the importance of the domestic
political economy underpinning the energy transition.
That said, little scholarly attention is paid to the energy transition and the Global
South beyond the fate of producer economies and the developmental state. Devel-
oping countries will be central, as 70% of the future energy demand is expected to
come from non-OECD countries in 2040 (IEA 2018b), thanks to rapidly growing
populations and economies.Among these,manydeveloping countries in sub-Saharan
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Africa, South East Asia or Latin America are confronted with the imperative to foster
economic development but at the same time lack the domestic capacity to ensure this
is done in a sustainable way. China, India, and Brazil, by contrast, have large enough
markets to make up for some of the potential risks for companies to do business
there, and have proven capable of ‘catching up’ in many areas, including the (low
carbon) energy domain.1 The focus of the present analysis therefore is on the ‘non-
BRICS Global South’, that is on developing countries other than the large emerging
economies.
This chapter seeks to fill an apparent scholarly gap and offer a ‘Global South
perspective’ by shedding light on the specific circumstances pertaining to countries
of the Global South. More to the point, it argues that countries in the Global South
may face a specific set of challenges in their efforts to embrace a low-carbon future
(Sect. 2). Empirically, the chapter zooms into the trias of technology, finance, and
trade, and suggests that there exist structural barriers and uncertainties that require the
attention of scholars and policymakers (Sect. 3). Theoretically, it offers three different
conceptual lenses on the low-carbon transition and the Global South, drawing on
realist International Political Economy (IPE), critical IPE, and dependency theory
(Sect. 4). A final section concludes.
2 A Global South Perspective on the Energy Transition
2.1 Innovation, Investment, and Low-Carbon Modes
of Production
Judging by their cost curves, renewable technologies have entered the stage ofmarket
maturity. The unit costs of solar PV fell by around 90% over the past decade (IRENA
2019), and similar dynamics have unfolded in onshore wind turbines. This is largely
a function of scale effects and a surge in global investment in renewable energy
capacity. Low-carbon technologies are now cost-effective sources of power and have
in many regions resumed a top place in power investment (IEA 2019).
That said, there exist significant differences in the distribution of global capital
allocation (see Fig. 1). Northern America, Europe, and China are the top destinations
of global investment in renewable energy. Within the developing world, the bulk of
investment essentially goes to three countries: China, India, and Brazil. Other devel-
oping countries received a mere 12% of the total investment volumes of USD 280
billion in 2017 (UNEP/BNEF 2018). It is likely that this trend will continue, as the
underlying investment decisions reflect public policies favoring renewables and a
strong market pull stemming from sizeable economies. This lopsided investment
pattern in renewables is in line with energy investment more generally. As the IEA
1This is evidenced by investment flows, among other (Murphy et al. 2015). Especially China should
not be considered as a developing country due to its unique set of circumstances (Watson and Byrne
2012).




















Fig. 1 Geographical distribution of investment in renewable energy. Source (UNEP/BNEF 2018)
estimates,middle-to low-income countries accounted for some 14%of overall invest-
ment in 2017, but represent 41% of the world’s population. By contrast, high-income
countries, representing less than 15% of the population, received more than 40% of
investment volumes (IEA 2019).
To be sure, from a climate policy perspective it is highly desirable that investment
in low-carbon energy sources is geared toward large (emerging) markets, as these
will generate the bulk of GHG emissions increases in the near future. Yet, with a
view to the SDGs, it is detrimental if (private) capital shies away from low-income
economies, as it means perpetuating the energy access problem. Moreover, it is
typically less developed countries (LDC) economies where most of the economic
growth potential lies, given their generally young population (Gribble and Bremner
2012). Ensuring sustainable development in low-income countries would therefore
require sufficient investment in low-carbon energy sources, setting themon a climate-
friendly growth path. In fact, finance needs in mitigation technologies are found
highest among developing nations (Tempest and Lazarus 2014).
A second challenge pertains to the fact that low-carbon technology remains con-
centrated in terms of ownership. Judging by the number of patents in the low-carbon
technology domain, technology leadership essentially lies in the OECD world and
China. Only few developing economies joined this rather exclusive club, and if at
all, then only on a very selective basis. Brazil andMexico, for instance, have become
players in the field of biofuels, whereas Russia managed to catch up in the wind sec-
tor (IRENA 2019). The upshot is, however, that low-carbon technology innovation
happens in the North, not the South.
In this context, observers have repeatedly pointed to the health sector for it exhibits
structural similarities (Abbott 2009; Chon et al. 2018). Notably, intellectual property
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rights (IPRs) for drugs tend to be concentrated in OECD nations. IPRs are governed
by stringent regimes protecting the right of the innovator to recoup significant upfront
costs. In the health sector, fierce debates emerged arounddeveloping countries’ access
to essential medicines, and the question which good is more valuable: the private
good of an IPR, or the public good of a population’s health and wellbeing. Such
arguments have beenmade also in the context of theUNFCCC,where representatives
of the developing world raised the issue of IPRs as a potential impediment to their
sustainable development and successful energy transition (Ockwell et al. 2010; Zhou
2019).
While it remains contested whether the pharma and the low-carbon tech sec-
tors indeed are comparable, the more fundamental point here is a ‘technology gap’
(Castellacci 2011) facing many countries in the Global South, a cause of persist-
ing underdevelopment and indeed poverty (Fofack 2008). Observers have therefore
made the argument that efforts to foster access to low-carbon technologies are likely
to generate a ‘development dividend’ in LDCs (Forsyth 2007). Note that this is about
more than simply ensuring climate-friendly energy supply and energy access. It is
about facilitating a low-carbon mode of production for any good or service a given
country feeds into global value and supply chains. The rationale here is as simple as
it is straightforward: as climate policies progress and become a determinant also in
global trade, a low-carbon footprint ensures a country’s products stay competitive in
the global market. Short of access to low-carbon technologies, developing nations
may therefore face the risk of being cut out of global trade relations through such
mechanisms as carbon border adjustment, which has been lauded by economists
(Akerlof et al. 2019) and planned at the EU level (Horn and Sapir 2019).
In this context, and as discussed in further detail below, countries rich in fossil
fuels are believed to face a specific challenge. Predominantly found in the Global
South, producer economies are typically locked in a resource-dependent economic
model. Many qualify as rentier states and are trapped in a ‘resource curse’ that makes
the extractive sector their dominant industry (Auty 1993; Ross 2012; Schwarz 2008).
As research has shown, there exists great potential for solar and wind farming in the
Gulf, Northern Africa or the Gulf of Guinea (IRENA 2018; Kruyt et al. 2009), world
regions that at present are home to prime fossil fuel exporters. The low-carbon energy
transition therefore presents these countries with the opportunity to embrace a new
economic model based on industrial diversification. Yet leaving aside questions of
political will (many resource-rich countries have shied away from diversifying their
economies in the past), administrative capacity and technical expertise, it has been
suggested that itwill be hard for such states to leave the carbon-intensive development
pathway that characterizes their socioeconomic system (Friedrichs and Inderwildi
2013). In other words, the development challenge goes beyond ensuring access to
pertinent low-carbon technology and embedding them in national systems of value
creation. It is about replacing a path-dependent, fossil-based rentier state with a
fundamentally different, low carbon-based economic model.
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2.2 The Limits of Adopting a ‘Global South’ Perspective
That said, there are clear limitations to what a ‘Global South’ lens can do for ana-
lyzing the global energy transition. It can only point out global trends and risks, and
will not be able to account for the differences between Global South countries, which
are clearly a heterogeneous group. Their differences in market size and investment
risks, for instance, will mean that least developed nations clearly face more extensive
risks and challenges than other developing countries, both in the realm of investment
(Newell and Bulkeley 2017) and tech transfer (Ockwell and Byrne 2016). The degree
to which Global South countries protect intellectual property rights may also impact
their respective energy transitions, although this is a contested point and not one
that can be addressed in detail here (see for example Abdel-Latif 2014; Ockwell
et al. 2010; Pirrong 2014; Raiser and Bruhn 2017). Neither can a ‘Global South per-
spective’ address the national-level dynamics, which also shape energy transitions.
Some challenges for developing countries in the energy transition are specific to their
national political economies, such as governance and capacities (Jordana et al. 2006)
and the interests of incumbent players (Baker et al. 2014).
3 Three Challenges for Countries in the Global South
Clean tech, finance, and trade are key elements for a successful transition to a low-
carbon future. This section discusses these three elements with a view to identifying
challenges and barriers for the case of the Global South.
3.1 Technology and Value Chains
A first challenge comes with the way value is captured in the global value chain
(GVC) for low-carbon technology. Renewable energy magnifies the importance of
technology for value creation due to the zero marginal cost problem: the resource
such as the sun and wind is free, whereas the technology that converts energy and
moves it to consumers earns money (see for example Overland 2019). Technology is
made up of both hardware (equipment) and software, knowing to use and reproduce
or improve upon hardware (Ockwell et al. 2010). Such technology is one of the most
valuable parts of the value chain, which is a series of steps for a product or service to
move from its conception to end use (Gereffi et al. 2005). In general, product develop-
ment and design are more valuable than other activities such as resource extraction
(Gereffi and Lee 2012). As global innovations systems scholars have elaborated,
clean tech valuation differs between industries according to their standardization vs.
customization, which is not static (Binz and Truffer 2017). Nevertheless, the value
chains for low-carbon energy technologies may be categorized as producer-driven,
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which are ‘capital, technology, or skill-intensive industries’ with the potential for
large, vertically integrated firms to control the production system (Gereffi 2014).
The value chains for low-carbon energy tech are quickly globalizing. Where solar
PVwas previously produced by vertically integrated firmswithin a country or region,
its “production is now governed by multiple value chains made up of vertically spe-
cialized, and some integrated, firms, spanning across multiple countries” (Meckling
and Hughes 2017: 227). This increased geographical scope presents the opportunity
for technology diffusion and transfer,2 which Bell (1990) conceptualizes as taking
place in three flows: (A) the flow of capital goods and services; (B) skills and know-
how to use and maintain technologies; and (C) skills and knowledge necessary to
create technical change. While the first two flows may result in the diffusion of
low-carbon energy technologies and green growth, only the third stream enables
innovation. The prerequisite for this to take place is ‘absorptive capacity’ which
involves high levels of human capital and is especially important for complex tech-
nologies (Bell’s more recent work also focuses on low-carbon tech in particular, see
Bell 2012).
However, not all countries will be able to benefit from globalizing value chains,
and the Global South in particular risks being shut out. Many developing countries
remain excluded from international technology flows (Glachant and Dechezleprêtre
2016). This is because international private developers see politically unstable coun-
tries as too risky of an investment; and in very poor countries or regions there is
no market case for private industry to participate (Kirchherr and Urban 2018). The
possibility for countries to escape infrastructural and technological carbon lock-in
depends on the costs of moving away from high-carbon systems and options for
alternatives (Seto et al. 2016). Therefore, in those countries which are currently not
attractive for clean tech investments and do not participate in low-carbon tech value
chains, existing technologies and infrastructure will resist changes. Some mecha-
nisms exist to transfer low-carbon technology when private firms will not invest, led
by international institutions (Abdel-Latif 2014; Ockwell and Byrne 2016; Rimmer
2019) and public–private partnerships (Chon et al. 2018). The extent to which such
mechanisms succeed in transferring technology is unclear, but developing countries
excluding the big three have remined below their potential (Edenhofer et al. 2014).
This suggests that the carbon lock-in risk remains.
Countries which are attractive for investors in installing or producing low-carbon
energy technologies may become a part of the global energy value chain and achieve
co-benefits like better environmental quality andmore jobs. However, in clean energy
industries which are research- and technology-intensive, the most lucrative part of
the value chain is tech development, which is centered in the US, EU, China, and
Japan (Curran 2015; Nahm 2017). Most Global South countries lack the absorptive
capacity to innovate on transferred hardware and therefore ‘upgrade’ within the value
chain if they do not also receive ‘software’. A key exception to this is China: its high
2Weuse the IPCC2000definition of technology transfer: “a broad set of processes covering the flows
of know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst
different stakeholders” (Metz et al. 2000: 3), which is a commonly used definition.
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local innovative capacity, combined with industrial policies such as local content
requirements, helped its firms capture value and upgrade in the clean energy value
chain (Gosens and Lu 2013; Schmitz and Lema 2015; Zhang and Gallagher 2016).
Yet such industrial policies may not succeed in countries with small markets, poor
regulatory design and coherence, or low industry/innovation potential, and has only
seen moderate success even in large markets such as India (Johnson 2016). Whether
or not the Chinese experience can be recreated in other Global South countries with
the help of tech transfer initiatives remains unclear. Preliminary research on low-
carbon tech transfer initiatives suggests that initiatives mainly focus on transferring
hardware rather than software, which will help clean technology diffuse, but not
encourage indigenous innovation capacities or widespread entry into value chains
(see Fig. 2).
If Global South countries do not build up indigenous capacities, they may become
dependent on the Global North for low-carbon technologies, which comes with two
potential risks: increased trade litigation andpolitical tensions, andmonopolies.Work
by Lewis (2014) has shown that substantial trade imbalances between renewable
energy technology manufacturers and users resulted in increased international trade
litigation and escalating trade tensions. While Lewis’ work focuses on actors in the
EU, the US, and China, this pattern may be exacerbated if Global South countries
become technology users without upgrading within GVCs. North–South tensions
may also be exacerbated in the international political arena, as a lack of access to
low-carbon tech has already been a stumbling block for UN climate negotiations
(Abdel-Latif 2014). Currently, many nationally determined contributions (NDCs)
are conditional on climate finance and the transfer of low-carbon tech to meet their







Fig. 2 Focus of global tech transfer initiatives. Source Own data
326 A. Goldthau et al.
licensing which have been strictly opposed by the EU and the US (Pueyo et al. 2012).
In addition, because low-carbon tech value chains are producer-driven, large, verti-
cally integrated firms have the potential to monopolize production. Already authors
have argued that the current system uses IPRs to prevent market entry and follow-on
innovation (Baker et al. 2017; Raiser et al. 2017). Monopolies allow technology pro-
ducers to distort markets, and this dynamic may be worsened if the Global South is
increasingly dependent on low-carbon tech from a few powerful actors, rather than
having developed indigenous technologies. This risk may be more pronounced for
some technologies such as wind power, while solar PV may be less likely to develop
captive value chain governance (Binz and Truffer 2017).
3.2 Financial Risk and Path Dependency
A second challenge pertaining to the global energy transition and the Global South
are financial transition risks facing particularly resource-rich countries. Today, many
developing countries of the Global South find themselves at the crossroads between
trying to leapfrog carbon-intensive industrial production, and replicating the carbon
lock-in that characterizes the developed countries’ rise to industrial powerhouses.
As many countries only start shaping their future national energy systems, today’s
decisions matter: the infrastructure built now will be determining these countries’
energy mix for decades to come (Seto et al. 2016). Yet, carbon lock-in is not only
contingent on domestic factors, but also external actors. A case in point is Chinese
overseas investments in fossil fuels, which amounted to USD 128bn in comparison to
only USD 32bn in renewables between 2000 and 2018 (Gallagher et al. 2018;Wright
2018). Such investments create path-dependent positive returns in fossil infrastruc-
ture which has the potential to delay the adoption of low-carbon technologies and the
deployment of renewables despite their economic viability for decades (Unruh 2000;
Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla 2006). This may seriously impede low-carbon future
development pathways of the recipient countries of such investments. Leaving such
a lock-in is possible, but comes with high transaction costs as it requires changing
long-established infrastructure, rules, and (economic and political) institutions (Seto
et al. 2016).
This point extends to another aspect, which is the significant exposure of carbon
locked-in countries to several elements of financial risk.One such riskwhich has been
widely discussed is that of stranded assets. In essence, the challenge here consists in
the looming devaluation of fossil fuel assets held on public and private balance sheets.
As the 2015 Paris Agreement to limit global warming to well below 2 °C implies
two-thirds of known fossil fuel reserves need to remain unexploited (IEA 2018b),
much of the oil, gas, or coal currently held in the books will not be monetized. The
question therefore is not whether, but when these assets will be devalued and become
‘stranded’. Estimates go up to $100 trillion losses in fossil fuel assets’ value until
2050 (CitiGPS 2015). Modeling suggests that the resulting global ‘carbon bubble’
could lead to losses comparable to the 2008 financial crisis (Mercure et al. 2018). As
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the IEA estimates, oil and gas producer states bear the risk of some USD 7 trillion
losses in income in a Paris scenario: Nigeria risks a decrease of about 500 billion in
income, Saudi Arabia could lose almost USD 2 trillion and the United Arab Emirates
faces the risk of some USD 900 billion in foregone revenue (IEA 2018a).
A related question pertains to the distribution of such financial risks: that is, who
will be hit first and with which impacts. It has been argued that in the OECD, fossil
fuels are mainly held and exploited by publicly traded companies, which typically
have lower reserve-to-production ratios and more flexible business models as com-
pared to their state-owned peers (NOCs) elsewhere. Moreover, the majority of crude
and gas reserves are in state hands. This implies a higher degree of vulnerability and
indeed risk for countries of the Global South and their NOCs (Krane 2017). Invest-
ment in fossil fuel based energy infrastructure in the face of rising energy demand
in many developing countries further enhances this risk (Seto et al. 2016).
Short of decisive transition management, some countries might come under twin
pressure: they may lose resource rents whose redistribution ensures social stability,
but in some cases also domestic support for autocratic rule; at the same time, they
may face deteriorating terms of trade as their exports might decrease in relation to
imports and hence mounting pressure on their currencies. At worst, the financial risk
of stranded assets may become a political risk of ‘stranded nations’ (Manley et al.
2017) with possible implications for the stability of the international system. The
global energy transition therefore flips the logic of ‘resource curse’ (Karl 1997) on
its head: it no longer is the abundance of economic rents, but rather them withering
away faster than countries can adapt that creates problems for resource-rich states.
Still, the implications might look similar to the ones observed today, especially poor
economic performance (Sachs and Warner 1995), undemocratic tendencies (Ross
2001), and possibly even civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) (Fig. 3).












Fig. 3 Oil rents as percentage of GDP, average 2007–2017. SourceWorld Bank, World Bank Open
Data (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS), selected countries
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3.3 Trade
Finally, the global energy transition is susceptible to challenging incumbent global
trade patterns in energy and electricity. A key question here is whether global trade in
energywill increase or decrease. Underpinning this question is the fact that the global
energy transition in principle enables every country to produce renewable energy, yet
at different efficiency and cost levels. One scenario therefore suggests countries will
become more self-sufficient and global energy trade will falter (Scholten 2018b).
This could give importing states the upper hand in trade and also reduce pressure
on trade routes of fossil fuels such as the Strait of Hormuz, which have repeatedly
been the site of conflict. A contrasting view holds that trade volumes in energy
will stay the same or even increase (Schmidt et al. 2019). Technology innovation
in renewable fuels and Power-to-X are seen as increasingly enabling global trade
in renewable energy. Different production conditions, but also different acceptance
levels create price differences among countries, driving international trade. Some
fossil fuel infrastructure such as gas pipelines might see second use cases in, e.g.,
hydrogen trade. This could reduce the risk of stranded investment and therefore
also hedge the possible financial losses of decarbonization (Schmidt et al. 2019).
Depending on which scenario will unfold, it will impact on the relations between
today’s energy net-importing countries, transit countries, and net exporting countries.
Countries of the Global South will face the challenge to reposition themselves in this
new, emerging energy trade order.
What is more, the global energy transition is likely to particularly impact regional
integration dynamics in electricity trade. Regional electricity trade is expected to
increase as part of the energy transition, as money can be made from cross-border
balancing of fluctuations in renewables supply (Bahar and Sauvage 2013; Crieke-
mans 2018: 46). This results in more interconnected cross-border electricity grids.
Observers suggested that this gives an edge to countries dominating and owning
regional grids, the most efficient producers and balancing states. The control over
regional grid infrastructures such as power lines, storage, or software will become
vital for national security and for projecting influence and power (Criekemans 2018:
47). Some have also suggested that regional integration might happen around powers
centers in such networked grids (Goldthau et al. 2019). For instance, China heavily
invests in the strategic build-up of grid infrastructure as part of its great Belt and Road
Initiative. The Desertec project, planned to connect Europe to large North African
solar plants, has failed so far, by contrast. As existing evidence from the EU and
other world regions suggests, political stability, and mutual trust are, in addition to
administrative capacity, crucial preconditions for effective governance structures of
cross-border spanning grids—a challenging task for some countries and regions of
the Global South.
A last element and indeed significant uncertainty lies in carbon-related trade
measures. In a recent elite study we conducted among international energy experts
and energy investors, 87% confirmed that the global energy transition will raise the
importance of carbon content in products. Asked for the key driving forces behind
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Fig. 4 Elite perceptions on drivers of decarbonization. Source Own data
this, 54% trade regulations by big economic blocs as much more important drivers
than consumer preferences (33%) or companies (13%) (Fig. 4).
In fact, recent discussions in the EU have started to use trade regimes as a poten-
tially powerful instrument to foster a global energy transition. A case in point are
carbon border adjustments, which put a levy on carbon-intensive imports (Mehling
et al. 2019). Such measures could level the playing field for domestic and foreign
producers against the backdrop of more progressive climate policies in the EU, help
to export the EU’s decarbonization agenda, and strengthen the internationalization
of own efficiency standards (Keohane et al. 2015). This discussion ties into a broader
agenda of climate clubs, as championed by Nobel prize-winning William Nordhaus.
Economic modeling and theory suggests that such a climate club, by effectuating
small trade penalties on non-participants, is able to foster a large, stable coalitionwith
high effects on carbon reductions (Nordhaus 2015). Once introduced, carbon border
adjustments or even a coalition of climate clubs could have strong implications for
trade relations with countries of the Global South, as not only direct trading partner
countries but also large companies would most likely establish carbon content and
efficiency requirements along their production cycle (see also Vandenbergh 2007).
This goes back to the point made above, to the effect that a successful domestic
energy transition would become prerequisite of a country’s participation in global
value and supply chains.
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4 Three Conceptual Lenses on the Emerging Geopolitics
of the Energy Transition
A ‘Global South perspective’ on the global energy transition needs to go beyond
merely describing the possible structural barriers pertaining to technology, finance,
and trade. So how can we make sense of the three core aspects outlined above in
more conceptual terms? We use three different conceptual lenses to interpret current
dynamics pertaining to the low-carbon transition and the Global South, drawing on
realist IPE, critical IPE, and dependency theory. Each of these reflects a specific
strand in current policy debates on the global energy transition, and offers a distinct
take on the technology, finance, and trade in that context.
4.1 Realist IPE
The first lens broadly trades under the rubric of realist IPE. Essentially relying on a
state-centered perspective on International Political Economy (Gilpin 1987), realist
IPE firmly links economics and high politics by positing that state interests are central
to the shape and function of international economic relations. States strive for eco-
nomic security, a goal which is considered equal to military security. In its nationalist
reincarnation, realist IPE views economics as a source of power and supremacy, giv-
ing rise to a mercantilist approach in global political economy (Hamilton 1791; List
1841). An important aspect here is the balance of trade, which economic nationalists
tend to view as an indicator of a country’s relative strength or weakness vis-a-vis
competitors on the international stage. Because state interests and economics are
linked, the latter can become a function of the former, or vice versa, thus giving rise
to the patterns of ‘trade following the flag’ or ‘the flag following trade’ (Baru 2012).
In the context of the global energy transition and the Global South, the important
point here is that technology, trade or finance are considered a means to an end,
rather than sectors of their own. More to the point, from a realist IPE point of view,
low-carbon solutions cannot be assumed to globally diffuse thanks to free market
forces, sufficient demand pull, and falling unit costs. Rather, they may be available
depending onwhether it is in the strategic interest of the very states these technologies
originate from, and also of the organized incumbents in the recipient countries.
Given their status as tech laggards, countries in the Global South may therefore risk
becoming politically dependent on the goodwill of themajor green technology patent
leaders—China, the US, the EU, Japan, or Korea. Likewise, trade as such cannot be
considered to happen on a global-level playing field. Instead, the flows of goods
and services may be a function of strategic trade policies, facilitated by preferential
regimes or prevented by select tariff or non-tariff barriers. Similar assumptions can
be made regarding financial flows, whose allocation may be informed by states’
desire to maintain a surplus in their current account balance, rather than a deficit,
thus perpetuating the lopsided global distribution of RES investment (see Fig. 1).
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In short, such as lens suggests that all three aspects may become subject to ‘an
economics agenda for neo-realists’ (Moran 1993).
From a realist IPE lens, the export of low-carbon products (like solar PVs) and
services may help improving the trade balance and the current account. In turn, this
means that keeping control over the technological know-how is imperative to ensure
this effect to happen. As Meckling and Hughes (2017) have shown, for instance,
states may take action to ensure certain parts of the renewable value chain remain on
their territory. Or take renewable fuel trade, which may pick up thanks to advances
in technology (Schmidt et al. 2019): from an economic nationalist perspective, it in
principle does not make much difference whether it is fossil or green molecules that
are imported, as both deteriorate the trade balance. It is therefore not inconceivable
that states will try and curb imports of renewable fuels, not for reasons related to
climate skepticism but because it is not considered in the national interest. This
will result in global markets developing at a much smaller scale than technological
advances would suggest or allow.
Moreover, as realist IPE comes with a mercantilist edge, there is no such thing as
open and free trade. Energy technology transfermay be subject to strategic trade poli-
cies rather than business opportunity, andmay even fall prey to geopolitical scheming
(see also Goldthau et al. 2019). As the trend toward a retreat of the liberal order that
started to unfold in the twenty-first century weakens multilateral frameworks such as
the global trade regime, this may further exacerbate growing economic nationalism,
also in the energy domain. For the Global South, this essentially implies that the
Global South may fail to adequately profit from advances in low-carbon technology
and be excluded from participating in renewable value chains.
4.2 Critical IPE
A second lens offered here is critical IPE, which promises insights into interac-
tions between the state, markets, and society, zooming in on the underlying power
structures. An obvious starting point here is Karl Polanyi (1957), whose term of
a ‘Great Transformation’ has gained renewed attention in the context of the post-
fossil economy (Fraser 2017;WBGU 2011). At the most fundamental level, the deep
decarbonization implied by the Paris Agreement will arguably indeed bring about
profound change. The global energy transition is therefore likely to reshape not only
interstate relations or international trade along the lines discussed above, but equally
so the socioeconomic structure. And yet, there has been surprisingly little analysis
of the energy transition from a critical international political economy perspective
until now (see Newell 2019 for an exception).
To be sure, Polanyi’s work centered on the rise of market capitalism in nineteenth-
century Great Britain. But some of the core concepts may offer useful starting points
for the dynamics underpinning the global energy transition. His analysis of the rise of
the market society, for instance, reminds us of the risk of ‘disembedding’ economic
activity from the broader society, and of allowing this activity to develop its own
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distinctive laws. While the global energy transition arguably is about more than
mere economic activity, elements of it clearly resonate with Polanyi’s critique of
subordinating nature and society to separate systemic logics. This extends to the
notion of a ‘double movement’ between the competing dynamics of the expansion
of market forces and societal protection. This concept could be put to work for
analyzing dilemmas of the global energy transition: on the one hand, there exists the
market-based globalization, creating social, and environmental externalities such as
climate change. On the other hand, we witness the societal measures for protection,
such as climate change mitigation and adaptation policies. Sometimes these policies
aimed at ensuring human security and the habitat might in turn themselves foster
the expansion of market dynamics, e.g., through the creation of carbon markets or
REDD+ certificates, which in turn are mainly produced in countries of the Global
South.
A rich tradition in Polyanian-inspired IR theory (see Dale 2016) may, further,
inspire thinking about the implications for the international relations—or even the
geopolitics—of the unfolding global energy transition. Critical development studies
in particular offer important ways to conceptualize the ‘marginalized others’ (Inay-
atullah and Blaney 2016) in this context, that is countries of the Global South that
may remain outside of what may emerge the dominant paradigm of a new ‘climate
capitalism’ (Newell and Paterson 2010).
Antonio Gramsci’s theory on hegemony (2011) may be another promising
approach. A key focus of Gramsci’s work rests on the historical-materialist fac-
tors underpinning large-scale transformations. In contrast to realist IPE, which by
and large views states as black boxes, it is the intra-state power dynamics between
contrasting forces that are central to the analysis, making the state a function of
social relations. The supremacy of a ruling group is understood as hegemony, which
is characterized by a mixture of coercion and consent, requiring the formation of
selective compromises between rulers and ruled (Gramsci 2011). From a Gramscian
lens, the global energy transition and the emerging climate capitalism may be well
viewed as entailing an element of cultural (and indeed discursive) hegemony. Not
only is it the Global North that arguably set the global policy agenda pertaining to
the energy transition. It also defines the approach for addressing the climate chal-
lenge, which remains compatible with the incumbent capitalist paradigm. Such a
perspective could also add to our understanding of the contemporary contestations
surrounding the deep shifts facing the society’s very material basis that is the energy
system. Especially Gramsci’s conceptualization of the state and its internal dynamics
can guide analyses of the state’s role as a transition manager in this process (Newell
2019).
A Gramscian approach may also add value to analyzing global dynamics. For
instance, questions of access to technology and international finance may translate
into vulnerabilities for countries in the Global South and therefore become subject to
additional contestation. As Newell (2019) argues, the jury is out whether new actor
constellations arising in a renewable energy world will lean towards ‘trasformismo’,
referring to co-optation into a dominant coalition, in which potentially conflicting
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ideas become assimilated and incorporated (Cox 2016) rather than a great transfor-
mation of deep structural change in Polanyi’s sense. It is also not inconceivable that
it will give rise to a new counter-hegemony of emancipatory movements, rebelling
against the globally unjust distribution of benefits, risks, and losses within the glob-
alized production system of a global energy transition. Emerging debates around the
imperative of a ‘just transition’ accounting for developing countries, marginalized
groups, and economically vulnerable communities mirror this normative dimension
underpinning the low-carbon shift.
4.3 Dependency Theory
A final lens on energy transitions and the Global South is dependency theory, which
posits that a country’s economic development potential is determined by its relative
positionwithin the economic structure of aworld system.A key analytical category is
the distinction between core and periphery within this system. Dependency theorists
posit that given their peripheral status, some countries of the Global South may be
structurally unable to catch up in terms of technological development.Whereas some
transfer of technology occurs on the back of the influx of foreign capital, innovation
processes remains concentrated in the center (Vernengo 2016). In the context of the
global energy transition, the concentration of renewable technology patents can be
seen as indicative for the perpetuation of the established OECD ‘core’ in the global
economic system, complemented by the emergence of a select number of new core
countries, notably China.3 The mere deployment of solar panels across the world
does not do break the principle logic of replicating dependency relations of old.
This point extends to trade.Dependency theorywould suggest that the core exports
mainly advanced products, whereas the periphery delivers raw products and natural
resources in return. In the energy sector, many countries in Africa and Latin Amer-
ica have indeed long served as exporters of oil, gas, or other resources, and may in
part also resume that position when it comes to rare earth materials that are consid-
ered crucial for renewable energy technologies and electric vehicles. The OECD and
China, in turn, are set to dominate the export of renewable technologies as well as
related products and services, thanks to their role as innovation leaders. The under-
lying pattern here reflects some of the theory’s structural assumptions on the typical
international division of labor between center and periphery countries, perpetuating
dependency relations. Importantly, resource exports are generally subject to higher
price volatility than manufactured goods (Becker 2008), as illustrated by the noto-
rious oil price fluctuations. The Prebisch-Singer effect also suggests that the terms
of trade tend to deteriorate for primary commodity exporters, as the relative demand
3In terms of technological development, lessons may be drawn from the recent Chinese experience.
China heavily relied on state support and steering coupled with domestic content requirement for
foreign investment, thus ensuring technology transfer. What in the 1960s would have qualified as
state-assisted import substitution industrialization (ISI) has proven a model for the 21st century and
gave rise to technology leadership in one of the most important sectors going forward.
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for resources tends to shrink as the world income increases (Engel’s law) (Prebisch
1949; Vernengo 2016). It is therefore doubtful whether the peripheral Global South
stands to gain relative power over industrialized countries thanks to being rich in
rare earth materials. Instead, the pattern suggests they will remain in a position of
underdevelopment.
Finally, it has been argued that structural dependence in finance may constitute
an even stronger limitation of development and growth than technology dependency
(Becker 2008; Tavares 1985), an argument that extends to the global energy tran-
sition. Renewable energy investment prominently relies on foreign capital in many
countries. This fact gains special importance in phases of economic growth, when
investments rise. The availability of foreign currency limits domestic accumulation
processes (Becker 2008). Capital inflow is highly dependent on economic trends
within the center. In phases of prosperity, the willingness to invest in the ‘riskier’
periphery is low. During times of little investment opportunities and excess liquidity
(as we are currently facing at zero interest rates in Europe), investment in peripheral
states picks up (Becker 2008). In turn, foreign debt rises, which in the past was seen
as strengthening the creditors’ hand over the debtors (e.g., through global financial
agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank). This suggests that renewable energy
investment in the Global South will remain a function of the economic cycles in the
center—the Global North.
5 Conclusion
The global energy transition is likely to generate important benefits for countries in
the Global South. At the same time, it will also throw up new questions and give rise
to novel challenges. As this chapter argued, these challenges are likely to center on
the trias of finance, technology, and trade. In each of these three aspects, there exists
the potential for outright ‘energy transition risk’ for countries that have yet to catch
up economically. To be sure, individual sectors such as the financial industry have
started to take these risks seriously. By definition, however, individual sectors adopt
stovepipe approaches, which presents a call on the scholarly community to make
sense of the bigger picture.
This call is yet to be heeded. While some important scholarly work has been
done, for instance, on the prospects of oil producer economies, much more effort is
needed to comprehensively grasp the implications of the global energy transition for
the Global South. As the discussion in this chapter suggests, there exists a serious
chance of some of the Global South either not gaining access to low-carbon energy
technologies, or of becoming technology-dependent. While China, officially still
considered a developing country, has been able to ‘upgrade’ its place in the global
low-carbon tech value chain,most of theGlobal South only sees technologydiffusion.
This may be enough to deliver important co-benefits in the shape of health effects,
the empowerment of women, or decentralized energy access for local communities.
It will not be enough to make developing countries climb up the economic ladder
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and industrialize on a low-carbon model—the idea that underpins the promise of
leapfrogging. What is more, the poorest and least stable countries which either do
not manage to participate in global (low carbon) value chains or fall out of it thanks to
various carbon regimes ringfencing consumer blocs, run the risk of not transitioning.
Such an uneven transition brings its own set of geopolitical consequences (Eicke
et al. 2019).
In terms of theory, these challenges offer great potential for further analytical
advancement. This chapter has suggested three approaches to make sense of trends
and possible risks, but there may be more. Admittedly, the present bias towards
left-leaning or outright Marxist approaches—dependency theory and critical IPE—
leaves open flanks for criticism. This, however, is intentional. Liberal theories, often
the basis of cost-related energy technology diffusion arguments, rely on equally
strong normative foundations and indeed assumptions that are hard to maintain in
the very real-world setting presented by the global energy transition. To drive the
point home again: while there is good reason to believe that solar PVs will help
the poor across the planet thanks to falling unit costs, it would be false to ignore
the underlying structural imbalances that have emerged over centuries of uneven
global economic development. For the energy transition to become a fully global
phenomenon, it is arguably these imbalances that need to be addressed.
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Governing the Global Energy
Transformation
Maria Pastukhova and Kirsten Westphal
An effective and efficient governance is key for the global energy transformation.
We argue that the process under the Paris Agreement, its ‘rulebook’ and the nation-
ally determined contributions (NDCs) will have to be accompanied by focused and
tailored governance mechanisms in the energy realm. The energy sector itself is key
to limiting global warming to two degrees centigrade compared to the preindustrial
level, because it is responsible for over two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Yet, neither the energy transition nor energy governance start from scratch.
Energy governance is already happening on many levels: the local, the national, the
regional and the global. These multi-level governance structures are necessary to
enable, facilitate, and accelerate the energy transition(s) on the ground. They have
to be adapted, however, to the changing and transforming energy world as we argue
in the conclusions.
In a first step, we conceptualize the notion of ‘energy transition’ and relate it to
the concept of ‘energy transformation’. We argue that it is necessary to firstly move
beyond the normative and target-driven idea(s) behind ‘transition’ and to secondly
bring in the systemic aspects of energy transformation. Moreover, energy security,
economic efficiency, sustainability and climate neutrality have emerged over time as
the guiding paradigms, forming a strategic quadrangle, as opposed to a strategic tri-
angle, traditionally used to define energy security. In a second step, we present an
overview of the current international energy governance system where multilayered
governance structures have developed over time. We argue that the existing architec-
ture is stemming from the past and is neither fit for governing the energy transition,
nor even reflecting the proccesses underway in todays’world. In a third step, we high-
light that the energy transformation has and will have tremendous techno-economic,
socio-technical and political (Cherp et al. 2018) effects that have both internal and
external dimensions. Moreover, the transformation comes with (geo)political effects
as it changes the political economy of energy on all levels: the global, the regional, the
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national and the local. In the final step, we look at ways forward. We argue that it is
necessary to preserve existing multilateral institutions and to strengthen them.More-
over, we assume that governance approaches towards and inside regions will have
to be re-shaped or even created from scratch. We conclude that the crumbling of the
global liberal order and the crises of multilateralism are complicating the approach
to a better governance of the energy transition on the global level. Moreover, we
witness the emergence of illiberal tendencies in the Western democracies as well.
Climate and energy are playing into the polarization of societies as the two topics
emerged as a major cleavage and a conflict line. We emphasize that a just and inclu-
sive energy transition, both on national and international levels, is necessary to keep
countries and the world on a sustainable energy transformation path. The challenge
faced by the planet is indeed systemic.
1 Energy Transition—Lost in Conceptualization?
If governance of the energy transition is to be exercised effectively and efficiently,
a common understanding of ‘energy transition’ seems to be helpful and necessary.
Nowadays, ‘energy transition’ is a concept widely accepted and operationalized
by national governments, regional and international bodies and non-governmental
organizations alike. Although the term “Energiewende”1 has been first introduced in
the early 1980s by the GermanÖkoinstitut (Krause 1980), it hasn’t found its way into
the vocabulary of policymaking until the twenty-first century. Yet, when Germany
published the “Energy Concept for environmentally sound, reliable and affordable
energy supply” (BMWi and BMU 2010), which was readapted after the nuclear
accident in Fukushima by the 2011 Energy Concept and the related package on the
“Energiewende”, its English pendant ‘energy transition’ has become the international
buzzword for a shift towards cleaner and more sustainable energy systems.
As omnipresent and relevant the term ‘energy transition’ might be nowadays, it is
remarkably difficult to grasp, not least because of the lacking conceptual clarity and
uniformity. The lack of both a comprehensive definition and a theoretical framework
to support the concept of energy transition is not only lamentable from a scientific
point of view: the resulting lack of common understanding among (inter)national
actors also incapacitates the development of functioning international governance
mechanisms to address this global issue.
The main reason for this lack of conceptual integrity lies in the broadly preferred
focus on the “toolbox”, that is, the single components or tasks of the energy transition.
Energy transition is most commonly defined extensionally (see Fig. 1), e.g. through
its components such as the increasing share of renewable energy sources in the total
energy mix (IRENA, IEA), energy efficiency (EU, IPEEC, IRENA), phase-out of
fossil fuels (IRENA, EU) and nuclear energy (German Fed. Gov.), electrification of
1German for “Energy Transition”.
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Fig. 1 Components of energy transition(s). Source IEA (2019a, b)World EnergyOutlook, Authors’
analysis
the transport sector (IEA, EU), development of carbon capture and storage technolo-
gies (Norway, Saudi Arabia). An important observation at this point is, that the set
of these components differs among countries, regions and organizations according
to their respective agenda. In other words: the global community lacks a uniformly
agreed energy transition agenda.
The respective policy approaches are guided by a set of paradigms, the central
one often being energy security. Traditionally, in the EU and in the OECD countries,
energy security has been defined through the strategic energy triangle, consisting of
the three objectives of security of supply, sustainability and economic efficiency. Yet,
there has always been the issue of prioritization of these objectives, given that there
are not only synergies but also trade-offs between the policies addressing them. On
the other side, the World Energy Council highlights that countries face an energy
trilemmaof addressing security of supply, ecological sustainability and energy justice
simultaneously. The different wording chosen by the World Energy Council illus-
trates the variety of notions associated with the paradigms across the globe. While
security aspects have been at the heart of energy governance since the emergence of
the first energy institutions, the economic aspects have been gradually added after-
wards, whereby their definition differs largely across the world. In the OECD coun-
tries, economic efficiency, competitiveness and affordability are prevailing notions.
In other parts of the world, energy equity and energy justice underpin the economic,
or better socio-economic angle of energy policies.
The concept of energy transition is pervasively used as a normative one, it is
also often tailored to fit certain policy objectives or to underpin specific measures
and steps. Therefore, international fora such as the G20 or theWorld Energy Council
make the case for multiple energy transitions, i.e. structural shifts in the energy
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system of each country according to its respective goals and economic and resource
potential (G20 2019; WEC 2014).
It is obvious that the various positions of countries in energy trading (influenced
by their world market share/their position as a net importer/net exporter), in the glob-
alized economy (trade surplus/deficit), with regard to their respective degrees of eco-
nomic and social development (population growth/industrialization/urbanization)
(Bradshaw 2010) as well as to the state of the energy system and the level of access
to modern energy supplies determine the weighing of objectives and the prioritiza-
tion of energy policy goals. With climate change mitigation, adaption and resilience
added to the set of objectives, this diversity of priorities has proven to be a heavy
burden and at times an obstacle for energy and climate governance beyond national
levels (ibid.). Multilateral initiatives aiming to shape energy relations are in general
hampered by widely scattered interests, which exacerbate the already considerable
existing uncertainties. As a result, states have pursued very different pathways in
energy governance: In the OECD area, it has been above all a matter of safeguard-
ing prosperity; the post-socialist states have had to deal with the after-effects of the
Soviet era, including the task of socio-economic transformation and a search for
a new position in the global economy. The ‘resource curse’ and rent-seeking patterns
have determined the energy dilemma of the energy-rich countries, while the question
of sufficient access to energy has occupied the energy-poor countries (ibid.).
In addition to the traditional paradigms, sustainable development and growth
have become key concerns. Since the second decade of the 2000s, the two key
objectives of security of supply and climate protection have been accompanied by the
goals of sustainable development and a fair and equal supply of energy worldwide,
above all promoted by the United Nations. At that time, the United Nations also
began to take an active stance on sustainable energy with its Sustainable Energy For
All (SE4All) initiative. In the same vein, the Millennium Development Goals were
translated into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. Goal 7 is to
ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all by 2030.
Sustainable development is very much connected to the issues of energy justice
and energy poverty, but also to environmental protection, and more specifically,
protection of water, soil and air. In the same year of 2015, the Paris Agreement on
Climate Change was signed. According to the Paris Agreement, countries’ ambitions
onNDCshave to progress in 5-year cycles.According toArt 2.1 of theAgreement, the
NDCs should be formulated in line with the goal to keep global warming well below
the 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit
temperature increase to 1.5°. The Paris Agreement, the consecutive Conferences
of Parties (COPs) and reports by the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UN FCCC) have added a sense of urgency to the issue of climate
protection, but at the same time possibly aggravated the dilemmas in addressing all
four objectives even further. Local air, soil and water pollution as part of sustainable
development are in many countries a major driver and mitigating climate change
comes as a transformation dividend (Goldthau et al. 2018), rather than as a policy
goal on its own. Although sustainable development has become a major underlying
theme, e.g. also in the International Energy Agency and itsWorld Energy Outlook(s),
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and climate is often subsumed under ‘sustainability’, we argue that both, climate and
sustainability constitute paradigms in their own right.
Therefore, we suggest that a strategic energy quadrangle rather than a triangle
is informing energy policies across the globe. Energy security, economic efficiency,
sustainable development and climate change mitigation, adaptation and resilience
form fourmajor angles or baskets, towhich countries associate very different notions.
At the same time, however, these four angles significantly overlap and create and
numerous synergies to exploit and lift.
To summarize, when it comes to energy transition governance, countries differ in
terms of their starting points, their path dependencies and their future pathways as
well as their ambitions. In view of this diversity, the Paris Agreement, its rulebook as
well as the bottom-upmechanism of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are
important and necessary, but not sufficient preconditions to steer energy transition
towards climate neutrality nor appropriate to govern energy transition(s) to meet the
other objectives.
Indeed, if we are talking not about one, but multiple energy transitions, defin-
ing them through their respective components makes a lot of sense, since such a
definition can be easily operationalized by, say, national policy makers. However,
in order to enable global governance and international cooperation mechanisms on
this issue, there must be an understanding of energy transition every stakeholder can
identify itself with. Although different stakeholders propose different measures and
elements, there is indeed one common element such a definition can be based on:
the characteristics of the future energy system they deem necessary and aim for are
the same. All major stakeholders, some explicitly (G20 2019; BMWi 2015, p. 3;
G20 2019, p. 1; MOFA Japan 2018), and some implicitly (IEA 2019a, b; EC 2015;
IRENA 2018; national governments, e.g. the PRC’s government2) define sustain-
ability, environmental safety, economic efficiency and security of supply to be the
central goals and the end-state to which the process of energy transition should lead.
A future energy system with these characteristics is indeed universally aspired—the
Sustainable Development Goal 7 on Energy, that is, access to affordable, reliable,
sustainable and modern energy for all (UN 2019), has been adopted by governments
of 193 countries.
Moreover, instead of energy transition, talking about energy transformation
reflects the necessary systemic nature shifts in the energy system. Sometimes both
concepts are used interchangeably: in IRENA’s report “Global energy transforma-
tion—roadmap to 2050” energy transformation is a means to achieve energy tran-
sition, which is conceptualized as the end-state itself: “The challenge that policy
makers around the world face is how to accelerate the transition. Fully delivering
the energy transition will require a transformation in how we view and manage the
energy system. Transitioning in a few decades from a global fossil-fuel powered
energy system, built-up over several hundred years, to one that is sustainable, will
2As stated, for instance, in Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19th National Congress of the Communist
Party of China (Xi 2017).
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require a much greater transformation than current and planned policies (the Ref-
erence Case) envisage” (IRENA 2018: 68). As in several recent academic studies,
in one if its newest reports “Geopolitics of energy transformation”, IRENA uses the
term “energy transformation” intentionally instead of energy transition, to point out
the broader implications a transition to low-carbon energy sources brings with it
(IRENA 2019).
Against the above said, we suggest having an intensional3 definition of energy
transition that is formulated as follows: a policy-driven process which involves sys-
temic shifts towards (a) sustainable and climate-friendly, economically efficient and
secure energy system(s). The measures and building blocks of such a transition will
differ from country to country. Yet, there should be a governance system behind
these national efforts, to pave the way, facilitate, enhance and accelerate the energy
transition(s).
2 The Status Quo of Energy Governance
and the Institutional Landscape
The existing energy governance landscape began emerging in the second half of the
last century and has developed over time. It is sketchy and fragmented. Within this
landscape, there are very few multilateral institutions that tackle energy issues in a
comprehensive way (see Fig. 2). This is the result of (1) the different positions and
roles of countries in the international energy system and (2) the diverging national
priorities in energy policies regarding the strategic quadrangle of energy.
The traditional organizations such as the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries
(OPEC), the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) or the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) focus on specific energy sources, respectively oil, natural
gas and nuclear energy.
Whereas OPEC and GECF are providing platforms for dialogue and cooperation
among producing countries, the International Energy Agency (IEA) was formed
by the OECD countries as an organization of energy consumers and primarily in
response to the first oil crisis of 1973–1974. The IEA has been dealing with different
energy sources ever since, albeit it has always had a pillar on oil crisis management
and prevention. The IEA has been adjusting its role constantly to the new energy
and climate realities. However, its membership structure, restricted to the OECD
countries, came under increasing criticism as non-OECD countries like China and
India have becomepowerful energymarket players. In face of the changing dynamics,
an association process has been currently under way with major non-OECD energy
3An intensional definition provides the meaning of an expression by specifying necessary and
sufficient conditions for correct application of the expression. An intensional definition should be
distinguished froman extensional definition,whichmerely provides a list of those instances inwhich
the expression being defined is applicable. Cook, Roy T. "Intensional Definition". In A Dictionary
of Philosophical Logic. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. 155.
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powers. In 2020, the IEA comprises 30 member states, 8 association countries and 2
countries in accession. Though being a display of IEA’s adaptability, the association
process is certainly an attempt to maintain the existing order.
The creation of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in 2009
meant a significant advance, both in renewable global governance as well as with
regard to multilateralism (see also Roehrkasten 2015). IRENA got a clearly defined
mandate to “be the global voice and knowledge base for the use of renewable energy,
to serve as a forum for international technological cooperation, and to advise the
member states on these matters”. (Roehrkasten and Westphal 2013; Roehrkasten
2015). The specific focus has been on renewables. IRENA has also been looking into
the geopolitical implications of an energy transformation (IRENA 2019).
As Fig. 2 shows, there are some organizations and fora that deal with specific
energy sources or encompass a particular group of countries. This overview con-
tains institutions on the global level, whereas regional organizations that specifically
focus on energy (such as the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE)) or
have energy in their portfolio (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE), European Union (EU), United Nations Economic and Social Commis-
sions for Western Asia, for Asia and the Pacific and for Latin America and the
Caribbean (UNESCWA, UNESCAP, UNECLAC), etc.) are not included here. Not
included is also theWorld Trade Organization, which has played an important role in
setting the rules for trade generally, but not in the energy sector (with an exception of
energy services). The European Energy Charter in 1991 and the Treaty in 1994 were
an attempt to translate similar rules into the energy trade, transport and investment.
Yet, from today’s perspective, it can be said that it is very doubtfulwhether the Energy
Charter Process can be revived and modernized in a way to provide a ‘rule book’ or
a ‘code of conduct’ for international energy trade, transport and investments, despite
the 2015 signed International Energy Charter.
As Fig. 3 shows, very few existing institutions equally address energy policy
objectives in an institutionalized manner.
At the end of the 2000s, there was a strong impetus to strengthen the coordination
among the existing governance mechanisms and organizations. The initial idea was
to better integrate the new powers such as China and India, and to have an outreach
to the regions. The outreach and association process of IEA as well the International
Platform of Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC) under the umbrella of IEA
resulted from initiatives of the Group of Eight (G8). It was the G8 that reacted to the
fact that energy governance did neither reflect the energy landscape any longer nor
the changes in global politics in general. In an increasingly multipolar world, energy
governance (Lesage et al. 2010) became a matter of steering committees and clubs,
first and foremost of the G7/8 and G20. The G7 transformed back into an exclusive
OECD-club with the crisis in and over Ukraine, when Russia was excluded from
the process in 2014. The Group of 7 carried on with the agenda of tackling climate
change and energy security (with the primary focus on natural gas).
In 2009, the G20 emerged as the new ‘club’ to primarily address the financial
crises. The G20 began to work on energy matters under the US presidency in 2009,
when G20 members declared their intent to phase out harmful and inefficient fossil
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fuel subsidies (Van de Graaf and Westphal 2011). This new focus was also intended
as an answer to the financial and economic crises as themember countries committed
themselves to a resilient, sustainable and green recovery.
The G20 is perfectly positioned to steer global energy transition. Along with the
G7 countries Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the US, the G20 includes
the European Union (EU), Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia,
Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, as well as Turkey. It com-
prises countries that are of utmost importance for a successful energy transition and
includesmajor energy producers, consumers and key players in existing international
institutions. Also, in terms of climate policies, the G20 countries would make a huge
difference, if acted together, as they account for 81% of global emissions (in com-
parison, G7 accounts for 25%). Last but not least, the G20 includes all permanent
members of the UN Security Council, and major financiers of principal international
organizations.
The G20 has constantly stepped up its voluntary cooperation in energy-related
areas such as subsidies, market transparency and price volatility, international energy
collaboration, energy efficiency, energy access and renewable energies. The G20
summits provide countries with an opportunity to meet on an equal footing and to
exchange national views and standpoints on energy topics, amajor step forward being
made in 2015 with the first G20 Energy Ministers Meeting that took place under the
Turkish Presidency. Yet since then, every new presidency set its own priorities, which
hampered continuity as an important precondition for efficient and effective energy
governance. Energy ministers have met each year since 2015, except for 2017 under
the German Presidency. Overall, though the G20 unites a representative group of
industrialized countries and new powers that can have an impact in their respective
regions, the members have very distinct and diverse policies and perspectives. This
limits the role of the G20 when it comes to global energy governance and is also the
reason for the group’s focus on less controversial issues, such as energy efficiency.
As a result, the G20 has only partly lived up to its potential as a steering commit-
tee (Van de Graaf and Westphal 2011). In its current form, the G20 builds on the
principle of voluntariness and on “soft” modes of steering, such as agenda setting,
coordination among G20 members, information exchange and the steering of inter-
national organizations (ibid.). At the same time, the G20 has moved international
energy governance up on its policy agenda, has rhetorically connected energy and
climate policies and has enlarged its focus to sustainable development.
Since 2009, the G20 has continued to exchange on and monitor the progress
towards phasing-out of fossil fuel subsidies: in 2010 the IEA, OPEC, OECD and the
WorldBank published reports tracking fossil fuels subsidies (IEA/OPEC/OECD/WB
2010, 2011). In 2013, the G20 endorsed a methodology for voluntary peer reviews
“on inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encouragewasteful consumption” (G20 2013,
paragraph 94). Since 2013, the G20 has been addressing energy issues more com-
prehensively. At the 2014 G20 Summit in Brisbane, Australia, the G20 endorsed the
G20 Principles on Energy Collaboration. The Chinese Presidency in 2016 continued
this initiative to make energy institutions more inclusive and effective under the title
“Global Energy Architecture”.
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TheG20 affirmed its support for the SDG target Number 7 and pledged to increase
the share of renewable energy substantially by 2030. At the core of the G20 action
on renewable energy is the toolkit of voluntary options, developed by IRENA. The
following five options are presented as particularly beneficial for the G20 action:
(1) in-depth and country-specific analyses of renewable energy costs and reduction
potentials, (2) exchange good practice examples on enabling national policy frame-
works, (3) development of renewable energy-specific riskmitigation instruments, (4)
country-specific assessment of renewable energy technology potential and develop-
ment of roadmaps and (5) support the sustainability indicators and further actions
of the Global Bioenergy Partnership (GBEP), in close cooperation with IRENA and
IEA Bioenergy.
In addition, G20 members decided to explore the potential for increased regional
infrastructure connectivity and cross-border investment to enable greater levels of
investments in renewable energy, and to continue the support for international coop-
eration, including capacity building for developing countries and encouraging the
use of existing cooperation platforms. In 2019, energy transformation has been offi-
cially put on the agenda at theministerial meeting on “Energy Transitions and Global
Environment for Sustainable Growth” in Japan (G20 2019).
Today’s fragmented energy landscape increasingly amplifies the contours of a
multipolar world. It is clear that in its current state, energy governance is far from
being comprehensive, efficient and effective to steer a global energy transition.More-
over, in the current geopolitical environment the efforts to strengthen theglobal coop-
eration and work on global public goods seem more and more futile. At the turn of
the new decade of the 2020s, personal ambitions of politicians determine politics.
These are less directed to multilateral negotiations rather than to bilateral tit-for-tat
zero-sum games. The volatility of personal relationships among the world leaders,
where selfish nation-first policies dominate, increasingly compromises the stability
and continuity of international relations.4
In the same vein, the global geopolitics around climate have changed fundamen-
tally: Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015, the consensus among
major powers has faded. COP 25 in Madrid in 2019 ended without a clear statement
on raising the ambitions of the nationally determined contributions (NDCs), with
the communiqué being watered down by the US, Brazil and Australia. The ‘NDC
explorer’ shows, that the absolute majority of the countries put renewable energy
first, while carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) technologies are hardly
mentioned. Even when taking into account that the NDCs have been produced under
time pressure and that they may not be the best-grounded pledges, massive political
and financial gaps are obvious and the ambitions are far too low (Pauw et al. 2019).
This altogether makes energy (transition) governance—albeit granular, selective and
regional—more important than ever.
4We owe these thoughts to Carlos Pascual and his inspiring presentation in December 2019 in
Berlin.
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3 The Energy Transitions and Their Geopolitical Impact
Policymakers at all levels face the Herculean task of making energy systems more
sustainable and climate friendly. Moreover, at the same time, they have to ensure the
supply of, e.g. fossil fuels, for the transitional periodwithout perpetuating the existing
energy system (Westphal 2012). If one looks to the horizon 2050, in which the world
aims to become carbon-neutral, the energy supply worldwide should be structured
in such a way that the expected nine to ten billion people on earth have access to
modern, affordable and sustainable energy supplies without further destroying the
livelihoods of present and future generations (ibid.).
We assume that energy transition pathways differ and depend on countries’ respec-
tive preferences and imagined energy futures (see Chapters in this volume). Thus,
we defined energy transitions as an intensional policy-driven process which involves
systemic shifts towards (a) sustainable and climate-friendly, economically efficient
and secure energy system(s).
There is no single and simple solution to transitioning the energy system(s) in line
with these paradigms, as stated by the IEA in its World Energy Outlook of 2019.
The IEA’s WEO 2019 has been very clearly stating that there is no silver bullet
at hand, but a combination of technologies ranging from energy efficiency, renew-
ables, fuel switch, nuclear, CCUS, etc. as well as—not least—behavioural change
are needed to put the world on track (see Fig. 4).
The systemic nature of energy transitions in general has been pointed out before,
most notably in works on historical energy transformations (ex. Smil 2010; Kander
et al. 2014, etc.). In its core, previous energy transitions have been transitions from
one energy source (wood, coal, oil, electricity) and one type of energy converter
(manpower, animal power, steam engine) to another. In all of these cases, major
Fig. 4 No single or simple solutions to each sustainable energy goals. Source IEA (2019a, b),
World Energy Outlook. All rights reserved
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inventions of leading technologies such as the steam engine, electric lightning, etc.,
have kick-started processes of transition. However, all these transitions have been
also accompanied by the profound and irreversible shifts on societal, ideological,
political and economic levels (ibd.). In this regard, the energy transition that is taking
place nowadays is no exception: it involves a shift to new, low-carbon energy sources.
Yet, this time, the range and speed of the transition is and needs to be different.
Moreover, the range of measures that will have to be deployed is enormous. As a
result, the scale of socio-economic and political changes to be expected from the
energy transitions happening around the world is not comparable to the historic
cases. In other words, we have to think about energy transformation, in a way Karl
Polanyi described the “Great Transformation”—neither national nor global energy
systems are discrete elements. They are closely intertwined with politics, as well as
with economic and social systems. A transition to a low-carbon economy doesn’t
just change the energy system. It has massive knock-on and distributional effects,
causing re-allocation of resources both nationally and internationally.
How to think about the New World (IRENA, 2019) and the difficult, painful, but
promising transition phase? (1) The energy transition(s) come with various struc-
tural shifts that create newpatterns of energy supply and demand, investment and data
flows, new infrastructure systems and new power balances. (2) The new system will
bemore electrified, digitized, demand-side driven and distributed. This requires large
infrastructure to adapt, to modernize or to be developed, depending on the respec-
tive countries. (3) Today’s energy system rests on individual sectors (i.e. electricity,
buildings, transport, industry), each characterized by a dominant mix of (fossil) fuels
(Goldthau et al. 2018). In the system of the future, the sectors (electricity, industry,
heating and cooling, transport and mobility) will be coupled by the use of electricity
and synthetic/decarbonized molecules and liquids. (4) As a consequence of these
changes in the system, a relocation of production and demand as well as a reconfig-
uration of energy spaces will take place. (5) In the new energy world, the value is no
longer generated primarily from the fossil fuel resource such as coal, oil or gas, but
rather at the stage of conversion into end-user energy/services (ibid). In other words,
more and more value will be created downstream of the energy supply chain and
in services (e.g. lightning, heating, cooling, etc.). As a consequence, profits will be
generated by the availability and use of low-carbon technologies.
Energy transformation does not only recalibrate energy value chains. It also
(re)configures energy spaces, which are shaped by infrastructure, production chains,
and industrial clusters. Energy infrastructure can be viewed as an “infrastructured”
geography of “long durée” that shapes spaces and even creates its own “ecolo-
gy” and topography (Högselius 2013). This is particularly true for electricity grids
and their different shapes (central, decentralized) as well as sizes (local, national,
trans/continental). The spatial effects of the energy transition(s) result from techno-
economic change, e.g.in the shape of local micro grids or region-spanning super
grids, such as those promoted by China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Connectivity will
be newly defined, knocking on existing interdependencies, alleviating old sensitivi-
ties and vulnerabilities, but also creating new ones. The interconnectedness of two
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critical infrastructures, the electric grid and the internet creates specific challenges
and hybrid threats.
If we assume that the energy transition has tremendous political, economic and
social effects, the interaction with international political and geographical factor is
evident (Ivleva and Tänzler 2019). Geopolitics can be understood as dynamics that
stem from the interaction of geographical factors and international politics (ibid.;
Scholl and Westphal 2017). In international politics energy is (intended to be) used
as a tool and means to influence political outcomes, achieve foreign policy goals
and as a lever to project power (Ivleva and Tänzler 2019). The geopolitics of energy
transformation constitute a governance challenge in its own right. There is a growing
body of literature on the energy transition having a geo-economic and geostrategic
character (Bradshaw 2014; Scholten 2018; Goldthau et al. 2018; Bazilian et al. 2019;
IRENA 2019).
Importantly, the very notion of energy security will change along with the trans-
formation of energy systems: To be more precise, in the oil-centered world of the
past, national security and the issue of import dependencies were at the heart of
energy security. In the new energy landscape, where electrification is a major trend,
the stability of the power grid will be the defining feature of energy security. Not
surprisingly, energy is and will remain at the heart of national sovereignty and/or
statecraft, as Daniel Yergin’s definition of energy security as “adequate, reliable sup-
plies of energy at reasonable prices in ways that do not jeopardize major national
values and objectives” hints to (Yergin 1988). Energy has always proven to be a
major policy field, involving a strong role of the state, as it is closely related to its
traditional tasks of providing prosperity, security and stability. The energy transi-
tion offers new opportunities to shape the energy system in a new vein, which is in
line with national values and interests, while also providing and protecting global
commons and goods.
While traditional geopolitics is related to power relations, the energy transition
implies power shifts and alters the political economy on the national and the inter-
national levels. It creates winners and losers (IRENA 2019; Overland et al. 2019).
Petrostates and coal-exporting countries are repositioning themselves in the interna-
tional system as their major assets become de-valued (IRENA 2019). At the interna-
tional level, fossil fuel producers are vulnerable to the fundamental changes caused
by the energy transitions. Resilience to the energy transition effects depends on the
percentage of fossil fuel rents in the GDP and the diversification of their economy
(IRENA 2019). If petrostates such as Russia, Saudi Arabia or Iraq, etc., are con-
fronted with declining oil rents, their socio-economic model and political systems
come under severe pressure. Fossil fuel exporters are not only faced with a devalua-
tion of their natural resources, but increasingly face fundamental challenges to their
economic and social systems, since the resource wealth is part of the social contract.
This in turn affects the political stability and economic growth in these countries.
Yet, it is fair to say that the US shale gas and tight oil revolution has already caused
a landslide by creating a new situation of energy abundance, shaking up the position
of energy rich countries and diminishing their respective rents. In a sense, the US
shale revolution has already anticipated certain effects for the petrostates.
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Transit countries such as Ukraine, Morocco or Tunisia that gain rents from their
midstream part in fossil fuel supply chains, will also feel the effects of energy tran-
sitions. Obviously, the energy transformation will have knock-on effects along the
whole fossil fuel value chainmaking the exporting and transit countries to losers of an
energy transformation. Evident winners are major importing countries, which will be
able to produce more energy from renewables locally and at home or in cross-border
cooperation within ‘grid communities’ (Scholten 2018), formed by political choice
and not due to geological circumstances. At the same time, renewable technology
leaders are emerging (IRENA 2019; Goldthau et al. 2018), gaining more and more
political weight and a central place in the global markets. Hence, energy governance
has to tackle the geopolitical ramifications of energy transformation and aim for a
transition that is as smooth as possible. In this respect, the notion of a ‘just transition’,
energy justice or evenness, is key for the global energy transition, in particular with
regard to the Global South (see Goldthau in this volume).
Finally, the energy transformation has profound and even disruptive structural
effects. At the national level, it inherently entails structural ruptures and puts stress
on the incumbent energy system. Incumbent utilities like the German companies E.
On and RWE lost significantly in their market capitalization and/or changed their
asset base, which also split their renewable branches. In the socio-technical realm, a
paradigm shift will have to take place, with the end consumer and/or the community
moving into focus. Consumers are becoming key actors as both, consumers and
producers (“prosumers”) of sustainable energy, which requires a behavioural change
beyond energy saving and efficient energy use. The EU, for instance, has paid a
tribute to this paradigm shift by focusing on the end consumer in its ‘Clean Energy
Package for all Europeans’ of 2017. In general, this paradigm shift from supply to
the end consumer has three dimensions. First, consumer behaviour is critical to the
success and speedof an energy transition: consumers have to take up responsibility, be
empowered and become to a certain extend ‘owners’ of the transition. Second, there
is the social dimension of access, availability and affordability of (modern) energy:
among others, governance measures are needed to deal with e.g. (temporary) price
increases. Last, but not least, structural ruptures such as a ‘coal phase out’ are part of
the decarbonization. This requires states to mitigate social risks, e.g. ones expected
from the coal phase-out negotiated in Germany in 2019 (BMWi 2019). Germany’s
decision to phase out coal by 2038 was achieved by a societal consensus after a
long negotiation process and backed by a set of structural policies in coal regions.
These policies translate into a long phase-out over almost 20 years, depending on
the age (and technology used) of the respective power plants. Other countries might
have the chance to leap-frog this technology, or might have to close down coal-fired
power plants before their respective lifespan ends(as is likely to be the case for some
countries in Asia) (IEA 2019a, b). In any case, the socio-economic dimension of the
energy transformation cannot be underestimated.
As mentioned above, energy transition affects societies. Energy transition has a
considerable effect on labor markets. Germany is a case in point where the narrative
of creating green jobs has not really (or only temporarily) delivered. When feed-in
tariffs triggered the diffusion of PV in Germany, the ‘solar valley’ in Sachsen-Anhalt
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boomed.5 Yet, as China began to expand its solar panel manufacturing industry,
many involved in the same sector in Germany lost their green jobs. Socio-technical
dynamics have to be closely analysed and the respective policy measures devel-
oped: In Germany, traditional energy sectors are covered by unions, primarily the
respective labor union IGBCE (IG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie), whereas workers in
new industries such as solar and wind energy are not organized in trade unions and
therefore don’t have the same kind of support.
This particular challenge to tackle the socio-economic effects of the energy tran-
sition is thus increasingly debated as the “just energy transition”. The focus on a just
transition is inextricably linked to the question of “who wins, who loses, how and
why“. It is imperative to ask this question both in relation to the existing distribution
of energy (e.g. “who lives with the side effects of extraction, production and genera-
tion?”), and with regards to the ongoing energy transformation (e.g. “who will bear
the social costs of decarbonizing energy sources and economies?”) (Newell andMul-
vaney 2013, p. 3). This, in turn, necessitates addressing the issues of distribution and
access to political power, natural, social and economic resources, and the political
economy behind socio-technical energy transitions (Goldthau and Sovacool 2012).
Attention has to be paid to the interrelation between a just energy transition and the
speed of decarbonization, though. In the beginning, mitigating social effects can be
an impediment to moving ahead with the rapid decarbonization, but a sound social
consensus is needed as a stabilizing element to transform the energy system. The
creation of green jobs can serve as a catalyst and is even more important than social
measures to compensate for income losses and job cutbacks. These social aspects
are moving to the political core of manyWestern societies, where, i.e. resulting from
such movements as “Fridays for Future”, the energy-climate cleavage has started to
influence the politics and polarize the societies.
4 Conclusions and Recommendations
The message this chapter can’t emphasize enough is that the energy transition(s) will
play out differently in countries and regions, but they all will have a huge impact on
all levels: the global, the regional, the national and the local. Moreover, while the
targets and paradigms are in place, creating the institutional framework fit to steer the
transitions’ pathways remains an open issue. As there is no simple and single solution
(see Fig. 4), there is no one-size-fits-all approach to governance. Instead, what is
needed is a flexible multilevel architecture which is (1) reflecting new connectivities
and energy spaces, (2) enabling, promoting anddiffusingnew technologies andknow-
how and (3) adapting the institutional and regulatory framework to the changes that
come along with the transformation of the energy system(s) (see Fig. 5). There is
a need for a better global and regional, and a good governance on the national and
5https://www.mdr.de/sachsen-anhalt/dessau/bitterfeld/solar-valley-solarzellen-photovoltaik-
chronologie-q-cells-solibro-100.html.
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local level. Particularly in today’s world of nation-first policies and geo-economics,
it is imperative to establish, maintain and improve the multilateral energy landscape.
Moreover, the governance task is not only to move forward with the energy tran-
sition, and to transform the system, but also to deal with the geopolitical aspects
which the energy transition brings about. Energy transformation comes with a cost,
but the costs of doing nothing are higher, even if less immediate and more diffuse.
The call on governance is evident, because it is assumed that this will make the tran-
sition(s) faster, smoother and more even. The transition period is assumed to have
systemic transformational effects on political systems, economies and societies, and
thus can be messy, disruptive and conflictive. Furthermore, the energy transition(s)
are not taking place in a vacuum but have the potential to add to the geo-economic
rivalry. Moreover, technology leadership and control over mineral resources can add
to the struggles over political authority and power.
The global environment of great power rivalry and the crises of multilateralism
are clearly complicating the global energy transformation. There is less political
will to work together to create and preserve global common goods than in the past.
Under these circumstances preserving the existing institutions such asWTO, IRENA
and UN Energy that build on ‘altruism’ and are aiming at a level-playing field is of
the utmost importance. If the global consensus is shaky, it will remain important to
act plurilaterally, in clubs, coalitions and alliances. The existing governance structure
(Figs. 2 and 3) can and has to ensure the functioning of today’s energy systemwithout
perpetuating it. The format of Clubs, the comprehensive institutions of IAEA and
IEAwill have a role to play. This is equally true for IRENA, UN Energy and SE4All,
which are directed to changing the energy system(s) along the paradigms of the
strategic energy quadrangle. In order to ensure that the measures undertaken (see
Fig. 4) not only contribute to diversification, but in fact transform the system, the
efforts in governing energy efficiency and renewable energy have to be stepped up.
Aside from the global level, new governance structures will have to be developed or
adapted at the regional level.
Without an aspiration of being comprehensive,we recommend the following focus
areas.
Governing Energy Regionalization and Connectivity. The energy transition will
reshape regions, but also create webs and routes within and between them (con-
nectivity). So far they are largely un- or only partly governed. Yet, the existence of
large infrastructure (e.g. power grids) running across regulatory spaces will require
new norms, rules and standards which deal with interoperability of systems and
cross-border management of flows (Scholl andWestphal 2017; Overland et al. 2016;
Balmaceda and Westphal forthcoming). Energy regionalization takes place without
a recognition of existing jurisdictions and polities. The question of who defines the
rules of the game in the “infrastructured” space or across production and value chains
is very acute. New governance schemes are necessary, also to prevent regulatory fault
lines from feeding into geopolitical conflicts. This has systemic, structural and spa-
tial implications of a transboundary nature that have repercussions on the regional
and global level. Among them are the global shift of investment and financial flows
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due to the changes in energy and technology markets; the emergence of new geogra-
phies of demand and supply; where the digitization comes with its own risks and
challenges, as both energy, IT and telecommunication sectors are connected by super
infrastructures, which are highly critical to modern societies. The cascading effects
in case of a crisis or a ‘black-out’ demand for specific resilience measures to be
taken in smart/super grid communities. This issue is already very tangible in the
EU, where electricity security and grid stability have gained utmost importance. The
creation of synchronized grid communities that include Turkey, and soon the Baltics
and Ukraine, come with their own governance challenges, not least of them being
connected to cyber security.
A Common Set of Global Rules. One immediate blind spot to address in global
energy governance is the lack of a code of conduct and/or a set of common rules. Both
are needed in order to create a level playingfield aswell as transparent and functioning
markets. The more technology-driven the energy system will be, the more important
will rule-setting organizations such as the WTO become. Patents and intellectual
property rights will remain important in order to make profits from innovation, but at
the same time, solutions will be needed to provide access to important technologies
for developing countries.
Investments.One of the key challenges for a sustainable energy transition is to get
the investments right and right in time. Under the current price regime of low energy
prices and in an era of abundance of energy sources, price signals to turn away from
fossil fuels will be too weak or simply lacking. Investments into production sites and
infrastructure predetermine and cement path dependencies given the long lead times
and lock-in effects they create. Policy measures and regulatory frameworks will be
key in the transition toward a sustainable global energy system. Institutions will
play a central role in incentivizing and realizing the big shifts in technology, as well
as creating and capturing the value and creating new business models. This is also
related to the question of who will finance the necessary infrastructure. Therefore,
‘shifting the trillions’ and getting the financial and taxation framework right, is of a
paramount importance. In many countries with high renewable energy and energy
efficiency potential, the cost of capital is too high. New power grid infrastructure,
renewable energy facilities, development of energy efficient buildings and appliances,
restructuring transport sector, etc., require huge sums of infrastructure investments,
great coordination efforts, and a stable regulatory framework to realize the shift.
The unprecedented oil price slump triggered by the Covid-19 pandemia in the first
quarter of 2020 is burning capital which will be missing in the energy sector and for
the transformation as a whole.
Technology-specific governance schemes and mechanisms. Moreover, there are
many issues around specific measures and technologies to be addressed by specific
governance mechanisms. The table above is not considered comprehensive. Yet, it
aims to visualize the complexity of the tasks faced by the global community. The
instrumental and operational level aims to grasp the multitude of the technologies,
components and tools needed to bring forward energy transition, among them the
deployment of low-carbon energy sources, Power-to-X and synthetic fuels, but also
the new approaches to power grid design (e.g. smart grids or super grids) as well
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as energy efficiency, sector coupling, and phase-out of fossil fuels. These elements
and tools are employed altogether or in part, based on the political agenda and
preferences of the respective countries—their efforts on the operational are therefore
highly heterogeneous.
A consumer-producer dialogue.One of the keymechanisms to ensure a successful
energy transition is an enhanced and effective consumer-producer dialogue. Such a
dialogue is particularly important for depletion strategies and gradually phasing-out
of fossil fuels. Moreover, this dialogue can create new partnerships to produce, trade
and transport ‘de-carbonized’ molecules and fuels (hydrogen and Power-to-X) and
coopt fossil fuel producers. The International Energy Forum (IEF), whose primary
focus is consumer-producer dialogue, is not delivering on that. It seems that it would
be more fruitful to move ahead with the ‘clubs’ and ‘coalitions of the willing’ to e.g.
gradually develop hydrogen markets.
Get the institutions right. Steering energy transition on the global level requires
enhanced technical and regulatory dialogue as well as a continuous exchange on best
(and worst) practices among countries, regions and communities. There is no lack of
targets, but themajor challenge is to create effective incentives, frameworks and regu-
lations to implement and accelerate the energy transformation. In addition, exchange
and cooperation on a knowledge- and database on energy (including exchange on
energy forecasts and common modelling exercises) must be developed, to provide
transparency needed for an efficient energy transition governance. For these modes
of inter- and transnational cooperation, the multilateralism of energy governance
institutions should be kept up and preserved. Coordination and coherence among
the existing institutions, clubs, and coalitions of the willing must be strengthened,
while governance structures where cooperation on energy transition can take place in
a level-playing field and is not driven by geo-economic rivalry have to be developed.
For this, countries and other relevant stakeholders have to abandon the traditional
perception of the quadrangle of energy security, economic efficiency, climate and
sustainable development as mutually exclusive dilemmas, and put synergies from
coordinating these four elements to the forefront instead.
Tandems between Global North and South are imperative to efficiently addressing
the issues of energy poverty and just energy transition globally and to making sure
that no region is left behind. With regard to the deployment of renewables, ‘tandems’
may be a way forward as pursued in the G20 with phasing-out fossil fuel subsidies.
Healey and Barry (2017) rightfully highlight an “increasing inequality—of income,
wealth and resource ownership” in general, and rising “inequality of access to safe and
affordable energy” aswell as “energy poverty” asmajor challenges. Energy transition
regimes must address inequalities in power and injustices across entire socio-energy
systems. The issue of energy justice must be incorporated into all governance mech-
anisms. This can be done by paying tribute to the eight principles of energy justice:
availability, affordability, due process and information, responsibility, sustainability,
intra-generational and inter-generational equity (Sovacool and Dworkin 2015).
Education, research and information.At the end of the day, the benefits of energy
transition have to be communicated and pushed forward in the public debates: for
instance, human security gains as improved air and water quality are among the
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‘dividends’ of energy transition (Goldthau et al. 2018). Education and information
are key in addressing societies in general and in particular increasingly polarized
societies.
Approach climate and energy security through the lens of public goods. Energy
transition has the potential of re-localizing the economy around human-scale enter-
prises rootedmore closely in the communities they serve. Internally, energy transition
should be ‘democratized’ as entailing a shift towards empowerment and ownership,
transforming end-users into “prosumers” in the true sense of the word. Normatively,
the aim should be a reconfiguration of “transition arenas” from spaces for ‘coalitions
of frontrunners’ towards more open spaces for deliberation, dialogue and participa-
tion (Barry et al. 2015). For this, approaching energy and climate security through
the lens of global public goods as opposed to a strategic national interest is important.
We conclude that a just energy transition on all levels, but certainly on the national
and the international level, is necessary to keep countries and the world on a sustain-
able energy transition path. It is essential for the international community to stick to
the Paris Agreement in order to keep up the level of ambition nationally. But also
vice versa, the international ambition cannot be sustained without an enduring social
consensus in major countries.
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Setting Up a Global System
for Sustainable Energy Governance
Vladimir Zuev
1 Energy Geopolitics: From Security Above Anything
to Sustainability Among Everything
The global energy landscape is currently shaken by tectonic shifts.1 We witness
dramatic changes in energy geopolitics, the formation of the global system of energy
governance, a huge wave of massive technological innovations, global markets are
undergoing a radical transformation embracing a fast multiplication of new sources
of energy, new products, new producers, and suppliers, coupledwith the development
of the vast and sophisticated infrastructure and an increasing efficiency in energy use.
Each and every component of the system is touched upon by a wind of change that
brings about the contours of a new energy global order.
One core element of the current transformation is evidently the transition from
fossil fuels to renewables or rather a rapid rise in renewables usage, especially in
those parts of the world which used to be poor in possession of traditional fossil
fuels. This transformation will mean a radical shift in the focus of energy geopolitics.
Some aspects of this shift have been already mentioned in several studies (Overland
2019). We’d like to outline one more aspect of the new energy geopolitics that seems
important for this analysis.
Western countries used to be heavily dependent on oil imports from the Middle
East (oil crises of 1973 and 1979), or on gas imports from Russia (Hassanzadeh et al.
2014) (the gas crises betweenRussia andUkraine in 2006 and 2009) (Sharples 2016),
and on the constantly rising oil prices that reached a peak of $150 a barrel before the
global financial and economic crisis. Nowadays, we can register a new phenomenon
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that we can call a “reversed dependence.” This time, developing countries producing
an abundance of fossil fuels are becoming increasingly dependent on consumers from
the major developed and emerging economies. The higher the level of renewables
will be in the future energy mix the less fossil fuels will be needed globally. If that
happens (and there is a high chance it will), this may mean a terrific blow to the
developing countries’ energy incomes, affecting many economies and re-shaping
geopolitical influences.
The oil-producing countries themselves come to realize all the more, the neces-
sity to diversify their economies away from fossil fuels dependence (OPEC 2019),
which could be yet another factor for sustainable economic development. For energy-
exporting developing countries that rely on revenues from a limited range of natural
resources, the need to reorient their economies is also growing because of an emerg-
ing regulatory framework on climate change. Achieving diversification is considered
vital for the long-term economic sustainability of their economies. The notion of
economic diversification suggests a strategy to transform the economy from using a
single resource, or a relatively narrow set of income sources, into multiple sources
of income or a considerably broader variety of new and emerging economic sectors.
Such a diversification pathway or strategy may be driven by various motivations,
with the key objective being to boost economic performance along with sustainable
growth.
Energy security, perceived above all as an important element of military and
political security, has been one of the top priorities of each and every government
of the international community (Blumer et al. 2015). The rapid growth of renewable
energy sectors is providing room for a differentway of geopolitical thinking, focusing
more on economic and sustainability aspects of energy production within, or outside
of the national economies, rather than focusing primarily on military and political
aspects of energy security at a time of being fully dependent on energy imports
(Kelanic 2016; Barnes and Jaffe 2006). The shift can also be traced by using the
EnergyTrilemma Index of theWorldEnergyCouncil that is aimed to help countries to
formulate better policy through balancing energy security, equity, and environmental
sustainability. In other words, the more energy self-sufficient the countries become
(most of the renewables can be produced practically everywhere), the better the
chances are for sustainable energy development.
It is not only the rise in renewables that is the key to understanding the new system.
It is not a mere transition from one energy source to another. In each sector, energy
production and consumption become different: more efficient, reliable, safe, afford-
able and available to everybody, eco and climate-friendly. The bottom-upmarket and
technology-driven transformation of the energy sector, multiplication of energy pro-
duction sites in each and every corner of the world, have completely revolutionized
the way we consume and produce energy. By combining renewable energy, digital
technologies, and advanced materials, supported by appropriate infrastructure, the
world can modernize the energy system and reduce the flow and the waste of primary
resources. Overall, energy usage is becoming, or at least should become sustainable.
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2 Energy Governance Institutions—A Key to Sustainable
Transformation
The market and tech developments represent a basis that is a necessary precondition
for the introduction of the new principles into the energy governance. In order to push
the economic development in line with the wishful sustainable scenario, one has to
have an appropriate system of governance at hand. According to the International
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) roadmap to 2050, “energy transformation” is
possible due to digitalization, education, and regulation.We can agree that education
is important and not alone in this sector, but in each and every field. Education for
new energy generation is imperative. We could add that not only digitalization, but
the technological progress in general (batteries, panels, etc.) is also vital for the
development of renewables. And the governance challenge that we describe in this
chapter, is for sure critical for this transformation.
A sustainable development goal on Energy, formulated as an access to affordable,
reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all, has been adopted within the United
Nations by governments of 193 countries (UN 2015). The UN set up the foundations,
basics for the legal framework of the energy sector development, according to the
principles of sustainability and climate protection, as in the UN Convention on cli-
mate change, supported by concrete mechanisms provided for in the Kyoto protocol
and in the Paris agreement on climate change. The UN has the largest country cov-
erage, as the number of participants is close to totality. However, consensus is hard
to reach, decisions are difficult to implement, and big deals are rarely finalized. That
is the reason other institutions take their turn to fulfill the mission of global energy
governance. We will take a brief look at some of the most important of them for the
reasons of the suggested analysis.
The G20 stands next to the UN in terms of the scope and coverage of the sector, as
its members represent about 85% of global GDP. The G20 as an informal institution
is quick to react on the burning issues in energy governance, and energy was in
focus of most G20 Summits of the recent decade as a high-profile issue. Energy
efficiency has been a long-term priority for the G20 as it contributes to the optimum
utilization of energy resources. G20 members agree that increased collaboration on
energy efficiency can drive economic activity and productivity, strengthen energy
security, and improve environmental effects. Energy security, economic efficiency,
and environmental safety came to be fully integrated into the G20 sustainable energy
development concept.
At the G20 Global Summit on Financing Energy Efficiency, Innovation and Clean
Technology in Tokyo, Japan, June 2019, the CEOs of major investment funds and
senior financiers joined G20 policy makers, deciding how to close the world’s energy
efficiency investment gap. The Summitwas organized during the 2019 Japanese Pres-
idency of the G20 in conjunction with theMinisterial Meeting on Energy Transitions
for Sustainable Growth. The finance industry debated, with G20 government dele-
gations, on the scope of finance for innovation required to boost the world’s USD
240 billion annual energy efficiency investment market up to one trillion-dollars
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(G20 2019a). Another priority was how to improve the world´s emerging sustain-
able energy finance markets. One measure envisaged, is the so called “green tag-
ging”—the attachment of energy performance and data to financial performance and
data. Increased transparency of the energy performance of banks’ assets through
their accelerated tagging could be an additional factor to achieve energy transfor-
mation. Green tagging can also serve as an instrument to inform regulators about
the impact of energy efficiency on financial activity. At the G20 Global Summit on
Financing Energy Efficiency, over 150 high-level delegates concluded a declaration
on improving the energy performance of asset investments by financial institutions.
They also set up a mode for the implementation of the 2017 G20 Energy Efficiency
Investment Toolkit that could support transformation inside member economies. The
G20 Energy Efficiency Finance Task Group has developed tools to enable 122 pri-
vate banks and six public financial institutions, bringing USD 4 trillion for energy
efficiency activities. Ministers adopted the “G20 Karuizawa Innovation Action Plan
on Energy Transitions and Global Environment for Sustainable Growth,” which will
enhance cooperation at national, regional, and international levels (G20 2019b). They
also agreed to the initiative “Research and Development 20 for Clean Energy Tech-
nologies (RD20),” to promote international collaboration among research institutes
in G20 countries.
Though these are mostly recommendations, they are aimed at the point. The
G20 Energy Efficiency Leading Program (G20 2016) called for the broadening and
deepening of private sector engagement, including through the establishment of a
Private SectorEnergyEfficiency Investment Platform.Usingbest practices for energy
performance through networks of leading financial institutions is another instrument
of the transformation, like the UNEP FI Energy Efficiency Finance Platform. There
are manymore G20 initiatives, but the ones alreadymentioned, demonstrate the level
of the G20’s engagement to the global sustainable energy governance.
OPEC has a special role in global energy governance, as it has an extended
mandate and can fix oil production quotas, thus affecting oil prices that can affect
all energy prices indirectly. Its goals are well known, and though officially the goals
are set to keep prices stable, reasonable, and to reduce price volatility, in reality, they
are aimed more to protect the interests of producers in order not to suffer too much
from the relatively low price levels, the way these prices happen to be most of the
time since the global financial crisis of 2007–09. The deficit of impact on the global
production levels, and accordingly on prices, was partially offset by the OPEC+ 11
non-OPEC countries agreement (now +10 as Equatorial Guinea became an OPEC
Member in May 2017). Had this been done 5 years earlier, the effect would have
been much greater.
Currently, the USA, not being a member of OPEC and not a part of the OPEC+
deal, has become a new important actor on the global energy markets, undergoing
a spectacular transformation from a net importer to a net exporter of oil and gas
after the shale revolution. The USA alone is capable to compensate for the reduction
in the oil production quotas of all OPEC and 11 non-OPEC countries altogether,
which downgrades the regulative effects of OPEC’s action on oil production and
oil prices. Drone attacks, or the USA—Iran 2020 military tensions, or coronavirus
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threat fromChina, do influencemore, the volatility of oil prices than OPEC’s actions.
The meaning of these consequences is that governing the global security issues has
becomea factormore important for oil price volatility than energy-related governance
per se. Thus, the role of the global institutions like the UN or the G7 could be no
less important for global energy governance than the role of specialized energy
institutions.
The transformation of the OPEC cooperative framework is very illustrative in a
way that it brings together more countries to decide upon the global oil agenda.
OPEC+ format becoming permanent is already making OPEC more globalized.
Bringing China into the permanent cooperation frame is another change in this direc-
tion. Three High-level Meetings of the OPEC-China Energy Dialogue proved to be
promising. The thirdMeeting provided a platform for knowledge exchange, and con-
tributed to the deepening of energy dialogue in general between China and OPEC.
Another illustrative change in OPEC’s activities consists of the fact that the sustain-
ability agenda becomes an all the more sensitive and important topic in its work. For
OPECMember Countries and other energy-exporting developing countries that rely
on revenues from natural resources, the imperative need to reorient their economies
is growing, owing mainly to an emerging stringent regulatory framework on cli-
mate change and a sustainable development agenda. Achieving diversification is
proclaimed vital for the long-term economic sustainability of the OPEC economies
(OPEC 2010, 2019). It remains to be seen how far a strategy to transform the econ-
omy from using a single resource, or a relatively narrower set of income sources,
into one based on multiple sources of income, or a considerably broader variety of
new and emerging economic sectors, will go. For us, it is important to note that such
a diversification strategy may be driven by sustainable development concepts.
Energy markets become all the more globalized, like in the case of gas markets
that used to be either national or regional connected by the pipe-lines infrastructure.
The fast spread of the LNG facilities has led to the fast globalization of the gas
markets. As the International Energy Agency notes in its World Energy Outlook,
liquified natural gas will surpass pipeline gas as the main way of gas trade over long
distances by 2030 (IEA 2019). Within the next 30 years, LNG’s share in total gas
demand is projected to rise from 20% in 2018 to 40% in 2040.
Global governance response to these fast changes is slow, and appears to be so
far, inadequate. One can’t claim that the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF)
becomes kind of the new OPEC for the gas markets. Though already in the Doha
Declaration, adopted at the first GECF Summit in November 2011, member-states
agreed upon the need for fair pricing with respect to a balanced distribution of
market risks between gas producers and consumers. However, no robust mechanism
to safeguard fair pricing was provided for. The idea of gas prices indexation to oil
prices, or support of the long-term gas contracts, put forward at the 2nd Summit
in 2013 in Moscow, came into conflict with the fast development of the global gas
market with spot sales booming. There is simply no need and it is not realistically
feasible to arrange the gas production in a similar way to oil production.
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It is interesting to note that the fossil fuel-producing countries put a special empha-
sis on making evident a link between sustainable development and fossil fuels’ con-
tinued production increase to the energy-consuming countries. At the 4th Summit of
GECF in Bolivia in November, 2017, the participating countries focused on the pro-
motion of natural gas as an environmentally friendly type of fuel, and on the need
for using the potential of natural gas for the implementation of the UN approved
Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Climate Agreement. At the 5th GECF
Summit in Malabo (Equatorial Guinea) in November, 2019, the Declaration itself
was under-titled “Natural Gas: Energy for Sustainable Development,” to highlight
the need to use gas as the core source of energy for Africa. The same focus on
sustainability has been noticed through OPEC’s activities (see above). It becomes
clear that the future of fossil fuels will depend to a large extent, among other factors,
on the regulators’ ability to make fossil fuels usage, eco-friendly, and sustainable.
This task is becoming more ambitious under additional pressure from the fast rise in
renewables usage, that will serve as an extra point of reference to the efficiency of
the traditional energy sources.
Renewables surge can be largely accredited to the regulators’ deliberate policies
to push forward sustainable energy networks. An evident example of this kind could
be the EU energy policies. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) is
another global intergovernmental organization case that supports countries in their
transition to a sustainable energy future, and serves as a platform for international
cooperation, facilitating technology transfer on renewable energy. IRENA promotes
the widespread adoption and sustainable use of all forms of renewable energy, in
the pursuit of sustainable development, energy security, and low-carbon economic
growth. The adoption of the Agenda for Sustainable Development and Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change in 2015,
provided a powerful global signal for a transition to sustainable energy. Since then
IRENAmembership doubled to 154 countries and 26more in accession, with around
1100 governmental representatives, demonstrating the Agency’s rise in global sig-
nificance for energy governance. The instruments of cooperation are innovative,
compared to traditional energy institutions, the way renewables are innovative. The
work is based on designing a centre of excellence for energy transformation, mak-
ing heard the “Global voice of Renewables” and spreading around the “advice and
support” initiatives, creating a Network Hub.
The paradox critical assessment of the IRENA’s work could be expressed in a way
that it is too much centered upon renewables. The global goal, officially formulated
and advanced by IRENA, consists of supporting and fostering the “energy transit”
and turning the energy system from the one based on fossil fuels to another one that
enhances efficiency and is based on renewable energy. The International Energy
Agency’s (IEA) work, as well as the task of the Agreement on the International
Energy Program signed in Paris inNovember, 1974 are similarly envisaging to reduce
dependence on oil and to develop alternative energy sources.
However, in traditional energy sectors from coal to atomic energy, countries, and
producers do also improve efficiency and security. For instance, in the OPEC Long-
term strategy, adopted 2019, it is stated that “OPEC supports the development and
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promotion of technologies that advance the environmental performance of oil, and
advocates the continuous improvement in standards for exploration and development
activities” (OPEC 2010, 2019). Thus, these other traditional energy sectors could
also be integrated into the concept of sustainable development, especially having
in mind the realistic assessment that their importance will be still great for decades
ahead. Though, it is natural that priority in IRENA’s or in the IEA work is given to
renewables, denying that much of a role for other sources of energy in the future
system could be unnecessary discouraging for many countries and sectors in their
efforts toward sustainability.
Many energy organizations that seemed to be far from the sustainable energy con-
cept, are doing a lot, building alliances and shifting their priorities toward sustainable
development. For instance, since 1996, IAEA joined the Uranium Group (since then
it is called Joint NEA-IAEA Uranium Group). The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
itself was set up within the OECD framework, to deal with nuclear power safety.
Recently, the IAEA and NEA under the Uranium Group started to coordinate their
work to better meet the climate change targets, to advance research and technologies
on small modular reactors, upgrading safety standards, and embracing human capital
into the concept of nuclear energy development. All of these changes fall well into the
concept of sustainable energy governance. Thus, the traditional energy institutions
like OPEC, GECF, IAEA are in the process of active adaptation of their respective
agendas, to the sustainable development goals that have to be further encouraged by
the international community.
3 Setting Up a Global System of Sustainable Energy
Governance
Global, regional, and national institutions set up a frame and a vector for the energy
sectors’ transformation and a top-down policy driven decarbonization, affecting both
market conditions and fostering tech innovations, predetermining to a high extent
the future energy landscape. We put into focus, global governance institutions and
the way they act and should act to make energy transition sustainable. National
energy systems are no longer isolated, they are becoming all the more interconnected
and interdependent, thus making global governance—an objective imperative. With
time, the necessity for coordinated action will be felt as more of a necessity. To
make Global Energy Governance (GEG) ready to meet the challenges of the day is
becoming an important global policy task. Which mechanisms, at a global level, will
help to generate the major changes in a sustainable way? What is missing to make
the energy sector sustainable? What model should be chosen to move forward at a
global institutions level?
Analyzing the activities of the international energy organizations, we can find a
lot of evidence of intensive cooperation links between them either, on ad hoc or on
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permanent basis, to support the argument of an emerging global energy network.
Some cases are listed below.
The United Nations has its special place in the center of the system, setting up
the concepts, the goals and institutions, providing a legal basis for energy gover-
nance by concluding conventions and agreements, and providing a framework for
cooperation between all the major international energy organizations. Advancing
the Sustainable Development Goals had a special milestone meaning for the global
energy governance, with a particular emphasis to achieve the 7th Goal: “Ensure
access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.” Numerous
expert discussions in different formats, like at the Conference of Parties (COP) of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), do have
a huge capacity-building potential for energy governance.
The G20, G7, OECD, IEA assure the global coordination for sustainable energy.
They work together on concepts and ways to achieve the transformation. Since the
Pittsburgh G20 Summit in 2009, the IEA has actively contributed to all energy-
related activities of the G20, including those on energy security, energy data, market
transparency, renewable energy, energy access, energy efficiency, and phasing-out
fossil fuel subsidies.
The G20 Summit’s work on financing energy efficiency in June 2019 in Tokyo,
was a very illustrative evidence of an intense cooperation between the global gen-
eral competence organizations and specialized energy institutions. This work was
coordinated by the UN Environment’s Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) and the Inter-
national Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC), as co-hosts of the
G20 Energy Efficiency Finance Task Group (“EEFTG”). The experts, negotiators,
and industry representatives were brought together under the Japanese Presidency of
the G20with the CEOs of major financial institutions, to find a commonway forward
in energy governance (UNEP Finance Initiative 2019).
TheWorld Energy Council is another place where national committees from 100
countries and about 3,000 energy-related organizations, work together promoting
the sustainable supply and use of energy. The World Energy Congress, which takes
place every three years, is a strategic place for many countries where trends in the
rapidly changing energy sector are discussed. In 2019, the congress was held in Abu
Dhabi and the Council issued a Report on the “World energy scenarios,” that showed
global energy pathways to 2040 in line with the sustainable scenario.
June 7, 2017, IRENAand theStateGridCorporation ofChina (SGCC), theworld’s
largest utility company, agreed to enhance cooperation on advancing the energy
transition. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and IRENA cooperate
in the area of energy planning. Collaboration between the IAEA and IRENA was
formalized by a Practical Arrangement in 2016. In 2019, the International Energy
Agency and IRENA enhanced cooperation between the two organizations by signing
a Memorandum of Understanding. The IEA plays an important role in the global
energy debate, and co-operates with a broad range of international organizations and
forums. It hosted a number of multilateral organizations at its headquarters in Paris,
including the Clean Energy Ministerial Secretariat and the Energy Efficiency Hub.
The IEA was also the facilitator for the Bio-Future Platform.
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Each year, the IEA, the International Energy Forum (IEF), and OPEC, work
together in a joint Symposium on EnergyOutlooks, which becomes an important part
of their working program. The symposium gathers senior analysts and delegates from
energy producing and energy-consuming countries, bringing together oil companies,
banks, and experts, to discuss the IEA World Energy Outlook and OPEC’s World
Oil Outlook. This dialogue is leading to greater convergence in the baseline data.
During the 8th IEA-IEF-OPEC symposium, which was held in 2018 in Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia, IEA Executive Director Dr. Birol, who began his career at OPEC
before joining the IEA, emphasized that a major dialogue between the IEA and
OPEC is critical to ensuring global energy security in an environmentally sound and
economically sustainable way (IEA-IEF-OPEC 2018).
Sustainable energy agenda became a priority for many organizations that are
not directly or solely linked to energy. For instance, the Sustainable Development
Working Group of the Arctic Council of the eight Arctic states is committed to
promoting sustainable development in the Arctic and improving the living conditions
of Arctic communities in general. The spreading of green energy in the Arctic region
will become one of the main vectors for the Arctic Council work in the coming years.
Protecting the Arctic has a special meaning, therefore, energy projects in the Arctic
should be agreed upon and supervised more rigorously from a sustainable energy
perspective.
The Food andAgricultureOrganization (FAO) is one of the IAEA’s partners. Since
1964, the two organizations govern together the Joint FAO/IAEADivision ofNuclear
Techniques in Food andAgriculture. The cooperation envisages, among other things,
common targets, joint programming, co-funding, and coordinated management.
Global and regional organizations are in close cooperation on sustainable energy
issues. In 2011, the IEA and ASEAN formally recognized their ongoing cooperation
in energy-related activities by signing a Memorandum of Understanding focused
on information-sharing, training, and capacity-building on key energy priorities in
the region such as stable and affordable energy supply, power sector development
and market integration, the ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement, and energy
efficiency. Another illustrative example of this kind could be the 2018 Agreement
between the IEA and the African Union, for a strategic partnership toward a more
secure, sustainable and clean energy future for countries across theAfrican continent,
through a memorandum of understanding. Eradicating energy poverty is a priority
for the IEA, and the agreement will play a vital role in stepping up efforts to achieve
secure and sustainable energy for all.
In October 2015 the IEA signed a Statement of Intent with the APEC Energy
Working Group at the APEC Energy Ministers Meeting in Cebu, Philippines. This
statement builds upon many years of extensive cooperation, and seeks to expand
collaboration in areas including energy security, energy data and statistics, renewable
energy, fossil fuel subsidy reform, energy market analysis, and capacity building.
Among the new lines of cooperation between global and regional institutions in
the sphere of energy, we can mention the recent developments, when for the last
year, the GECF and the EAEU have been discussing the models of cooperation.
An agreement has been reached on sending, in the year 2020, an invitation to the
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Eurasian Economic Commission, to take part in the upcoming GECF Summit. These
organizations also discussed eventual spheres of cooperation to create a sustainable
and transparent energy market with an option to sign a memorandum of cooperation.
We could further continue listing the evidence of intensive cooperation links
between the global and regional energy organizations. Having looked through and
having analyzed the above-cited cases, it becomes clear that a solid energy coop-
eration base has been established within a comprehensive format. There are far-
reaching goals and concepts proclaimed. Formal and informal energy institutions
do actively work and cooperate with each other in an intensive way to form a new
energy system, sustainable and viable with a just place for everybody and access to
energy for all. Having made the analysis of the activities of the major energy sector
institutions, and taking into consideration the increased level of interaction between
them, we can arrive to a conclusion that a system of global energy governance is
being actively formed. We see more coordination at an international level between
the policy regulators, more coherence, a higher role of global institutions in policy
priorities formulation in general. We can also conclude that this system of global
sustainable energy governance, has all the chances to be no less solid and important
than recognized systems of global trade or financial governance.
4 Looking Forward to Sustainable Energy Governance
One method to advance new ideas within global energy governance may consist of
bringing for consideration some of the existing mechanisms from the best regional
(EU) and global practices (trade and finance). To what extent these can be applied at
a global energy governance level remains to be seen. We made a first attempt of this
kind in this book.
It appears that the European Union provides the best model so far, for regional
and global energy governance (see chap. 2). The EU has moved in a tremendously
dramatic and successful way from the common energy policy, intensified after the
Lisbon Treaty, to the Energy Community and Energy Union concepts, all the way up
to the recent Green Energy Initiative. The European Union’s clean energy package
sets up an ambitious target of reaching 32% for renewable energy’s share in the total
final energy consumption, by 2030. It was made with the support of IRENA, which
is another demonstration of the intensity and importance of interlinks between the
institutions within the system of the global energy governance. The European Green
Deal re-announced in December 2019 by the European Commission, seems to be
so far, the best comprehensive plan to achieve sustainable development (European
Commission 2019a). The EU concept is coming as a global benchmark—a certain
guide “how-to advance” a transformation to a prosperous, inclusive, and sustainable
economy on the basis of clean energy concept.
It is not only the EU that can provide useful experience of implementing good
governance procedures for the global energy governance. About three decades ago,
there was another spectacular development at the global trade governance level.
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Although few drawbacks can currently be registered within this system. Another
governance case, which provides a useful reference for us, can be seen by the global
financial governance that has been built up within a decade after the global financial
crisis. After the global trade and financial governance surge, today comes the turn
of the consistent global energy governance system. Both global trade and financial
governance so far, are more advanced in the variety of instruments and more efficient
in governing the system compared to global energy governance.
Assessing what is missing from the global energy governance initiatives, could
be made by a comparative analysis between a respective global energy institution
with the energy policies in the EU, and the ones in global trade and global financial
governance according to a set of criteria. Before inventing a bike let’s have a look
whether we can make good usage of the already existing one. Some of the most
important points for good governance are mentioned below.
Availability of the appropriate vision, ideas, concepts, goals. These are well
advanced in the system of the global energy institutions (WEC, IEA, IEF, G20).
The concept of sustainable energy is well advanced in the UN SDGs and in the
agenda of major global institutions—G20, OECD, IEA, International energy forum,
GECF, IAEA, OPEC, IRENA. In this chapter, we provided concrete examples of
the good goals of different institutions which match in a good way with the concept
of sustainable development. The focus within these concepts is made on structural
shifts that create new patterns of energy investment, production, supply, and con-
sumption, facilitated by technological transformation of economy, data flows, and
new infrastructure systems.
Progress in establishing a solid legal basis for energy governance was evident
(many conventions and agreements already signed). However, the international legal
platform for energy governance could be further improved, mainly in the direction
of more binding commitments from the stake-holders. Even in the area of atomic
energy and IAEAactivities,where binding commitments are badly needed, the reality
remains that the nuclear security regime “is still a patchwork of voluntary, non-
binding, non-transparent national commitments, ad hoc bilateral and multilateral
initiatives, and vague legally binding measures that provide no specific standards
that states must follow” (FMWG 2013).
Some important agreements, like the European Energy Charter Treaty, were sup-
posed to set up the sound legal basis for cooperation between the energy producing
and energy-consuming countries. The Russian Federation planned to be part of this
order and signed the Charter. Unfortunately, the Charter was not ratified by Rus-
sia. Time went by and the cooperation environment changed dramatically. In May
2019, the European Commission adopted a proposal to modernize the Energy Char-
ter Treaty (European Commission 2019b). The Commission recommended that the
Energy Charter Treaty provided stronger provisions on sustainable development and
on the energy transition, in line with recent agreements. In the coming years the
necessity to either reconsider the existing legal order or to set it up anew, will only
grow.
Monitoring procedures become a special issue for energy governance. With some
exceptions, monitoring mechanisms within the system of global energy governance
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are either not provided for at all, or not well organized. For instance, OPEC sets
quotas for oil production, but there is no OPEC body to monitor compliance with the
fixed quotas. It remains under the responsibility of the countries concerned. Under
the OPEC+ agreement there is no clear-cut monitoring mechanism at all. The same
situation of theweak structures formonitoring is typical for the global emissions quo-
tas. Thinking about the nuclear security, the 20/20 Commission of Eminent Persons
recommended that binding agreements should “…give the IAEA a precise mandate
to confirm that these (nuclear security) standards are being implemented” (IAEA
2008). One main achievement of the IAEAwas the verification of Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram, re-confirmed in 2019, that allowed the achieving of a diplomatic breakthrough
from 2015. A joint comprehensive plan of action followed, the implementation of
which remains again under the control of the IAEA. Even with these instruments
in place, suspicions and mistrust remain (D. Trump’s Administration claims against
Iran in the beginning of 2020 could be provided as proof). This controversial case
is highly revealing. Irrespective of the US President’s Administration’s discontent
at the results of the work of IAEA inspectors in Iran overall, monitoring could be
considered as sufficiently reliable, as all the sites were under control of international
inspectors with appropriate reports at hand. Working further on the reliability of
monitoring procedures remains a challenge for sustainable energy governance.
Access to finance is critical for the success of energy governance. Proclaimed
initiatives and goals should be supported by an appropriate financial contribution.
The EU experience in encouraging the development of renewables by an extensive
financial contribution, both in direct and indirect way, is a good illustration of this
success story (see Chap. 2). So far, the common financial funds for energy sys-
tems’ transformation and adaptation are rare to find, though the traditional fossil fuel
energy-rich countries in good times of high energy prices and even now, could have
created important common funds for common institutions like OPEC, GECF, EAEU,
that could have increased their ability to meet the new energy order challenges in a
much better way. The financial part of the Kyoto Protocol mechanism was also an
important attempt to provide financial backing for the envisaged transformation.
The decisions of the above mentioned G20 Global Summit on Financing Energy
Efficiency, Innovation and Clean Technology in Tokyo, June 2019 are a clear recent
example of moving in a proper direction. Access to more finance for energy trans-
formation in a sustainable way, is not only a problem for specialized classical and
new energy organizations, but also for the general competence global institutions as
well. The banking and the business community are all more involved in the energy
transformation activity, as the market realities demonstrate to what extent energy
efficiency investments or renewables investment, may happen to be profitable with
or even without the support of the regulator, which seemed unlikely only a decade
ago.
Transparency is fundamental for consensus building on energy transformation.
Practically all global energy organizations do contribute in one way or another to
increased transparency of the system by data collection, spreading of information,
preparing reports, undertaking analysis, and working on statistics. Some of them do
contribute more by preparing the regular comprehensive reports, like IAE or IRENA.
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Others make an additional contribution by a joint effort, like in the case of the recent
EnergyDataReport presented to theG20 to support energy policies that was prepared
by IEA in collaboration with IEF and IRENA (IEA 2018). However, some of the data
sources are still missing or considered as not sufficiently reliable, like in the case of
Iran’s nuclear facilities, or like in the case of the actual oil production facilities, or
CO2 country related emissions. On the spot missions, the way they are provided for
in the IAEA Treaty, could help to fill in the data gap. However, this mechanism is
missing both in specialized organizations as in the case of OPEC, or similarly in the
general Treaties, like in the Paris Agreement on climate change. More transparency
necessitates more trust and vice versa. On the other hand, digital data platforms,
modern systems of space tracking, and other technologies on the rise, as well as
intensified governmental cooperation, could help filling in the remaining gaps in
reliable data collection and verification.
Extended mandate of bodies that are set within the structures of international
organizations (Secretariats, Commissions, Councils) predetermines to a large extent
their governing role to build the future energy order. The downgraded role of common
bodies remains the weak point for global energy governance. The big problem is
that most of these bodies do not have enough competences to push forward the
concepts and ideas of the organizations they represent. Unlike in the EU, most of
the global energy governance bodies do have a very limited mandate. These energy
organizations do have Councils, Commissions, and Secretariats, but their mandate is
far from being so comprehensive and extended, compared to the one of the European
Commission—an executive body of the EU, for example. Most structures of the
energy organizations do not have the power of legal initiative, they can’t exercise
strict control over the policies of the member-states of the organization and they do
not have the power of enforcement or arbitration. Among other things, setting up a
kind of specialized Dispute settlement body for energy governance, the way it was
useful in trade within the WTO for many years before the current deadlock of trade
wars, seems to be a helpful move.
One can ask if this is rational or feasible at all for the energy organizations to have
a structure more or less similar to the EU structure? However, if we consider the
efficiency criteria and if we accept the fact that the EU energy policies could serve
as a model for other institutions, then the mandate of the other organizations should
be further extended.
Decision-making procedures represent yet another focal element for the success
of any governance system.Most of the energy governance organizations do have con-
sensus ruled systems. Reaching consensus for many countries is extremely difficult,
especially when you have as members, countries from different continents, with dif-
ferent traditions and policy priorities with developed or developing economies and
not least—energy abundant or energy-dependent economies. Thus, their interests
differ to a large extent, and finding consensus is difficult. It makes the governance
system slow to advance new decisions needed for the world. Consensus is easier to
achieve for ecology and climate change, as awareness of urgency and utility of action
is higher in these respective areas. Though, we know how difficult it was to reach
consensus at the time of Kyoto protocol, and more so during the Paris agreement. It
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is still more difficult to reach universal agreement on decarbonisation paths. Some
actors will not share the mere idea of decarbonization to the extent other countries
will consider that necessary.
Simplemajority or qualifiedmajority decision-making prevails in the EU, and that
is the reason that member countries are able to make so many important decisions for
economic cooperation between them. Moving away from consensus and organizing
the redistribution of votes between countries within the organization according to,
and in proportion with certain criteria, is not only the reality of the European Union.
For instance, in the IMF the voting power depends upon the financial contribution
to the Fund. It is true that certain decisions in the energy organizations are also not
made by the consensus rule. For example, the decision to accept a new member into
OPEC could be passed with a three-fourth majority vote. That is a way forward to
increasing the efficiency of decision-making in many global energy organizations
(and probably not only in the energy sector). Not all (that is not realistic), but at least
some decisions on specific issues relevant for the daily operation of an organization
should be passed on amajority vote procedure. That is becomingmore of a necessity,
taking into consideration that more energy-ecology-climate related problems require
faster, if not immediate solutions, and waiting a long time to reach a consensus would
be unacceptable where a decision is desperately needed.
Technology transfer lies at the heart of the global energy sector transformation.
Many organizations and conventions aim to support the increase in energy sustain-
ability by means of technological exchange. That is clearly a distinctive feature of
the emerging system of global energy governance. The Kyoto Protocol, the GECF,
the IEA, the IEF, the IAEA, the IRENA, and even OPEC, all of the existing energy-
related conventions and energy organizations do support, in an open and clearly
defined way, the transfer of advanced technologies as an important element to arrive
to a sustainable economy on the basis of sustainable energy. October, 2017 at the 2nd
General Conference of the IEA on technological cooperation, the main focus was to
identify opportunities for cooperation between the states in the exchange. TheWorld
Energy Council’s annual report on Innovation insights is an important toolkit for
countries wanting to navigate through the fast-changing innovation landscape. From
a tech point of view, it becomes feasible and clear, how to make the transition. For
instance, the IEA 2019 Report with guidance for policymakers on how to accelerate
the decarbonization of the power sector, shows a clear way forward to sustainable
energy. An additional point for consideration is the technical assistance procedures
that will facilitate the transfer.
If there is a political will, the financial ability (see above) and the technical fea-
sibility for the transfer, the one major remaining issue largely concerns the appro-
priate protection of intellectual property rights. If the matter relates to trade, there
are mechanisms within the WTO for the protection of intellectual property rights.
However, the multilateral trade governance system is currently in a mess. Does that
mean that the global energy governance should depend upon the system of global
trade governance? There should be a link, for sure. On the other hand, there should
be some institutions within the energy governance system to deal with the specific
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issues of protection of intellectual property rights. Alternatively, an intensified coop-
eration with the WIPO with appropriate legal arrangements could be an important
element of the secure transfer of advanced energy technology. The ambition could
be not dealing only with the one-way transfer of technologies from the West toward
the East, but increasingly on deals the other way around. Organizing the transfer
of technologies and safeguarding the protection of the related intellectual property
rights in a sound way, could be considered as a fundamental element of the emerg-
ing system of sustainable energy governance. The usage of the best practices and
an exchange of information in this regard is already strong and supported by many
energy organizations (IRENA, IEA).
Technical progress will make it possible to advance new secure and sustain-
able standards that humanity never dreamed of. Hydro-power and nuclear power
stations became that much more advanced that a small-scale production becomes
cost-efficient. Will we live to see the time when new global standards will set the
maximum size for the hydro or the nuclear power plants, in order to minimize the
environmental damage in event of the natural disasters, for instance? Bringing dif-
ferent security concepts together in an integrated global sustainable vision for the
technically advanced new energy order becomes a realistic scenario under certain
assumptions of the globalization of energy innovations.
Compliance and enforcement are at the heart of another critical issue for gov-
ernance. Enforcement procedures, which are strong in the EU, are practically non-
existent in the global energy governance institutions, and agreements (OPEC, GECF,
G20, Paris climate). The system relies on nationally driven systems. Though the legal
enforcement procedures and instruments of common control are weak in most global
energy organizations with rare exceptions (IAEA), stakes for non-compliance are too
high. Be it the consequences of non-compliance for climate change, or for nuclear
safety, or for security of energy supplies, or for stability of energy prices. In the
case of non-compliance with a tariff line in trading metals, or in another case of not
abiding fully with theWTO rules of origin for a product, a country or a company can
miss million or even billion-dollar deals. In the case of not-respecting the emissions’
quotas under the Paris agreement, or the OECD or IAEA nuclear safety standards,
humanity risks not only money, but people’s lives. This situation of high stakes and
high risks of energy governance non-compliance puts additional pressure on govern-
ments and companies, and puts forward the importance of a responsible attitude to
energy usages major decisions. Thus, the chances for higher compliance on critical
energy issues depend not only upon procedures and mechanisms within the energy
organizations, but also to a large extent on social, moral, and ethical aspects of high-
level officials in charge of the energy agenda. Conclusions on this point are left for
the readers.
Looking at the present system of energy governance one can suggest many more
things to come. According to the IRENA report “Global energy transformation—
roadmap to 2050”, “The challenge that policy makers around the world face, is how
to accelerate the transition. Transitioning from a global fossil-fuel powered energy
system, built-up over several hundred years, to one that is sustainable, will require
a much greater transformation than current policies envisage” (IRENA 2018). We
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fully share this opinion and will continue the efforts to suggest ways and means for
the transformation, to the benefit of all people concerned.
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